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Executive Summary 
 
According to the Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) the increased supply of Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), with a range of subordination, has broadened the 
investor base in real estate debt markets and reduced the commercial property sector’s 
dependence on bank financing  The CMBS market has been one of the most dynamic 
and fastest-growing sectors in the capital markets, for a market which was virtually non-
existent prior to 1990. The global CMBS market issuance which stood at AU$5.1 billion 
(US$4 billion)1 in 1990 had grown to AU$380 billion (US$299 billion) by the end of 
2006. In Australia, a total of over 60 CMBSs with nearly 180 tranches totalling over 
AU$17.4 billion had been issued to December 2006 from when they were first 
introduced in 1999. 
 
To date few studies have been done on Australian CMBSs outside the credit rating 
agency circles. These studies are predominantly practitioner focused (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2001; Richardson 2003; Roche 2000, 2002). O’Sullivan (1998) and Simonovski 
(2003) are the only academic studies on CMBSs. As such, this thesis examines issues 
relating to the development of Australian CMBSs and quantitatively and qualitatively 
analyses the structuring of Australian CMBSs. 
 
In assessing the growth of the Australian CMBS market, an interpretive historical 
approach (Baumgarter & Hensley 2005) is adopted to provide a cogent review and 
explanation of features of international and Australian CMBSs. This helps to understand 
the changing nature of the market and provides better understanding of the present and 
suggests possible future directions. 
 
The Australian CMBS market is matured in comparison with the larger US and EU 
CMBS markets as seen by the diversity of asset classes backing the issues and 
transaction types, tightening spreads, and record issuance volumes. High property 
market transparency (Jones Lang LaSalle 2006b) and predominance of Listed Property 
Trusts (LPT) as CMBS issuers (Standard & Poor's 2005b), who legally have to report 
                                                 
1
 For ease of comparison, the interbank exchange rates of US$1=AU$1.27 and EUR€1=AU$1.67 as at 
December 31, 2006 have been used. 
 
xx 
 
their activities and underlying collateral performance to regulatory regimes such as 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)/Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) and their equity partners, have contributed to the success of the Australian 
CMBS market. Furthermore, the positive commercial real estate market outlook should 
support future CMBS issuance, with LPTs continuing their dominance as issuers. 
 
In investigating property risk assessment in Australian CMBSs, all the CMBSs issued 
over a six year period of 2000 to 2005 were obtained from Standard and Poor’s presale 
reports as found in their Ratings Direct database to identify and review how property 
risk factors were addressed in all issues and within specific property asset classes 
following the delineation of property risk  by Adair and Hutchinson (2005).  
 
Adequate assessment of property risk and its reporting is critical to the success of CMBS 
issues. The proposed framework shows that assessing and reporting property risk in 
Australian CMBSs, which are primarily backed by direct property assets, under the 
headings of investment quality risk, covenant strength risk, and depreciation and 
obsolescence risk can easily be done. The proposed framework should prove useful to 
rating agencies, bond issuers and institutional investors. Rating agencies can adopt a 
more systematic and consistent approach towards reporting of assessed property risk in 
CMBSs. Issuers and institutional investors can examine the perceived consistency and 
appropriateness of the rating assigned to a CMBS issue by providing inferences 
concerning property risk assessment. 
 
The ultimate goal of structuring CMBS transactions is to obtain a high credit rating as 
this has an impact on the yield obtainable and the success of the issue. The credit rating 
process involves highly subjective assessment of both qualitative and quantitative 
factors of a particular company as well as pertinent industry level or market level 
variables (Huang et al. 2004), with the final rating assigned by a credit committee via 
voting (Kwon et al. 1997). As such, credit rating agencies state that researchers cannot 
replicate their ratings quantitatively since their ratings reflect each agency’s opinion 
about an issue’s potential default risk and relies heavily on a committee’s analysis of the 
issuer’s ability and willingness to repay its debt.  However, researchers have replicated 
bond ratings on the premise that financial ratios contain a large amount of information 
about a company’s credit risk. 
xxi 
 
 
In this study, quantitative analysis of determinants of CMBS credit ratings issued by 
Standard and Poor’s from 2000 – 2006 using ANNs and OR and qualitative analysis of 
factors considered necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues necessary 
for the success of an issue through mail surveys of arrangers and issuers are undertaken. 
 
Of the quantitative variables propagated by credit rating agencies as being important to 
CMBS rating, only loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is found to be statistically significant, with 
the other variables being statistically insignificant using OR. This leads to the 
conclusion that statistical approaches used in corporate bond rating studies have limited 
replication capabilities in CMBS rating and that the endogeneity arguments raise 
significant questions about LTV and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as convenient, 
short-cut measures of CMBS default risk.  
 
However, ANNs do offer promising predictive results and can be used to facilitate 
implementation of survey-based CMBS rating systems. This should contribute to 
making the CMBS rating methodology become more explicit which is advantageous in 
that both CMBS investors and issuers are provided with greater information and faith in 
the investment. ANN results show that 62.0% of CMBS rating is attributable to LTV 
(38.2%) and DSCR (23.6%); supporting earlier studies which have listed the two as 
being the most important variables in CMBS rating. The other variables’ contributions 
are: CMBS issue size (10.1%), CMBS tenure (6.7%), geographical diversity (13.5%) 
and property diversity (7.9%) respectively. The methodology used to obtain these results 
is validated when applied to predict LPT bond ratings. Both OR and ANN produce 
provide robust alternatives to rating LPT bonds, with no significant differences in results 
between the full models of the two methods. 
 
Qualitative analysis of surveys on arrangers and issuers provides insights into 
structuring issues they consider necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing 
issues necessary for the success of an issue. Rating of issues was found to be the main 
reason why investors invest in CMBSs and provision of funds at attractive rates as the 
main motivation behind CMBS issuance. Furthermore, asset quality was found to be the 
most important factor necessary to obtain a high credit rating supporting the view by 
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Henderson and ING Barings (1997) that assets backing securitisation are its fundamental 
credit strength. 
 
In addition, analyses of the surveys reveal the following: 
• The choice of which debt funding option to use depends on market conditions. 
• Credit tranching, over-collateralisation and cross-collateralisation are the main 
forms of credit enhancement in use. 
• On average, the AAA note tranche needs to be above AU$100 million and have 60 
- 85% subordination for the CMBS issue to be economically viable. 
• Structuring costs range between 0.1% – 1% of issue size and structuring duration 
ranges from 4 – 9 months. 
• Preferred refinancing options are further capital market issues and bank debt. 
• Pricing CMBSs is greatly influenced by factors in the broader capital markets. For 
instance, the market had literary shut down as a result of the “credit crunch” 
caused by the meltdown in the US sub-prime mortgage market. 
 
These findings can be useful to issuers as a guide on the cost of going to the bond 
market to raise capital, which can be useful in comparing with other sources of funds. 
 
The findings of this thesis address crucial research priorities of the property industry as 
CMBSs are seen as a major commercial real estate debt instrument. By looking at how 
property risk can be assessed and reported in a more systematic way, and investigating 
quantitative and qualitative factors considered in structuring CMBSs, investor 
confidence can be increased through the increased body of knowledge. Several 
published refereed journal articles in Appendix C further validate the stature and 
significance of this thesis. 
 
It is evident that the property research in this thesis can lead aid in the revitalisation of 
the Australian CMBS market after the “shut down” caused by the melt-down in the US 
sub-prime mortgage market and can also be used to set up property-backed CMBSs in 
emerging countries where the CMBS market is immature or non-existent. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Bonds provide an important mechanism by which firms obtain new funds to finance new 
and continuing activities and projects. Bond issuance has been recognised by Listed 
Property Trusts (LPTs) as an important debt funding tool. Newell (2007a) and PIR 
(PCA/IPD 2007a) show the growth in debt levels of LPTs from only 15% in 1997 to 
36% as at December 2006. Debt funding has been through direct bank borrowings and 
issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and unsecured bonds. For 
the period 1999 - 2006, bonds2 worth a total of AU$10.5 billion were issued by LPTs 
(Chikolwa 2008; Property Council Australia 2007). In contrast, the Connect 4 Company 
Prospectuses database shows that LPTs raised AU$18.2 billion in equity raisings, 
excluding initial price offerings (IPOs). Chikolwa (2007a) also shows that LPTs issued 
CMBSs worth AU$9.3 billion over the same period. 
 
In Australia, bond ratings are assigned by Standard and Poor’s (S & P), Moody’s 
Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. In this study, data on CMBS credit ratings is 
obtained from S & P, as it is the most widely used rating agency in Australia and 
publishes its CMBS credit ratings in the Property Australia magazine. The ratings 
inform the public of the likelihood of an investor to receive the promised principal and 
interest payments associated with the bond issue (Shin & Han 2001). The assigned 
ratings are important due to the implications they contain regarding the bond issue. 
Market yields correspond to bond ratings, which indicate an association between rating 
and risk. For instance, the success of an issue is dependent on obtaining a lower yield 
which is also influenced by high credit quality (Alles 2000; Kose et al. 2003). Issues of 
proprietorship have resulted in the methodology of rating mostly being shrouded in 
mystery. The methods and input variables used in rating are not fully disclosed to the 
public (Altman & Rijken 2006; Shin & Han 2001). As such, studies of the rating process 
are of interest not only to bond holders but also to investors. 
                                                 
2
 This excludes commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
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The credit rating process involves highly subjective assessment of both qualitative and 
quantitative factors of a particular company as well as pertinent industry level or market 
level variables (Huang et al. 2004) with the final rating assigned by a credit committee 
via voting (Kwon et al. 1997). Bond rating agencies assert that researchers cannot 
replicate their ratings quantitatively (Kim 2005) as they are the agency’s opinion about 
an issue’s potential default risk and that they rely heavily on a committee’s analysis of 
the issuer’s ability and willingness to repay its debt. However, researchers have still 
gone ahead and replicated bond ratings on the premise that the financial variables 
extracted from public financial statements, such as financial ratios, contain a large 
amount of information about a company’s credit risk (Huang et al. 2004).  
 
The primary reference for modelling bond ratings which has been utilised directly or 
with minor variations is the Kaplan and Urwitz (KU) (1979) model. The KU model uses 
financial ratios relating to leverage, coverage, liquidity, profitability, and size. Kamstra 
et al. (2001) state that financial variables are able to explain about two-thirds of a 
company’s bond rating. Traditionally statistical techniques such as multivariate 
discriminant analysis (MDA), multiple regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit 
models and more recently artificial neural networks (ANN) have been used to capture 
and model the expertise of the bond rating process. 
 
Maher and Sen (1997) show the following as reasons why predictability of credit rating 
is useful: 
- It provides a firm some insight into the cost of going to the bond market to raise 
capital, which can be useful in comparing with other sources of funds; 
- It can help investors decide where they want to place their money; 
- It can provide a modified form of implicit evaluation of the firm in addition to 
the explicit evaluation of the bond issue; and 
- It can provide an insight into factors useful in understanding the value of the 
firm. 
Furthermore, security analysts and investors can use these ratings as the primary source 
of obtaining information about the quality and marketability of various issues and assess 
also market risk premium attached to the bonds while investment bankers use the ratings 
for determining commission rates on undertakings (Kim 2005). 
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The following sections present an introduction to the development of Australian CMBSs 
as an investment and financing option and also factors considered in structuring CMBSs. 
1.1.1 Development of the Australian CMBS Market 
 
The CMBS market has been one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing sectors in the 
capital markets for a market which was virtually non-existent prior to 1990. The global 
CMBS market issuance which stood at AU$5.1 billion (US$4 billion) in 1990 had 
grown to AU$380 billion (US$299 billion) by the end of 2006 (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: CMBS Global Issuance (1999 - 2006) 
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Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert (2007) 
 
The US has been the market leader in terms of issuance volumes and diversity of asset 
classes backing the issues, with other regions replicating the US CMBS model to suit 
their local needs. In Australia, the description of CMBS has been expanded and accepted 
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in the market to include a form of securitisation backed by direct property assets (Jones 
Lang LaSalle 2001), in addition to the traditional definition of the securitisation of 
commercial mortgages (Jacob and Fabozzi, 2003). The market has undergone significant 
development since the first transactions came to the market in 1999, with a range of 
transaction types and issuers now accessing the market. The first CMBSs in Australia 
were done by Leda Holdings in 1999, followed by the Longreach/Qantas head office and 
the David Jones stores securitisations in 2000.  As at December 2006, a total of over 60 
CMBSs with nearly 180 tranches totalling over AU$17.4 billion had been issued, 
excluding credit lease transactions and small ticket transactions (Figure 1.2). Appendix 
A shows AAA-rated CMBSs issued between 2000 and 2006, representing 78% of total 
issuance. 
 
Figure 1.2: Australian CMBS Issuance by Sector(2000 - 2006) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
Over 2000 - 2006, diversified property backed issues3 had the most tranches at 31%, 
followed by retail property backed issues at 28% and office at 23%. The least number of 
tranches were in the industrial property backed issues at 18%. This is shown in Table 
1.1. 
                                                 
3
 These are property portfolios composed of different property types. 
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Table 1.1: Number of Tranches in Australian CMBS Issues (2000 - 2006) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2000-2006 % of Total 
Diversified 1 2 11 7 7 14 13 55 31% 
Industrial 4 3 6 12 4 3 0 32 18% 
Office 0 3 4 5 9 10 11 42 23% 
Retail 0 0 15 9 0 8 18 50 28% 
Total 5 8 36 33 20 35 42 179 100% 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
The growth of the CMBS market as a funding source and as an investment option is 
attributable to its advantages of lower pricing, improved liquidity, diversification of 
lenders, non-recourse to the parent company, release of value while retaining future 
growth potential, and off-balance sheet financing in comparison to bank financing. Jones 
Lang LaSalle (2001) illustrated the potential of CMBSs being a cheaper and alternative 
debt financing option for companies with property exposure. They further added that 
CMBSs offered investors advantages of insolvency remoteness, greater diversification, 
and greater transparency. Roche (2000), Blundell (2001) and Morrison (2001) also 
stated the advantages of CMBS over traditional bank financing as cost effectiveness, 
flexible arrangement, and longer repayment timeframes that closely match the long-term 
nature of property investment. The Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) also noted that 
increased supply of CMBS, with a range of subordination, has broadened the investor 
base in real estate debt markets and reduced the commercial property sector’s 
dependence on bank financing. 
 
Table 1.2 presents an overview of the Australian, US and EU CMBS markets. Further 
details of these markets are presented in Chapter 3. 
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Table 1.2: Overview of the CMBS Market in Australia, US and EU 
Feature Australia US EU 
Market Size: • AU$4.9 billion worth  issued in 2006; 7% of ABS mark et. 
• 65 issues with over 180 tranches, worth over AU$17.4 
bi llion were issued from 1999  to 2006 
• AU$261 bi llion ($US$206 bil lion) issued in 2006; 
around 40% of ABS market. 
• AU$1257 bi llion (US$990.7 bil lion) issued from 
1990-2006. 
• 80 transactions worth AU$108  b illion (€64.75 
bill ion) in 2006. 
• More th an AU$129 billion (€77 bi llion) was 
raised from 124 transact ions between  1997 and 
2004. 
Underlying Collateral: • Issuance backed by various sectors  between 2000 and 2006: 
office 36% (AU$5.2 bill ion), retail 31% (AU$4.5 bill ion), 
diversified 23% (AU$ 3.4 billion) and industrial 10% 
(AU$1 .4 billion). 
• Retai l and office backed issues dominant at 25% 
each in 2006. 
• Office 31%, retail  28% and mult i-family 23% in 
2006. 
    
Rating Tranche: • 67% in AAA category by 2006;  lower B-class t ranches 
becoming common. 
• Well matured market  with A-rated and B-rated 
notes  issued. 
• 60% in AAA category; AU$7.5 billion (€4.5 
bill ion) worth of non-investment  notes by 2005. 
    
Interest Type: • 68% float ing rate notes and 32% fixed  rate notes  in 2005. 
• 90% float ing rate notes and 10% fixed  rate notes  in 2006. 
• 81% floating rate notes and 12% fixed rate notes in 
2006. 
• 89% floating rate notes and 11% fixed rate notes 
between  2000 and April 2006. 
    
Tranche Distribution: • 95% single-borrower transactions 
• Only 1 conduit t ransaction by end of 2006. 
• 88% conduit/fusion transact ions and  12% large 
loans  in 2006. 
• 50% conduit /fusion transactions and 50% 
single-borrower transactions in 2006. 
    
Spread Trend s: • AAA 5-year spreads at 20-25bp over BBSW and BBB 5-
year spreads at 60-95bp in 2005. 
• AAA 5-year spreads 20bp wider and BBB 5-year spread s 
60bp wider in 2002. 
• Downward trend; average 10-year AAA conduit  
spreads at 30bp in 2006, a drop from 53bp in 2001. 
• Spreads t ightened by approximately 60% in the 
last three quarters of 2004. 
• AAA and BBB spreads narrowed from 160 bp 
to only 58 bp in 2005: a 64 % reduction. 
    
Performance: • 15% credit rating upgrades, 14% downgrades and 71% 
affirmations  in 2006. 
• 36% credit  rating upgrades, 1% downgrades  and 
63% affirmations in 2006. 
• 7.6% credit ratin g upgrades (highest of any ABS 
sub-sector; average for ABS 4.5%) and 4.8% 
downgrades  in 2004. 
    
Others features: • Secured mortgage structures used in all t ransact ions. 
• Typically 3-5 year n ote tenure. 
• Average deal size of AU$400  million for new issues in 
2006;  two large issues worth AU$1 bill ion and AU$900 
million in the last  two years.  
• True-sale structures dominate. 
• Typically 5-10 year note tenure. 
• Average conduit/fusion deal s ize of AU$3 bil lion 
(US$ 2.4 billion ) in 2006, up from AU$ 2.7 billion 
(US$ 2.1 billion ) in 2001. 
• 90% synthet ic and 10% true-sale structures in 
2004. 
• UK traditionally the d ominant  jurisdiction, 
accounting for 74% in 2004;  Germany is  rapidly 
catching up, with multifamily deals  making up 
23% of all CMBS and 29% of conduit d eals in 
2006.  
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A cogent review and explanation of features of international and Australian CMBSs 
helps to understand the changing nature of the market. Using the historical approach, a 
researcher endeavours to record and understand events of the past. In turn, 
interpretations of recorded history hold to provide better understanding of the present 
and suggest possible future directions (Baumgarter & Hensley 2005). As such, the 
evolution of Australian CMBS is analysed and compared to that of the US and EU. 
Detailed research on the CMBS market structure and issue details add to its promotion 
as major commercial debt fund instrument. 
1.1.2 Structuring Australian CMBSs 
 
The ultimate goal of structuring CMBS transactions is to obtain a high credit rating as 
this has an impact on the yield obtainable and the success of the issue. Credit rating 
agencies recognise the use of both quantitative and qualitative techniques in arriving at 
their CMBS credit ratings (Fitch Ratings 2005c; Moody's Investor Service 2001a). 
Further, some rating agencies and some researchers have emphasized the importance of 
subjective judgement in the bond rating process and criticized the use of simple 
statistical models and other models derived from artificial intelligence to predict credit 
ratings, although they agree that such analysis provide a basic ground for judgement in 
general (Huang et al. 2004). 
 
Qualitative judgement, which includes accounting quality, operating efficiency, 
financial flexibility, industry risk, and market position, is still difficult to measure. 
However, other researchers like Kim (2005) contend that most of these qualitative 
factors are likely to be reflected in quantifiable data such as financial and non-financial 
variables, and could be assessed indirectly from analysing these quantifiable data. 
Literature on bond rating prediction has demonstrated that statistical models and 
artificial intelligence models (mainly ANNs) achieved remarkably good prediction 
performance and largely captured the characteristics of the bond rating process. 
 
To obtain a deeper understanding of factors considered in structuring CMBSs, a 
triangulation approach is adopted in this thesis. Triangulation is broadly defined by 
Denzin (1978 :291) as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
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phenomenon”. Levy and Henry (2003) contend that a growing number of academics are 
now recognising the advantages of integrating both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods by way of triangulation. They further quote Kummerow (2000) who states: 
“My personal view is that qualitative and quantitative methods are 
complementary and that methodological mutual respect is as valuable as racial 
or religious tolerance. Not only are diverse methods interesting in themselves, 
combining methods may lead to greater understanding and better outcomes both 
in research and practice. Most real-world decisions would be improved by 
information from both qualitative and quantitative research”. 
 
In support of triangulation, Gallimore and McAllistair (2004; 2005) state that 
judgemental intervention is often a necessary and desirable element of the forecasting 
process and that subjectivity is intrinsic to the application of econometric methods. 
 
In this study, quantitative analysis of determinants of CMBS credit ratings using ANNs 
and ordinal regressions (OR) and qualitative analysis of factors considered necessary to 
obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues necessary for the success of an issue 
through mail surveys of arrangers and issuers are undertaken. Arrangers are defined as 
investment bankers responsible for structuring CMBSs.  Issuers or originators are 
commercial property owners seeking to use their properties as security for structured 
financing via CMBS issuance. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The previous segments have demonstrated the significance of CMBSs as a funding and 
investment vehicle internationally and in Australia. A background of how researchers 
have replicated corporate bond ratings has also been presented. This study endeavours to 
show the importance of Australian CMBSs as a commercial property debt funding 
instrument and to examine both quantitatively and qualitatively how Australian CMBSs 
are structured. 
 
As such, the objectives of this thesis are to: 
• Retrace the rapid growth of the Australian CMBS market and compare it with that 
of US and the EU; particularly focussing on market structure and issue details. 
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• Investigate how property risk assessed in Australian CMBSs over 2000 - 2005 can 
be reported in a more concise and systematic approach. 
• Investigate the use of ANN as a tool for predicting credit ratings of Australian 
CMBSs. Furthermore, to compare the predictive power of ANN models and OR 
models. 
• To investigate structuring issues considered necessary to obtain a high CMBS credit 
rating and pricing issues necessary for the success of a CMBS issue.  
 
The findings of this thesis address crucial research priorities of the property industry and 
are expected to have a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on CMBSs in 
Australia and internationally. 
1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS  
 
This thesis examines the development and structuring of CMBSs in Australia. As such, 
two themes, that is the development of the CMBS market and factors considered in 
structuring CMBSs, are the focus of this thesis. Each theme encompasses complete 
segments of introduction, literature review, research methodology, analysis and findings, 
conclusion and future research of each study. Each theme is structured in a way that not 
only forms a complete extensive study for a particular CMBS issue, but is also an 
integrated segment of the entire thesis. 
 
The first two common chapters (Chapters 1 and 2) lay down the foundation and research 
significance for the extensive analysis of the two CMBS research themes. Chapters 3 
and 4 are devoted to the development of the CMBS market, whilst Chapters 5 to 8 are 
for structuring CMBSs, respectively. The last chapter concludes the overall findings and 
property investment and financing contributions of this thesis. Several sections of this 
thesis have been published/presented in refereed property journals and international 
conferences. These published and presented research papers are found in Appendix C. 
 
The chapter-by-chapter organisation of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 presents the 
background of the development and structuring of CMBS. Chapter 2 provides an 
introduction to the Australian commercial property market, in particular its structure and 
performance and the available property investment and funding vehicles.  
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Chapter 3 provides an overview of commercial mortgage-backed securities, in particular 
its significance as a funding source not only in Australia but globally as well. Chapter 4 
outlines six case studies of Australian CMBSs to signify how the market has evolved 
and to show the diversity of the CMBS issues.  
 
Assessment of property risk in Australian CMBSs is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 
empirically tests the determinants of CMBS credit ratings, with similar tests done on 
LPT bonds in Chapter 7 to validate the methodology.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the data, results and analysis of surveys of issuers and arrangers of 
CMBSs. The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 9, summarises the conclusions and 
property investment and financing implications addressed in the previous chapters. 
Summaries of the overall contributions of this thesis, as well as limitations and future 
research are also presented in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTY MARKET 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The global commercial property market has been estimated to be close to AU$12.7 
trillion (US$10 trillion) and accounts for approximately 15% of global equity and 24% 
of global bond markets (RREEF 2007a; 2007b). Accounting for 2% of the world’s 
commercial property markets, Australia is the 11th largest commercial property market 
in the world (Hughes & Arissen 2005; UBS Real Estate Research 2006), with property 
fund managers in Australia having AU$357 billion in total assets as at December 2006 
(PIR 2006). 
 
This chapter highlights the significance of commercial property investment in Australia 
as an asset class for institutional investors. Particular attention is given to the size of the 
market and its performance and the available property investment and financing 
vehicles. This sets context for CMBSs as a commercial debt funding/investment 
instrument since Australian CMBSs are primarily a securitisation of direct property 
assets. CMBSs are analogous to straight corporate bonds which derive their value from 
the ability of the underlying asset to generate sufficient revenue to support debt 
payments (Maxam & Fisher 2001). Therefore, the performance of the direct property 
market has an impact on the ability to meet coupon payments on CMBS issues, to “tap” 
issues, and to refinance maturing CMBSs. 
 
Ghosh et al. (1997) conclude that financing decisions by REIT managers are influenced 
by their perception of the expected changes in the overall market, especially the real 
estate sector. As such, a review of the available commercial property financing and 
investment vehicles is important to show the stature of CMBSs in relation to other 
instruments and to show is growth potential. 
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2.2 AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Australian commercial real estate is a relatively small asset class in comparison with 
other mature markets such as the USA and EU. The USA commercial real estate market 
has been estimated at AU$6 trillion (US$4.7 trillion), whereas estimates for the EU 
commercial real estate market is at AU$4.1 trillion (US$3.2 trillion) (RREEF 2007a). 
Higgins (2007) estimates a value of AU$449 billion of which investment grade ‘core’ 
(retail, office and industrial) assets accounted for AU$232 billion as at December 2006 
(Table 2.1). Shown in Table 2.1 is the large involvement of institutional investors in the 
Australian ‘core’ commercial property market at 72% of market coverage.  
 
Table 2.1: Summary of the Australian Property Investment Market 
Sector Property 
investment 
market size total 
value (AU$bn) 
Institutionally 
owned property 
total value 
(AU$bn) 
Market coverage by 
institutional 
investors 
Core Property Sector    
  Office  $92 $64 70% 
  Retail  $87 $83 95% 
  Industrial  $52 $20 39% 
Sub-Total $232 $167 72% 
Non-core Property Sector $217 $11 5% 
Total $449 $178 40% 
 
Source: Higgins (2007) 
 
Growth in the Australian commercial property markets has been underpinned by strong 
economic growth, reflected in Australia being listed twelfth on the World 
Competitiveness Scorecard (IMD 2007) and ninetieth on the Global Competitiveness 
Index (World Economic Forum 2007) in 2007.  Real GDP is forecast to grow by 3.75% 
in 2007 - 2008, up from 2.5% in 2006 - 2007 (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). This 
has resulted in investors in indirect property being rewarded with strong returns with 
LPTs outperforming shares and bonds over a ten-year period to Q3:2007 (Table 2.2). 
Details are discussed under subsequent sub-headings for each asset class. 
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Table 2.2: Asset Class Performance: Australia: Q3:2007 
 
Source: PCA/IPD (2007b), UBS (2007) 
 
These strong returns have reinforced the importance of real estate as an asset class in its 
own right leading to sustained demand for real estate as evidenced by continued yield 
compression. Figure 2.1 shows yield trends in retail, office and industrial sectors from 
1991 to 2006. These trends are expected to continue due to the limited number of 
‘investment-grade’ properties (Murdoch 2004) and the large amounts of funds being 
allocated to property investment mainly by the superannuation funds (Newell 2006b). 
According to PIR (2007a) a 10% allocation to property translates to an investment of 
over AU$101 billion as of December 2006. Newell (2006b) estimated an average 10% 
allocation to property (either direct or indirect) by superannuation funds in 2005.  
 
Average Annual Return (%) 
Asset Class 1Y 3Y 5Y 10Y 
Direct property 17.3% 15.4% 13.6% 12.0% 
Office 20.0% 13.9% 11.1% 10.5% 
Retail 15.5% 16.9% 16.0% 13.3% 
Industrial 13.0% 13.0% 13.1% 13.2% 
 
    
LPTs 18.4% 19.7% 18.6% 15.2% 
 Office 18.9% 17.0% 15.4% 12.2% 
 Retail 17.6% 20.1% 18.8% 16.4% 
 Industrial 31.2% 26.9% 25.4% 19.0% 
     
Shares 33.6% 26.4% 19.6% 13.1% 
Bonds 3.1% 5.9% 5.6% 5.9% 
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The large amounts of funds being invested in property are not only particular to 
Australia but a global trend, with RREEF (2007b) estimating close to AU$762 billion 
(US$600 billion) invested globally in real estate during 2006, up 20% on the previous 
year. RREEF attribute this to strong investor appetite, strong rent growth prospects and 
tightening cap rate spreads to bond yields. Jones Lang LaSalle (2007c) found that 87% 
of Australian investors are seeking to increase their exposure to direct property (with 
only 4% seeking to sell), compared with 50% seeking to increase exposure to LPTs 
(with 15% seeking to sell). 
2.2.1 Office Market 
 
Commercial office stock in Australia totalled over 26.4 million square metres, with a 
market value estimate of AU$107.3 billion as at January 2007 (CB Richard Ellis 2007a). 
This comprises both CBD (70.3%) and non-CBD (29.7%) office stock. The 2006 office 
stock represents a 28.5% increase over 1990-2006. The largest office markets located in 
the CBDs of the five main Australian cities (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and 
Sydney) have over 200 prime buildings totalling 5.5 million square metres, accounting 
for 68.6% of Australian’s total office stock (PCA/IPD 2007a). The remainder is located 
in 14 secondary markets. A profile of the Australian office markets as of July 2007 is 
shown in Table 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Australian Direct Property Markets Yields 
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Source: JLL, and CFS Research (2006). 
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Table 2.3: Australian Office Markets Profile: July 2007 
 
Office Market Total Stock 
(m2) 
Vacancy 
Rate 
Percentage of Total 
Australian Office 
Stock 
Australian CBD Office 14,439,509 4.3% 70.25% 
Sydney CBD 4,762,478 5.6% 23.17% 
Melbourne CBD 3,629,350 5.9% 17.67% 
Brisbane CBD 1,744,698 1.2% 8.49% 
Canberra CBD 1,726,425 1.3% 8.40% 
Perth CBD 1,279,840 0.7% 6.23% 
Adelaide CBD 959,793 7.6% 4.67% 
Hobart CBD 336,925 1.7% 1.64% 
    
Australian non-CBD Office 6,115,146 6.0% 29.75% 
North Sydney 803,502 8.3% 3.91% 
Crows Nest/St. Leonards 356,992 10.2% 1.74% 
Chatswood 298,721 7.1% 1.45% 
Parramatta 608,826 8.2% 2.96% 
North Ryde 553,474 7.9% 2.69% 
Newcastle 218,655 7.0% 1.06% 
St Kilda Road 761,931 8.6% 3.71% 
Southbank 368,905 4.4% 1.79% 
East Melbourne 172,919 5.5% 0.84% 
Gold Coast 370,438 5.0% 1.80% 
Brisbane (near city) 822,702 1.3% 4.00% 
Adelaide (frame) 224,032 4.4% 1.09% 
Adelaide (fringe) 192,968 1.4% 0.94% 
West Perth 361,081 0.4% 1.76% 
Australia Office 20,554,655 4.8% 100% 
 
Source: PCA (2007) 
 
Within Asia Pacific, Australia surpasses other countries in the region, with modern 
office buildings in planned cities complementing a low risk business environment that 
provides access to a acknowledgeable and creative pool of skilled and multi-lingual 
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labour (Axiss Australia 2005). Table 2.4 presents some of the major Australian prime 
office buildings. 
 
Table 2.4: Major Australian Prime Office Buildings 
Floor Area 
(m2) 
Year 
Completed  
City Building Name 
84,500 1986 Melbourne Rialto, 505-535 Collins Street 
82,750 1987 Sydney Grosvenor Place, 205-235 George Street 
77,950 1991 Melbourne 101 Collins Street 
72,700 2000 Sydney Citibank Centre, 2-26 Park Street 
68,500 1978 Sydney MLC Centre, 19-29 Martin Place 
68,050 1991 Melbourne The Stock Exchange Centre, 530 Collins 
Street 
65,400 1991 Melbourne The Tower, Melbourne Central, 350-360 
Collins Street 
64,850 1992 Sydney Chifley Tower, 2 Chifley Square 
64,100 1991 Melbourne BHP Petroleum Plaza, 108-120 Collins 
Street 
63,800 1993 Perth Central Park, 152-158 St George Terrace 
47,170 2003 Perth Woodside Plaza, 240 St Georges Terrace 
 
Growth in the Australian office markets has been underpinned by strong economic 
growth, with Access Economics (2007) predicting white collar employment growth to 
be above 1.5% to 2011. 
 
Further, Australian office markets play a significant role for both national and 
international financial and business services with Sydney ranked 46 out a total of 50 
cities in CB Richard Ellis’ Global Market Rents Report of November 2006 (CB Richard 
Ellis 2006). Perth, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney also feature prominently among 
major Asia-Pacific cities in Jones Lang LaSalle’s Asia Pacific Property Digest (Jones 
Lang LaSalle 2007a). Generally, office markets across Australia have performed well, 
with record sales activity and rental growth in Perth and Brisbane. Over AU$3 billion 
(sales above AU$5 million) in office property sales occurred in Sydney and Melbourne 
in 2006, with a national average of 306,000m2 to be added to stock each year for the 
next five years. Strong office sales activity continued into the first quarter of 2007 with 
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total sales reaching AU$846.9 million and average net face rents growing by 16.6% to 
AU$490/sq m. Net effective rentals increased by 21% from AU$324/sq m. to 
AU$391/sq m. (CB Richard Ellis 2007a). 
 
Institutional investors have played a dominant role in commercial property investment, 
with a market coverage of 70% estimated at AU$64 billion in 2006 (Higgins 2007). Of 
the 3,982 properties valued at AU$223.4 billion in commercial property assets in 418 
property funds in Australia, the 149 office property funds account for 357 properties 
valued at AU$25 billion. Table 2.5 provides details of the major office property 
investors in Australia. 
 
Table 2.5: Major Office Property Investors: June 2007 
 
Investor Type Number of Properties Portfolio Value  
(AU$bn) 
Listed property trusts: office   
Investa1 34 $31.8 
Macquarie Office 42 $6.2 
Commonwealth Property 29 $3.5 
ING Office 23 $3.2 
Tishman Speyer 18 $1.6 
   
Listed property trusts: diversified2   
Stockland  32 $4.3 
Multiplex1 14 $2.5 
General Property Trust 39 $1.8 
Mirvac 18 $0.7 
DB RREEF 6 $0.6 
   
Unlisted property trusts   
GPT Wholesale Office Centre Fund 12 $2.2 
Australian Prime Property Fund 10 $0.9 
(1) Investa and Multiplex have since December 2007 been de-listed from the ASX following their acquisition 
by private equity consortiums led by Morgan Stanley and Brookfield Asset Management, respectively. 
(2) Only contribution by office properties to diversified portfolio is shown. 
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In particular, the LPT sector is the major contributor to office property in Australia, 
having both substantial Australian and international office property portfolios. Major 
office LPTs include Macquarie Office (AU$6.2 billion in total property assets), as well 
as office property making major contributions to the leading diversified LPTs, including 
Stockland (AU$4.3 billion in office property from AU$13.7 billion in total property 
assets). Pension funds in Australia typically access office property via the unlisted 
property funds, including the unlisted office property funds by major institutional 
investors such as Investa, Multiplex, GPT and Lend Lease which have multi-billion 
dollar office property portfolios (Table 2.5). Property syndicates targeting smaller 
investors seeking direct office property investment have also been set up. These are 
predominantly backed by large single office buildings or diversified property portfolios. 
Some of the major players with specialised office funds are Cromwell Corporation 
Limited (5 funds with 6 properties worth AU$201.3 million) and Becton Investment 
Management Limited (8 funds with 11 properties worth AU$246.0 million). 
 
Amongst the LPT sectors in Australia, the office LPTs accounted for 8% of the LPT 
market capitalisation as at December 2007 compared to retail LPTs (45%), industrial 
LPTs (11%) and diversified LPTs (36%) (UBS 2007). These office LPTs have adopted 
different office portfolio investment strategies, including 100% domestic office 
portfolios (Commonwealth Property), 100% international office portfolios (Tishman 
Speyer Office, Rubicon Europe, Rubicon America) and merged domestic/international 
office portfolios ( ING Office Macquarie Office). Most of the international office LPTs 
(Tishman Speyer: 53.3%) tend to have higher debt levels in comparison to domestic 
office LPTs ( Commonwealth Property: 26.1%). 
 
To further reinforce the significance of office property in Australia, Table 2.1 presents 
the average annual returns for one, three, five and ten year holding periods for the 
various asset classes at Q3:2007. Direct office property was the best performer over the 
one-year period of all direct property sectors, but the lowest performer over the five-year 
and ten-year periods. Low returns were also recorded for the office LPTs in comparison 
to the retail and industrial LPTs over the five-year and ten-year periods. However, office 
LPT returns were still higher than those of shares and bonds over a ten-year period.  
Despite the low return in comparison to other property asset classes, the office sector 
still attracts large capital inflows on the backdrop of strong economic growth and has 
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favourable current investor sentiment in the short-term and medium-term (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2007b).  
2.2.2 Retail Market 
 
The retail sector makes an important contribution to the Australian economy, being the 
largest employment sector (14.4% contribution) and the seventh largest contributor to 
GDP (5.8% contribution) in 2006 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). Australia’s recent 
robust economic performance resulted in a 6.9% retail sales growth a year to June 2007, 
largely driven by income growth. Retail sales are further predicted to grow at 6.3% in 
2008 (ANZ Banking Group 2007a, b). 
 
Importantly, a diverse range of retail property types are available in Australia. For 
example, Sydney retail comprises over 5.0 million m2, including shopping centres 
(68%), CBD retail (14%), bulky goods centres (15%) and retail strips (3%) (CB Richard 
Ellis 2007b). On a regional basis, the larger states of NSW (30%, including Sydney), 
Queensland (23%, including Brisbane) and Victoria (23%, including Melbourne) 
dominate the retail property landscape (UrbisJHD 2007). E-retailing has had minimal 
impact on retail patterns accounting for only 2 - 5% of retail sales in Australia (Ryder 
2004), US (Worzala et al. 2002) and UK (Dixon & Marston 2002), further reinforcing 
the importance of these retail property types.  
 
Institutional investors are major owners of retail property, with a market coverage of 
95% (Higgins 2007). LPTs/syndicates have been progressively increasing purchases of 
retail property from 70% of all real property purchases over 2001 - 2004 (Burdekin and 
Snoswell, 2004) to over 85% of retail property purchases in 2005 (CBRE, 2006). LPTs 
and property funds accounted for only 30% of purchases over 1993-1996.  
 
Table 2.6 provides details of the major retail property investors in Australia. Of the 
3,982 properties valued at AU$223.4 billion in commercial property assets in 418 
property funds in Australia, the 85 retail property funds account for 934 properties 
valued at AU$71.9 billion.  
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Table 2.6: Major Retail Property Investors: June 2007 
Investor Type Number of Properties Portfolio Value 
(AU$bn) 
Listed property trusts: retail   
Westfield 119 $43.1 
Centro Properties 810 $26.6 
CFS Gandel Retail 24 $6.4 
Macquarie CountryWide 252 $5.4 
Macquarie DDR 78 $2.6 
   
Listed property trusts: diversified (1)   
General Property Trust 25 $4.1 
Stockland 43 $4.3 
Mirvac 18 $0.7 
   
Unlisted property trusts   
Australian Prime Property Fund 11 $2.8 
GPT Wholesale Shopping Centre Fund 8 $1.9 
ING Retail Property Fund 18 $1.5 
Colonial Direct Property Investment Fund 5 $0.8 
 
Property syndicates 
Centro MCS(2) 105 $2.8 
(1) Only contribution by retail properties to diversified portfolio is shown 
(2) Includes 30 separate property syndicates as at 31 December 2006. 
 
In particular, the LPT sector is the major contributor to retail property in Australia, 
having both substantial Australian and international retail property portfolios. One major 
retail LPTs is Westfield (AU$43.1 billion in total property assets), which is the largest 
LPT/REIT in the world. Retail property also makes major contributions to the leading 
diversified LPT property portfolios, e.g. General Property Trust (AU$4.1 billion in retail 
property from AU$15.7 billion in total property assets) and Stockland (AU$4.3 billion in 
retail property from AU$13.7 billion in total property assets). Pension funds in Australia 
typically access retail property via the unlisted property funds, including the unlisted 
retail property funds of  major institutional investors such as GPT, Lend Lease and AMP 
which have multi-billion dollar retail property portfolios (Table 2.6). Smaller investors 
 21 
 
seeking direct retail property exposure are able to utilise property syndicates, with 
Centro MCS being the major retail property player in this property syndicates sector 
(Table 2.6). 
 
Amongst the LPT sectors in Australia, retail LPTs figure prominently, accounting for 
45% of the LPT market capitalisation as at December 2007 compared to office LPTs 
(8%), industrial LPTs (11%) and diversified LPTs (36%) (UBS 2007) These retail LPTs 
have adopted different retail portfolio investment strategies, including 100% domestic 
retail portfolios (CFS Gandel), 100% international retail portfolios (Macquarie DDR, 
APN European) and merged domestic/international retail portfolios (Westfield, 
Macquarie CountryWide). The higher gearing levels for retail LPTs (41.5%), compared 
to office LPTs (33.8%), industrial LPTs (35.6%) and diversified LPTs (32.6%) reflects 
the higher levels of international property in these retail LPTs (Newell & Peng 2007b).  
Higher gearing is used as a natural hedging strategy by LPTs with international property 
exposure (Tan Y.K. 2004a). 
 
To further reinforce the significance of retail property in Australia, Table 2.2 presents 
the average annual returns for one, three, five and ten year holding periods for the 
various asset classes at Q3:2007.  Direct retail property outperformed both the office and 
industrial property sectors, with retail LPTs being only outperformed by industrial LPTs 
over the five-year and ten-year periods. The share market, though, outperformed both 
the direct and indirect property markets a year to Q3:2007, with the bond market being 
outperformed by the direct property sector, LPTs, and shares. Newell and Peng (2007b) 
show that strong performance by retail property is not only particular to Australia but 
also in US and UK. Though the retail market has had strong performance, current 
investor sentiment for retail property in the short-term and medium-term is not as 
favourable as that for office property and industrial property (JLL, 2006b). 
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2.2.3 Industrial Market 
 
Industrial property is an important property sector in Australia, with core industrial 
property estimated to account for AU$52 billion (22.4%) of Australia’s core property 
assets of AU$232 billion (Higgins 2007) . With industrial property performance closely 
linked to economic performance, the strong GDP growth in Australia in recent years has 
seen enhanced stature and performance by industrial property.  Australia’s GDP grew by 
4.3% a year to June 2007 driven by the global commodities boom with businesses 
reporting the highest capacity utilisation since the late 1980’s.  Real GDP is forecasted 
to grow by 3.75% in 2007-2008 (Commonwealth of Australia 2007).  In 2007, the 
industrial sector was the second largest contributor to GDP contributing almost 
AU$98bn, 10%. However, the longer term trend is downwards (DTZ Australia 2007).  
As a result of this economic growth, Sydney industrial values increased by 10% - 15% 
per annum over ten years to June 2005 (JLL, 2005) and over AU$1.6 billion in industrial 
property sales occurred in 2005-2006; largely in Sydney (40%) and Melbourne (27%). 
In addition, 3.8M m2 of industrial property stock become available in 2006 (CBRE, 
2006). 
 
In the 2005/2006 financial year, over AU$1.75 billion was invested in the industrial 
market, an increase of 18.8% on the 2004/2005 financial year. The growing disparity 
between limited supply and rising demand has resulted in yield compression. Over the 
year to June 2006, prime industrial yields tightened by around 35 basis points to range 
between 6.75% and 8.50% nationally (CBRE, 2006). 
  
Industrial property has taken on increased importance in institutional property portfolios 
in recent years via a wide range of property investment vehicles; particularly listed 
property trusts and wholesale property funds. Table 2.7 provides details of the major 
industrial property investors in Australia, with over 1,250 industrial properties valued at 
over AU$17.9 billion in 68 property funds, including both sector-specific and diversified 
property portfolios (PIR, 2006 #655). Institutional investors are estimated to own 
approximately 39% of industrial property in Australia (Higgins 2007). 
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Table 2.7: Major Industrial Property Investors: June 2006 
Investor Type Portfolio Value (AU$m) 
LPT: industrial  
Macquarie Goodman $4,900 
ING Industrial Trust $2,398 
Macquarie ProLogis Trust $1,993 
JF US Industrial Trust $597 
LPT: diversified(1)  
DB RREEF $2,327 
Stockland $754 
GPT $365 
Mirvac $128 
Valad $126 
Wholesale property funds: industrial  
APPF-Industrial $258 
Colonial FS Direct-Industrial $196 
Macquarie Goodman Wholesale Fund $1,239 
Macquarie Goodman Wholesale Fund $800M 
Wholesale property funds: diversified(1)  
AMP Australian Core Property $307 
AMP Property Income Fund $223 
Deutsche Wholesale Direct Property $104 
Colonial FS Private Property Syndicate $101 
ISPT Core Fund $287 
Property syndicates  
Australian Unity (3 funds) $140 
Becton $132 
Investa (2 funds) $116 
Unlisted property funds  
Westpac $203 
APN $221 
Source: Newell (2007b) 
(1)
 Only contribution by industrial properties to diversified portfolio is shown 
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In particular, the LPT sector is the major contributor to industrial property investment in 
Australia, having over AU$13.7 billion in Australian and international industrial 
property assets (PIR, 2006 #655). Major industrial LPTs include Macquarie Goodman 
(AU$4.9 billion in total property assets) being the fourth largest LPT in Australia4 and 
ING Industrial (AU$2.4 billion), as well as the 100% US industrial property LPTs 
(Macquarie ProLogis and JF US Industrial). Industrial property also makes major 
contributions to the leading diversified LPTs, including DB RREEF (AU$2.3 billion in 
industrial property from AU$7.2 billion in total property assets, representing 32% of 
portfolio) and Stockland (AU$754 million in industrial property from AU$7.2 billion in 
total property assets, representing 10% of portfolio). 
 
Similarly, wholesale property funds have invested over AU$3.5 billion in Australian and 
international industrial property assets (Table 2.7), providing a major source of direct 
property exposure for superannuation funds in Australia. This industrial property 
exposure is achieved through sector-specific wholesale property funds (eg: Macquarie 
Goodman Wholesale Fund (AU$1.2 billion), APPF-Industrial (AU$258 million)) and 
diversified wholesale property funds (eg: AMP Australian Core Property (8% 
industrial), ISPT Core Fund (8% industrial) and AMP Property Income Fund (27% 
industrial). Macquarie Goodman have been particularly active, establishing two new 
wholesale industrial property funds (one Australian industrial property, one Hong Kong 
industrial property) in 2006 with total industrial property assets of over AU$2 billion. 
Smaller investors seeking direct industrial property exposure are able to utilise property 
syndicates and unlisted property funds (Table 2.7). 
 
Over 1985 - 2005 in Australia, industrial property had been the best performed property 
sector in 48% of years, compared to retail property (33% of years) and office property 
(19% of years), as well as industrial property being the worst performed property sector 
in only 19% of years (see Table 2.8). Industrial property also outperformed shares in 
52% of years over this 21-year period of 1985 - 2005 (IPD/PCA, 2006). Both direct 
industrial property and industrial LPTs delivered strong risk-adjusted returns over 
                                                 
4
 Largest US industrial REITs are Prologis (US$11.9 billion market cap; 4th largest US REIT) and AMB 
Property (US$4.2 billion) (NAREIT, 2006) 
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Q3:1995 - Q2:2006; being the best performed direct property and LPT sectors 
respectively (Newell 2007b). 
  
Table 2.8: Industrial Property Performance Analysis: Q3:1995 - Q2:2006 
Asset Class Average Annual 
Return 
Annual Risk Sharpe Index(1) 
Total property 10.87% 1.44% 3.70 
 Office   9.20% 1.32% 2.77 (3) 
 Retail 12.10% 2.25% 2.92 (2) 
 Industrial 13.68% 1.46% 5.60 (1) 
    
LPTs 13.62% 7.92% 1.02 
 Office 11.09% 7.59% 0.73 (4) 
 Retail 14.75% 9.70% 0.95 (2) 
 Industrial 18.56% 11.18% 1.17 (1) 
 Diversified 13.11% 9.44% 0.80 (3) 
    
Shares 12.87% 10.87% 0.68 
Bonds 7.20% 4.28% 0.39 
(1) Rank amongst property sectors and LPTs given in brackets  
Source: Newell (2007b) 
 
The future outlook for industrial property in Australia is positive, reflected in the strong 
economic outlook and the strong current investor sentiment for industrial property in 
both the short-term and medium-term; particularly for high-tech industrial and prime 
industrial property (Jones Lang LaSalle 2007b, c). 
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2.3 AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INVESTMENT AND 
FINANCING VEHICLES 
 
The Australian investment market was estimated to be around AU$6.1 trillion as at 
December 2006, with the Australian commercial property markets contribution at 5% 
(Higgins 2007). Details of this estimate are shown in Table 2.9 
 
Table 2.9: Australian Investment Market as at December 2006 
 Public Markets Private Markets 
Equity Assets Shares (AU$1,390 billion) 
-Listed Property Trusts (AU$136 
billion) 
Private Entities (AU$1,156 
billion) 
-Direct Property & Unlisted 
Property (AU$69 Billion) 
Debt Assets Traded Debt Securities 
(AU$2,659 billion) 
-CMBS and Property Trust Bonds 
(AU$12 billion) 
Bank Loans (AU$904 billion) 
-Whole Commercial Property 
Mortgages (AU$71 billion) 
 
Source: Higgins (2007) 
 
The commercial property investment market is further split at 67% equity and 33% debt 
of institutional-grade commercial property assets.  This is the opposite of USA 
commercial property market segmentation, which is split at around debt 70% and equity 
30% (Mirvac 2006). 
 
The following sections will briefly outline the characteristics of these main property 
investment and financing vehicles in Australia. 
2.3.1 Listed Property Trusts 
 
As at December 2006, the LPT sector had total assets of over AU$140 billion, 
comprising over 3,000 institutional-grade properties in diversified and sector-specific 
portfolios (PIR 2006). LPTs currently account for over AU$124 billion in market 
capitalisation, being the third largest sector on the stock market and representing over 
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10% of the total Australian stock market capitalisation, compared to only 5% of the total 
Australian stock market capitalisation in 2000 (UBS, 2007 #605). 
 
Figure 2.2: Growth in LPT Market Capitalisation: 1987 – 2006 
 
Source: Newell (2007a) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the growth in LPT market capitalisation since 1987. Significant growth 
has occurred since 1992, which has seen the LPT market capitalisation grow from AU$7 
billion to its current level of over AU$140 billion. Currently, there are a range of LPTs, 
including diversified LPTs (36%), office LPTs (8%), retail LPTs (45%) and industrial 
LPTs (11%) (UBS 2007). Unlike US REITs, Australian LPTs do not have multifamily 
property in their portfolios.  
 
Table 2.10 presents an overall profile of the leading diversified and sector-specific LPTs 
in the LPT sector as at December 2006. There are 32 LPTs in the top 300 companies on 
the Australia stock market, with 60 LPTs in total as at December 2006 (UBS, 2007 
#605). The largest LPTs include Westfield (AU$36.98 billion), Stockland (AU$11.33 
billion) and GPT (AU$11.43 billion), with some LPTs having in excess of 100 
commercial properties in their portfolios (DB RREEF, Macquarie Goodman, Westfield, 
Macquarie CountryWide, and Stockland).  
 
Currently, LPTs account for approximately 7% of institutional asset allocations and 
account for over 45% of all institutional-grade property in Australia. As Australia only 
accounts for 2% of the world’s commercial property, this sees Australia as the most 
securitised property market in the world (Hughes and Arissen, 2005). Approximately, 
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70% of LPT stocks are held by the major institutional investors, with LPTs being highly 
liquid stocks, having an annual LPT turnover of over 85% of the total LPT market 
capitalisation in 2006; this compares with a turnover of only 45% in 1999. 
 
Table 2.10: Leading LPTs as at December 2006 
LPT Market Capitalisation 
(AU$bn) 
Number of Properties 
Diversified   
GPT  $11.43 78 
Stockland $11.33 160 
Mirvac $5.43 60 
DB RREEF $5.06 176 
Multiplex $3.28 28 
Office   
Investa Property $3.83 34 
Macquarie Office  $3.01 41 
Commonwealth Property $2.38 29 
ING Office $1.79 23 
Retail   
Westfield $36.98 128 
Centro Properties $7.42 62 
CFS Retail Property $4.88 24 
Macquarie CountryWide $2.57 250 
Macquarie DDR $1.20 71 
Galileo Shopping America $1.20 127 
Industrial   
Macquarie Goodman $12.61 752 
ING Industrial $2.20 60 
Macquarie Prologis $1.08 125 
 
Source: UBS (2007), PIR (2006) 
 
Private equity is becoming increasingly interested in the property investment market, 
driven by the secure nature of income return and potential capital growth of holding 
property for the medium to long term (DTZ Australia 2007). In Australia, three LPTs 
have recently been acquired by private equity consortiums including Morgan Stanley’s 
purchase of Investa for AU$4.7 billion, Brookfield Asset Management’s bid of AU$4.3 
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billion for Multiplex and Prologis AU$1.4 billion buyout of the Macquarie share of 
Macquarie Prologis. Investa and Multiplex has since been de-listed from the ASX.  
 
LPTs have performed strongly compared to the other major asset classes over the last 
ten years, with LPT risk levels being significantly below stock market risk, reflecting the 
defensive characteristics of LPTs. Sector-specific LPTs have also typically 
outperformed the corresponding direct property sector.  
 
Typically, LPTs are not considered to be highly geared at an average gearing of 36% as 
at December 2006, although these debt levels have increased significantly from 15% 
gearing in 1997(PIR 2007a).  De Francesco (2007) show that LPT debt levels can be 
increased without taking on substantially more risk whilst enhancing returns. The yields 
for LPTs (currently 6.0%) make them attractive yield-focused investment alternatives to 
10-year bonds, although there has been significant yield compression for LPTs in 2005-
2006 (PIR 2007a).  The LPT sector also trades at a significant premium to NTA; this is 
unlike most other securitised property markets and reflects the quality of LPT 
management. 
 
LPT and stock market performance in Australia is correlated (r = .62 over 1985-2006) 
(IPD/PCA, 2007) and it has been shown that there is no long-term market integration 
between LPTs and the stock market (Peng, 2004; Wilson and Okunev, 1996, 1999; 
Wilson et al, 1998). This evidence of market segmentation suggests that there are 
diversification benefits from including LPTs in an investment portfolio, particularly in 
conditions of increased stock market volatility (Newell and Acheampong, 2001). Both 
diversified and sector-specific strategies are equally effective for LPT portfolio 
diversification (Newell and Tan, 2003). LPTs also show evidence of superior property 
selection and market timing (Peng, 2004). The establishment of an LPT futures market 
in August 2002 further enhanced the stature of LPTs, with institutions being able to use 
LPT futures as an effective risk management tool for hedging their LPT exposure 
(Newell and Tan, 2004a). 
 
Overall, LPTs have been seen to be a world-class indirect property investment vehicle, 
offering a range of attractive investment features and access to quality commercial 
property portfolios for both institutional and general investors.  
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2.3.2 Property Securities Funds 
 
Property securities funds (PSF) offer both retail and wholesale investors the opportunity 
to invest in a portfolio of property securities managed by professional fund managers, 
which allows the investor to achieve diversification across the spectrum of property 
securities (mainly LPTs) with reduced portfolio risk (Tan Y.K 2004). There are 128 
funds with 116,621 investors and AU$39 billion in funds under management, 
comprising wholesale PSFs (AU$26 billion), retail PSFs (AU$9.2 billion) and property 
securities mandate (AU$3.7 billion) (PIR 2007a). These PSFs include value-added 
funds, as well as index-based funds (Vanguard), with AMP Capital (AU$6.3 billion) 
being the dominant PSF manager. Table 2.11 shows the top ten PSF managers, who 
account for 69% market share. 
 
Table 2.11: Leading Property Securities Fund Managers: December 2006 
Fund Manager  Total Assets 
(AU$bn) 
% of Total  
Funds Under 
Management 
AMP Capital Investors Limited $6.3 23.4% 
Macquarie Bank Limited $3.2 11.9% 
BT Funds Management Limited $3.0 11.2% 
Colonial First State Investment Ltd $2.8 10.4% 
Vanguard Investments Australia Ltd $2.5 9.3% 
Lend Lease Corporation Limited $2.5 9.3% 
MLC Investments Limited  $1.8 6.7% 
APN Funds Management Limited $1.8 6.7% 
Legg Mason Asset Management Limited $1.7 6.3% 
UBS Global Asset Management (Australia) Ltd $1.3 4.8% 
Total $26.9 69.2% 
 
Source: PIR (2007a) 
 
A number of global PSFs, such as AMP, APN, Colonial First State, BT, RREEF, have 
been introduced reflecting the increased maturity in many global markets and the 
significant recent developments of REITs in Asia and Europe. 
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PIR (2007a) show wholesale PSF total returns of 18.02% - 29.31% (over 1 year) and 
15.71% - 19.1% (over 5 years), with retail PSF having total returns of 19.24% - 40.42% 
(over 1 year) and 13.93% - 23.63% (over 5 years). These high returns illustrate the 
strong appeal of PSFs as an investment asset class and funding tool. 
2.3.3 Direct Property Syndicates 
 
Direct Property Syndicates (DPS) are pooled property funds that can be invested in (via 
a fund manager) for approximately $10,000 to gain commercial property exposure. 
Typically, the grade of property in these syndicates is of lesser quality and value to that 
included in LPT portfolios. However, there is generally no market to trade the units in 
the property syndicate; hence there is no liquidity and the units are kept until the 
property is sold. Typically this is 5 - 10 years, during which time quarterly distributions 
are received. Some newer property syndicates are offering some limited liquidity as an 
exit strategy. 
 
As at December 2006, funds under management by DPS’s were AU$12 billion, with 
291 property syndicates comprising 99,107 investors and 586 properties (PIR 2007b). 
Table 2.12 shows some of the top DPS managers, who account for 68% of the total 
market share. 
 
Table 2.12: Leading DPS Managers: December 2006 
Fund Manager No. of 
Properties 
Total Assets 
(AU$m) 
% of Total  
Funds Under 
Management 
Centro Properties Group 100 $3,570 29.8% 
DB RREEF 28 $2,190 18.3% 
Cromwell 25 $970 8.1% 
Becton Investment Management Ltd 46 $630 5.3% 
Australian Unity Property Limited 35 $408 3.4% 
SAITeysMcMahon 18 $355 3.0% 
Total 252 $8,123 67.7% 
 
Source: PIR (2007) 
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Jones Lang LaSalle (2003), Upton (1998) and Glanville (1987) show the advantages and 
disadvantages of investing in property syndicates. The advantages include high initial 
yields, substantial tax benefits, higher gearing levels and access to varied forms of 
property investment. The risks associated with syndicates include limited diversification 
in individual syndicates, higher asset risk profile, relative illiquidity and a higher fee 
burden. 
2.3.4 Unlisted Retail Property Funds 
 
These are prospectus (Product Disclosure Statement) based funds open to retail and 
private investors (an unlisted property trust). Investment strategy centres on the 
ownership of property. These trusts are ‘open-ended’ and can raise additional capital to 
fund subsequent property acquisitions when required (PIR 2007b). 
 
There were 92 funds with 48,182 investors and AU$7.1 billion in funds under 
management as at December 2006. The number of properties held is the second largest 
of all managed funds at 1,009 (PIR 2007a). The market is dominated by Multiplex 
Capital (AU$1,419 million) and SAITeysMcMahon Property Limited (AU$946.1 
million), who together have a market shares of 33%. Table 2.13 shows the top ten 
unlisted retail fund managers, who account for 72% of market share. 
 
Table 2.13: Leading Unlisted Retail Fund Managers: December 2006 
Fund Manager Total Assets 
(AU$m) 
% of Total Funds 
Under Management 
Multiplex Capital $1,419 20.0% 
SAITeysMcMahon Investments Limited $946 13.3% 
Westpac Funds Management Limited $509 7.2% 
APN Funds Management Limited $382 5.4% 
Abacus Funds Limited $367 5.2% 
Property Funds Australia Limited $334 4.7% 
Trinity Funds Management Limited $317 4.5% 
Lachlan REIT Limited $273 3.8% 
Australian Unity $268 3.8% 
James Fielding Funds Management Limited $259 3.6% 
Total $5,074 71.5% 
Source: PIR (2007a) 
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Unlisted retail funds have played a pivotal role in the establishment of property funds in 
non-traditional or emerging property sectors of self-storage (APN, Abacus), retirement 
(Australian Property Custodian), childcare (SAITeysMcMahon), leisure (James 
Fielding), healthcare (Australian Unity, SAITeysMcMahon) and agriculture (Colonial 
First State Global Asset Management) (Newell & Peng 2006). 
2.3.5 Unlisted Wholesale Property Funds 
 
Unlisted wholesale property funds account for AU$39 billion in total assets, comprising 
557 institutional-grade commercial properties in their portfolio (PIR 2006).  Table 2.14 
gives the leading unlisted wholesale property funds, highlighting the significance of 
AMP Capital (AU$8.7 billion) and QIC (AU$6.0 billion), with these top ten unlisted 
wholesale property fund managers accounting for an 86.9% market share of the unlisted 
wholesale property fund sector. 
 
Table 2.14: Leading Unlisted Wholesale Fund Managers: December 2005 
Fund Manager Total Assets 
(AU$m) 
% of Total Funds Under 
Management 
AMP Capital Investors Limited $8,680 22.3% 
QIC Real Estate Funds Pty Ltd $6,045 15.5% 
Colonial First State Property $5,191 13.3% 
ISPT Pty Limited $3,985 10.2% 
Lend Lease Corporation Limited $3,479 8.9% 
DB RREEF Funds Management Limited $1,624 4.2% 
Eureka Funds Management Limited $1,519 3.9% 
Macquarie Bank Limited $1,468 3.8% 
ING Management Limited $1,100 2.8% 
Valad Commercial Management Limited $805 2.1% 
Total $33,896 86.9% 
Source: PIR (2006) 
 
Superannuation funds are major contributors to the unlisted wholesale property funds, 
seeking significant long-term exposure to quality commercial property portfolios and 
focusing on total returns. The major unlisted wholesale property funds are shown in 
Table 2.15, with several major players having diversified and sector specific wholesale 
funds. Limited liquidity is available with these unlisted wholesale funds. 
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Table 2.15: Leading Unlisted Wholesale Funds: December 2005 
Fund Manager Total Assets 
(AU$m) 
% of Total Funds 
Under Management 
AMP Australian Core Property Portfolio $4,106 10.5% 
QIC Property Fund $4,104 10.5% 
ISPT Core Fund $3,286 8.4% 
APPT-Retail $2,292 5.9% 
GPT Wholesale Shopping Centre $2,100 5.4% 
AMP Wholesale Shopping Centre $1,992 5.1% 
QIC Shopping Centre $1,941 5.0% 
Deutsche Wholesale Office $1,624 4.2% 
AMP Wholesale Office $1,600 4.1% 
Macquarie Goodman Wholesale Fund (Aust) $1,239 3.2% 
 $24,284 62.3% 
 
Source: Newell (2007c) 
 
Significant growth is expected in these unlisted wholesale funds, as superannuation 
funds seek to increase their exposure to property with the increase level of capital flows 
in superannuation funds in Australia. Recently, this has seen a number of institutional 
investor expand their offerings on unlisted wholesale property funds (GPT, Westfield, 
Stockland and DB), as well as international property also being included in unlisted 
wholesale property funds (ISPT) (Newell 2007c). 
 
Whilst LPTs delivered the highest annual average returns over Q3:1995 - Q4:2006 
(13.67%), wholesale property funds gave strong returns (10.62%) at a low level of risk 
(1.59%), seeing wholesale property funds being the second best performed on a risk-
adjusted return basis (via Sharpe index); only exceeded by direct property and out-
performing both LPTs and shares (Newell 2007c). 
2.3.6 Unlisted Hybrid Property Funds 
 
A hybrid fund is defined as a fund which targets a portfolio composition comprising a 
majority allocation (up to 85%) to direct property assets, with the balance incorporating 
an allocation to indirect property through ownership of unlisted and listed property 
securities. Essentially, hybrids are positioned between direct property funds and property 
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securities funds. Clearly hybrids have the potential to offer a broad range of 
diversification options, subject to double layering of fees. Some of the characteristics of 
several hybrid property trusts operating in the market are shown in Table 2.16. 
 
Table 2.16: Characteristics of Hybrid Property Trusts  
Fund  Gross 
Assets 
(AU$m) 
Gearing 
(%Total 
Assets) 
Target 
Direct 
Property 
Allocation 
Direct 
Property 
Allocation 
Direct 
Property 
Sector 
The Diversified P.F. $838 37% 20-95% 74% Diversified 
Macquarie P.F. $453 40% 50-90% 81% Office 
Westlawn Property Trust $300 50% n/a 87% Diversified 
Investa Diversified 
Office Fund $214 44% n/a 66% Office 
Reed Property Trust $100 58% 70%% 96% Retail 
Charter Hall Diversified 
P.F. $90 69% 80% 98% 
Diversified 
APN Direct P.F. $43 0% 20-75% 29% Diversified 
WRF Property Fund $38 53% ~80% 89% Diversified 
 
Source: PIR (2007b) 
2.3.7 Direct Financing 
2.3.7.1 Mezzanine Funds 
 
Mezzanine property lenders supply the layer of funding that bridges the gap between the 
first mortgage (senior debt) and a developer’s or investor’s own equity (Chu & Lonegan 
2006; Psaltis & Evans 2002). There has been a rapid growth in recent years in funding 
of property and construction projects both world-wide and in Australia. In Australia, 
non-residential construction finance commitments totalled AU$18.2 billion in the twelve 
months to September 2005, up from AU$8 billion recorded five years earlier. Mezzanine 
debt lending was estimated at around AU$15 billion to AU$22 billion for the year 2005, 
which was equivalent to 5% of the total construction lending market in Australia. This 
compares with 10% to 15% estimated in the USA (Mirvac 2006). 
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The use of mezzanine finance to fund property development projects in Australia is 
fraught with much controversy surrounding it after the collapse of several high profile 
projects such as Wespoint, Fincorp and Australian Capital Reserve. This has led the 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) issuing consultation papers to 
increase disclosure in unlisted and unrated debentures aimed at protecting retail 
investors (Australian Securities & Investments Commission 2007). 
 
Chu and Lonegan (2006) show how the two commonly used methods of measuring the 
capital structure occupied by mezzanine finance used in development, loan-to-cost ratio 
(LCR) and loan-to-value ratio (LVR) using the value to the completed project do not 
capture all the inherent risks involved in property development. LCR ignores market risk 
and thus overstates LVR. Market conditions could deteriorate at the time the property is 
completed and land is acquired at a significant discount to what would otherwise be 
considered to be market value. LVR arrived at using the value of a completed project 
can severely understate the slice of the capital structure occupied by mezzanine finance 
because it does not explicitly allow for risk that the owner’s forecast of sale price or 
independently estimated value of the development may not be achieved upon 
completion. 
2.3.7.2 Bank Lending 
 
As at December 2006, total commercial property exposure by all banks was AU$117.4 
billion, with 0.4% and 0.2% classified as nonperforming and impaired5, respectively 
(APRA 2007a; Reserve Bank of Australia 2006). Banks have generally been reluctant to 
securitise their commercial property loans due to the low default rates as shown in Table 
2.17. Levels of bank lending to the commercial property market have an impact on the 
development of indirect public debt and equity funding/investment instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Assets on which payments are in arrears by more than 90 days or otherwise doubtful and the amount due 
is not well covered by the value of collateral. The remainder of these assets were in arrears, but were well 
covered by collateral. 
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Table 2.17: Australian Commercial Bank Property Exposure – September 2007 
Sector Commercial 
Property 
Exposure- All 
Banks (%) 
Share of Total 
Commercial Lending 
(%)♣ 
Impaired Assets 
Share of 
Commercial 
Property Exposure 
(%) 
Office  26.1 7 0.1 
Retail  18.3 4 0.1 
Industrial  11.2 3 0 
Land 
Developments/subdivisions 11.8 N/K N/K 
Residential  15.6 7 0.4 
Tourism and leisure  4.4 2 0.1 
Other  12.6 3 0.2 
Total 100 27 0.2 
♣As at March 2007. N/K: Not known. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2007); APRA (2007a) 
 
Banking lending for commercial property investment has been buoyant recently, 
increasing by 27% over the year to March 2007, with lending to the industrial property 
market growing by 31% (Reserve Bank of Australia 2007). This is attributable to the 
strong property performance supported by improving business climate. Prime office 
property prices rose by 22% over the year to December 2006, the strongest annual 
growth since December 1988, while industrial property prices rose by 12% over the 
same period. The NAB Business November 2007 Survey (National Australia Bank 
2007) states that business conditions remain at record levels despite financial market 
turbulence and that though confidence has edged down, it is still at robust levels.  
 
With strong commercial property market performance and business climate expected to 
continue in the medium to short term, bank lending to the commercial property market is 
expected to be favourable. Banks though are implementing prudent lending practices in 
conformity with the Basel II Accord (APRA 2007b; The Economist 2005) which 
requires maintenance of adequate capital reserves and undertaking more credit 
assessment of pledged assets. 
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2.3.8 Mortgage Funds 
 
A mortgage fund is a straight forward trust which holds a portfolio of mortgages over 
property assets. The security is normally by way of a mortgage giving the unit holder 
first priority over the assets in the event of default. The objective of mortgage trust is 
generally to provide stabilised and relatively low-risk income to the investor which is 
derived from the loan interest payments from the borrower (PIR 2005).  There are two 
main types of mortgage funds: 
 
i) Pooled Mortgage Scheme: A fund that pools together investors’ monies to 
invest in a diversified range of approved mortgages over property. Generally 
first mortgages. 
ii) Select Mortgage Scheme: A fund in which the investor invests in a specific 
mortgage chosen by the investor. Borrowers and lenders are matched. 
 
As at December 2006, there were 104 mortgage funds with 162,310 investors and 
AU$24.7 billion in total assets (PIR 2006). 
2.3.9 CMBSs and LPT Bonds 
2.3.9.1 CMBS 
 
The Australian CMBS market for has been one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing 
capital market sectors (Richardson 2003). The market has undergone significant 
development since the first transactions came to the market in 1999, with a range of 
transaction types and issuers now accessing the market. The first CMBSs in Australia 
were done by Leda Holdings in 1999, followed by the Longreach/Qantas head office 
securitisation and the David Jones stores securitisation in 2000.  To date, a total of over 
60 CMBSs with nearly a 180 tranches totalling over AU$17.4 billion have been issued. 
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Figure 2.3: Australian Annual ABS/MBS/CMBS Issuance Volumes 
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Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006a) 
 
The overall cumulative Australian CMBS issuance since 1999 reached AU$17.5 billion 
at the end of 2006. In 2006, a record number of new issues exceeding AU$4.9 billion 
were issued, passing the earlier issuance record year of 2002 (AU$3.7 billion)(Standard 
& Poor's 2007c). The years 2003 and 2005 produced issues of over AU$2 billion per 
year. In 2004, there was a slight fall in issuances to AU$1.6 billion. Figure 2.3 shows the 
volumes of CMBS issuance since 1999 in dollar amount and number of issues per 
annum. It also shows the size of the CMBS issues in relation to the overall asset backed 
securities market. The total ABS issuance in the year 2006 was AU$70 billion, of which 
the CMBS sub-market accounted for 7%. This represents a significant leap from 2% of 
the AU$14.4 billion ABS total issuance in 1999 (Fitch Ratings 2007b). 
 
Further details on Australian CMBS market are presented in the chapter 3. 
 
2.3.9.2 LPT Bonds 
 
Bonds provide an important mechanism by which firms obtain new funds to finance new 
and continuing activities and projects. Bond issuance has been recognised by Listed 
Property Trusts (LPTs) as an important debt funding tool. The total cumulative LPT 
bond issuance volume from 1999 to December 2006 reached AU$10.5 billion, with a 
total of 87 issues as shown in Figure 2.4. Generally, annual LPT bond issuance has 
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remained stable at around AU$1.5 billion, with the exception of 2003 when issuance 
nearly reached AU$2.8 billion. LPT bond issuance as a funding source can be compared 
to LPT equity raisings, excluding initial price offerings (IPOs). Although LPTs have 
raised more funds through issuing additional securities (AU$18.2 billion), bond issuance 
has featured prominently as well at an average of 65% of equity raisings. For instance in 
2006, LPTs issued bonds worth AU$1.7 billion and raised AU$2.2 billion through 
issuance of additional securities. 
 
Figure 2.4: Australian LPT Bond Issuance and Equity Raisings Excluding. 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines and Connect 4 Company 
Prospectuses database (1999-2006) 
 
To further emphasise the importance of issuance of bonds by LPTs as a funding source, 
LPT bond issuance is compared to the issuance of CMBSs which is dominated by LPTs 
(Chikolwa 2007a; Standard & Poor's 2005b)6 from 2000 to 2006; see Table 2.18. 
Although more funds have been raised via CMBS (AU$14.3 billion) than LPT bonds 
(AU$10 billion), more LPT bonds (total number issued 85) have been issued in number 
than CMBSs (total number issued 66). Furthermore, in some certain years (2001 and 
2003) more funds where raised via LPT bonds than CMBS issuance. 
 
                                                 
6
 Listed Property Trusts have a 65% CMBS market share. 
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Table 2.18: Australian LPT Bond Issuance and CMBS Issuance: 1999 – 2006 
 
AU$m No. of Issues AU$m No. of Issues
2000 $357 2 $100 1
2001 $1,320 5 $1,615 12
2002 $2,845 19 $1,570 12
2003 $2,191 14 $2,792 28
2004 $1,513 7 $905 9
2005 $2,102 8 $1,320 12
2006 $4,013 11 $1,650 11
Total $14,340 66 $9,952 85
CMBS Issuance LPT Bond IssuanceYear
 
Source: CMBS issuance: Chikolwa (2007a); LPT bonds: Author’s compilation from various Property 
Australia magazines (1999 - 2006) 
 
The Australian LPT bond market has remained competitive in comparison to their US 
equivalent, REITS unsecured debt offerings, with the two countries showing its increase 
in importance as a debt funding source. Table 2.19 shows LPT bond issuance and US 
REIT unsecured debt offerings by value and number from 1999-2006.  
 
Table 2.19: Australian LPT Bond Issuance and US REITS Unsecured Debt 
Offerings: 1999 - 2006 
Year
AU$m No. of Issues AU$m No. of Issues
1999 $500 2 $10,337 69
2000 $100 1 $9,117 70
2001 $1,615 12 $12,864 44
2002 $1,570 12 $13,830 71
2003 $2,792 28 $14,163 68
2004 $905 9 $22,499 97
2005 $1,320 12 $21,230 105
2006 $1,650 11 $32,841 82
Total $10,452 87 $136,880 606
US$1 = AU$0.7692 as at 31 December 2006
LPT Bonds US REIT Unsecured Debt Offerings
 
Source: LPT bonds: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999 - 2006); US 
REITS: NAREIT website 2007 
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Figure 2.5 shows the top 10 LPT bond issuers who command a 93% market share and 
have issued bonds worth a combined total of AU$9.8 billion from 1999 - 2006. Major 
players in the LPT bond market include GPT (AU$2.8 billion), Westfield (A$1.5 
billion), Stockland (AU$1.4 billion) and CFS Gandel Retail Trust (A$1 billion).  
 
Figure 2.5: Top 10 Australian LPT Bond Issuers: 1999 - 2006 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999 - 2006) 
 
An interesting feature is that of the top 5 LPT bond issuers, only the Investa Property 
Group have issued CMBSs with the remaining preferring only LPT bond issuance. 
Further, of the top 5 LPT bond issuers, Westfield, General Property Trust and Stockland 
are in the UBS Leaders 300 Index, emphasizing their ability to use their balance sheet to 
back bond issuance. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows an inverse relationship between industry spread to swaps and 10-year 
government bond rates; as 10-year government bonds rates rise, industry spread to 
swaps tighten and vice versa. Generally, 1 - 3 year LPT bonds have been priced at 2 - 
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3bp above 5 year LPT bonds. There are no marked differences in swaps between 5 year 
and above LPT bonds. 
 
Figure 2.6: Australian LPT Bond Industry Spread to Swap and 10-Year 
Government Bond Rates: April 2003 - October 2006 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999 - 2006) and RBA  
 (2007) 
 
The sub-prime mortgage market events in the US are having an impact on the global 
bond markets and may have an impact on the refinancing prospects for maturing LPT 
bonds. Figure 2.7 presents the maturity profile of all the LPT bonds issued between 1999 
and 2006. Nearly AU$3.3 billion worth of LPT bonds are maturing in 2007 - 2008, of 
which 45.9% are BBB rated bonds. As investors require greater compensation to invest 
in BBB rated bonds, refinancing will become more expensive. 
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Figure 2.7: Australian LPT Bond Maturity Profile 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999 - 2006) 
  
The macroeconomic outlook for the Australian market remains benign, with historically 
low unemployment rates and a low interest environment expected to continue. However, 
liquidity and valuation issues surrounding securitised debt backed by sub-prime 
mortgages in the US home market has resulted in the ‘credit crunch’ in the global 
financial system due to an increased perception of risk on the part of lenders. This has 
resulted in higher spreads on securitisable financial receivables and unsecured debt 
offerings.  
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2.4 SUMMARY 
 
The future outlook of various property sectors is positive with large capital inflows 
being directed towards the asset class. At the backdrop of the strong commercial 
property market performance is the growth of various funding sources and investment 
options showing the maturity of the market. Funding and investment options ranging 
from unlisted property trusts, LPTs, mortgage funds, property securities funds, direct 
lending, CMBS and LPT bonds, cater both retail and wholesale investors. 
 
The maturing nature of the LPT market has seen the increased sophistication of LPT 
debt management. Intense competition and pressure to add value to LPT returns have 
required LPT managers to be more sophisticated in capital and debt management 
(Blundell 2001). A range of sophisticated debt products including CMBS, property trust 
bonds, hybrids and off-balance sheet financing are being utilised. In particular, usage 
among major commercial property owners, such as LPTs, of CMBS as funding source 
continues to grow. As such, the next chapter reviews the principles behind CMBSs and 
CMBS market activity in US, Europe, Asia and Australia. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES 
 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Since Australian CMBSs are predominantly a form of securitisation of direct property 
assets (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001), overviews of the Australian commercial property 
market and the various commercial property funding vehicles are important as covered 
in the previous chapter. CMBSs are one of the many commercial property funding tools 
and investment options.  
 
As such the purpose of this chapter is to present the principles behind CMBS and its 
significance as a funding source internationally and in Australia. CMBS market activity 
in the US and EU is reviewed as 97% of all global CMBS issuances in 2006 occurred in 
the two regions (Commercial Mortgage Alert 2007). In addition, market activity in Asia 
is reviewed to show the stature of the Australian CMBS market in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Other regions are not reviewed due to lack of data. 
3.2 PRINCIPLES BEHIND COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES 
 
Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) or asset securitization, of which CMBS is a sub-class,  
is a creative financing arrangement whereby debt instruments backed by assets such as 
mortgages, cash flows generated from the assets, are issued and offered for investment 
purposes in the capital markets (Ong et al. 2000). Alles (2001) defines asset 
securitisation as a process where ill-liquid assets owned by a financial institution, are 
pooled and sold in the legal or economic sense, to a third party referred to a special-
purpose vehicle (SPV). The legal transfer or separation of the asset to an SPV that issues 
bonds is the key feature that distinguishes an asset securitization arrangement from the 
traditional mortgage-backed or collateralised bond issues. A generic depiction of the 
process involved in structuring an asset-backed security is graphically shown in Figure 
3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Structured Finance: Key Market Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements (2005) 
 
In Australia, the description of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) has 
been expanded and accepted in the market to include a form of securitisation of direct 
property assets (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001), in addition to the traditional definition of the 
securitisation of commercial mortgages (Jacob & Fabozzi 2003). Securitisation has 
further been extended to non-traditional asset classes such as retirement villages, leisure 
parks, nursing homes, self-storage and infrastructural assets such as toll roads, utilities, 
airports, power stations, wind farms, healthcare facilities, education facilities, and 
correctional facilities. Chikolwa (2007c) shows how ABS can be used as a funding 
source by developing countries for infrastructural projects. 
 
Credit enhancement is undertaken to act as a “ring-fence” around the assets to avoid 
insolvency and also results in a higher rating of the bonds issued. The new obligations 
are of different form than the assets- different maturity, currency, security, or interest 
rate-and because of this difference are more attractive to investors. The differences are 
often related to credit ratings. The theory of why ABS works is that the sum of parts is 
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greater than the whole (Partnoy 1999). As a result, transaction risks amongst many 
investors in several classes of securities known as tranches can be spread (Geltner & 
Miller 2001). The credit quality of the security is directly related to the yield of the 
issue. The higher the credit quality the lower will be the yield and the more successful 
will be the issue (Alles 2001). 
 
Some of the credit enhancement techniques that are used are: credit tranching; 
overcollateralisation; cash collateralisation; reserve funds; spread accounts; amortisation 
triggers; related party guarantees; letters of credit; monoline insurance; and multiline 
insurance. 
 
According to Henderson & ING Barings (1997), factors that support securitization are: 
i. Funds can be provided at attractive rates as a result of the added credit 
enhancement and resulting higher credit rating. 
ii. An improved company’s return on capital. Structured correctly, a securitization 
will remove securitised assets from the originator’s balance sheet, thus 
generating cash flow without increasing debt. 
iii. Provision of an alternative source of funding. 
iv. Provision of matched funding for medium and long-term receivables. 
 
The limits of the securitisation transaction can be found on the cost side and on the legal 
and structuring side. For example in Singapore, outright sale brokerage costs are 
between 0.5% and 1.0% of the selling price, whereas the total cost of asset securitisation 
is in the region of 1.5% to 2%, excluding the extra management effort and time involved 
in structuring such deals (Ooi et al. 2003).  The cost of securitisation includes front-end 
fees and expenses, the running cost of debt funding, the running cost of ancillary 
facilities and the cost of first loss cover or credit enhancement. 
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3.3 EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
 
The US has been the market leader in the development of real estate securitised 
products, both residential and commercial, with other countries adapting the US model 
to suit local conditions. The market for CMBS is growing rapidly. Hoesli and 
MacGregor (2000) quote Corgel et al. (1998) as saying: 
 
‘the market for CMBS is one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing sectors in 
the capital markets. Although the value of outstanding commercial mortgages 
being used as collateral for CMBSs is only approximately 8% of total 
outstanding commercial debt, the size of the market is significant given CMBS 
were virtually non-existent prior to 1990.’  
 
This is clearly depicted by Figure 3.2. The global CMBS market issuance which stood at 
AU$5.1 billion (US$4 billion) in 1990 had grown to AU$380 billion (US$299 billion) 
by the end of 2006. 
 
Figure 3.2: CMBS Global Issuance (1999 - 2006) 
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The evolution and early development of CMBS illustrated below draws largely on 
literature review by Vogel (2003); Sing et al. (2004b); and Underwood (2005), unless 
otherwise quoted. 
 
Sing et al. (2004b) broadly categorises the development of the CMBS market in the US 
into three phases:  
 
 packaging of commercial mortgages on single properties into CMBSs in the mid-
1980s;  
 setting up of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to 
liquidate non-performing loans of distressed thrifts and banks that were severely 
hit by the crash in the commercial property market in the late 1980s;  
 and shifting of CMBS loan pools to small and low-quality commercial properties 
that were riskier.  
 
In the first phase, CMBS issued were mainly in a single tranche. Despite the legislative 
passage that facilitated the creation of a non-taxable Real Estate Mortgage Investment 
Conduit (REMIC) in 1986, the use of the multi-tranche securities structure was 
infrequent in the 1980s. 
 
The second phase saw the RTC selling non-performing loan assets to investors in Wall 
Street by introducing proper credit rating for loans that were pooled into CMBS 
portfolio by putting in a subordinated structure in CMBS securities. RTC was able to 
provide adequate risk protection to investors of the senior CMBS tranche without 
obtaining credit enhancement by government sponsored agencies like the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) or the Veteran Administration (VA). Having 
accomplished its objective, the RTC was disbanded in 1995. However, the RTC model 
continues to be adopted by other commercial real estate lenders to tap into capital 
sources in the CMBS markets. The strong demand coupled with attractive yield spreads 
for the CMBS issued by the RTC further boosted investors’ confidence in the 
instruments.  
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The final phase saw the gap in financing small and low-quality commercial properties 
filled quickly by conduit mortgage lenders after the mid 1990s. Diversified portfolios of 
“jumbo-grade” commercial mortgages with asset values in a range of US$1 million to 
US$10 million provided a stable supply of the conduit-CMBS, which was estimated to 
be US$25 billion to US$30 billion a year on average. 
 
Liquidity creation, specialisation in loan production and customization of securities were 
three important factors that underpinned the continuous growth of the conduit CMBS 
market (Sing et al. 2004b).  Karbelk et al. (2006) are of a similar view when they state 
that standardisation, managerial leadership, and broadened risk management 
underpinned this growth.  
 
Vogel (2003) identifies four factors as having partly contributed to the rise of CMBSs: 
great timing; great economy; regulation; and technology and economies of scale. After 
the crash in commercial property market in the late 1980s, the time was perfect to launch 
CMBS. Distressed thrifts and banks severely hit by the crash were anxious to liquidate 
non-performing loans from their portfolios and investors and developers were so willing 
to put up with a product as difficult, expensive and inflexible as the CMBS.  
 
The mid and late 1990s turned out to be wonderful times for real estate lenders as the 
economy was strong. The delinquency rate (and the percentage of loans in foreclosure) 
declined almost every quarter for the rest of the decade so that in 1999 and 2000 the 
delinquency rate was under one percent. The painful lessons from the early 1990s 
allowed lenders to impose greater discipline on developers, which kept supply and 
demand at reasonable balance in most real estate markets.  
 
With the banks and insurance companies suffering billions of dollars in losses, the 
federal government and the bank and insurance regulators created rules and incentives to 
get them to reduce their real estate portfolios. The new reserve requirements were a 
disincentive for banks and insurance companies to hold real estate loans in their 
portfolios and an incentive for them to purchase and hold CMBSs. 
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The advent of low cost personal computers, allowed investors to analyse these 
complicated transactions with ease. Efficiency and economies of scale were also 
introduced with the specialisation of functions of the various parties involved 
 
According to Wachovia Securities analyst Tony Butler, the market “took off in earnest 
in 1996 - 1997” (Vogel 2003). This was the time when defeasance was added as a 
feature to deals to protect bond holders. Defeasance is a form of pre-payment protection 
in which borrowers who want to pre-pay a CMBS loan and remove it from a CMBS deal 
must replace the principal and interest cash flows in a deal using US treasury securities 
(Davison et al. 2003). 
 
Issuance in the CMBS market grew by an average 37% through much of the 1990s, 
reaching AU$102 billion (US$80 billion) in 1998. However, in August of that year, the 
market was effectively shut down when the Russian debt crisis caused panic in the 
general bond market. The market eventually rebounded, helped by the development of 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which provided a more efficient outlet for 
CMBS bonds that were below investment grade (Vogel 2003). 
 
However, complexities in the valuation and pricing of CMBS CDOs as a result of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis have resulted in a drastic slowdown in CMBS issuance in the 
US and a shutdown of the CMBS market in Australia from Q3:2007. 
3.4 COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES IN OVERSEAS 
MARKETS 
 
On a global level, the CMBS market increase is linked to the United States of America 
(US) market. For the period 1999 to 2006, CMBSs totalling over AU $977 billion 
(US$770 billion)7 had been issued in the US compared to AU$367 billion (US$289 
billion) for the rest of the world (Figure 3.2). Industry data show that in 2006 issuance of 
commercial CMBS in the US was around AU$261 (US$206 billion), a 22% increase 
over the previous year, and non-US issues were AU$118 (US$93 billion), representing 
an increase of 34% over the 2005 period (Commercial Mortgage Alert 2007). There was 
strong activity in Europe (EU) in 2006, where around AU$108 billion (€64.75 billion) of 
                                                 
7
 For ease of comparison, the interbank exchange rates of US$1=AU$1.27 and EUR€1=AU$1.67 as at 
December 31, 2006 have been used. 
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CMBS were issued in 2005, with around three quarters of this amount issued in the 
United Kingdom (UK). In 2006, AU$4.9 billion of newly rated notes were issued in 
Australia, an increase of 38% on the previous year (Standard & Poor's 2007c). 
 
The 2006 CMBS issuance of AU$261 billion (US$206 billion) in the US, AU$108 
billion (€64.75 billion) in the EU and AU$4.9 billion in Australia, represents 40%, 12% 
and 7% respectively of the overall securitisation markets in these regions (Standard & 
Poor's 2007b; 2007c). Although these percentages appear to be low except for the US, 
CMBSs are seen as a good source of funding by issuers and as a good investment option 
by investors. 
3.4.1 US CMBS Market 
 
The US has been leading the way in global issuance of CMBSs. For the period 1990 to 
2006, CMBSs totalling over AU$1,257 billion (US$990.7 billion) had been issued in the 
US. Figure 3.3 shows the total amount of CMBS issuance per year since 1990. 
 
Figure 3.3: US CMBS Issuance (1990 - 2006) 
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Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert (2006) 
 
US CMBS issuance rose from AU$4.3 billion (US$3.4 billion) in 1990 to AU$261 
billion (US$206 billion) in 2006. As of the second quarter of 2005, there was AU$596 
billion (US$470 billion) worth of CMBS outstanding in the US market, representing 
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around 40% of the overall asset-backed securities market and around 20% of the overall 
commercial loan market. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows market size of commercial and multifamily securitisations (US$720 
billion) with that of REITs (US$438 billion market cap), Microsoft (US$274 billion 
market capitalisation on the New York Stock Exchange) and the GDP of Australia 
(US$741 billion).  The US$720 billion worth of commercial and multifamily 
securitisations outstanding only represents about 26% of commercial and multifamily 
mortgages that have been issued (Figure 3.5). This further shows the potential for 
growth of this investment class, with 74% of commercial and multifamily mortgages yet 
to be securitised. 
 
Figure 3.4: Market Comparison (as of December 31, 2006) 
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Figure 3.5: Market Comparison (as of September 30, 2006) 
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According to Commercial Mortgage Alert (2007), US CMBS backed by retail property 
mortgages have commanded roughly a 25% share of issues by value for several years. 
CMBSs of mortgages on multi-family properties have declined in share as CMBSs on 
mortgages on office properties have increased in importance. CMBSs backed by 
mortgages on industrial and hotel property types have retained relatively small, but 
significant shares. 
 
From since 1993 until Q3:2007 when market turned, the proportion of issues carrying 
triple-A ratings increased steadily, largely as a result of a number of improvements 
throughout the CMBS market. Originators and issuers improved underwriting, 
documentation, and marketing, which helped to improve the average loan quality. 
Rating agencies improved the rating process with more sophisticated models 
incorporating more historical performance data, thereby providing a better guidance on 
risk. Property market fundamentals remained healthy; and the market for CMBS 
deepened, particularly for highly rated securities such as triple A-rated CMBS, 
encouraging an increase in their supply. This trend was also driven in part by the 
shallow market for lowest grade CMBS tranches8, a chronic condition that exerts 
significant influence on both the public and private real estate debt markets. 
 
                                                 
8
 Tranching involves issuance of several classes of securities against a pool of assets, each with distinct 
risk-return profiles. 
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The period, 2004 – 2006, saw a predominant issuance of floating rate notes. In 2006, 
81% of the issues were floating rate notes representing an increase of 1.2% and 4.9% 
over 2005 and 2004 respectively. 
 
The US CMBS market is dominated by conduit/fusion transactions9. In 2006, 
conduit/fusion transactions accounted for 88% of the outstanding CMBS issuance, and 
the large loan deals for the remaining 12% (Standard & Poor's 2006e). For analytical 
purposes, re-REMICS, CRE CDOs, and corporate-dependant deals have been included 
in the above two categories due to their special collateral characteristics.  
 
Conduit transactions have had strong investor appeal as evidenced by contraction in 
spreads. Figure 3.6 shows the 10-year fixed conduit spreads between 1996 and 2006. 
The earlier years saw upward movements in annual average spreads of between 44basis 
points (bp), and 53bp, with the exception being 1998 which recorded a high of 111bp. 
However, after 2001 there has been a fall from a high of 53bp to just less than 30bp as at 
the end of 2006 (Commercial Mortgage Alert 2007). 
 
Figure 3.6: 10-Year Fixed Conduit Spreads and 10-Year Treasury Rate 
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9
 CMBS backed by reasonably large, well diversified pools of small-to medium-sized and large-sized 
secured property loans. 
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According to Fitch Ratings (2007d), by the end of 2006, the ratio of upgrades to 
downgrades was 34:1 (the highest ratio for structured finance products). Of the nearly 
5000 CMBS deals they rated, the surveillance group upgraded 1,781 tranches and 
downgraded 52. Credit rating upgrades depict mainly an improvement in the 
performance of the underlying asset backing a CMBS issue and downgrades the 
opposite. 
3.4.2 EU CMBS Market 
 
EU CMBS issuance in 2006 was AU$108 billion (€64.75 billion), an increase of 39% on 
2005 levels despite the number of transactions decreased to 80 from 285 (Standard & 
Poor's 2007b). Between 1997 and 2004, more than AU$129 billion (€77 billion) was 
raised from 124 transactions. Figure 3.7 shows and historical overview of annual 
issuance.  
Figure 3.7: EU CMBS Issuance 1995 - 2006 
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The UK has been traditionally the dominant jurisdiction in EU CMBS issuance, 
accounting for 74% in 2004. Germany is rapidly catching up, with multifamily deals 
making up 23% of all CMBS and 29% of conduit deals in 2006 (Structured Finance 
International 2006). 
 
In terms of asset composition for EU CMBSs, office and retail properties continued to 
form the dominant collateral security in 2006 at 31% and 28%, respectively. The 
multifamily residential sector emerged as a leading collateral security in 2006, mainly 
driven by securitisations of loans secured by German multifamily portfolios; it increased 
from 15% in 2005 to 23% in 2006 (Moody's Investor Service 2007a).  
 
By 2005, EU CMBS issuance was largely in the AAA rating category with 60% of the 
total and AU$7.5 billion (€4.5 billion) worth of non-investment grade CMBS issued 
from 2000. Vresen (2005) points out that the majority of EU CMBS issuance from 2000 
to Q1:2005 were floating notes averaging at 73%, similar to US and Australia.  
 
No single transaction type made up a majority issuance mainly due to a wide range of 
legal structures to accommodate each of the transaction types. However, the single 
largest transaction type was the single-borrower single-property transaction with 28% of 
the total issuance to the end of 2004. Together the single borrower and multi borrower 
property categories made up 605 ( 68.8%) of the 879 issues as at end of 2005 (Vresen 
2005). Credit tenant transactions and synthetic transactions made up the remaining 
31.2% of the issues. 
 
EU CMBS transactions are generally grouped into three segments: true-sale single 
borrower10, true-sale multiple borrower11, and synthetic transactions12. Figure 3.8 shows 
the dominance of true-sale transactions from 1999 - 2004. True-sale multiple borrower 
transactions comprised 68% and 42.3% of all true-sale transaction in 2003 and 2004 
respectively (Moody's Investor Service 2005).  
 
 
                                                 
10
 True-sale borrower (single property, multiple-property, liquidating pool, credit tenant lease) 
11
 True-sale multiple borrower (single property and multiple property) 
12
 Synthetic transactions are typically funded through the sale of credit linked notes 
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Figure 3.8: EU CMBS Volume by Structure Category (1999 - 2004) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Moody’s Investor Service EU CMBS Year-end and Outlook  
Reports 1999 – 2004.  
 
Spreads tightened by approximately 60% in the last three quarters of 2004. In July 2004 
the market saw AA spreads at around 40bp, with two recent first quarter 2005 
transactions closing at 17bp for the AAA classes. This implied a 57.5% tightening in 
AAA over the last three quarters. Furthermore, the BBB class saw spreads at 200bp in 
July and in the first quarter of 2005 at around 75bp. This implied a 62.5% tightening at 
BB over the last three quarters. As a result, the difference between AAA and BBB 
spreads narrowed from 160bp to only 58bp, a 64% reduction (Vresen 2005). Obviously, 
lower spreads mean that bond investors are not being compensated as they were for 
similar risk. On the other hand, it also means that costs of funds for originators and 
borrowers are lower, making CMBS even more attractive as a financing source. 
 
According to Vresen (2005), EU CMBS showed the best upgrade performance in 2004 
of any major EU ABS sector, with 7.6% of the ratings being upgraded. This compares 
with an average upgrade in EU ABS of 4.5%. The 2004 CMBS downgrade-to-upgrade 
ratio was 0.4, just behind residential mortgage backed securities and consumer ABS, 
both which saw downgrades in 2004. Moody’s (2007b) reported 2006 EU CMBS 
upgrades at 8% and downgrades at 2.1%. 
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3.4.3 Asian CMBS Market 
 
The use of CMBS as a funding source and as a balance sheet management tool is still in 
its infancy in most Asia Pacific countries, with notable exceptions being Japan and 
Singapore. Securitisation of property by owners to unlock their holdings either for 
liquidity and cash improvement or for the redeployment of capital to other 
business/investment activities has been through the setting up of property trusts or real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). 
 
Several factors have contributed to the recent adoption of REIT structure investment 
vehicles in Asia. Low yields from capital and money market investments, desire to boost 
liquidity of the industrial and commercial property markets and to facilitate the sale of 
properties by over-extended corporations and their bankers are quoted as the main 
drivers of several Asian governments to pass new laws for the establishment of property 
trusts in their countries (Tan Y.K. 2004b). 
 
However, according to Moody’s (2006), the following impediments exist in most Asian 
countries for REITs to use CMBSs as a funding source: 
 
 Contentious taxation treatments and structural arrangements which have no 
provision for issuance of CBMS via REITs e.g. Taiwan. 
 Relaxed regulatory restrictions and abundant liquidity subduing securitisation as 
a funding source e.g. Hong Kong 
 Lack of a developed comprehensive regulatory infrastructure e.g. Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. 
 
The following is an overview of the CMBS markets in several Asian countries. Table 
3.1 shows the number of CMBS issues that have been rated by Moody’s Investor 
Services and Fitch Ratings from 2003 to December 2006. The table shows the 
dominance of Singaporean firms in CMBS issuance in Asia. 
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Table 3.1: Asian CMBSs Rated by Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch Ratings 2003 – 2006 
Year Name of Issuer Location of Assets Assets Class Issuance (Millions) Rating
2006 Star Topaz Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties Senior SGD650 AAA
Silver Oak Singapore A1 US$651.6 AAA
A2 AAA
B AAA
RCF A
Silver Maple 2007 Sinagopre Mortgage on Commercial Properties Senior EUR175 AAA
Blossom Assets Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties US$121 AAA
DAD SPV Thailand Mortgage on Commercial Properties THB8,200 AAA
Dynasty Assets China Commercial Properties US$145 AAA
2005 Platinum AC1 Limited Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties € 320 Aaa
Orion Prime Ltd. Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties € 320 Aaa
Silver Maple Investment Corporation Ltd. Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties RCL € 186.20 Aaa
Entrustment of Shin Kong Zhong Shan Building to Land Bank of Taiwan
Taiwan Commercial Property A NT$873 Aaa
Entrustment of Shin Kong Zhong Shan Building to Land Bank of Taiwan
Taiwan Commercial Property A NT$1,130 Aaa
Fubon No.1 Real Estate Investment Trust Fund Taiwan Commercial Property Min NTD 4,500 Aaa
Max NTD5,830 Aaa
Shin Kong No.1 Real Estate Investment Trust Fund Taiwan Commercial Property Min NTD 8,500 Aaa
Max NTD11,300 Aaa
2004 CapitalRetail Singapore Limited Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties A € 320 Aaa
Silver Maple Investment Corporation Limited Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties Series 022 US$195 Aaa
2nd RCF Up to S$20 Aaa
Emerald Assets Limited Singapore Mortgage on Commercial Properties P1-AAA-001 € 144 Aaa
Entrustment of Tong Yang Chia Hsia International Corp. IBM  Building to 
International Bank of Taipei
Taiwan
Commercial Property
A
NT$1,630 Aaa
2003 Cobalt Asset Management Singapore Lease Agreements S$45 Aaa
Silver Maple Investment Corporation Ltd. Singapore Commercial Properties Series018 US$72.1 Aaa
Mortgage on Commercial Properties
Source: Author’s compilation from various Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch Ratings Asian Structured Finance Year-end and Outlook Reports 2003 – 2006. 
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3.4.3.1 Japan 
 
For the period 1999 to 2006, a total of over AU$98.3 billion (US$77.4 billion) worth of 
CMBSs were issued, representing nearly 16% of total ABS issuance over the same 
period. During 2006, 40 CMBS deals were launched in Japan, with issuance of over 
AU$21.3 billion (US$16.8 billion or JPY1.4 trillion), a slight decrease from 2005. This 
was mainly due to a decrease in significant refinancing deals that totalled approximately 
AU$6.1 billion (US$4.8 billion or JPY400 billion). Coupon spreads of CMBS widened 
during the first half of 2006, especially for ‘AAA’ rated notes. No transaction was 
downgraded in Fitch-rated Japanese CMBS deals in 2006 (Fitch Ratings 2007c). Figure 
3.9 shows CMBS market issuance by amount and size as a percentage of the overall 
securitisation market trends from 1999 to 2006. 
 
Figure 3.9: Japanese CMBS Issuance (1999 - 2006) 
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CMBSs backed by non-performing commercial property loans have played a major role 
in the development of multi-borrower transactions. However, single asset transactions 
are the dominant CMBS vehicle. 
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3.4.3.2 South Korea 
 
The securitisation market in South Korea is dominated by asset backed securities mainly 
of consumer finance receivable-backed securities with the CMBS market largely 
underdeveloped.  It is anticipated that with the establishment of Corporate Restructuring 
REITs (CR-REITs) and Korean REITs (K-REITs), the CMBS market will grow. The K-
REIT is an ordinary REIT, while the CR-REIT is a special vehicle created to transform 
the unproductive properties of a restructured company into liquid assets. 
 
It is anticipated that the CR-REITs and K-REITs will use CMBSs as a funding source. 
3.4.3.3 Singapore 
 
Singapore offers one of the most vibrant securitisation markets in the Asian region. The 
driving forces have been the improving macro-economic dynamics; favourable legal and 
regulatory framework; relaxed leverage requirements; stable performance of existing 
transactions and increased investor familiarity with specific asset types and asset 
managers. 
 
Property-related transactions mainly commercial properties –are the dominant players. 
These transactions are either repeat issuances by established REITs or new 
securitisations of landmark properties. Property companies have become proficient in 
using CMBSs as a funding source and in balance sheet management. In 2004, 85% of 
the securitisation deals were by REITs compared to 70% and 75% for 2003 and 2002 
respectively.   
 
In 2006, there was a new type of asset (hotels) providing as collateral for the CMBS 
market. The cross-border issuance amounted to AU$1,118 billion (US$930 million) 
from three CMBS transactions. The CMBS originators were Keppel REIT (K-REIT), 
Frasers Centrepoint Trust and RCS Trust, a joint venture trust established by CapitaMall 
Trust (CMT) and CapitalCommercial Trust (CCT). In the CMBS originated by RCS 
Trust, the portfolio property was the integrated Raffles City complex which comprises a 
shopping centre, an office tower, a convention centre and two hotels in Singapore. This 
was the first CMBS involving hotel assets and the largest CMBS issuance in Asia (ex-
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Japan). The proceeds from this deal were used to partly finance the AU$2.8 billion 
(US$2.2 billion) acquisition of the Raffles City complex by CCT and CMT. The total 
number of transactions remained unchanged in 2006 at four. In February 2007, 
CapitaMall Trust issued its fifth CMBS worth AU$292.3 billion (EU€175 million) to 
refinance its 2002 CMBS issue (Fitch Ratings 2007a).  
3.4.3.4 Malaysia 
 
In 2001 the Securities Commission introduced ABS guidelines which have set the 
regulatory and infrastructural framework for all securitisation deals including CMBSs. 
Authorities seek to use securitisation as a means of dealing with non-performing loans. 
 
The country’s first CMBS transaction was in 2002 sponsored by Sunway City Berhad 
worth AU$161 million (RM450 million).  
3.4.3.5 Hong Kong 
 
The capital markets have been awash with liquidity for the past few years subduing the 
securitisation market as there are cheaper financing sources (Fitch Ratings 2007a). 
However, the government’s use of securitisation as a means to raise AU$1 billion 
(HK$6 billion) from future revenues from 6 government-owned toll bridges and tunnels 
in 2003 set the regulatory and infrastructural framework for securitisation deals. 
Potential is there for CMBS transactions from REITs that will be listed.  
 
In 2006, a cross-border CMBS transaction worth AU$381 million (US$300 million) 
from Singapore listed Fortune REIT was concluded (Fitch Ratings 2007a). 
3.4.3.6 Taiwan 
 
The Financial Asset Securitisation Law (FASL) and the Real Estate Securitisation Law 
passed in 2002 and 2003 respectively set the regulatory and infrastructural framework 
for all securitisation deals. By the end of 2005, 35 deals worth AU$6.35 billion (US$5 
billion or NTD170 billion) had been structured: 25 were financial base deals and 10 
were real estate based deals. Of the 10 real estate based deals, 3 were issued by REITs 
and the other 7 were issued by Real Estate Asset Trusts (REATs).  Total issues by 
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REITs amounted to AU$1.2 billion (US$ 941 million or NTD 31 billion) and AU$269 
million (US$ 212 million or NTD7 billion) for four of the REATs. 
 
The securitisation market is facing impediments in the form of certain tax treatments and 
structural arrangements. There is a hurdle for refinancing as there is a 6% tax on interest 
and a 10% tax on the difference between sale price and purchase price. REITs also have 
no provision to issue CMBSs.  
 
3.4.3.7 China 
 
Currently developments are underway for a reliable legal, regulatory and structural 
securitisation framework in China. The sheer size of available assets and non-
performing loans shows great potential for the development of REITs. Launched in 
September 2006 with an issue size of AU$184 million (US$145 million), Dynasty is 
China’s first cross-border CMBS, securing over nine retail properties located in nine 
cities in eastern China. It is anticipated that further issuance of cross-border CMBS 
backed by Chinese properties may come from Singapore- and Hong Kong-listed 
Chinese REITs due to the popular use by REITs of CMBS as a funding strategy. 
However, investors are cautious as they doubt the enforceability of China’s legal 
framework (Fitch Ratings 2007a).  
3.4.3.8 Other Countries 
 
In Thailand, Dhanarak Asset Development’s (DAD) repeat office leases-backed CMBS 
issuance by in 2006 at AU$280 million (THB8.2 billion) was down from the AU$341 
million (THB10 billion) CMBS it had issued the previous year (Fitch Ratings 2007a). 
 
As at December 2006, no CMBS issuance had taken place in the remaining countries in 
the region.  
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3.5 AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
3.5.1 Background  
 
The growth of the Australian CMBS market is linked to that of LPTs. The single-
purpose-vehicle-like characteristics of LPTs have helped in their establishment as major 
players in the CMBS market. LPTs continue to be the mainstay of the Australian CMBS 
market, with 65% of issuance market share. If wholesale funds are included, this figure 
increases to 75% (Standard & Poor's 2005b). Draffin (2002) attributed the strong interest 
in CMBS issuance from LPTs to the ability to achieve AAA rating matched by strong 
investor demand; the cost effectiveness of CMBS debt relative to traditional forms of 
property finance; and the potential flexibility afforded by structured CMBS debt.  
 
Many LPTs used equity capital to fuel growth and expansion during the mid-1990’s, but 
later switched to debt financing in 1997 when the RBA cut interest rates in the second 
half of 1996, which made debt financing a cheaper option to equity capital (Kavanagh 
1997). Jones Jang LaSalle (2001) predicted the rise of LPT CMBSs on the premise that 
they had AU$16 billion debt, of which 50% was bank debt. Between 2001 and 2004, 
LPTs issued CMBSs worth over AU$3.7 billion via 27 issues (eg: Mirvac, Macquarie 
Goodman Industrial, ING Office, ING Industrial, Investa, Macquarie Office) and bonds 
worth over AU$4.8 billion via 40 issues (eg: Gandel, Commonwealth Property, GPT, 
Stockland, Westfield) (Newell & Tan 2005).  
 
This increased participation in CMBS issuance can also be partly attributed to the high 
demand by institutional investors, mainly superannuation funds, for shares and bonds 
issued by LPTs in comparison to investing in direct property. The total contribution of 
asset allocation by Australian superannuation funds to property (both direct and indirect) 
declined from 17% in 1988 to 9% in 2000 - 2002, though the contribution of indirect 
property increased from 3% to 7% over the same period (InTech 2003). In 2005, 95% of 
superannuation funds had a specific allocation to property (either direct or indirect) 
averaging 10% (Newell 2006b). The introduction of compulsory superannuation in 1992 
saw superannuation funds increase their total assets from AU$36 billion in June 1984 
and AU$238 billion in June 2005 to AU$946 billion in September 2006 (Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority 2006). Their growth has been underpinned by strong 
investment returns and new contributions.   
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With the drop in public bond issuance, bonds and CMBSs issued by LPTs have been an 
attractive investment option for superannuation funds. Outstanding government 
securities fell from AU$130 billion in 1999 to AU$112 billion at the end of 2006. On 
the contrary, outstanding amounts for other debt securities; in particular asset backed 
securities13 increased from AU$17.5 billion to AU$104 billion over the same period. 
Figure 3.10 shows outstanding debt securities from 1999 to 2006. 
  
Figure 3.10: Outstanding Debt Securities (1999 - 2006) 
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3.5.2 Market Structure 
 
The overall cumulative Australian CMBS issuance since 1999 reached AU$17.5 billion 
at the end of 2006 (section 2.3.9.1). The three years to 2006 saw an average number of 
issues of eight per year, lower than the record number of issuances of fourteen in 2002. 
However, the size of issues has been increasing. For instance, all the new issues in 2006 
each had a combined tranche value of over AU$400 million. Furthermore, the last three 
years have seen record issue sizes with AU$1 billion for Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 
                                                 
13
 These include commercial mortgage-backed securities 
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2005-1 & 2 in 2005 and AU$900 million for Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS 
Series 2006-1 in 2006. 
 
Over 2000 - 2006, the most dominant CMBS issues have been in the office sector 
(AU$5.2 billion), followed by the retail sector (AU$4.5 billion). The diversified sector 
and the industrial sector have had AU$3.4 billion and AU$1.4 billion worth of CMBS 
issuance respectively (Figure 1.2). Further details on some of the major properties in the 
portfolios backing the issues are in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Major Properties in Australian CMBS Issues by Value 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
S ec tor  Issu e D ate o f 
Is su e 
M a j o r P rop er ty  in  Is sue  P r o pe rty  V a lu e 
(A U $  m )  
O ffice  CP IT  200 6  A ur o ra  B o nd s  A p r-01  A BN  A M R O  T ow e r $ 49 5  
O ffice  D eu tsche  O ffice  F inan ce  
20 04-C MB S  T rus t 
M a y- 04  G o ver no r Ph il lip  T ow er  
and  G over no r M a cqua rie 
T o w er , Sydn e y  N SW  
$ 47 8  
R eta il /  
O ffice /H o tel  
Q u ay  62  P ty  L td  Se ries  
20 05-1  
A p r-05  Co ll in s  P la ce , 2 5 -5 5  
Co ll in s  S tr ee t,  M e lbo urn e 
V IC  
$ 42 5  
R eta il  Q u ay  62  P ty  L td  Se ries  
20 03-1  
O c t- 03  So u th lan d ,  V I C  $ 35 0  
O ffice  Mir vac C ap i tal  P ty  L td  Jun -01  T h e O p tu s  C en t re , M i ller  S t  
N SW   
$ 33 0  
R eta il  D eu tsche  O ffice  F inan ce  
20 04-C MB S  T rus t 
M a y- 04  So u th gate  C om ple x , 
M elbo urn e  V I C 
$ 31 6  
R eta il  Ce n tr o  S hop p in g  C en tre  
Se cu ri t ies  L imi ted  - 
CM B S Se ries  2 006 -1  
Jun -06  Ce n tr o  G alleria , W A  (50 % ) 
& C en tro  G o u lb u rn ,  N S W  
(50 % )  
$ 29 9  
R eta il  Q u ay  62  P ty  L td  Se ries  
20 03-1  
O c t- 03  Pa cific Fa ir,  B roa d bea ch  $ 29 2  
I ndu str ia l  D eu tsche  I n dustr ia l  
Fin an c e 2 00 2  -  C M BS  
T ru s t  
D e c-0 2  D B  O f fice P ark ,  N orth  
Ry de  N S W  
$ 10 3  
I ndu str ia l  Ma cq ua rie G oo dm an  
Ind us tr ial  F inan c e Pty  L td .  
N ov-01  City  W es t  O ffice  P a rk , 
Py r mo n t N SW  
$ 93  
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Majority of the tranches have been A-class rated though lower B-class tranches are 
becoming common as well (Figure 3.11). This shows the growth/maturing of the market, 
increased acceptance of the investment asset and the increased participation of more 
knowledgeable investors (Chikolwa 2007a). 
 
Figure 3.11: Australian CMBS Issuance by Tranche Type and Amount (1998 - 
2006) 
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Source: Standard and Poor’s(2006a) 
 
A combination of both fixed-interest and floating-rate notes have been issued to attract a 
broad spectrum of investors. In the earlier years floating rate notes and fixed rate notes 
were issued in equal proportions. However, since 2004 floating rate notes have been 
dominate. For instance in 2005, 68% were floating rate notes in comparison to 32% 
fixed rate notes. 
 
Majority of the issues are in the single borrower multi-property category with over 95% 
of the total issuance to date. The CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds CMBS issued in April 2001 
is the only single borrower single-property issuance to date being for a single Sydney 
CBD office property.  There have been two multi-borrower multi-property issues, MCS 
Capital Pty Limited issued in May 2002 and Challenger Capital Markets Ltd issued in 
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June 2002. ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 CMBS issued first in November 
2003 and its tap issue14 in April 2006, is the only whole-business CMBS to date. Whole 
business securitisation (WBS) is a structured financing technique that involves the 
securitisation of the future cash flows of an entire business or business unit, rather than a 
discrete pool of existing revenue generating assets. 
 
The year 2006 saw the introduction of the first Australian conduit-style CMBS common 
in the US, Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd, CMBS Series 2006-1. This AU$900 
million transaction is the securitisation of a portfolio of 13 non cross-collateralised and 
non cross-defaulted real estate backed debt facilities to 12 obligators. Each financing is 
backed by between 1 and 11 retail properties located in major Australian cities and 
regional centres. The total independent value of the assets backing the issue was 
AU$1.67 billion. Table 3.3 presents examples of the various Australian CMBSs by 
transaction type. The diversity of issuance transaction types show the maturity of the 
market as well as the issuer’s confidence in trying out various CMBS structures to suit 
market needs. These deals are structured on a ‘secured loan’ basis unlike other parts of 
the world where they are done on a ‘true-sale’ basis15. A possible explanation is the 
predominance of LPTs in the CMBS market, having a 65% market share (Standard & 
Poor's 2005b). LPTs’ core business is real estate investment and retaining control of the 
securitised assets is critical to their survival. 
 
                                                 
14
 Issuance of additional securities in an existing CMBS structure within credit rating agency set loan-to-
value and debt service coverage ratio limits. 
15
 A “secured loan structure” involves “selling” assets to a special-purpose “bankruptcy-remote” entity 
that, in turn, pledges the assets as collateral for a loan and then conveys the borrowed funds to the “seller” 
as consideration. 
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Table 3.3: Examples of Australian CMBS by Transaction Type 
 
No. Issue 
Date 
Sector Issue Transaction 
Type 
S&P 
Rating 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$m) 
Coupon 
Type 
Coupon/
BBSW+ 
Scheduled 
Maturity 
DSCR** LTV** Security 
1 Apr-
01 
Office CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Single-
borrower 
single-
property 
 
Aaa* 150 Floating 41 Mar-06 2.0 32% ABN AMRO Office Tower with a total 
portfolio value of AU$713 million 
2 
  
Jun-
01 
  
Diversified 
  
Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd - Series 
2001-1 
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AAA 
150 
350 
Fixed 
Floating 
6.50% 
41 
 
 
Jun-06 
Jun-06 
2.2 
2.2 
40% 
40% 
25 modern, investment-grade buildings in 
the office, hotel, retail, industrial & carpark 
sectors with a total portfolio value of 
AU$1,430 million 
3 
  
Feb-
02 
  
Office 
  
ING Office Finance Pty Ltd 
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
 
AAA 
AAA 
230 
178 
Fixed 
Floating 
6.25% 
40 
Feb-07 
Feb-07 
2.4 
2.4 
39% 
39% 
18 commercial office properties with a total 
portfolio value of AU$1,215 million 
4 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Jun-
02 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Diversified 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Challenger Capital Markets Ltd 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Multi-
borrower 
multi-
property 
AAA 
AAA 
A 
A 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB 
NR 
100 
120 
61 
54 
55 
17 
10 
99 
Fixed 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
6.00% 
40 
6.50% 
80 
100 
6.75% 
130 
P 
Jun-05 
Jun-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
2.7 
2.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
2.7 
32% 
32% 
48% 
48% 
56% 
60% 
60% 
32% 
25 retail, office, industrial, cinema and car 
park properties with a total portfolio value of 
AU$798 million 
  
  
  
  
 
  
5 
  
  
  
  
Nov-
03 
  
  
  
  
Retail 
  
  
  
  
ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - 
Series 1 
  
  
  
  
Whole-
business  
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AA 
100 
110 
45 
35 
40 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
6.60% 
47 
90 
120 
67 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
3.1 
3.1 
2.2 
1.8 
2.6 
43% 
43% 
60% 
71% 
51% 
101 pub assets with a total portfolio value of 
AU$562 million 
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No. Issue 
Date 
Sector Issue Transaction 
Type 
S&P 
Rating 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$m) 
Coupon 
Type 
Coupon/
BBSW+ 
Scheduled 
Maturity 
DSCR** LTV** Security 
6 
  
  
  
May-
05 
  
  
 
Office 
  
  
  
  
Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 
2005-1 
  
  
 
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
343 
61 
54 
51 
28 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
20 
30 
40 
57 
80 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
40% 
47% 
53% 
59% 
62% 
8 commercial properties with a total 
portfolio value of AU$932 million 
  
  
  
7 
  
  
  
May-
05 
  
  
  
Diversified 
  
  
  
Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 
2005-2 
  
  
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
298 
53 
39 
52 
21 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
25 
40 
50 
75 
90 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
40% 
47% 
52% 
59% 
62% 
5 commercial and 4 retail properties 
with a total portfolio value of 
AU$804 million 
  
  
  
  
8 
  
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
  
Office 
  
  
  
  
Series MCWF 2006-1 
  
  
  
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
320 
50 
25 
30 
15 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
19 
23 
27 
47 
57 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
1.8 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
44% 
51% 
54% 
58% 
60% 
52 retail centres with a total portfolio 
value of AU$802 million 
  
  
9 
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
Office 
  
  
  
WOT CMBS Pty Ltd Series 1 
  
  
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
320 
45 
90 
50 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
26 
31 
41 
61 
May-11 
May-11 
May-11 
May-11 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
2 office buildings, 1 retail building 
and 1 university building with a total 
portfolio value of AU$1,088 million 
  
  
10 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Retail 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Centro Shopping Centre Securities 
- CMBS Series 2006-1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Conduit AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
250 
300 
170 
37 
62 
53 
28 
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
19 
24 
18 
28 
40 
65 
85 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
43% 
43% 
43% 
45% 
49% 
52% 
54% 
13  mortgage facilities secured 
against 47 retail properties and 1 
retail distribution centre with a total 
portfolio value of AU$1,580 million 
  
  
  
  
 
Key: 
N/K: Non-known; P: Private 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
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Given the general appetite for fixed-income securities and the limited supply in the 
market, CMBS credit spreads were contracting until the end of 2005 and have been 
stable since the start of 2006 as shown in Figure 3.12. In 2005, ‘AAA’ five-year, interest 
only notes were priced at 20 – 25 bps over three month bank bill swap rate (BBSW), and 
three-year, interest-only notes at 17 – 20 bps over three-month BBSW. ‘BBB’ were 
priced at 60 – 95 bps over BBSW. These margins were lower than those of 2002, when 
they were priced at least 20 bps wider for ‘AAA’ and 60 bps wider at ‘BBB’ level. At 
the beginning of 2006, both ‘AAA’ five-year and ‘AAA’ three-year were trading at 
average ranges of 8 – 10 bps; as at the end of 2006 they were trading at average ranges 
of 15 – 17 bps. With the shutting down of the CMBS market in Q3:2007, AAA spreads 
are predicted to be around 60 -80 bp. This is discussed more fully in chapter eight. 
 
Figure 3.12: AAA Rated CMBS - Average Industrial Spread to Swap (April 2003 
- November 2006) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines 2003 – 2006. 
 
From 2003 - 2006, there were more upgrades than downgrades by credit rating agencies 
buoyed by improvements in property performance. Stable property markets continue to 
be reflected in steady cash flows and occupancy trends. No rating changes were 
experienced throughout the second half of 2005. Of the six rating changes in 2006, three 
upgrades resulted from improved property performance and the three downgrades 
 74 
 
resulted from lowering of a support party rating such as financial guarantors. The year 
2006 also had fifteen rating affirmations (Standard & Poor's 2007c). Table 3.5 shows the 
total number of upgrades and downgrades between 2003 and 2006. 
 
Table 3.5: CMBS Upgrades and Downgrades 
 
Year Upgrades Downgrades No. of 
Ratings 
2003 1 1 135 
2004 4 0 136 
2005 0 1 134 
2006 3 0 136 
Total 8 2 541 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006a) 
3.5.3 Future Outlook 
 
The following supports the continued dominance of LPTs in CMBS issuance:  
 
 Their structure and single-purpose nature have been well established and 
accepted in the market. Only about a third of the 48 LPTs have issued CMBSs. 
The others have yet to utilise CMBSs as a funding source. 
 Of the AU$116 billion (68% market coverage) institutionally owned property in 
Australia, LPTs contribute AU$75 billion (61% of total) (Higgins 2006). These 
assets are best suited for securitisation due to their high capital values and stable 
cash flows.  
 The low gearing levels in comparison to the US (Newell & Tan 2005) present 
possibility for further issuance of debt securities via CMBS. Australian LPTs had 
an average gearing level of 42.1%, whereas their US counter-parts (equity Real 
Estate Investment Trusts) had levels higher than 50% (BDO Chartered 
Accountants & Advisers 2006). 
 The provision to buy and sale collateral assets in CMBS portfolios supports 
market growth through ‘tap’ issuances. In 2006, over 80% of activity came from 
tap issues, refinancing and restructurings from existing sponsors (Efrat 2006). 
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 The insatiable demand alluded to earlier by superannuation funds for fixed 
income securities issued by LPTs. 
 
Many industry experts are divided on the role that unlisted property trusts will play in 
growth of the CMBS market (Efrat 2006). Some contend that unlisted property trusts 
have become sophisticated and have outgrown their existing financing mechanisms and 
that CMBS are an alternative debt funding tool for them. However, other industry 
experts have highlighted that the higher unlisted property trust gearing levels would 
entail issuance of lower rated tranches, for example, double B and lower which are not 
favourable for both issuers and investors due to the increased level to repayment risk. 
 
The launch of Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS Series 2006-1 in 2006 
marked a milestone in the Australian CMBS market. Being the first such multi-borrower 
program in Australia, it is anticipated that momentum for other similar issues will come 
from small to medium enterprises and the loans this sector has sitting on bank’s books, 
most of which have not historically been securitised. As at June 2006, total commercial 
property exposure by all Australian banks was AU$94.5 billion, with 0.4% and 0.2% 
classified as nonperforming and impaired16 respectively (Reserve Bank of Australia 
2006). Banks have generally been reluctant to securitise their commercial property loans 
due to the low default rates (Table 2.17). 
dominance as issuers. 
 
The strong commercial real estate market outlook should support future CMBS issuance. 
Investors in real estate were rewarded with strong returns with both direct property and 
LPTs outperforming shares and bonds over a ten-year period to Q4:2006 (Newell 
2007b). Though there was been a strong surge in returns on shares over one year to 
Q3:2007 (see Table 2.2 in chapter 2), favourable real estate returns are still leading to 
sustained demand for real estate as evidenced by continued yield compression. Figure 
2.1 in chapter 2 shows yield trends in retail, office and industrial sectors from 1991 to 
2006. These trends are expected to continue due to the limited number of ‘investment-
                                                 
16
 Assets on which payments are in arrears by more than 90 days or otherwise doubtful and the amount 
due is not well covered by the value of collateral. The remainder of these assets were in arrears, but were 
well covered by collateral. 
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grade’ properties (Murdoch 2004) and the huge amounts being allocated to property 
investment, as alluded to earlier.  
 
The future outlook of various property sectors is positive: there is strong economic 
outlook and investor sentiment for industrial property (Jones Lang LaSalle 2007c; 
Newell 2007b). There are continued catalysts to growth in retail property of strong rental 
growth, stable income streams, favourable planning environment limiting new supply 
and undue competition, and strong investor support (Burdekin & Snoswell 2004). 
Further, office market growth is underpinned by strong economic growth. Australia was 
ranked twelfth on World Competitiveness Scorecard (IMD 2007) and nineteenth on the 
Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2007) in 2007 and Sydney 
ranked at 46 in CB Richard Ellis’ Global Market Rents Report of November 2006 (CB 
Richard Ellis 2006). Perth, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney also featured prominently 
among major Asia-Pacific cities in Jones Lang LaSalle’s Asia Pacific Property Digest 
(Jones Lang LaSalle 2007a). Generally, office markets across Australia have performed 
well, with record sales activity and rental growth in Perth and Brisbane. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter shows how CMBSs, which were non-existent before 1990, have grown into 
one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing capital market sectors. This growth is not 
only particular to the US, but also to the EU and Australia. In 2006, there were record 
CMBS issuances in US, EU and Australia, signifying its importance as a major 
commercial property debt funding/investment instrument. However, the use of CMBS as 
a funding source and as a balance sheet management tool is still in its infancy in most 
Asia Pacific countries, with notable exceptions being Japan and Singapore. 
 
Whilst the US has been the market leader in terms of issuance volumes and diversity of 
asset classes backing the issues, the EU and Australia have not lagged far behind and 
have replicated the US CMBS model to suit their local needs. In comparison to the 
larger US and EU CMBS markets, the Australian CMBS market is well matured as seen 
by the diversity of property types backing the issues and transaction types, tightening 
spreads, and record issuance volumes. Although the Australian CMBS market has “shut-
down” with the advent of the credit squeeze in the financial markets, the strong 
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commercial real estate market outlook should support future CMBS issuance, with 
Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) continuing their dominance as issuers. 
 
The next chapter takes an in-depth look at how various Australian CMBSs have been 
structured as case studies. These case-studies are randomly selected on the basis of 
diversity of property classes backing the issues and on other special features 
incorporated in the issues. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE STUDIES ON AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Six case studies are presented to signify how the Australian CMBS market has evolved 
and to show the diversity of the CMBS issues. The case studies are randomly selected on 
the basis of diversity of property classes backing the issues and on other special features 
incorporated in the issues. 
4.2 JUSTIFICATION OF CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
Case studies are a preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin 1994).  Eisenhardt (1989) 
also supports the use of case studies in new research areas or research areas for which 
existing theory seems inadequate. The case studies presented here are both exploratory 
and explanatory.  The methodology has been used in other CMBS (Ooi et al. 2003; Sing 
et al. 2004b) and ABS studies (Fan et al. 2004) in the Asia-Pacific region. CMBS is a 
sub-asset class of ABS. 
 
The case study description, report or story is used as an analytic strategy for within case 
analysis to highlight how CMBSs have been structured. Emerging themes throughout 
the data analysis process illustrate the entire strategic actions involved in the structuring 
process as well as critical success factors. Furthermore, pattern or theme matching, 
through comparing the emerging themes with patterns derived from the literature 
review, is utilised (Yin 1994). 
 
In cross-case analysis, categorising the case studies based on the size and type of CMBS 
issue such as larger issues vs. smaller issues, diversified property-backed issues vs. 
specific property-backed issues, single borrower multi-property vs. single borrower 
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single-property or conduit or whole business, followed by searching for similarities and 
differences between the categories, is adopted as an analytical strategy for identifying 
cross-case patterns (Eisenhardt 1989). 
4.3 COMMON STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS IN AUSTRALIAN CMBS 
 
Some of the common structural mechanisms in Australian CMBSs found in all the 
selected case-studies are: 
 
 Soft bullet securities: The Notes issued are usually interest-only with no 
amortisation of principal until the Scheduled Maturity Date. If no refinance is 
available at the time, the transaction moves into a refinancing period or “tail 
period” during which the properties will be sold under the security trustee’s 
direction. The most common tail period used is 18 months, though 24 months 
has also been used depending on the property class backing a CMBS issue. 
 Further indebtedness: Transactions can be structured to allow the Special 
Purpose Entity to raise further rated (or unrated) debt secured by the collateral, if  
the debt is raised and rated within existing gearing limits and/or subject to 
confirmation that the further issue of notes will not have an adverse rating effect 
on the existing notes. These are referred to as “tap issues”. 
 Right to deal in properties: The transactions can be structured to allow the SPE 
to both acquire further properties as well as dispose of existing properties either 
within an agreed criteria (usually by maintaining a gearing cap requirement) in 
the period prior to Scheduled Maturity Date or subject to confirmation from the 
rating agency that there will be no adverse impact to the rating of the Notes. 
 Insurance: The SPE may be required to hold one or more of the following (1) 
Industrial Special Risks Insurance which may include Acts of Terrorism and (2) 
Public Liability Insurance. For rated CMBSs , the credit rating agencies demand 
that: 
- At least 45% of the insured amount is insured by an insurer with a credit 
rating not less than one rating category below the highest rated Notes on 
issue. 
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- The remainder of the insured amount is insured by an insurer with a credit 
rating which is not less than two rating categories below the highest rated 
Notes on issue. 
 Secured loan structure: The predominant CMBS transaction structure in 
Australia is a ‘secured loan’ unlike other parts of the world where they are done 
on a ‘true-sale’ basis. Secured loan structures involve “selling” assets to a 
special-purpose “bankruptcy-remote” entity that, in turn, pledges the assets as 
collateral for a loan and then conveys the borrowed funds to the “seller” as 
consideration. A possible explanation of this market practice is the predominance 
of Listed Property Trusts as issuers of CMBSs, having a 65% market share 
(Standard & Poor's 2005b). LPTs’ core business is real estate investment and 
retaining control of the securitised assets is critical to their survival. 
 Liquidity facility: This covers interest shortfalls and amounts necessary to 
preserve and protect the mortgage collateral. The standard has been to allow for 
six months’ of note payments at the credit rating agency’s refinance constant for 
six months’ of transaction expenses. 
 Hedging mechanism: The collateral and/or note cash flows may be hedged with 
interest rate swaps or other derivative instruments to manage the fixed-floating 
rate exposures. 
 Maintenance and capital expenditure reserve: Sufficient and regular expenditure 
is necessary to ensure that collateral quality, occupancy and value are 
maximised. A capital expenditure reserve may be required to ensure sufficient 
funds are available to cover any major capital expenditure works during the life 
of the transaction. Capital expenditure requirements may also be addressed via a 
facility from an appropriately rated counterparty. 
 Cross-collateralisation: In cross-collateralisation or cross-defaulted pools of 
properties, the cash flow of each property before debt service jointly supports the 
entire pool, a default on one property triggers a default on the entire pool and 
total liquidation proceeds from each and all the properties are available to repay 
the debt. Cross-collateralisation is powerful tool in reducing volatility of cash 
flows. To the extent the performance of the crossed assets is not 100% 
correlated, the cash flow and asset value volatility of the assets is reduced. 
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4.4 CASE STUDY ONE: CPIT 2006 AURORA BONDS 
 
In March 2001, Commonwealth Managed Investments Ltd (CMIL), as responsible entity 
for the Commonwealth Property Investment Trust (CPIT), an unlisted registered 
managed investment scheme with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), issued Aaa-rated CMBSs worth AU$150 million. CMIL is a 
wholly owned, but not guaranteed, subsidiary of the Commonwealth Bank Australia. 
The asset backing the issue was a single premium grade office building known as “ABN 
AMRO Tower” and retail stratum, collectively known as “Aurora Place” shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: ABN AMRO Tower, Sydney NSW 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds transaction structure. Aurora Place 
Holdings Pty Ltd (APH), a special purpose company wholly-owned by CPIT, acted as 
trustee of Aurora Trust and was set up for the sole purpose of raising debt finance and 
providing loans to CPIT. The proceeds from the securities issued were ultimately used to 
repay an existing bridging finance facility provided by ABN AMRO. CPIT Trustee used 
the debt finance, together with equity funds, to acquire the property ownership structure. 
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Figure 4.2: CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Transaction Structure 
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Details of the CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds issue are shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Issue 
 
CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds 
 
Issue Date: March 2001    
Term-to-Maturity:  5 years    
Property Type: Premium grade office building and retail stratum. 
 
Size:  49,650 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$470m    
Issue Size:  AU$150m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
Aaa AU$150m 31.7% 2.04 41bp 
Interest Type Floating with fixed interest swap 
Occupancy Rate 83.2%    
Weighted Average Unexpired Lease Term:  8 years    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$10m or 6.7% of issued debt  
Refinance Constant: 9.5%    
Largest Tenant (Share of Net Lettable Area): 34%    
Top 5 Tenants (Share of Net Lettable Area) 79.9%    
Herfindahl Property Type Index (HHPT)∗: 1.000    
Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR)∗: 1.000    
 
∗HHPT measures the risk of exposure by the largest single property by value in a portfolio and HHGR 
measures the risk of geographical concentration of the assets in a portfolio. Details of the calculation of 
these formulas are shown in chapter five. 
Source: Author’s compilation from Moody’s Investor Service (2001b). 
 
In line with Fitch Ratings (2001) and Moody’s Investor Service (2001b), the following 
are deduced as strengths, weaknesses and mitigants of the issue: 
i) Strengths: 
• Premium, newly constructed office building located in the Sydney central 
business district (CBD). 
• Excellent location within the CBD, with access to all means of transportation 
(bus, ferry, train motorway). 
• High quality tenancy with mostly long-term leases. The average lease 
maturity period of 8 years was in excess of the final maturity period of 5 
years. 
• The conservative LTV afforded by the collateral at 31.7% and DSCR of 
2.04x. 
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• Working capital facility of AU$10 million to cover free rent periods and 
other rent concessions. 
• The fixed-rate swap agreement entered into by the issuer to mitigate interest 
rate volatility during the term of the transaction until the scheduled maturity 
date. 
• Single tranche issuance. 
• Experienced, responsible entity. 
 
ii) Weaknesses: 
• Concentration of a single property in a single property sector shown by 
HHGR and HHGR of 1, respectively. 
• Two largest tenants occupy 62.4% of the net lettable area. 
• The property had not yet stabilised, with occupancy rate at approximately 
83%. 
• Liquidity support was heavily dependent on rentals being collected on a 
timely manner. 
 
iii) Mitigants: 
• The asset is located in Australia’s most populous city in the heart of the core 
CBD Sydney office market and is pre-eminent in its class. 
• On a joint probability basis, the likelihood of two high credit quality tenants 
defaulting was considered remote. In addition, the availability of the bank 
guarantee allowed the issuer to meet interest payments and to find 
replacement tenants in a reasonable timeframe, should a major tenant 
default. 
• Rent from tenants was paid directly to a trust account controlled by the 
property manager and monitored by the CPIT trustee. 
 
To date, the CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds issue is the only single-borrower single-property 
transaction to have been done in Australia. The issue successfully closed in September 
2007. CPIT got a syndicated loan to cover the balloon payment. 
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4.5 CASE STUDY TWO: CENTRO SHOPPING CENTRE SECURITIES 
LTD, CMBS SERIES 2006-1 
 
In a first for the Australian market, Centro Properties Group (“Centro”) established in 
December 2006 a conduit for the securitisation of pools of payment obligation which are 
ultimately secured by commercial properties. This is similar to multi-loan conduit 
programs common in the US. The transaction is the securitisation of a portfolio of 
thirteen real estate backed financings to twelve obligors (Centro and its associated direct 
property vehicles) (Figure 4.3).  Each financing is backed by between one and eleven 
retail properties located in major Australian cities and regional centres. The proceeds of 
the issue totalling AU$899.8 million were used to refinance bank debt facilities and for 
general working capital. 
 
Centro is a retail property investment organisation specialising in investment, 
management and development of shopping centres and is listed on the Australian stock 
exchange. Currently, Centro’s portfolio includes properties in Australia, New Zealand 
and the US valued at approximately AU$15.8 billion. Centro has previously issued 
CMBS under Centro Capital Pty Limited and MCS Capital Pty Limited with over AU$1 
billion outstanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
Figure 4.3: Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd. CMBS Series 2006 - 1 
Structure 
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Details of the Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd. CMBS Series 2006-1 issue are 
shown in Table 4.2. The issue had a depth of seven tranches from AAA to BBB-, with 
one AAA tranche denominated in Euro’s targeting European investors. A cross currency 
swap was entered into with BNP Sydney to swap the Euro notes with Australian dollars. 
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Table 4.2: Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd. CMBS Series 2006 - 1 Issue 
Details 
 
Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd - CMBS Series 2006-1 
 
Issue Date: December 2006    
Term-to-Maturity:  3-5 years    
Property Type: 13 mortgage facilities secured against 47 retail properties and 1 bulky 
goods centre. 
Size:  669,154 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$1,670.14m    
Issue Size:  AU$899.6m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
AAA AU$250m 43.1% 1.7 19bp 
AAA AU$300m 43.1% 1.6 24bp 
AAA AU$170m 
(EUR €100m) 
43.1% 1.6 18bp 
AA AU$37.0m 45.3% 1.6 28bp 
A AU$62.0m 49.1% 1.4 40bp 
BBB AU$52.6m 52.2% 1.4 65bp 
BBB- AU$26.0m 53.9% 1.3 85bp 
Interest Type: Floating rate    
Occupancy Rate: 98.6%    
Weighted Average Unexpired Lease Term:  5.9 years    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$42m or 4.7% of issued debt 
Refinance Constant: 8-11%    
Largest Tenant (% of Net Income): 17.8%    
Property Diversity (Largest single exposure): AU$299m or 17.9% of portfolio value 
Net Income from Top 5 Tenants:  38.6%    
Geographic Diversity:     
New South Wales 29%    
Queensland 18%    
Western Australia 22%    
Victoria 14%    
South Australia 16%    
Herfindahl Property Type Index (HHPT): 1.000    
Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR): 0.210    
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s (2006c) 
 
Further details of the portfolio’s backing the issue are shown in Table 4.3. The portfolio, 
though sector specific with an HHPT of 1, is well diversified in terms of property sub-
class having a discount department store, neighbourhood shopping centres, liquor 
outlets, a warehouse distribution centre, and regional and sub-regional shopping centres. 
Majority of the properties are anchored by investment grade tenants, with the largest 
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tenant contributing 17.8% of net income and the top 5 tenants contributing 38.6% of net 
income. The average occupancy rate of the portfolio is 98.6%. 
 
Table 4.3: Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd. CMBS Series 2006 - 1 
Property Portfolios 
Syndicate 
Name 
No. of 
Properties 
Property Type Facility 
Term 
(Years) 
Facility 
Required 
(AU$m) 
Net 
Passing 
Income 
(p.a) 
(AU$m) 
Occupancy 
Rate (%)  
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
CMCS 10 3 Discount department store, 
sub-regional and 
neighbourhood shopping 
centre(SC) 
3 45.17 6.5 98.8 93.03 
CMCS 17 11 Eight liquor outlets, sub-
regional SC, two 
neighbourhood SCs 
3 64.15 9.5 99.9 130.80 
CMCS 18 4 Neighbourhood SCs 3 31.42 4.8 99.8 60.97 
CMCS 21 1 Regional SC 3 73.64 9.9 99.8 162.98 
CMCS 22 1 Warehouse distribution center 3 16.22 4.6 100.0 39.50 
CMCS 23 1 Sub-regional SC 5 21.73 2.8 100.0 37.00 
CMCS 25 5 Four neighbourhood SCs, one 
sub-regional SC 
5 41.11 7.4 99.6 96.58 
CMCS 26 3 Freestanding supermarket, 
sub-regional SC, bulky goods 
center 
5 54.42 8.6 100.0 120.65 
CMCS 27 1 Sub-regional center 4 54.02 6.2 100.0 89.00 
CMCS 34 7 Neighbourhood SC 5 72.50 9.0 99.8 111.55 
CMCS 37 6 Five neighbourhood SCs, one 
bulky goods center 
5 98.90 10.3 99.2 148.70 
CER 
Conduit 1 
2 One regional SC, one 
neighbourhood SC 
4 171.08 17.2 99.8 299.00 
CER 
Conduit 2 
5 One regional SC, five 
neighbourhood SCS 
3 155.44 15.7 99.6 280.40 
Total 48   $899.80 $112.5 98.6% $1,670.14 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006c) 
 
Some of the properties backing the issue are shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Centro Shopping Centres: Centro Galleria and Centro Colonnades 
 
 
 
 
Centro Galleria – Part of CER Facility 1  Centro Colonnades – Part of CER Facility 2  
 
In line with Standard and Poor’s (2006c), the following are deduced as strengths, 
weaknesses and mitigants of the issue: 
i) Strengths: 
• Well diversified portfolio in terms of debt facilities (13 facilities to 12 
obligators), underlying real estate (50 underlying property interests in 48 
unique properties) and facility maturity. 
• Underlying real estate security consists of 47 well located retail facilities and 
1 bulky goods centre, with an HHGR of 0.210. 
• Well diversified tenant pool; the largest tenant represents 17.8% of net 
income. The average lease maturity period of 5.9 years was in excess of the 
maximum final maturity period of 5 years. 
• The transaction benefits from staggered maturity dates of the facilities with 
maturity of the underlying facilities being spread over 3 years (years 3 to 5) 
with the maximum maturity by facility size occurring in any single year 
being 41% in year three. 
• The transaction benefits from a professional asset manager with a strong 
track record in the retail sector whose interests are tightly aligned to those of 
noteholders. 
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ii) Weaknesses: 
• Each financing, with the exception of the CER Facility 1 and CER Facility 
2, are not cross collateralised with other facilities and as a result noteholders 
could be adversely impacted by a single obligator default. 
• Interest swaps are undertaken at the obligator level and in each case are 
entered into with an unrated counterparty in CPT. 
• DSCR and LTV for each facility varies widely from 1.3x to 1.7x and 43.1% 
to 53.9%, respectively. The default of a single facility could cause a default 
on one or more classes of notes. 
 
iii) Mitigants: 
• The notes have been sized on an individual basis and do not rely on cross 
collateralisation for credit protection. 
• While interest rate hedging is done at the obligator level with an unrated 
counterparty, strict parameters have been placed on each obligator requiring 
them to find alternate hedging arrangements should conditions change and 
for the swap counterparty to cash collateralise the swap should rates rise 
above 7.5%. 
• Market risk on issuer cash flows is mitigated by the provision of an AU$42 
million liquidity facility, covering 8 months of note payments. 
 
The issue was fully subscribed, with the AAA notes priced at 19 bp and BBB- notes at 
85 bp over 3 month BBSW. Final maturity of the notes is June 2013. 
4.6 CASE STUDY THREE: QUAY 62 PTY LTD. SERIES 2001-1 
 
The initial Quay 62 2001-1 AU$110 million AAA-rated CMBS transaction was done by 
AMP Industrial Property Trust in January 2001, who were taken over by Macquarie 
Goodman Industrial Trust (MGI) in August 2003. MGI added twenty-six properties to 
the trust at a total cost of AU$614.6 million.  MGI and Macquarie Goodman Funds 
Management (MGM) merged to form the Macquarie Goodman Group in 2004/2005, 
with AU$7 billion assets under management as at June 2005. Macquarie Goodman is a 
property investment and management group which specialises in the ownership, 
management and development of industrial and business space. 
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In December 2003, Quay 62 2001-1 issued a further AU$55 million of AAA-rated class 
A notes since the original issue and new subordinated Class B Notes (AU$33 million) 
and Class C Notes (AU$35 million). The new notes have the same scheduled and final 
maturity date as the existing notes. The Class B notes are fully subordinated to class A 
notes; the Class C notes are fully subordinated to Class A and B Notes. Figure 4.5 shows 
the structure of Quay 62 Pty Ltd. 2001-1 CMBS issue. 
 
Figure 4.5: Quay 62 CMBS Series 2001-1 Transaction Structure 
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Details of the issue are shown in Table 4.4. The issue shows a sector specific backed 
CMBS being industrial property and also the ability of CMBS issuers to issue further 
debt or “tap issues” once the CMBS structure has been set up. 
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Table 4.4: Quay 62 CMBS Series 2001-1 Issue Details 
 
Quay 62 CMBS Series 2001-1 
 
Issue Date: January 2001    
Term-to-Maturity:  5 years    
Property Type: 26 industrial properties 
 
Size:  526,937 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$521.5m    
Issue Size:  AU$233m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
AAA AU$165m 37.5% 2.7 37bp 
AA AU$33m 45.0% 2.3 55bp 
A AU$35m 53.0% 1.9 72bp 
Interest Type: Floating rate notes 
Occupancy Rate: 97.0%    
Weighted Average Unexpired Lease Term:  4.1years    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$13.3m or 5.7% of issued debt 
Refinance Constant:: 9.5%    
Property Diversity (Largest single exposure): AU$50.5m  or 9.68% of portfolio value 
Geographic Diversity:     
New South Wales 73%    
Victoria 13%    
Queensland 7%    
South Australia 5%    
Western Australia 2%    
Herfindahl Property Type Index (HHPT): 1.000    
Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR): 0.617    
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s (2003b) 
 
Details of the top ten properties by value in the issue are shown in Table 4.5. These had 
a combined market value of AU$319.90 million or 61.34% of the portfolio market 
value. The portfolio, though sector specific with an HHPT of 1, is well diversified in 
terms of property sub-class having industrial estates, business parks and warehouse 
distribution centres. The portfolio has an HHGR of 0.617 showing not much geographic 
spread. However, this is mitigated by the fact that 40% of Australia’s industrial activity 
is located in the eastern states of NSW, Victoria and Queensland. 
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Table 4.5: Quay 62 CMBS Series 2001-1 Property Portfolio: Top 10 Properties 
by Value 
 
Property Location Property Type Size (m2) % of 
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
62 Hume Highway Chullora New South 
Wales 
Industrial estate 45,729 9.95 51.90 
3 Davis Road, Wetherill 
Park 
New South 
Wales 
Warehouse 
distribution 
49,292 9.01 47.00 
2-8 McPherson Street, 
Banksmeadow 
New South 
Wales 
Industrial estate 30,900 7.65 39.90 
9 Canal Road, St Peters New South 
Wales 
Business park 21,815 6.71 35.00 
146-156 Warren Road, 
Smithfield 
New South 
Wales 
Industrial estate 10,012 5.16 26.90 
12-20 Anella Avenue, Castle 
Hill 
New South 
Wales 
Business park 23,677 5.04 26.30 
2-12 Beauchamp Road, 
Botany 
New South 
Wales 
Industrial estate 25,013 4.95 25.80 
400 Nudgee Road, Hendra Queensland Industrial estate 43,705 4.51 23.50 
41 Roberts Road, Chullora New South 
Wales 
Warehouse 
distribution 
21,905 4.28 22.30 
148 James Ruse Drive, 
Parramatta 
New South 
Wales 
Industrial estate 14,834 4.08 21.30 
Total   286,882 m2 61.34% $319.90 
 
 
In line with Standard and Poor’s (2003b), the following are deduced as strengths, 
weaknesses and mitigants of the issue: 
i) Strengths: 
• The collateral comprises 26 modern, investment grade buildings in the 
industrial and warehouses sectors, occupied by about 80 tenants generating 
significant annual cash flows. 
• The conservative LTV afforded by the collateral at 37.5% and DSCR of 2.7x 
for AAA notes. Further, the notes benefit from cross collateralisation. 
• The takeover of AMP Industrial Trust (AIP) by Macquarie Goodman Funds 
Management Ltd. (MGFM) brought management expertise and potential 
efficiency improvements. 
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ii) Weaknesses: 
• The rental receipts are subject to market risk and ongoing lease maturity 
risk. The average lease maturity period of 4.1 years which is less than the 
maximum final maturity period of 5 years. 
 
iii) Mitigants: 
• Lease rollover and market risk is mitigated by the diversity of tenants and 
the spread in the lease rollover profile, the high debt service coverage in 
place, and the liquidity facility of AU$13.3 million, which is enough to 
cover six months of coupon and priority payments. 
 
The issue was fully subscribed, with the AAA notes priced at 37 bp and BBB- notes at 
72 bp over 3 month BBSW. Final maturity of the notes is March 2008. 
4.7 CASE STUDY FOUR: ALE FINANCE COMPANY PTY LTD - SERIES 1 
 
In late 2003, Foster’s Group Limited divested its leisure and entertainment business, 
including Australia’s largest portfolio of pubs, in a complex package of transactions that 
included the float of two separate listed businesses: 
 
● ALE Property Trust, a holding trust that held as its principal asset all the units in 
a sub-trust ALE Direct Property Trust (ALE Direct), being the entity to which 
Foster’s transferred its freehold interest in the pubs (other than a small number of 
pubs that Foster’s itself held on lease from third parties); and  
● Australian Leisure & Hospitality Group Limited (ALH), to which Foster’s 
transferred the operating business associated with those pubs. 
 
ALE Direct leases its pub portfolio to ALH. ALE Property Trust raised a total of 
AU$112 million of capital through a combination of stapled securities and unsecured 
loan notes, and used the issue proceeds principally to capitalise ALE Direct. ALE Direct 
raised a further AU$330 million through an issue of CMBSs by another member of the 
group, ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd. (ALE Finance), backed principally by the value 
of its property portfolio and of the rental stream from ALH as lessee. Through an 
innovative structuring arrangement with ALH, however, ALE Direct was also able to 
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bring the enterprise value of the ALH operating business into account in support of its 
payment obligations under the CMBS issue, so that the transaction operated in part as a 
form of whole-business securitisation (WBS) by ALE of ALH’s business. 
 
A simplified version of the transaction structure is set out in Figure 4.6. It can be seen 
that this structure follows closely the typical UK WBS structure. The particularly 
innovative aspect of this transaction lies in the relationship between ALE Direct and 
ALH. From a WBS perspective, it is noteable that ALE Direct is able to access the 
business value in ALH to support its obligation to repay its loan from ALE Finance, and 
so ultimately to support ALE Finance’s ability to repay its notes. Those arrangements 
allow ALE Direct (or its security trustee), if ALH is in default under the leases, to take 
possession of the pubs and sell them on behalf of both ALE Direct and ALH (Standard 
& Poor's 2003a). 
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Figure 4.6: ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 Transaction Structure 
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Table 4.6 shows details of the 2003 CMBS issue and subsequent “tap issue” in 2006. 
The tap issue raised a total of AU$350 million with class AB, B and C being nominal 
floating rate, bullet notes and having a final maturity date of May 2015. The class AA 
notes are structured as non-amortising, capital-indexed bonds, indexed to consumer 
price index and have a final maturity date of November 2025. 
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Table 4.6: ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 Issue Details 
 
Details ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 
Issue Date: November 2003  April  2006  
Term-to-Maturity:  5 years  5 years; 17 years  
Property Type: Over 101 pubs Over 101 pubs 
Size:  245,323 m²  245,323 m²  
Aggregate Market Value: AU$561.9m  AU$637.7m  
Issue Size:  AU$330m  AU$350m  
Tranche: AMOUNT LVR DSCR BBSW AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
AAA AU$100m 42.6% 3.1 6.6% AU$150m 25.4% 3.3 20bp 
AAA AU$110m 42.6% 3.1 47bp AU$85m 39.8% 2.1 25bp 
AA AU$40m 50.7% 2.6 67bp AU$60m 50.0% 1.7 34bp 
A AU$45m 59.9% 2.2 90bp AU$55m 59.3% 1.4 84bp 
BBB- AU$35m 71.0% 1.8 120bp     
Interest Type: Floating rate and fixed rate.  Floating rate    
Occupancy Rate: 100%  100%  
Weighted Average 
Unexpired Lease Term:  
25 years  25 years  
Liquidity Facility:  AU$11m or 3.3% of issued debt AU$12.15m or 3.5% of issued debt 
Refinance Constant: 7.0%  9.5%  
Geographic Diversity:     
New South Wales 15.3%  15.3%  
Queensland 30.7%  30.7%  
Western Australia 2.2%  2.2%  
Victoria 46.1%  46.1%  
South Australia 5.7%  5.7%  
Herfindahl Property Type 
Index (HHPT): 
1.000  1.000  
Herfindahl Geographic 
Region Index (HHGR): 
0.334  0.334  
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s (2003a; 2006b) 
 
In line with Standard and Poor’s (2003a; 2006b), the following are deduced as strengths, 
weakness and mitigants of the issue: 
i) Strengths: 
• The portfolio of pubs is well diversified with HHGR of 0.334, with very 
long leases. 
• The properties generate significant annual cash flows with strong rental 
coverage and therefore the certainty of receiving the contracted lease 
payments from ALH is well supported by the operating performance of the 
pubs. 
 98 
 
• The transaction benefits from a robust equity cash trap which will be 
triggered upon a decline of the portfolio’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortisation and rent (EBITDAR). 
• Game-related revenues represent a significant proportion of the revenues 
derived by ALH as operator and lessee of the pub portfolio. These revenues 
are heavily regulated, and are a significant component of relevant state 
government derived revenue. 
 
ii) Weakness: 
• The transaction involves the securitisation of rental cash flows while the 
unrated tenant, AHL, is performing.  
 
iii) Mitigants: 
• The transaction structure includes triple-net leases, stringent monitoring 
regimes, and cash trap mechanisms to help mitigate operating performance 
related impacts and risks. 
• In the event of failure by AHL, ALE Direct and/or ALE Finance may take 
control and continue to operate the pub businesses as going concern 
enterprises. 
• A cash reserve of AU$5.5 million and a liquidity facility of AU$12.15 
million is available to ALE Finance for any shortfall in loan repayments 
received from ALE Direct. 
 
The issue was fully subscribed, with the 2003 AAA notes priced at 47 bp and the 2006 
AAA notes priced at 20 bp over 3 month BBSW. Final maturity of the notes is March 
2008 for the 2003 issue and May 2015 and November 2025 for the 2006 issue, 
respectively. 
 
The 2006 “tap issue” was the first CMBS transaction by a property trust to issue capital 
index-linked debt and the first Australian CMBS transaction by a LPT to contain 
tranches with split maturities.  
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4.8 CASE STUDY FIVE: STOREs PTY. LTD. 
 
STOREs Securitisation Pty. Ltd. (STOREs) issued in May 2004 CMBSs worth AU$220 
million, which were supported by first-registered mortgages over forty-four bulky goods 
retail outlets in Australia trading as “Harvey Norman” or “Domayne”.  Concurrently, a 
similar issue occurred in New Zealand, with the securities supported by ten Harvey 
Norman stores. The two programs were cross collateralised within each jurisdiction and 
across both jurisdictions. The program was designed to issue both short-term-notes and 
medium-term-notes. Figure 4.7 shows the transaction structure of STOREs Pty. Ltd. 
 
Figure 4.7: STOREs Pty. Ltd. Series Transaction Structure 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2004b) 
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Details of the STOREs Pty. Ltd. CMBS issue are shown in Table 4.7. This is the first 
multi-jurisdictional CMBS issue covering Australia and New Zealand issued in 
Australia, with provision to issue medium and short term notes. 
 
Table 4.7: STOREs Pty. Ltd. Issue Details 
 
STOREs Pty. Ltd. 
 
Issue Date: May 2004    
Term-to-Maturity:  5 years    
Property Type: 44 bulky good retail outlets throughout Australia and 10 in New Zealand 
 
Aggregate Market Value: AU$479.6m (Australian 
properties) 
 NZ$88.7 (AU82.7m)(New Zealand 
properties) 
Issue Size:  AU$220m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
AAA AU$150m 35.7% 2.7 39bp 
AA AU$40.0m 45.2% 2.1 52bp 
A AU$30.0m 52.4% 1.8 70bp 
Interest Type: Floating    
Occupancy Rate: 100%    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$24m or 11.4% of issued debt 
Refinance Constant: 9.5%    
Property Diversity:  Largest  two properties represent 17% of portfolio value 
Geographic Diversity:     
New South Wales 52%    
Queensland 10%    
Western Australia 10%    
ACT 7%    
Victoria 11%    
Tasmania 4%    
South Australia 6%    
Herfindahl Property Type Index (HHPT): 1.000    
Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR): 0.313    
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s (2004b) 
 
Details of the properties backing STOREs Pty Ltd. are shown in Table 4.8. There are 
high levels of cash flow coverage derived from rent from franchisees and external 
tenants. Generally, there are between three and six franchisees within each store. The 
licence to the franchise is for one-month rolling term with the licence fee payable 
monthly in advance. Licence fees are increased by 3% and operating expenses are borne 
by the franchisee. Each store’s administration manager handles day-to-day management 
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of the properties. Franchisee rent is split into three elements: retail, ancillary warehouse, 
and administration area. 
 
Leases to external tenants are for traditional lease terms of between three and five years 
with a mix of fixed and market rental reviews throughout the term. About 12% of cash 
flow is derived from external tenants. 
 
Table 4.8: STOREs Pty. Ltd. Property Portfolios 
 
State No. of 
Properties 
Market Value 
(AU$m) 
Income 
(AU$000) 
 
Franchisees External 
Tenants 
New South Wales 19 249,950 21,558 110 18 
Victoria 6 47,475 4,044 31 5 
Western Australia 5 54,400 5,043 33 4 
South Australia 3 28,400 2,543 17 1 
Queensland 7 48,200 4,298 39 4 
Australia Capital Territory 2 32,350 3,160 17 1 
Tasmania 2 18,850 1,828 14 1 
Australia 44 AU$479,625 AU$42,465 261 34 
New Zealand 10 NZ$88,680 NZ$8,711 10 3 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2004b) 
 
In line with Standard and Poor’s (2004b), the following are deduced as strengths, 
weaknesses and mitigants of the issue: 
iv) Strengths: 
• The portfolio is well diversified with 44 bulky goods retail properties with a 
good mix of size, styles, and ages located throughout Australia. In addition, 
there are 10 bulky goods retail properties located in New Zealand which may 
support the notes issued by STOREs and STOREs (NZ). The issue has a 
HHGR of 0.313. 
• The underlying assets tend to be in highly visible, highly trafficked areas 
that are well suited to retail businesses. 
• Bulky goods retailing has established itself as a strong performing real estate 
asset class in Australia and New Zealand. 
• The Harvey Norman and Domayne names are well known, established retail 
brands that provide a unique retail concept in Australia; and there are no 
directly comparable bulky goods retailers in Australia or New Zealand. 
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• Excess spread is trapped in the event of a borrower event of default, which 
may create additional reserves for debt service, property and capital 
expenditure, and issuer expenses. 
 
v) Weaknesses 
• The underlying franchise agreements are for monthly terms only. 
• The franchisees rely heavily on the support and systems of Harvey Norman 
Holdings Ltd. (HNHL). If the franchisees cease to have access to these 
systems, there may be significant disruptions to cash flow. 
• The underlying household goods retailing business is susceptible to 
fluctuations in general economic conditions and interest rate movements. 
• The properties are generally configured to suit a larger retailer. If any of the 
properties have to be relet, there may be limited demand for alternative 
occupiers. 
• The Australian and New Zealand programs are cross collateralised and, as 
such, a default in one jurisdiction will cause a default in the other 
jurisdiction. 
• The two largest properties represent around 17% of the secured pool. 
 
vi) Mitigants: 
• The properties are readily capable of being sub-divided, which is useful in 
determining alternative use in the event of a sale after loan default. 
• The conservative LTV afforded by the collateral at 31.7% to 52.4% and 
DSCR of 1.8x to 2.04x. 
• The liquidity facility of AU$24 million is enough to cover twelve months of 
coupon and priority payments. 
 
The issue was fully subscribed, with the AAA notes priced at 39 bp, AA notes at 52 bp 
and A- notes at 70 bp over 3 month BBSW. Final maturity of the notes is November 
2010. 
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4.9 CASE STUDY SIX: CROMWELL CMBS PTY LTD 
 
In April 2006, Cromwell Property Securities Limited (CPSL), as responsible entity of 
the Cromwell Diversified property Trust (CDPT) issued CMBSs totalling AU$452 
million secured by first-ranking mortgages over fully cross-collateralised diversified 
pool of twenty-one properties.  Some of the properties in the Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd. 
property portfolio are shown in Figure 4.8. CDPT is a substantial Australian unlisted 
property fund with funds under management in excess of AU$1 billion and access to 
more than 5,600 direct investors. 
 
Figure 4.8: Part of Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd. Property Portfolio 
 
 
  
700 Collins Street, 
Melbourne VIC 
475 Victoria Avenue, 
Chatswood NSW 
380 LaTrobe Street, Melbourne VIC 
 
The CMBS issuance was used to re-finance existing debt, lowering CDPT’s cost of 
funding and freeing-up credit exposure to existing bankers for easier access to funds 
which may be required to fund future acquisitions. The CMBS issue had a weighted 
average issuance margin of 25% over BBSW compared to the current equivalent 
weighted margin of approximately 0.95% over BBSW, which resulted in savings to the 
CDPT of more than AU$2 million per annum. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the transaction structure of the CMBS issuance. The transaction 
structure provides for early redemption of the class E and class F notes on a quarterly 
basis at the election of CPSL. It is intended that the class F notes are also able to be 
redrawn following a prepayment. 
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Figure 4.9: Cromwell CMBS Ltd. Transaction Structure 
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Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006d) 
 
Table 4.9 shows details of the Cromwell CMBS issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
 
 
Table 4.9: Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd. Details 
 
Cromwell CMBS Pty. Ltd. 
 
Issue Date: April 2006    
Term-to-Maturity:  3 years    
Property Type: 21 properties (72% commercial, 18% industrial, and 10% retail/cinema). 
Size:  396,605 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$712.98m    
Issue Size:  AU$452m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR  
AAA AU$266.0m 40.5% 2.17  
AA AU$42.0m 47.0% 1.88  
A AU$43.0m 53.5% 1.65  
BBB AU$56.0m 62.0% 1.42  
BBB- AU$22.0m 65.3% 1.35  
BB+ AU$23.0 68.9% 1.28  
Interest Type: Fixed-rate and floating-rate 
Occupancy Rate: 97.3%    
Weighted Average Unexpired Lease Term:  5.5 years    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$21.1m    
Refinance Constant: 9.25%    
Largest Tenant (% of Net Income): 9.7%    
Property Diversity (Largest single exposure): AU$110.78m or 15.54% of portfolio value 
Net Income from Top 5 Tenants:  36.3%    
Geographic Diversity:     
Victoria 33%    
Queensland 14%    
South Australia 14%    
Tasmania 14%    
Western Australia 10%    
New South Wales 10%    
Australian Capital Territory 5%    
Herfindahl Property Type Index (HHPT): 0.561    
Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR): 0.190    
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s (2006d) 
 
Details of the top ten properties by value in the issue are shown in Table 4.10. These had 
a combined market value of AU$595.89 million or 83.58% of the entire portfolio market 
value. 
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Table 4.10: Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd. Property Portfolio: Top 10 Properties by 
Value 
 
Property Location Size (m2) Occupancy 
(%) 
% of 
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
700 Collins St, Melbourne Victoria 33,882 97.5 19.57 139.50 
475 Victoria Ave, Chatswood New South Wales 24,965 72.0 15.54 110.78 
Australian Wheat Board Building, 
380-390 Latrobe St, Melbourne Victoria 22,041 91.7 12.72 90.70 
Bundall Corporate Centre, Cnr 
Bundall Rd & Slayter Ave, Bundall Queensland 13,124 99.5 6.17 44.00 
Forsyth Distribution Centre, Hoopers 
Crossing Victoria 52,020 100.0 5.75 41.00 
Westfarmers Woolstore, Brooklyn South Australia 104,342 100.0 5.05 36.00 
Centenary House, 19 National Circuit, 
Barton Victoria 6,867 100.0 4.98 35.53 
100 Waymouth St, Adelaide South Australia 12,589 100.0 4.91 35.00 
Village City Centre, 200 Bourke St, 
Melbourne Victoria 9,635 99.7 4.63 33.00 
101 Grenfell St, Adelaide South Australia 13,196 100.0 4.26 30.38 
Total  292,661 m2 96.0% 83.58% $595.89 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006d) 
 
In line with Standard and Poor’s (2006d), the following are deduced as strengths, 
weaknesses and mitigants of the issue: 
i) Strengths: 
• The reasonable diversity of the collateral pool of properties supporting the 
CMBS. The issue has a HHPT of 0.561 and a HHGR of 0.190, with no 
single property contributing more than 16% of collateral pool by value. 
• The secured properties have relatively lengthy weighted average unexpired 
lease term of 5.5 years. About 43% of current rental income is derived from 
government related authorities, with a further 21% derived from investment 
grade tenants. 
• The majority of the collateral properties are modern and well maintained, 
minimising the likelihood of significant capital expenditure during the 
transaction term. 
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ii) Weaknesses 
• The three largest assets account for 47.8% of the collateral pool, by value. 
• The collateral includes 16 properties subject to single tenancies or with a 
significant exposure to a single tenant, representing 41% of the pool.  
• The collateral includes five cinema properties representing 10% of the 
portfolio value, whose values are considered to be more volatile than 
established commercial and industrial properties. 
 
iii) Mitigants: 
• The two of the three largest properties are newly refurbished and the third 
property is newly constructed. The properties are leased to investment grade 
tenants and their weighted average unexpired lease term is 9.6 years. 
• No single tenant contributes more than 10% of the portfolio’s gross income. 
• The liquidity facility of AU$21.1 million is enough to cover six months of 
coupon and priority payments. 
• A rental reserve of AU$2 million for the benefit of noteholders to cover for 
any disruptions in rental payments from the cinema properties. 
 
The issue was fully subscribed, with final maturity of the notes being October 2010. 
 
CDPT were the first unlisted property trust to enter the CMBS market, with other 
unlisted trusts expected to emulate them in diversifying their sources of funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
 
4.10 CROSS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
The property class backing a CMBS issue will influence its transaction structure. Of 
particular importance are its fundamental property characteristics, which in turn 
influence the issuer’s risk profile. Cross case study analysis of the CMBS issues mainly 
involves property risk assessment. Presented here is a comparison of the transaction 
structures and issue details, with details on property risk assessment presented in chapter 
five.  
 
The case studies reviewed show the diversity of issuance transaction types depicting the 
maturity of the market as well as the issuer’s confidence in trying out various CMBS 
structures to suit market needs. Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS Series 2006-
1 or “Centro” and ALE Finance Company Pty. Ltd. – Series 1 were the first conduit and 
whole-business CMBS transactions, respectively, in Australia. Centro further had a 
tranche which was denominated in Euro’s targeted forwards European investors. The 
international approach in structuring CMBSs can also be seen in STOREs Pty. Ltd. The 
CMBS issue had multi-jurisdiction covering Australia and New Zealand.  Entrance into 
the CMBS market has also been made by unlisted property trusts, as shown by the 
Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd. CMBS issue. Some unlisted property trusts have become 
sophisticated and have outgrown their existing financing mechanisms and CMBSs are 
an alternative debt funding tool for them. This will add to further growth of the CMBS 
market. The ability of existing CMBSs to issue further debt or “tap issues” can be seen 
in the ALE Finance Co. Pty Ltd. – Series 1 and Quay 62 Pty Ltd. Series 2001-1 issues. 
In 2006, over 80% of activity came from tap issues, refinancing and restructurings from 
existing sponsors (Efrat 2006). 
 
Another feature in the Australian CMBS market has been the increase in the size of 
issues. For instance, all the new issues in 2006 each had a combined tranche value of 
over AU$400 million. Furthermore, the last two years have seen record issue sizes with 
AU$1 billion for Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 2005-1 & 2 in 2005 and AU$900 million 
for Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS Series 2006-1 in 2006. This is a 
significant shift from the early 2000’s CMBS issues which had combined totals of less 
than AU$400 million. 
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4.11 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter highlighted how the Australian CMBS market has evolved from the 
simplistic CPIT Aurora 2006 Bonds CMBS issue to the more complex Centro Shopping 
Centre Securities Limited – CMBS Series 2006-1 CMBS issue.  Investor appeal has 
been broadened by issuing sector specific property-backed CMBSs and diversified 
property-backed CMBSs. Sector specific property-backed CMBSs are further diversified 
by property sub-class. Other investor appeal features include multi-jurisdiction CMBS 
issues and foreign currency denominated tranches in some CMBS issues. 
 
The case studies further show two features which a particular to Australian CMBSs 
different from other parts of the world relating to the secured loan structure and issuance 
of soft bullet securities. Conduit transaction structures common in the US have just been 
introduced though backed by direct property assets.  
 
The next chapter looks at the assessment of property risk in Australian CMBSs. 
Adequate assessment of property risk and its reporting is critical to the success of CMBS 
issues. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY RISK IN AUSTRALIAN 
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The previous chapter showed case studies depicting the growth of Australian CMBSs 
and the diversity of the CMBS issues. This chapter will highlight the significance of 
credit risk assessment in Australian CMBSs. 
 
According to Henderson and ING Barings (1997), assets backing a securitisation are its 
fundamental credit strength. In the case of Australian CMBSs this involves looking at 
the property backing these issues vis-à-vis property risk. There are four main areas of 
risk in securitisation, namely asset risk; cash flow risk; legal risk; and third party risk. 
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) state that the credit risk of a mortgage loan will depend 
on the characteristics of the underlying properties; the loan structure; loan-to-value 
(LTV) and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR); the overall portfolio diversification; and 
other factors, such as the transaction structure, legal risk and servicing quality. Moody’s 
further state that the assigned rating is the relative risk of the collateral and its ability to 
generate income. Therefore, the ratings inform the public of the likelihood of an investor 
receiving the promised principal and interest payments associated with the bond issue 
(Shin & Han 2001). 
 
In particular, a framework is proposed under which property risk assessment, as 
delineated by Adair and Hutchinson’s (2005), can be reported in a more concise and 
systematic approach. A case study is presented to illustrate assessment and reporting of 
property risk within and among CMBS issues. 
 
The key headings under Adair and Hutchinson’s (2005) property risk scoring model are: 
 Market transparency risk; 
 Investment quality risk; 
 Covenant strength risk; and 
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 Depreciation and obsolescence risk. 
 
However, of concern are the last three property risk parameters since market 
transparency risk is not an issue for the Australian property market. Australia is one of 
the most transparent property markets, ranked first together with the USA (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2006b) and has the most highly securitised commercial property market in the 
world (Hughes & Arissen 2005). Jones Lang LaSalle(JLL) (2006:3) define transparency 
as “as any open and clearly organized real estate market operating in a legal and 
regulatory framework that is characterized by a consistent approach to the enforcement 
of rules and regulations and that respects private property rights. JLL further add that 
“the ethical and professional standards of private sector advisors, agents and brokers 
who are licensed to conduct business in each country have to be high”. The advantage of 
having a highly securitised property market is that investors have more publicly 
available information on property risk as a result of the listed property companies being 
legally bound to report their activities and underlying collateral performance to 
regulatory regimes such as ASX/ASIC and their equity investors. According to Hughes 
and Arissen (2005), 30.2% of Australia’s investment-grade property was listed on the 
stock market and the share of listed property as a percentage of overall stock market was 
10.7%, higher than any other country in the world. 
 
Other secondary risk factors such as legal risk and third party risk are not addressed as 
common structural mechanisms to mitigate them have been set for all CMBS issues; 
readers referred to Standard and Poor’s, (2005c), Clayton UTZ (2003) and  Moody’s 
Investor Service (2003). The proposed property risk assessing and reporting framework 
should prove useful to rating agencies, bond issuers and institutional investors. Rating 
agencies could adopt a more systematic and consistent approach towards reporting of 
assessed property risk in CMBS. Issuers and institutional investors could examine the 
perceived consistency and appropriateness of the rating assigned to a CMBS issue by 
providing inferences concerning property risk assessment. 
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5.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPERTY RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
The last few years have seen growth in the area of property risk research in both the 
valuation and investment realm. The debate for more property risk research started with 
the Mallinson Report (RICS 1994). One of the recommendations of this report was that 
common professional standards and methods should be developed for measuring and 
expressing valuation uncertainty. Mallinson and French (2000) took this 
recommendation a step further by examining in-depth the reporting of uncertainty within 
valuation to the client. They proposed a statistical method to account for uncertainty in 
valuation reports. The Investment Property Forum/Investment Property Databank (2000; 
2002) also highlighted the need for more rigorous risk assessment measures within the 
property profession, with a conclusion that a new approach was needed which combined 
conventional analysis of returns uncertainty with a more comprehensive survey of 
business risks.  This debate was brought into sharper focus by the publication of the 
Carsberg Report (RICS 2002) , which emphasised the need for more acceptable methods 
of expressing uncertainty, particularly when pricing in thin markets where information is 
deficient. Furthermore, the debate on the reporting of risk was taken forward by The 
European Group of Valuers Association (TEGoVA) (2003) by the publication of the 
“European Property and Market Rating: A Valuer’s Guide”. The function of the rating 
system is to support risk, property, and loan analyses of portfolios in connection with 
securitisation, investment and disinvestment decisions and granting of property loans 
respectively. An earlier publication by TEGoVA (2002) entitled “European Mortgage 
Securitisation: A Valuer’s Guide” provided valuers with criteria for determination of the 
risk profile in the European mortgage-backed securities market. The International 
Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC) (2006c) has also published a white paper on 
guidelines for the valuation of property-backed securitised assets, with a call for 
comments on these guidelines. The thrust of the white paper is that these assets should 
be assessed on a discounted cash flow basis accounting for all risk factors. 
 
Lorenz et al (2006) show how rating and simulation approaches can be used in property 
valuation to address uncertainty and risk. Hutchinson et al (2005) develop a generic 
market model that can be used to risk score individual property investments utilising  the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a multi-criteria decision making tool. Adair and 
Hutchinson (2005) examine risk analysis within investment decision-making framework 
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and the property industry and further explain how their property risk scoring framework 
can be applied. French and Gabrielli (2004; 2005) show the superiority of using 
simulations in property valuation to account for uncertainty. Despite attempts by these 
studies for better assessment of risk and uncertainty and their communication to clients, 
Lorenz (2006) and Joslin (2005) concede that the concept of uncertainty within property 
valuation is poorly understood and that it is rarely conveyed to clients in a coherent 
form. 
 
Impetus for the explicit communication of risk in property has emerged more recently 
under the requirements of the Basel 2. The implications of Basel 2 are that banks must 
be more explicit about the risks of lending. As property constitutes a major source of 
such lending, the identification, analysis and communication of the risks involved are 
becoming more important (APRA 2007b; The Economist 2005) 
 
Lorenz et al (2006) report that confusion surrounds the terms risk and uncertainty within 
valuation literature because they are often used interchangeably and because one can 
often be found within the description of the other. They do not offer a definition of risk 
but follow Chicken and Posner’s (1999) classification of the constituents of risk as 
shown below: 
 
    Risk = Hazard × Exposure 
 
Whereby hazard is the way in which a thing or situation can cause harm while exposure 
is the extent to which the likely receipt of the harm can be influenced by the hazard.  
This is analogous to the perception of risk in CMBS in terms of the probability of 
default and severity of loss. The probability of default is measured through debt service 
coverage ratio (DSCR) and severity of loss through loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Fabozzi 
and Jacob (1997) state that these are the main criteria used to quickly assess the risk of 
CMBS deals. The LTV is calculated by dividing the total amount of the notes issued by 
the current market value of all the properties. The DSCR is calculated by dividing the 
total net passing income of the properties by the debt-servicing amount. The debt-
servicing amount is derived by multiplying credit rating agencies’ stressed interest rate 
assumption by the notes’ issuance amount. 
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Credit rating agencies establish a stabilised net cash flow and a ‘assessed capital value’, 
which are used as the basis of the debt-sizing calculations. The appropriate LTV and 
DSCR are applied to those values. The capitalisation rate used to determine the 
‘assessed capital value’ is a function of the risk and return of the asset, reflecting its age, 
quality, location, and competitive position within the market. 
 
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) state that the core of their analysis is the assessment of 
cash flows that will be available to service the debt during the term of the loans and for 
refinancing, if necessary. Sustainable cash flows are meant to represent the cash-
generating potential of a property looking through the real estate cycle. Underwriting at 
or near the peak is more likely to produce unsustainable incomes and capital values than 
underwriting at the bottom of the cycle. For instance, Fitch Ratings (1999) show that a 
rating of ‘A’ or higher should have survived the early 1990’s Australian recession intact. 
Transactions rated lower than ‘A’ would have suffered losses. At the peak of the 
recession in 1992, interest rates rose to 17% and commercial real estate market in 
Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide were severely hit. In general, net effective rents 
on commercial properties decreased more than 50%, vacancy rates increased to more 
than 20%, and values dropped more than 50%. 
 
One of this study’s major contributions is offering a framework for assessing and 
communicating property risk for the success of the CMBS issues. As pointed out earlier, 
risk and uncertainty are poorly understood in property valuation and this may extend to 
CMBSs since property assets are the fundamental credit strength of Australian CMBSs.  
CMBS investors are able to make informed decisions before investing in CMBSs on the 
premise that property risk has been systematically and consistently assessed before 
credit ratings are assigned prior to the launch of the CMBS issue. 
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5.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
All the CMBSs issued over a six year period of 2000 to 2005 were obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s presale reports as found in their Ratings Direct database to identify 
and review how property risk factors were addressed in all issues and within specific 
property asset classes following the delineation of property risk by Adair and 
Hutchinson (2005).  
  
The dataset comprised a total of 49 generic CMBSs (excluding credit lease and small 
ticket transactions) with a total of 135 tranches, worth over AU$10.3 billion.  Generic 
CMBSs, which are mainly single-borrower transactions, account for 62% of all CMBS 
issuances (Standard & Poor's 2005a). Credit lease and small ticket transactions are not 
discussed in this thesis. Specific details obtained per CMBS issue were: 
 
 Total lettable area, capital values, and net income; 
 Gearing and transaction structure details; 
 Tenancy and lease details relating to the credit quality of tenants, tenant 
concentration, and lease expiry profiles; 
 Asset quality details relating to location, average age, condition, and tenancy 
retention; 
 Diversification and total number of assets backing the issues; and 
 Management profile of issuers. 
 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of aggregated details of all the Australian CMBSs issued 
from 2000 to 2005. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Australian CMBS (2000 - 2005) 
MV 
(AU$m)
S&P AV 
(AU$m)
CVD (%) NI 
(AU$m)
S&P NI 
(AU$m)
NID (%) DSCR LTV PD HHGR
All Min 0.44 1 49,650 200 200 0.0% 17.90 17.90 0.0% 1.20 32.0% 1.16% 0.0% 20% 3.6 83.0% 1 8.0% 0.20
Max 350 7 1,008,603 1,880 1,660 22.9% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 3.50 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 100.0% 1.00
Average 75 4 349,805 760 672 11.0% 62.00 56.28 9.0% 2.14 45.1% 3.1% 37.5% 45.8% 7.8 97.2% 21 29.8% 0.47
Diversified Min 1 3 97,316 265 228 7.3% 21.00 19.50 3.0% 1.29 32.0% 1.9% 17.9% 42.0% 3.6 91.3% 7 9.7% 0.32
Max 350 6 588,200 1,430 1,255 20.2% 123.87 107.80 13.4% 3.50 68.0% 4.4% 56.0% 67.0% 10.0 99.0% 25 60.2% 0.51
Average 62 4 284,666 688 606 12.0% 56.79 50.97 9.3% 2.10 46.1% 3.2% 39.5% 50.9% 7.1 97.0% 19 35.5% 0.40
Industrial Min 5 1 500,844 454 399 3.0% 46.00 37.80 2.0% 1.46 33.0% 2.0% 24.2% 24.3% 4.1 94.0% 26 8.0% 0.48
Max 185 5 1,008,603 1,147 885 22.9% 92.26 84.10 17.8% 3.10 68.0% 3.3% 24.2% 25.0% 6.3 99.0% 39 14.0% 0.79
Average 60 3 787,841 808 701 12.2% 74.79 67.53 9.8% 2.40 42.6% 2.5% 24.2% 24.9% 5.4 97.6% 34 10.2% 0.63
Office Min 10 1 49,650 495 473 4.4% 34.40 29.30 5.4% 1.28 32.0% 1.2% 13.3% 39.0% 4.1 83.0% 1 11.9% 0.26
Max 350 5 431,691 1,880 1,660 16.4% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 2.40 62.0% 3.4% 75.0% 79.9% 8.0 99.5% 21 100.0% 1.00
Average 133 3 310,142 1,220 1,084 10.9% 96.40 83.27 13.6% 2.04 41.0% 2.2% 44.3% 54.2% 5.7 96.4% 13 26.3% 0.49
Retail Min 0.44 3 91,152 200 200 0.0% 17.90 17.90 0.0% 1.20 35.0% 2.0% 0.0% 20.1% 4.0 93.0% 2 11.0% 0.20
Max 240 7 533,343 1,380 1,100 20.3% 92.80 85.40 13.9% 3.30 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 64.0% 0.78
Average 61 5 189,845 524 468 9.7% 41.76 39.06 5.9% 2.09 47.9% 3.9% 30.5% 45.0% 13.9 97.8% 20 37.0% 0.45
Diversity
Tenant/Lease Details
LF TA
No. of Assets
CQI TC WALE OR
Property Details Financial DetailsSector Issue  Issued 
Amount 
(A$m) 
Note 
Tenure 
(Years)
TLA (m²) Capital Value Net Income ($m) Gearing
  
Key: TLA: Total Lettable Area  
MV: Market Value 
S&P AV: Standard & Poor’s Assessed Value 
CVD: Capital Value Discount 
NI: Net Income 
 
 
 
S&P NI: Standard & Poor’s Net     
               Income 
NID: Net Income Discount 
DSCR: Debt Service Coverage  
             Ratio 
 
 
 
LTV: Loan-to-Value Ratio 
LF: Liquidity Facility (% of S&P AV) 
CQI: Credit Quality of Income (% of  income from  
          investment grade  tenants)  
TC: Tenancy Concentration (Top 5 tenants as % of  
        total gross income)  
 
WALE: Weighted Average Unexpired Lease  
              Term (Years)  
OR: Occupancy Rate (%) 
TA: Total number of properties 
PD: Property Diversity (% of portfolio value)  
HHGR: Geographic Diversity Herfindahl   
              Index 
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Over the study period, the peak issuance year was the year 2002 with 19 (38%) followed 
by the year 2003 at 14 (27%) issues. The years 2004 and 2005 had comparatively similar 
issuances at 7 (14%) and 8 (16%) respectively. The formative years of 2000 and 2001 
had issues of 2 (1%) and 5 (4%) respectively. These figures are represented in Figure 
5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Australian CMBS Issuance by Percentage (2000 - 2005) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
Figure 5.2 presents the CMBS issuance by sector over 2000 to 2005. Over this six year 
period, the most dominant CMBS issues have been in the office sector (AU$3.6 billion), 
followed by the retail sector (AU$2.7 billion). The diversified sector17 and the industrial 
sector have had AU$2.6 billion and AU$1.4 billion worth of CMBS issuance 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 These are property portfolios composed of different property types. 
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Figure 5.2: Australian CMBS Issuance by Sector Amounts (2000 - 2005) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
To illustrate property risk assessment in individual CMBS issues, Multiplex CMBS 
Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 & 2005-2 are taken as case-study. The Multiplex CMBS issues 
were selected on account of being the largest and most recent during our study period. 
5.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The CMBS data collected as pointed out in Section 5.3 were analysed on an aggregate 
basis to compare property risk assessment within the various property sub-classes using 
the proposed framework. The results of the analysis under the delineation of property 
risk are shown below. 
5.4.1 Investment Quality Risk 
5.4.1.1 Cross and Over-Collateralisation 
 
Cross-collateralisation is a standard feature in Australian CMBS issues. Equity and cash 
flows from performing properties are available to support weaker properties, reducing 
the probability of default and improving the recovery assumptions on the loan.  Large 
asset backing contributes to the attainment of a higher credit rating (Moody's Investor 
Service 2003). Lee (2007), among other authors, asserts that real estate portfolios with 
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smaller number of properties have a higher volatility of portfolio returns than larger 
portfolios. CMBSs backed by industrial property had the most number of properties per 
issue at an average of 34 properties (788,000m²), followed by retail property-backed 
issues at an average of 20 properties (190,000m²). These were followed by CMBSs 
backed by diversified properties at an average of 18 properties (285,000m²) per issue. 
The least number of properties backing a CMBS issue were those of office properties at 
an average of 13 properties (310,000m²) per issue.  
 
Over-collateralisation is achieved by the special purpose vehicle owning assets to a 
greater value than the funds it raises from investors or lenders (Henderson & ING 
Barings 1997). In case of default, the market value should be able to meet all loan 
repayments. However, credit rating agencies substantially discount market values and 
net income to arrive at their “assessed values”. Assessed values are the basis on which 
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-service coverage ratio (DSCR) are determined. 
These are the main criteria used to quickly assess credit risk of CMBS deals (Fabozzi & 
Jacob 1997). This offers ‘double-edged’ protection to investors as the adopted LTV and 
DSCR are conservative in comparison to those used in direct property lending and are 
further based on discounted values.  
 
Table 5.1 shows averages of market value, Standard and Poor’s (S & P) assessed values, 
capital value discount, net income, S & P net income, and net rent discount, among 
others, over the study period. Industrial property-backed issues showed the highest 
average capital value discount (12.2%) followed by diversified property-backed issues 
(12.0%), office backed issues (10.9%) and retail property-backed issues (10.0%). 
Further, average net income discount shows office backed issues had the highest 
discount (13.6%) followed by industrial property-backed issues (9.8%), diversified 
property-backed issues (9.3%); and retail property-backed issues (5.9%) had the lowest 
discount. These discounts can be used as proxies of portfolio composition and CMBSs 
that can be issued. For instance, a CMBS issue of AU$100 million needs to be backed 
by a portfolio value of AU$109 million at a market average discount of 10.9% in the 
case of office backed issues. 
 
These results show that the composition of a property portfolio backing an issue and the 
capital and rental discounts applied, considered the volatility of the returns of the various 
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property sub-classes. Moody’s Investor Service (2003) assert that the stability of the 
cash flows and asset values of the major property types, ranked in order from lowest to 
highest volatility, is as follows – retail, industrial, office and hotel. 
5.4.1.2 Occupancy Rates 
 
Occupancy rates in all issues ranged between 83% and 100% above industry averages. 
Retail property-backed issues had an average occupancy rate of 98% in line with the 
average national occupancy rates of 97% - 98% followed by diversified and industrial 
property-backed issues which had 97% each. Office property-backed issues had an 
average occupancy rate of 96%, significantly above the average national occupancy rate 
of 92.5% as at December 2005 (Colonial First Estate Global Asset Management 2006). 
High occupancy rates mitigate the risk of rental loss due to vacancies.  
 
5.4.1.3 Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratio and Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) 
 
As pointed out in Section 5.2, the risk and return profile of an asset reflects its age, 
quality, location, and competitive position within the market. These aspects are captured 
in the capitalisation rate adopted for property valuation. The ‘assessed capital value’ is 
the basis of the debt-sizing calculations of LTV and DSCR.  
 
The incidence of default rises as the LTV rises; that is, if all other factors are held 
constant, the probability of default for a loan increases as the LTV increases, but not 
equally. Unlike the LTV, where the probability of default increases as the LTV rises, the 
incidence of default is a decreasing function of the DSCR. However, the relationship 
between the DSCR and the probability of default is weaker than the relationship 
between the LTV and default (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997). Table 5.2 shows composite 
ranges for both DSCR and LTV across all rating classes assigned during the study 
period. It should be noted that various rating classes have specific LTV and DSCR 
ranges. Progression from the lower notes (BBB) to higher notes (AAA), LTV thresholds 
decrease and DSCR thresholds increase respectively.  Details of indicative LTV and 
DSCR threshold levels in various asset classes can be found in Standard and Poor’s 
(2003c) and Jones Lang LaSalle (2001). 
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Table 5.2: LTV and DSCR Threshold in Australian CMBS Issues (2000 - 2005) 
 
 Sector 
DSCR (x) 
LTV range 
(%)* 
Min Max Min Max 
Diversified 1.29 3.50 0.32 0.68 
Industrial 1.46 3.10 0.33 0.68 
Office 1.28 2.40 0.32 0.62 
Retail 1.20 3.30 0.35 0.76 
 
 Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
DSCR ranged from 1.46 to 3.10 for the industrial and 1.28 to 2.40 for office property-
backed issues. Retail and diversified property-backed issues had a slightly higher ranges 
of 1.2 to 3.3 and 1.29 to 3.50, respectively. As for LTV ratios, the highest range was 
again in the retail property-backed issues from 0.35 to 0.76 with those backed by the 
diversified, industrial and office property-backed issues ranging from 0.32 to 0.628 as 
shown in Table 5.2. This confirms the earlier Moody’s Investor Service (2003) and 
Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) suppositions of retail properties having the least cash flow 
and asset value volatility and hence rating agencies assessing them at higher LTV and 
DSCR ranges. 
5.4.1.4 Liquidity Facility 
 
This covers interest shortfalls and amounts necessary to preserve and protect the 
mortgage collateral. The standard has been to allow for six months of note payments at 
the credit rating agencies refinance constant for six months of transaction expenses.  
Across all issues this ranged from 1.16% to 13.3% of S & P’s accessed capital values. 
Diversified property-backed issues had a range of 1.9% - 4.38%; industrial property-
backed issues ranged from 1.96% - 3.34%; and office property-backed issues from 
1.16% - 3.4%. The largest range was in the retail property-backed issues which had 
2.0% - 13.3%. A probable explanation is the number of tenants in property portfolios to 
mitigate incidences of rental default. For instance, retail properties have a larger number 
of tenants, hence the higher liquidity facility demanded. 
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5.4.1.5 Overall Portfolio Diversity 
 
The diversity of a portfolio of assets will have an impact on the volatility of the pool’s 
expected loss. Diversity is examined by property type, geographic location, property 
concentration and economic sector. By diversifying the mix of property types, one can 
mitigate a pool’s expected loss. Geographic diversity mitigates the risk of single market 
decline and may reduce any losses associated with this type of risk. Generally, loans 
secured by operational real estate such as hotel properties tend to have the highest 
default probability followed by unanchored retail properties and office properties. Loans 
secured by anchored retail and industrial/warehouse properties have the lowest default 
levels (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001). Roche (2002) further expands this assertion by stating 
that diversity across property type is more valuable than geographic diversity because 
the market for investment grade in Australia is relatively small and values across cities 
for specific asset types, such as single tenanted, large office properties in secondary 
CBD or suburban locations, are highly correlated. Table 5.3 shows the composition of 
Australian CMBS property portfolios by property class. 
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Table 5.3: Composition of Australian CMBS Property Portfolios by Property 
Class 
Property Type 
Property Portfolios 
Diversified Industrial Office Retail 
Hotel √    
Cinema √   √ 
Car park √    
Warehouse/Distribution √ √   
Business/Office park √ √   
Industrial estate √ √   
Container park √    
Campus √    
Development site/Hi-tech √ √   
CBD A-grade offices √  √  
Non-CBD A-grade offices √  √  
Regional shopping centre    √ 
Sub-regional shopping 
centre 
   √ 
Neighbourhood shopping 
centre 
   √ 
Bulky goods retail centre    √ 
 
 
Following Hedander (2005) who used a diversity scoring system based on the 
Herfindahl Index to measure diversity on a geographic and property type mix in 
Australian listed property trusts, a similar procedure is adopted to measure diversity in 
Australian CMBS portfolios. This index effectively converts a pool of CMBS issues of 
uneven size into a measurement of diversity, as if all issues were the same size. A totally 
focussed CMBS issue has an index equal to one, while the index for a diversified CMBS 
issue is closer to zero.  
 
The Herfindahl geographic region index (HHGR) for each respective CMBS issue is 
calculated as follows: 
HHGR = ∑
=
8
1
2
)(
j
j
x
x
        (5.1)
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where:   
j = Geographic region: the states in Australia (New South  
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western 
Australia, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) and Tasmania, 
x j  = percentage of asset type in portfolio 
x  = total portfolio composition  
 
Of all the CMBS sector issues, diversified property-backed issues had the most 
geographical diversity with an average score of 0.40 followed by retail and office 
property-backed issues with scores of 0.45 and 0.49, respectively. Industrial property-
backed issues had the least diversity with a score of 0.63. An explanation of this is that 
the eastern states of New South Wales and Victoria account for the bulk of Australia’s 
gross domestic product. Retail and office properties included in most issues are found in 
most states with little representation in Tasmania and Northern Territory. 
 
The Herfindahl property type index (HHPT) for each respective CMBS issue is 
calculated as follows: 
 
HHPT = ∑
=
6
1
2
)(
i
i
x
x
        (5.2) 
 
where:  i = type of property: industrial, office, retail, hotel, car park,  
other 
xi  = percentage of asset type in portfolio 
x  = total portfolio composition  
 
Assessment for diversity by property type basis was only undertaken for the diversified 
property-backed sector, which had a score of 0.77.  Lack of adequate data was the 
reason for not assessing the retail, office and industrial sectors.  
 
Another measure of diversity is the percentage of the largest property by value in 
relation to the whole portfolio value (PD). A large single property value exposure has a 
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negative impact on the portfolio in instances of default. The retail property-backed 
sector had the largest average single property value concentration at 37.5% due to the 
large size of the properties both on floor area basis and by market value. The least was 
the industrial sector at 10.2%. The diversified property-backed sector closely followed 
the retail property-backed sector at 35.5% whereas the office property-backed sector had 
an average of 26.3%. 
 
Details on HHGR and PD are found in Table 5.1. 
5.4.2 Covenant Strength Risk 
 
Covenant strength risk is impacted through credit quality of income, the weighted 
average lease expiry profile, and tenancy concentration. A large percentage of income 
from investment grade tenants minimises the incidence of default whereas a lower 
diversity of tenants increases the incidence of default.  
 
Tenancy concentration is measured through the contribution of 5 top tenants’ 
contribution to total net income. The office sector had the highest percentage of the 5 top 
tenants’ contribution to net income at an average of 54.2% and the least was the 
industrial sector at 24.9%. The diversified and retail sectors had averages of 50.9% and 
45.0%, respectively.  
 
As for credit quality of income which is measured by percentage of income from 
investment grade tenants, the same trend exhibited in tenancy concentration continues 
with office sector at 44.3%, diversified sector at 39.5%; retail sector at 30.5%; and 
industrial sector at 24.2%. An explanation of this is that most office buildings included 
in CMBSs are prized-trophy properties occupied by large, well-established and often 
highly credit-rated firms. As for retail properties, apart from credit-rated anchor tenants 
such as the Woolworths group, Coles Mayer and David Jones, the bulk of the tenants are 
small unrated specialty shops.   
 
A higher WALE profile also lowers the incidence of default as there is a higher 
probability of rental receipt (Moody's Investor Service 2003). All the issues had WALE 
profiles above the tenure of the issued CMBS notes. Retail sector had an average WALE 
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of 13.9 years due to long leases by some anchor tenants in excess of 15 years. The 
diversified sector had average WALE profile of 7.0 years and the office and industrial 
sectors had 5.6 and 5.4 years, respectively. The WALE profile is important in the 
determination of the note tenure. For instance, the note tenure of CMBSs backed by 
retail properties are longer than those backed by other property classes at an average of 2 
years due to the long leases found in this property class. 
5.4.3 Depreciation and Obsolescence Risk 
 
In all the issues, depreciation and obsolescence risk is mitigated by the inclusion of 
maintenance and capital expenditure reserves. Sufficient and regular capital expenditure 
is necessary to ensure that collateral quality, occupancy and value are maintained. A 
capital expenditure reserve may be required to ensure sufficient funds are available to 
cover any major capital expenditure works during the life of the transaction. Capital 
expenditure requirements may also be addressed via a guarantee facility from an 
appropriately rated counterparty. There are no set rules as each transaction has different 
requirements depending upon the condition of the assets, the gearing levels, and the 
positioning of the asset in the market. Some of the parameters in place are lump sums 
over a certain period or percentages of the independent valuation of the "core" 
properties. 
5.5 CASE STUDY: MULTIPLEX CMBS ISSUER LTD. SERIES 2005-1 & 2 
 
Although the above analysis was conducted on an aggregated basis for comparison of 
property risk assessment across various property sub-classes, this analysis can be 
extended to compare property risk assessment between CMBS issues. In this section, a 
CMBS issue is presented as a case study of how property risk can be assessed and 
reported with a single CMBS issue using the proposed framework. Justification of the 
case study methodology was presented in chapter four. 
5.5.1. Background 
 
In May 2005, Multiplex Property Trust announced the launch of a AU$1 billion CMBS 
issue to settle a significant portion of its bank debt. A substantial reduction in their cost 
of debt was also announced at a weighted average margin of 0.334% per annum 
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(Multiplex Property Trust 2005).  The CMBS was in two series, with tranches ranging 
from AAA through to BBB-. Series One had a scheduled maturity of three years and 
Series Two five years. The CMBS was secured by 17 properties located in Sydney, 
Melbourne, Brisbane, Canberra and Perth, with a combined fair market value of AU$1.7 
billion. The two series have a similar transaction structure. Figure 5.3 shows the 
transaction structure of Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2. 
 
Figure 5.3: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2 Transaction Structure 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2005a; 2005b) 
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5.5.2 Issue Details 
 
Details of the CMBS issues as shown in Table 5.4 were analysed using the property sub-
class averages in Table 5.1 and other industry benchmarks to assess property risk. 
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Table 5.4: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 & 2 Issue Details 
 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-
1 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2 
Issue Date: May 2005    May 2005    
Term-to-Maturity:  3 years    5 years    
Property Type: 8 Office Buildings 5 Retail (30.7%)* & 4 Office (69.3%)* 
Buildings 
Size:  245,323 m²    196,450 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$931.7m    AU$803.5m    
Issue Size:  AU$537m    AU$463m    
Tranche: AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW AMOUNT LTV DSCR BBSW 
AAA AU$343m 40.6% 2.03 20bp AU$298m 40.5% 2.01 25bp 
AA AU$61m 47.8% 1.73 30bp AU$53m 47.7% 1.70 40bp 
A AU$54m 54.2% 1.52 40bp AU$39m 53.1% 1.53 50bp 
BBB AU$51m 60.2% 1.37 57bp AU$52m 60.1% 1.35 75bp 
BBB- AU$28m 63.5% 1.30 80bp AU$21m 63.0% 1.29 90bp 
Interest Type Floating    Floating    
Occupancy Rate (OR): 98%    93%    
Weighted Average Unexpired 
Lease Term (WALE):  
4.9 years    7.6 years    
Liquidity Facility (LF):  AU$29.5m    AU$25.5m    
Refinance constant: 9.0%    9.0%    
Largest Tenant (% of Net 
Income) (TC): 
14%    17.9%    
Property Diversity (Largest 
single exposure) (PD): 
AU$200m or 21.48% of portfolio value AU$222.5m or 28% of portfolio value 
Net Income from Top 10 
Tenants (CQI):  
71%    54%    
Geographic Diversity:         
New South Wales 68%    57%    
Queensland 17%    22%    
Western Australia 15%    6%    
Victoria -    8%    
Australian Capital Territory -    7%    
Herfindahl property type index 
(HHPT): 
1.000    0.848    
Herfindahl geographic region 
index (HHGR): 
0.261    0.625    
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2005d; 2005e) and Fitch Ratings (2005a; 2005b) 
5.5.3 Property Portfolio 
 
Portfolio composition of the two series is shown below and additional details are shown 
in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 & 2 Property Portfolios 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 
Property Location Ownership Occupancy % of 
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
Goldfields House Sydney 100 98 21.46 200.00 
Jessie Street Centre Parramantta 100 100 19.32 180.00 
NRMA Centre Sydney 50 100 14.92 139.00 
AMP Place  Brisbane 100 87 12.29 114.50 
KPMG Tower Sydney 50 100 12.48 116.25 
Bank West Tower Perth 50 100 9.93 92.50 
Ernst & Young Building  Perth 100 93 5.06 47.20 
ANZ Centre Brisbane 50 100 4.54 42.20 
Total    100.00 931.65 
 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2 
Property Location Ownership Occupancy % of  
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
Ernst & Young Centre Sydney 50 88 27.7 222.50 
240 Queens Street Brisbane 100 98 15.9 127.50 
15 Blue Street Nth Sydney 100 100 10.8 87.00 
Defence Plaza Melbourne 100 100 8.1 65.00 
111 Alinga Street Canberra 100 96 6.8 55.00 
King Street Wharf Sydney 100 100 10.1 81.50 
Pittwater Place Sydney 100 86 8.0 64.0 
Great Western Super Centre Brisbane 100 96 6.4 51.0 
Carillon City Shopping Centre Perth 50 88 6.3 50.0 
Total    100.00 803.50 
 
 
The portfolio details were used to arrive at geographic and property diversity factors. 
These were then compared with the sector averages in Table 5.1. 
5.5.4 Property Risk Assessment 
 
Table 5.6 presents the results of the property risk assessment of Multiplex CMBS Issuer 
Ltd. Series 2005-1 CMBS issue as an example.  
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Table 5.6: Property Risk Assessment in Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series -1 
 
Property Risk Criteria Mitigating Strategy Comments for Risk Mitigation 
Investment Quality:   
Cross collateralisation 8 office buildings  Reduced risk of default as each of the properties 
support each other in instances of poor 
performance. Though the portfolio composition is 
less than the sub-sector average for 2000 - 2005 
of 13, the portfolio’s net income is higher than 
the sub-sector average by 35%. 
 
Over collateralisation Aggregated market value of 
AU$931.7m vs. total loan value of 
AU$537m 
The total property value would have to fall under 
42% to result in non-payment of principal. 
Property yields forecast to compress further 
during loan period (2005 - 2010) due to the high 
demand for ‘prized trophy’ properties and will 
result in growth in property values. 
 
Occupancy rate (OR) 98% Well above national average of 91.5% as at 
January 2005 for CBD offices and the sub-sector 
average for 2000 - 2005 of 96.4%. 
 
Tenancy Retention 87% MPT have shown ability to actively manage lease 
renewals. 
 
LTV (AAA notes) 40.6% Below the Australian rating parameter for 
commercial offices of 45% 
 
DSCR (AAA notes) 2.03 Above the Australian DSCR rating parameter for 
commercial offices of 2.00. Rental growth 
projected to grow at about 3% over loan period 
guaranteeing coupon payment. 
 
Liquidity Facility (LF) AU$29.5m or 5.49% of issued debt Adequate coverage of six months’ of note 
payments and transaction expenses. The sub-
sector average for 2000 - 2005 was 2.2%. 
 
Portfolio Diversification:   
- Asset Type (HHPT) 1 Highly focussed portfolio.  
 
-  Property (PD) 21.48% of portfolio value Single property value risk mitigated by “prized-
trophy” status of property. 
 
- Geographic (HHGR) 0.26 Well below the sub-sector average for 2000 - 
2005 of 0.49. 
Covenant Strength:   
Credit Quality of Income (CQI) 71.4% Low risk of rental default due to the high 
percentage of credit rated tenants. Sub-sector 
average for 2000 - 2005 is 44.3%. 
 
Weighted Average Lease Expiry 
(WALE) 
4.9 years 1.9 years above loan maturity, added certainty of 
rental income receipt but falls short of the sub-
sector average for 2000 - 2005 is 5.7 years. 
 
Tenancy Concentration (TC) 14% Well diversified rental income sources. Very 
favourable in comparison to the sub-sector 
average for 2000 - 2005 of 54.2%. 
 
Depreciation and Obsolescence: Guarantee to maintain assets to 
investment quality standards 
Limited capital expenditure requirements over the 
medium term as assets are relatively new. 
 
 
It has been shown that property risk in Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 can be 
easily compared with set benchmarks and reported using our framework. This is of 
benefit to guaranteeing investors of their promised principal and interest payments. 
Other transaction structure features, though not subject of discussion in this paper, such 
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as insurance for full reinstatement, along with public liability and business 
interruption/loss of rental, borrower collection accounts, interest rate swap provision and 
tail periods of 18 months to cover refinancing risk, further reinforce this. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
 
The success of Australian CMBSs can largely be attributed to high property market 
transparency and well developed securitisation market. These features and the 
dominance of issuance by LPTs have contributed to greater assessment and reporting of 
property risk in CMBSs. However, this has to be done in a more systematic and 
consistent approach as shown by the proposed property risk assessment and reporting 
framework. The dominance of CMBSs issuance by LPTs who legally have to report 
their activities and underlying collateral performance to regulatory regimes such as 
ASX/ASIC and their equity investors ensures availability of public information on 
property risk.  
 
The proposed framework can be implemented on an aggregated level as well as on a 
single CMBS issue as illustrated by a case study on the Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. 
Series 2005-1 & 2 issues.  The framework should prove useful to rating agencies, bond 
issuers and institutional investors. Rating agencies can adopt a more systematic and 
consistent approach towards reporting of assessed property risk in CMBS. Issuers and 
institutional investors can examine the perceived consistency and appropriateness of the 
rating assigned to a CMBS issue by providing inferences concerning property risk 
assessment. 
 
Over the study period 2000-2005, investment risk was minimised by composing well 
diversified portfolios of mainly ‘prized-trophy’ properties as well as utilising 
conservative loan-to-value ratios and high debt-service-coverage ratios. Weighted 
average lease expiry profiles in excess of the tenure of the issued notes, adequate tenant 
concentrations, and ample income from investment-grade tenants, all mitigated covenant 
strength risk. As for depreciation and obsolescence risk, no standard feature were set 
though all issues provide for maintenance and capital expenditure reserves to maximise 
collateral quality, occupancy and value. This information can be used to benchmark 
property risk assessment and reporting in individual CMBS issues. 
 132 
 
 
The next chapter extends risk analysis in CMBSs by empirically testing the capacity of 
artificial neural networks (ANN) and ordinal regression (OR) to predict credit ratings of 
Australian CMBSs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN CMBS CREDIT 
RATINGS 
 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Bond rating agencies claim that their credit ratings reflect each agency’s opinion about 
an issue’s potential default risk and rely heavily on a committee’s analysis of the issuer’s 
ability and willingness to repay its debt and therefore researchers cannot replicate their 
ratings quantitatively (Kim 2005). Despite this assertion, researchers have still gone 
ahead and replicated bond ratings on the premise that the financial variables extracted 
from public financial statements, such as financial ratios, contain a large amount of 
information about a company’s credit risk (Huang et al. 2004).  Bond rating studies have 
traditionally used statistical techniques such as multivariate discriminant analysis 
(MDA), multiple regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit models to capture and 
model the expertise of the bond rating process.  Recently, however, a number of studies 
have demonstrated that artificial neural networks (ANN) can be used as an alternative 
methodology to bond rating.  
 
As such, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate several aspects of the use of ANN 
as a tool for predicting credit ratings of Australian CMBSs. Tests are undertaken to 
compare the predictive power of ANN models and ordinal regression (OR) models.  The 
findings of this analysis will provide insights into what factors impact the credit rating of 
a CMBS issue. 
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
ANNs are trainable analytical tools that attempt to mimic information processing 
patterns in the human brain. They are applied to a wide variety of pattern matching, 
classification, and prediction problems and are useful in many financial applications 
such as: stock price prediction, development of security trading systems, modelling 
foreign exchange markets, prediction of bond ratings, forecasting financial distress, and 
credit fraud detection and prevention. Comprehensive reviews of articles demonstrating 
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the use of ANNs in various finance situations can be found in Fadlalla and Lin (2001); 
Coakley and Brown (2000); and Krishnaswamy et al. (2000).  
 
Neural networks are regarded by many authoritative commentators as a useful addition 
to standard statistical techniques, and are in fact themselves based on statistical 
principles. Statistical methods such as multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), 
multiple regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit models have been used in order to 
capture and model the expertise of the bond rating process.  Frequently these studies are 
in form of comparative analysis, with researchers contrasting them with the findings and 
perceived efficiency of ANNs.  Salchenberger et al. (1992) and Tam and Kiang (1992) 
state that the main advantage ANNs have over more traditional statistical methods is that 
they do not require priori specification of a function form, but rather they attempt to 
learn from the training input-output examples alone. 
6.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks in Real Estate Studies 
 
ANNs have earned a popular following amongst real estate researchers covering aspects 
such as real estate valuation: Tay and Ho (1991), Evans and Collins (1992), Worzala et 
al. (1995), Kauko (2004), Lai and Fischer (2006), Pagourtzi et al. (2007); examination of 
the impact of age on house values: Do and Grudnitski (1992); prediction of house value: 
McGreal et al. (1998), Nguyen and Cripps (2001) and Lai (2005); forecasting 
commercial property values: Connellan and James (1998a) and Connellan and James 
(1998b); predicting commercial mortgage-backed securities credit ratings: Chikolwa and 
Chan (2008); and the impact of environmental characteristics on real estate prices: 
Kauko (2003). 
 
Most of the studies, except for Worzala et al. (1995) and Lenk et al. (1997), show that 
ANNs have a superior predictive capacity over traditional statistical techniques. Worzala 
et al. and Lenk et al. noted that ANNs were not necessarily superior over traditional 
statistical techniques.  
 
The increased use of neural networks by academic and commercial analysts in real 
estate studies is motivated by their recognition of complex patterns of multivariate 
property data (Connellan & James 1998a). This increased use of ANN methodology in 
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commercial real estate research gives credence to its extension to research in predicting 
CMBS bond ratings.  
6.2.2 Artificial Neural Networks in Corporate Bond Studies 
 
Rating agencies and some researchers have emphasized the importance of subjective 
judgement in the bond rating process and criticized the use of simple statistical models 
and other models derived from artificial intelligence to predict credit ratings, although 
they agree that such analysis provides a basic ground for judgement in general (Huang et 
al. 2004). Qualitative judgement, which includes accounting quality, operating 
efficiency, financial flexibility, industry risk, and market position, is still difficult to 
measure. In this sense, various quantitative methods have been applied to bond rating. 
Statistical methods such as multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), multiple 
regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit models have been used in order to capture 
and model the expertise of the bond rating process. Literature on bond rating prediction 
has demonstrated that statistical models and artificial intelligence models (mainly neural 
networks) achieved remarkably good prediction performance and largely captured the 
characteristics of the bond rating process (Chaveesuk et al. 1999; Daniels & Kamp 1999; 
Dutta & Shekhar 1988; Huang et al. 2004; Kim 2005; Kwon et al. 1997; Maher & Sen 
1997; Surkan & Singleton 1990; Yesilyaprak 2004). 
 
Dutta and Shekhar (1988) were the first to investigate the ability of ANNs to bond 
rating. Their sample comprised bonds issued by 47 companies randomly selected from 
the April 1986 issues of Value Line Index and Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide. They 
obtained a very high accuracy of 83.3% in discerning AA from non-AA rated bonds. 
However, the sample was so small that it simply amounted to showing the applicability 
of ANNs to bond rating. 
 
Surkan and Singleton (1990) also investigated the bond rating abilities of neural 
networks and linear models. They used MDA, and found that ANNs outperformed the 
linear model for bond rating application. 
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Maher and Sen (1997) compared the performance of neural networks with that of 
logistic regression. ANN performed better than a traditional logistic regression model. 
The best performance of the model was 70% (42 out of 60 samples). 
 
Kwon et al. (1997) compared the predictive performance of ordinal pairwise partitioning 
(Shopping Centre Council of Australia) approach, conventional back propagation neural 
network (CNN) approach and MDA. They used 2365 Korean bond-rating data and 
demonstrated that ANNs with OPP had the highest accuracy (71 - 73%), followed by 
CNN (66 - 67%) and MDA (58-61%). 
 
Chaveesuk et al. (1999) compared the predictive power of three ANN paradigms- back 
propagation (BP), radial basis function (RBF) and learning vector quantisation (LVQ)- 
with logistic regression models (LRM). Bond issues of 90 companies were randomly 
selected from the 1997 issues listed by Standard and Poor’s. LVQ (36.7%) and RBF 
(38.3%) had inferior results to BP (51.9%) and LRM (53.3%). BP only performed 
slightly better than LRM.  They concluded that assignment of bond ratings is one area 
that is better performed by experienced and specialised experts since neither ANN nor 
LRM produced accurate results. 
 
Daniels and Kamp (1999) modelled the classification of bond rating using ANN with 
one hidden layer; and a linear model using ordinary least squares (Srinivasan & Bolster). 
Financial figures on bonds issued by 256 companies were selected from Standard and 
Poor’s DataStream. The percentage of correct classification ranged from 60 - 76% for 
ANN and 48 - 61% for OLS.  
 
Yesilyaprak (2004) compared ANNs and MDA and multinomial logit (ML) techniques 
to predict ratings on 921 bonds issued by electric utility (367), gas (259), telephone 
(110) and manufacturing (185) companies. ANNs (57 – 73 %) performed better than 
both MDA (46 – 67 %) and ML (46 – 68 %) in predicting the bond rating in three 
samples (gas, manufacturing, and telephone). ML (68 %) performed better in predicting 
the bond rating in one sample (electric utility). 
 
Huang et al. (2004) compared back propagation ANNs and vector support machine 
learning techniques for bond rating in Taiwan and the United States. The data set used in 
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this study was prepared from Standard and Poor’s CompuStat financial data. They 
obtained a prediction accuracy of 80% using ANNs. 
 
Kim (2005) used an artificial intelligence technique, adaptive learning network (ALN),  
on a sample of 1080 observations (companies) primarily collected from the 
COMPUSTAT database, Dun and Bradstreet database, and Standard and Poor’s bond 
manuals to predict their rating. The overall performance of the model shows that the 
trained ALN model was successful in predicting 228 (84%) out of 272 cases. They 
further showed a prediction accuracy of 88% and 91% for investment grade and 
speculative bonds, respectively. 
 
In summary, most studies on using artificial intelligence techniques to predict bond 
rating, in particular ANNs, have shown better results than those of other classification 
methods. The current study attempts to extend the use of ANNs to predict ratings on 
CMBSs. The predictive capacity of ANNs is further compared to that of OR. 
6.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
6.3.1 Selection of Variables 
 
Bond rating recognises the following: profitability; liquidity; asset protection; indenture 
provisions; and quality of management. Bond rating models use independent variables, 
often calculated as ratios, which are predominantly derived from public financial 
statements. The assumption is that financial variables extracted from public financial 
statements, such as financial ratios, contain a large amount of information about a 
company’s credit risk (Huang et al. 2004). Financial ratios used relate to leverage, 
coverage, liquidity, profitability, and size following Kaplan and Urwitz (1979). Rating 
agencies list qualitative factors such as management ability, value of intangible assets, 
financial flexibility, operating efficiency, industry risk, accounting quality and market 
position. However, most of these qualitative factors are likely reflected in the 
quantifiable data such as financial and non-financial variables, and could be assessed 
indirectly from analysing these quantifiable data (Kim 2005). 
 
According to Moody’s, the credit risk of CMBSs depends on the characteristics of the 
underlying properties, loan structure, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the debt service 
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coverage ratio (DSCR) and portfolio diversification (Moody's Investor Service 2003). 
Standard and Poor’s as well state that their basis of rating is the relative risk of the 
collateral and the ability of the collateral to generate income (Standard & Poor's 2001). 
Measures of property portfolio diversity on the basis of property concentration, type and 
geographic location were introduced in chapter five. 
 
It is acknowledged that other potential factors may be used in CMBS rating to deal with 
transaction and legal risk, but have not considered them in this study as there are 
common or standard features that have been set up to mitigate these risks in all issues. 
6.3.2 Hypotheses 
These hypotheses are that loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is negatively related to CMBS 
credit rating whereas debt-to-service coverage ratio (DSCR) is positively related. The 
incidence of default rises with increase in LTV; that is, if all other factors are held 
constant, the probability of default for a loan increases as the LTV increases, but not 
equally. Unlike the LTV, the incidence of default is a decreasing function of the DSCR. 
However, the relationship between the DSCR and the probability of default is weaker 
than the relationship between the LTV and default. The motivation for the specified 
hypothesis stems from Fabozzi and Jacob (1997) and Geltner and Miller (2001), among 
others, who state that LTV and DSCR are the two mostly widely used commercial 
mortgage underwriting criteria. Descriptions of LTV and DSCR are found in Section 
5.3.5 
 
A further hypothesis is that CMBS issues with a well diversified portfolio both on a 
property concentration, property composition and geographic location basis will attract 
higher credit ratings. The diversity of a portfolio of assets will have an impact on the 
volatility of the pools expected loss. Each property type will have its own distinct risk 
profile and market dynamic. Geographic diversity mitigates the risk single market 
decline and may reduce any losses associated with this type of risk. Property 
concentration diversity mitigates the risk of fall in asset value of the single largest 
property in the pool. By diversifying the concentration, type and location of property, 
one can mitigate a pool’s expected losses. In support of the hypotheses, Moody’s 
Investor Service (2003) asserts that CMBS deals also benefit from portfolio diversity. 
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Additional hypotheses are that size of issue and bond tenure are positively and 
negatively related to the success of bond issues, respectively. Larger bond issues are 
done by bigger firms with stronger track records who fall under stricter regulatory 
regimes such as the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the Managed 
Investment Scheme provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, among others, should 
attract higher credit ratings. Longer note tenures increase the incidence of default and 
should therefore attract lower credit ratings.  
 
Ordinal regressions are applied to the CMBS sample whereas prediction of accuracy in 
bond rating for ANN evaluates their contribution to the model. A number of models are 
used. Model 1 includes LTV and DSCR as independent variables. Model 2 has an 
addition of bond tenure and the log of issue size to the independent variables in Model 1. 
Finally, Model 3 has all the independent variables in Models 1 and 2 in addition to 
portfolio diversity variables. Tranche rating is the dependent variable in all the models.  
6.3.3 Ordinal Regression Model 
 
There is a general consensus on the inappropriateness of least squares methods to rate 
bonds as they ignore their ordinal nature (Kamstra et al. 2001).  Ordinal regressions 
(OR) are considered appropriate in the analysis as they accommodate the ordinal nature 
of the bond ratings.  
 
The model is similar to the general multiple linear regression model but defines Y i  and 
estimates β differently. 
 
The logistic model computes the probabilities that an observation will fall into each of 
the various rating categories. The observation is classified into the category with the 
highest probability. This probability is estimated by the logistic model as:  
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where:  
   r = bond rating category; 
pi  = P (Yi = r); 
i  = 1…n, where n is the sample size; and  
Xi1,….,, Xin  are predictor variables. 
 
The β s are estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function: 
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where β is the vector of the parameters to be estimated. Once β ’s are estimated, pi is 
estimated by  
 pi  = 
e X i+ −1
1
β        (6.3) 
 
The observation is assigned to the bond rating category with the highest predicted 
probability. These predictions are compared to the actual bond rating assigned to the 
issue to calculate classification accuracy for the model.  
 
The observed value on Y i  depends on whether or not a particular threshold has been 
crossed. 
 
 Y i  = BBB if Y i∗  is ≤ β1  
 Y i  = A if β1≤ Y i∗  ≤ β 2  
 Y i  = AA if β 2  ≤ Y i∗  ≤ β3  
 Y i  = AAA if Y i∗  ≥ β3  
 
OR regressions were carried out in SPSS® version 13.0 (SPSS Inc. 1968) 
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6.3.4 Artificial Neural Network Model 
 
This subsection contains a brief introduction to the fundamental theory of ANNs. 
Consider the following model: 
 
( ; )t t ty g x θ ε= +        (6.4) 
 
where ( )g • denotes a continuous differentiable function, tx is a 1k ×  vector of 
explanatory variables, which could include the lagged dependent variables, t iy −  for some 
i , θ  is a 1l ×  vector of parameter and tε  is a sequence of independently, identically 
distributed random variables. In general, the explicit function form of g  is unknown. 
However, it is possible to find a universal approximator, so that the function g  can be 
estimated as accurately as one wish. One such approximator is  
  
0
1
( ; ) ( ; )
q
t i t i
i
F x G xγ φ β γ
=
= +∑       (6.5) 
 
where:  
 
1( ; , )
1 exp( [ ])G z c z cν ν= + − −      (6.6) 
 
is the well known logistic function. Hornik et al. (1989; 1990) (see also Carroll and 
Dickinson (1989), Cybenko (1989b), and Funahashi (1989)) showed that for any 
continuous function ( ; )tg x θ , every compact subset K of Rk and every 0δ > , there 
exists a ( ; )tF x γ  such that  
 
sup || ( ; ) ( ; ) ||t t
x K
F x g xγ θ δ
∈
− <
      (6.7) 
 
Following these results, it is straightforward to show that the accuracy of the 
approximation is determined by the number of hidden layer units, namely, q  and the 
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parameter vector γ , given a set of k  inputs, namely, the 1k ×  vector tx . The choice of 
q  can be somewhat arbitrary, it is often a matter of striking a balance between accuracy 
and over-fitting. Given q , the parameter vector γ  can be estimated using non-linear 
least squares:  
 
2
1
ˆ arg min ( ( ; ))
T
t t
t
y F x
γ
γ γ
∈Λ
=
= −∑      (6.8) 
 
The computational complexity of this minimisation problem grows as the number of 
hidden layer units grows. Several studies (refer to Weeraprajak (2007) for a 
comprehensive review) have suggested that the computational burden can be reduced if 
it is possible to separate the function ( )F •  into linear and non-linear components. In this 
case, the parameters associated with the linear component can be estimated using 
conventional least squares estimator, which has a closed form solution and the 
parameters in the non-linear component can be estimated using the non-linear least 
squares estimator. This implies the number of parameters required to be estimated by the 
non-linear estimator is reduced and hence improve computation efficiency.  
 
The graphical representation of the basic ANN model with the three primary 
components, namely the input layer (the input/explanatory variables, tx ), the hidden 
layer (black box) with multiple units, ( , )t iG x γ  and the output measure layer (the 
estimated CMBS rating in this case) can be found in Figure 6.1: 
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Figure 6.1: Structure of a CMBS Rating Neural Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hidden layer(s) contain two processes: the weighted summation function (the linear 
component); and the transformation function (the nonlinear component). Both of these 
functions relate the values from the input data (e.g. LTV; DSCR; issue size; bond tenure, 
property diversity, geographical diversity) to output measures (CMBS rating).  
 
Alyuda Forecaster XL® (2001) was used for the ANN experimentation. In the case of 
our 6 input and 4 output network, the hidden units were automatically set at 29 (model 
1), 28 (model 2) and 23 (Model 3). 
6.3.5  Data 
 
Based on Standard and Poor’s Ratings Direct database, the dataset comprised all the 
CMBSs issued between July 1999 and December 2005 totalling 55 in Australia. The 
issues had a combined total of 137 tranches and ratings ranging from AAA, AA, A, 
BBB+, BBB, BBB- , to NR. In this study, all A- rated tranches were grouped into the A 
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rated category and all BBB+ and BBB- rated tranches were grouped into the BBB rated 
category. The reclassification of tranches into four classes should enhance model 
performance because mathematical and statistical approaches have general limits in 
dealing with the ordinal nature of bond rating. It is known that as the number of bond 
classification increases, the predictive power could likely decrease (Kwon et al. 1997). 
Unrated tranches were excluded as their numbers, two, was insufficient to any conduct 
statistical analysis. The final dataset of 135 was divided into 118 tranches for the 
training sample and 17 tranches for the test sample, respectively. Details of the 
individual rating categories in each sample are shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Observations per CMBS Rating 
 
Rating Training Sample  Test Sample 
 Count Proportion  Count Proportion 
A 17 14%  4 23% 
AA 25 21%  3 18% 
AAA 62 53%  3 18% 
BBB 14 12%  7 41% 
Total 118 100%  17 100% 
 
Descriptive statistics of the data used in the experiments are shown in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Training Sample 
  
LTV DSCR Property 
Diversity 
Geographical 
Diversity 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$ m) 
Bond 
Tenure 
(Years) 
Mean 0.46 2.14 0.29 0.48 79.87 3.97 
Standard Error 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 7.36 0.12 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.10 0.51 0.18 0.15 79.90 1.31 
Minimum 0.31 1.28 0.08 0.20 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 0.76 3.50 1.00 1.00 350.00 7.00 
 
Test Sample 
  
LTV DSCR Property 
Diversity 
Geographical 
Diversity 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$ m) 
Bond 
Tenure 
(Years) 
Mean 0.48 1.81 0.32 0.51 47.59 4.94 
Standard Error 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.06 13.33 0.06 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.07 0.36 0.18 0.26 54.96 0.24 
Minimum 0.36 1.20 0.11 0.21 3.00 4.00 
Maximum 0.61 2.70 0.55 0.78 190.00 5.00 
 
Table 6.3 provides bivariate training sample correlations that exist between the data 
items. Statistically significant relationships exist with LTV, DSCR and the issued 
amount at 1%. The result show that higher LTV result in lower issued amounts; vice 
versa is true for DSCR.  
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Table 6.3: Training Sample Correlations 
 
Variable LTV DSCR Property 
Diversity 
Geographical 
Diversity 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$ m) 
LTV      
DSCR -0.689(**)     
Property Diversity 0.203(*) -0.146    
Geographical Diversity 0.073 -0.042 0.194(*)   
Issued Amount (AU$ m) -0.465(**) 0.236(**) 0.025 -0.089  
Bond Tenure (Years) 0.037 0.070 0.108 -0.216(*) 0.037 
**Indicates significant at the 1% level; *indicates significant at the 5% level. 
6.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.4.1 Ordinal Regression  
 
The results of the ordinal regression analyses are shown in Table 6.4. To empirically 
specify the model, three tests were used: the standard technique of likelihood ratio test, 
the significance of the individual coefficients, explanatory power (pseudo R-Square) and 
the accuracy of the predicting rate. From the observed significance levels, only LTV is 
related to CMBS credit ratings being significant at .05 level of confidence in all three 
models but with anomalous positive coefficients implying that high LTV ratios 
command higher credit ratings. A negative coefficient for LTV was hypothesised as 
higher LTVs increases the level of default and result in lower credit ratings. Log of 
issued amount (SIZELN) had the anticipated positive coefficient sign whereas bond 
tenure (TENURE) and level of property diversity (PD) had the anticipated negative 
coefficients. DSCR, TENURE, PD and geographical diversity (GD) appear not be 
related to the rating being insignificant at .05 level of confidence. This is an interesting 
finding as prior literature has stipulated that LTV and DSCR are the two main predictors 
of CMBS default risk (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997). However, recent research by An (2006), 
Deng et al. (2005) and Grovenstein et al. (2004), among others, find little statistically 
significant relationship exists between original LTV and DSCR and CMBS default risk, 
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supporting results of this study. They attribute this to the endogenous nature of original 
LTV and DSCR to the underwriting process. Lenders frequently respond to higher 
perceived overall risk (based on a multidimensional analysis including factors other than 
LTV and DSCR) by limiting the amount they will lend thereby lowering the loan-to-
value ratio and increasing the debt service coverage ratio.  
 
The low pseudo R-square in all three models (ranging from 0.018 to 0.039) indicate that 
there are other factors affecting CMBS bond rating, giving credence to use of other 
investigative techniques into their rating such as ANN. It should also be noted that 
addition of variables SIZELN and TENURE (model 2) to the basic model of DSCR and 
LTV increased the predictive power from 0.018 to 0.033. The full model with all the 
variables (model 3) showed a substantial increase in the predictive power (0.018 to 
0.039) over the basic model though there was a marginal increase over model 2 (0.033 
to 0.039). 
 
Table 6.4: Ordinal Regression Results 
 
*We utilise McFadden’s pseudo R-Square based on Ederington (1985) who recommend it as being the most attractive intuitively as 
well as theoretically of all others. Regression coefficients provided with significance levels (in parenthesis) and Wald chi-square [in 
brackets]. 
Variable 
(Expected Sign) 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
A 1.980 (0.310) [1.031] 3.861 (0.100) [2.700] 4.115 (0.088) [2.914] 
AA 3.053 (0.118) [1.952] 4.959 (0.035) [4.428] 5.221 (0.031) [4.664] 
AAA 5.515 (0.006) [2.006] 7.481 (0.002) [9.545] 7.757 (0.002) [9.768] 
DSCR (+) 0.471 (0.321) [0.983] 0.622 (0.207) [1.593] 0.801 (0.122) [2.393] 
LTV (-) 6.268 (0.011) [6.548] 8.307 (0.003) [9.004] 9.512 (0.001) [10.401] 
SIZELN (+)    0.590 (0.122)  [0.331] 0.693 (0.077) [3.130] 
TENURE (-)    -0.079 (0.565) [2.394] -0.087 (0.553) [0.353] 
PD (-)       -1.255 (0.230) [1.438] 
GD (+)       -0.949 (0.446) [0.580] 
          
Chi-Square 7.036 (0.030)  9.778 (0.044)  11.495 (0.074)  
*Pseudo R-
Square 
0.018   0.033   0.039   
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The inclusion of additional variables to the basic model increased chi-square from 7.036 
(model 1) to 9.778 and 11.495 (model 2 and 3) respectively though significance levels 
decreased. Models 1 and 2 chi-square were significant at the 0.05 level and model 3 at 
the 0.10 level. 
 
These results imply that rating agencies use only some of variables they describe or 
indicate as important to CMBS rating. Further, the suggested variables do not generally 
(with exception of LTV and to some extent DSCR) discriminate among credit ratings. 
This is exemplified by Figure 6.2 a-f. There is a strong relationship between CMBS 
rating and LTV, whereas a weak relationship exists with DSCR. The other variables 
show no relationship to CMBS rating. 
 
Figure 6.2: Variable Scatter Plots 
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b)  CMBS Rating vs. DSCR (Weak relationship) 
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c) CMBS Rating vs. Issued Amount (No relationship) 
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d) Rating vs. Bond Tenure (No relationship) 
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e) CMBS Rating vs. Property Diversity (No relationship) 
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f) CMBS Rating vs. Geographical Diversity (No relationship) 
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Table 6.5 shows the number of ratings correctly predicted. The best results was obtained 
by model 3 which included all the variables at 53% (63 out of 118 cases) followed by 
models 1 and 2 at 52% (61 out of 118 cases) each. Further, the models could only 
predict the AAA and BBB notes, with a higher predictive capacity for the AAA notes. 
 
Table 6.5: OR Classification Accuracy of Models 1 - 3 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB  17 2 19 11% 
A 17 0 17 0% 
AA 23 0 23 0% 
AAA 59 0 59 100% 
Total 116 2 118 52% 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB 16 3 19 16% 
A 17 0 17 0% 
AA 23 0 23 0% 
AAA 58 1 59 98% 
Total 114 4 118 52% 
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Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
6.4.2.1 Prediction Accuracy of Analysis 
 
ANN is used to predict credit ratings using three models. The basic model has two 
independent variables, LTV and DSCR.  The second model includes bond tenure 
(TENURE) and log of issue size to the independent variables in Model 1. Finally, Model 
3 has all the independent variables used in Models 1 and 2 in addition to portfolio 
diversity variables. Tranche rating is the dependent variable in all the models.  
 
The predictive capacity of ANNs decreased from 95% (models 1 and 2) to 93% (model 
3) for the training set and test and increased from 70% (model 1) to 80% (model 2 and 
3) for the test set as shown in Table 6.6. Further Tables 6.7 shows the classification of 
accuracy within individual rating categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB  15 4 19 21% 
A 17 0 17 0% 
AA 23 0 23 0% 
AAA 59 0 59 100% 
Total 114 4 118 53% 
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Table 6.6: Summary of ANN Results 
 
Training Sample Test Sample Model 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
Model 1 93(95%) 5(5%) 14(70%) 6(30%) 
Model 2 93(95%) 5(5%) 16(80%) 4(20%) 
Model 3 91(93%) 7(7%) 16(80%) 4(20%) 
 
Table 6.7: ANN Classification Accuracy 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA AA A BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB  0 0 0 19 19 100% 
A 1 5 11 0 17 65% 
AA 0 22 1 0 23 96% 
AAA 55 3 1 0 59 93% 
Total 56 30 13 19 118 91% 
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Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.8 shows the error distributions for each of the three models. No clear 
explainable reason can be given for the high percentage of errors on A rated notes.  
 
 
 
 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA AA A BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB  1 0 0 18 19 95% 
A 1 3 11 2 17 65% 
AA 2 21 0 0 23 96% 
AAA 59 0 0 0 59 100% 
Total 63 24 11 20 118 92% 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 
 AAA AA A BBB Total Correctly 
Predicted (%) 
BBB  1 0 0 18 19 95% 
A 1 3 12 1 17 71% 
AA 1 20 2 0 23 87% 
AAA 57 0 2 0 59 97% 
Total 60 23 16 19 118 92% 
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Table 6.8: ANN Error Distribution 
Model 1  
Class No. of 
Cases 
No. of 
Errors 
% Errors 
AAA 59 4 6.78% 
AA 23 1 4.35% 
A 17 6 35.29% 
BBB 19 0 0.00% 
Total 118 11 9.32% 
 
Model 2 
Class No. of 
Cases 
No. of 
Errors 
% Errors 
AAA 59 0 0.00% 
AA 23 2 8.70% 
A 17 6 35.29% 
BBB 19 1 5.26% 
Total 118 9 7.63% 
 
Model 3 
Class No. of 
Cases 
No. of 
Errors 
% Errors 
AAA 59 2 3.39% 
AA 23 3 13.04% 
A 17 5 29.41% 
BBB 19 1 5.26% 
Total 118 11 9.32% 
 
Further Table 6.9 shows a comparison of the OR and ANN results, depicting the 
superiority of ANN across all the three models. 
 
Table 6.9: Prediction Accuracy Summary: OR vs. ANN 
 
OR ANN
Model 1 52% 91%
Model 2 52% 92%
Model 3 53% 92%
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6.4.2.2 Variable Contribution Analysis 
 
Though earlier literature and publications by credit rating agencies state that LTV and 
DCSR are important property ratios which impact on the achievable credit rating for a 
CMBS issue, to the best of knowledge no study has empirically examined the relative 
contribution of each of these input parameters to a CMBS rating. This study thus 
evaluates the relative importance of different factors considered in the CMBS rating 
using a neural network model. 
 
Garson (1991) developed a means whereby connection weights within a neural network 
can be interpreted allowing the effect of various input nodes to be examined and ranked 
according to their relative importance. This is intrinsically done in Alyuda Forecaster 
XL®.  The results of the relative importance of these variables in our full neural network 
model (model 3) are shown in Figure 6.3. In order to maintain brevity, results of the 
other two models are not shown but suffice to state that the following order of 
importance was revealed though at various percentages: LTV, DSCR, Issued Amount 
and Bond Tenure. 
 
Figure 6.3: CMBS Credit Rating Variable Contribution 
 
 
 The study has shown that 62% of a CMBS rating is attributable to LTV (38.2%) and 
DSCR (23.6%); supporting earlier studies which have listed the two as being the most 
important variables in CMBS rating. The other variables contributions are: geographical 
diversity (13.5%) and property diversity (7.9%), CMBS issue size (10.1%), CMBS 
tenure (6.7%), respectively. 
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The results of this study are comparable to those stated in the ABN AMRO CMBS 
Rating Model.  Under their model all the property-based factors added up to 75% (asset 
quality (15%); refinancing risk (20%); lease expiry profile (15%); credit quality of 
income (15%) and tenancy concentration (10%). All these factors are captured by LTV 
and DSCR in the full model of this study as earlier discussed in Section 5.2. They have a 
combined total weighting of 62%. In the full model of this study, geographical and 
property diversity accounted for 21% whereas the ABN AMRO model had 15%. 
Differences between full model of this study and the ABN AMRO model with the 
remaining factors makes it difficult to complete the comparisons comprehensively. The 
full model captures bond tenure and amount issued. The ABN AMRO model captures 
management experience and growth strategy. 
 
One drawback observable from Figure 6.3 is that no signs are attached to the calculated 
weights. Thus the interpretation of the relative weights can be inferred from OR 
analysis. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
 
Superior predictive results were obtained from the ANN analysis in comparison to a 
standard OR. ANN correctly predicted 95% and 91% CMBS rating for the training and 
test sets respectively whereas OR had 52 - 53% for the training set across the three 
models, confirming results obtained in earlier studies on predicting corporate bond 
rating using the two methodologies. Further, ANNs offer better results classifying across 
rating classes, while OR perform better only at the AAA class level and perform poorly 
for lower classes.  
 
The empirical test of variables propagated by credit rating agencies as being important 
to CMBS rating found all but LTV to be statistically insignificant using OR. A 
conclusion can therefore be drawn that statistical approaches used in corporate bond 
rating studies have limited replication capabilities in CMBS rating and that the 
endogenous argument raises significant questions about LTV and DSCR as convenient, 
short-cut measures of CMBS default risk. However, ANNs do offer promising 
predictive results and can be used to facilitate implementation of survey-based CMBS 
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rating systems. This should contribute to making the CMBS rating methodology more 
explicit which is advantageous in that both CMBS investors and issuers are provided 
with greater information and faith in the investment. Although the results of this study 
cannot be viewed as definitive due to the small sample size, they can form a basis for 
future studies. Over time with more CMBS issuances, a larger sample size will enable 
analysis of various issues backed by different property classes to check for differences, 
if any. 
 
In order to validate the methodology adopted to show the interpretation of the bond-
rating process obtained from the models in this chapter, the next chapter extends the 
approach to predict LPT bond ratings. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN LPT BOND 
RATINGS 
 
7.1 BACKGROUND 
Debt funding, through direct bank borrowings and issuance of CMBS and unsecured 
bonds, has played a significant role in the growth of Australian LPTs as shown in 
chapter two. Furthermore, chapter six empirically analysed credit ratings on CMBS 
using OR and ANNs to examine the informational content they convey to would-be 
investors. The same analysis is extended to LPT bonds to validate the adopted 
methodology and to show the prominence of LPT bonds as an alternative investment 
vehicle and a debt funding tool. 
 
The significance of LPT bonds as an investment vehicle and a debt funding tool was 
covered in chapter two and literature review on the application of ANNs in real estate 
studies and corporate bond ratings covered in chapter six.  
 
To the best of knowledge, only three studies have examined credit ratings using 
Australian data (Chikolwa & Chan 2008; Gray et al. 2006; Matolcsy & Lianto 1995).  
Chikolwa and Chan (2008) find that rating agencies use only a subset of variables they 
describe or indicate as important to rating CMBS18 and show the superiority of ANNs 
over ordinal regressions in predicting CMBS ratings. Gray et al (2006) find that interest 
coverage and leverage ratios have the most profound effect on credit ratings, using an 
ordered probit regression.  Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) examine the incremental 
information content of bond rating revisions on stock prices, after controlling for 
accounting information, using a cross-sectional regression approach. Their finding that 
only rating downgrades have informational content is consistent with other studies such 
as Hand,` et al. (1992). 
 
                                                 
18
 Only Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was found to be statistically significant. 
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As such, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the several aspects of the use of 
ANNs as tools for predicting credit ratings of Australian LPT bonds. Tests are 
undertaken to compare the predictive power of ANN models and OR models.  The 
findings of this analysis will provide insights in what factors impact on the credit rating 
of LPT bonds. 
7.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
7.3.1 Data 
 
The initial sample comprised of all 87 Standard and Poor’s rated bonds issued by 
Australian LPTs between 1999 and 2006 as found in the Property Australia magazine. 
After removing bonds that had incomplete financial information, the sample was 
reduced to 77. Concurrent and complete financial report information for the period 1999 
to 2006 is obtained from the Aspect FinAnalysis database. In line with Gray et al. 
(2006), an annual financial report is defined as being contemporaneous with the rating if 
it relates to the financial year-end that occurs three to fifteen months prior to the rating is 
followed. This ensures that any changes based on information released in the annual 
report are captured in the corresponding rating. Three-year averages of relevant financial 
ratios rather than the most recent observations are used in line with the ‘rating-through-
the-cycle’ process which is adopted by credit rating agencies to capture the longer-term 
perspective (Carey & Hrycay 2001; Carey & Treacy 2000). Rating-through-the-cycle is 
described as a rating assessment in a worst case scenario, in the bottom of a presumed 
credit quality cycle. 
 
In order to have a reasonable number of observations in each rating class, the agency 
rating classes A, A+ and A3* are combined into a single rating class A, and the agency-
rating classes BBB and BBB+ are combined into a single rating class BBB+. Further, 
the reclassification of tranches into three classes could enhance model performance 
because mathematical and statistical approaches have general limits in dealing with 
ordinal nature of bond rating. It known that as the number of bond classification 
increases, the predictive power could likely decrease (Kwon et al. 1997). Table 7.1 
provides summary statistics over time and by sector. 
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Table 7.1: Distribution of Sample Observations over Time, Rating Class and 
Sector 
 
A A- A+ A3* BBB BBB+ Total
1999 1 1 2
2000 1 1
2001 2 7 3 12
2002 4 2 3 1 2 12
2003 4 19 5 28
2004 1 4 4 9
2005 3 3 6 12
2006 1 4 2 4 11
Total 17 39 3 1 2 25 87
Diversified 3 15 3 2 16 39
Office 6 1 9 16
Retail 14 18 32
Total 17 39 3 1 2 25 87
Panel A: LPT Bond Rating by Year
Panel B: LPT Bond Rating by Sector
 
 
7.3.2 Selection of Variables 
 
Consistent with information provided by Standard and Poor’s (2007) and Moody’s 
Investor Service (2002) and with the approach used by Gray et al. (2006), LPT credit 
rating is modelled as a function of its financial characteristics given by interest coverage, 
profitability and leverage and industry characteristics. Credit ratings tend to be highly 
sensitive to the firm’s interest coverage ratio- firms with higher coverage ratios are 
likely to have higher credit ratings. Profitability is another signal of the firm’s ability to 
generate cash to meet its financial obligations- a high profitability ratio is more highly to 
be associated with a better credit rating. Cash flow or debt coverage ratios, such as free 
cash flows relative to total debt, are important in credit analysis as they provide an 
indication of the firm’s present ability to service its debt and meet its financial 
obligations. A low cash-flow-to-debt ratio may be symptomatic of higher risk and a 
signal of weak prospects. High cash flow relative to total debt is associated with higher 
credit ratings. Further, higher leverage factors, measured as debt to total assets, reduce 
the cushion the firm has with respect to any incremental changes in its fortunes. Higher 
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leverage is associated with lower credit ratings. In addition, long-term debt leverage is 
generally higher for firms with lower ratings.  
 
Blume et al (1998) hypothesise that a firm with higher equity beta is expected to have a 
lower credit rating as it will be less able to service its debt for given accounting ratios as 
its equity risk increases. However, there have been inconsistent results in prior literature 
of using equity beta as a predictor variable in credit rating. Earlier studies (KU) found it 
to be a significant variable in credit rating prediction, while recent studies (Crabtree & 
Maher 2005; Gray et al. 2006; Maher & Sen 1997) have all found the equity beta to be 
insignificant. As such our models do not include an equity beta a predictor variable. 
 
The log of assets provides a robust measure of firm size, while at the same time 
providing a rational proxy for information asymmetry in view of the fact that 
information asymmetry typically decreases as a firm size increases (Krishnaswami et al. 
1999).  As such we hypothesise that bonds issued by large LPTs by asset size should 
command higher ratings. 
 
Rating agencies suggest that credit ratings should depend, in part, on the firm’s business 
environment.  Numerous industry characteristics including competitiveness, barriers to 
entry, exposure to technological change, regulatory environment and vulnerability to 
economic cycles can have a significant influence on the level of business risk a firm 
faces (Gray et al. 2006; Iskander & Emery 1994). For instance, Moody’s Investor 
Service (2003) find competitive pressures, characteristics of the catchment areas, and 
expectations of future developments to have a greater impact in their rating of retail 
LPTs and vacancy rates, tenant demand trends, and future stock additions on office 
LPTs. Retail LPTs exhibit greater cash flow stability than office or industrial LPTs, 
given Australia’s relatively steady consumer spending trends as well as the long-term 
nature of their lease structures. Consequently, an office LPT is expected to generate 
higher debt coverage ratios at a given level. A more stable and predictable cash flow 
should translate into a lower level of business risk and hence a lower credit risk. To 
control for possible LPT sector effects, indicator variables (0,1) for each LPT sector in 
the sample are included.  An LPT sector dummy (0,1) is added as an independent 
variable to the benchmark model for two (i.e. n - 1) groups 
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Stapled securities19 account for over 75% of the LPT market capitalisation, compared to 
only 29% in 2004 (Newell 2006a). Tan (2004b) showed that the adoption of this internal 
management structure has enabled a closer alignment of unit holders and manager 
interests, no fee leakage and a lower cost of capital. Further, Newell (2006a) states that 
the adoption of the internal management structure has not increased LPT risk levels. 
However, Standard and Poor’s (2007) assert that LPTs exposure to non-lease-related 
income may constrain their credit rating as these activities carry much higher business 
risk than traditional, passive asset management, which reduces the firm’s percentage of 
income-producing assets and its debt capacity at all rating levels. To control for possible 
LPT stapled-structure effects, indicator variables (0,1) for each LPT stapled-structure in 
the sample are included.  An LPT stapled-structure dummy (0,1) is added as an 
independent variable to the benchmark model for one (i.e. n - 1) group. 
 
Descriptive statistics regarding the sample are provided in Panel A and variable 
definitions in Panel B of Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
NS 1.05 3.74 2.27 0.78
DA 0.08 0.38 0.23 0.07
OCD 0.08 0.52 0.24 0.08
TA ~ 8.89 9.96 9.56 0.29
LS_1 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39
LS_2 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47
SS 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.47
Panel B: Variable Definitions
NS
DA
OCD
TA
LS_1
LS_2
SS
~ In millions
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed by an LPT with a stapled structure, 
0 otherwise.
3-year average of total debt divided by 3-year average of LPT total assets.
3-year average of operating cash flow divided by 3-year average of total debt.
Natural log of 3-year average of total assets.
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed by an office LPT, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed by an retail LPT, 0 otherwise.
3-year average of net tangible assets per share.
 
                                                 
19
 Stapled securities are formed via stapling the units in a LPT to the shares of the management company. 
Unit holders of stapled securities benefit from incomes derived from purely property investment and from 
other activities such as property development. 
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Table 7.3 provides the bivariate correlations that exist between the data items. 
 
Table 7.3: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 NS DA OCD TA LS_1 LS_2
DA -0.083
OCD -0.154 -.745(**)
TA .610(**) 0.180 -0.028
LS_1 -.514(**) .363(**) -.265(*) -.350(**)
LS_2 -.274(*) 0.101 0.099 0.015 -.327(**)
SS .772(**) -0.089 0.027 .662(**) -0.177 -.408(**)
**Indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at 5% level.
 
A number of models are used. Our benchmark Model 1 includes net tangible assets per 
share (NS), Total debt/total assets (DA), operating cash flows/total debt (OCD) and log 
of total assets (TA) as independent variables. Model 2 tests whether the office LPT 
sector (LS_1) has an impact on bond rating. We further test whether retail LPT sector 
(LS_2) has an impact on bond rating in Model 3. In model 4, test the combined effect on 
LPT sector (LS_1 and LS_2) have on LPT bond rating. Finally, Model 5 has all the 
independent variables in Models 1 to 4 in addition to the stapled-structure (SS) variable. 
LPT bond rating is the dependent variable in all the models.  
 
Ordinal regressions are applied to the LPT bond sample whereas prediction of accuracy 
in bond rating for ANN evaluates their contribution to the model. 
7.3.3 Description of OR Model 
 
Details of the OR model are covered earlier in Section 6.3.2, with the only difference 
being LPT bond rating categories, Y i . 
 
The observed value on Y i  depends on whether or not a particular threshold has been 
crossed. 
 
 Y i  = BBB+ if Y i∗  is ≤ β1  
 Y i  = A- if β1≤ Y i∗  ≤ β 2  
 Y i  = A if Y i∗  ≥ β 2  
OR regressions were where carried out in SPSS® version 15.0 (SPSS Inc. 1968). 
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7.3.4 Description of ANN Model 
 
Similarly details of theory behind ANN are covered in Section 6.3, with graphical 
representation of the basic ANN model with the three primary components, namely the 
input layer (the input/explanatory variables, tx ), the hidden layer (black box) with 
multiple units, ( , )t iG x γ  and the output measure layer (the estimated LPT bond rating in 
this case) (Figure 7.1): 
 
Figure 7.1: Structure of a LPT Bond Rating Neural Network 
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The hidden layer(s) contain two processes: the weighted summation functions and the 
transformation functions (the nonlinear component). Both of these functions relate the 
values from the input data (NS, DA, OCD, TA, LS_1, LS_2 and SS variables) to output 
measures (LPT bond rating).  
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Alyuda Forecaster XL® (Alyuda Research Inc. 2001) was used for the ANN 
experimentation. In the case of our 4-7 input and 3 output network, the hidden units 
were automatically set at 9 (model 1), 12 (model 2), 33 (Model 3), 33 (model 4) and 6 
(model 5). 
7.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
7.4.1 OR 
The results of the ordinal regression analyses are shown in Table 7.4. To empirically 
specify the model, three tests were used: the standard technique of likelihood ratio test, 
the significance of the individual coefficients, explanatory power (pseudo R-Square) and 
the accuracy of the predicting rate.  
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Table 7.4: OR Results 
 
 
Variable  
(Expected Sign) 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
A- 37.741 
(0.000) 
[13.224] 
37.959 
(0.000) 
[13.062] 
66.040 
(0.000) 
[23.116] 
98.773 
(0.000) 
[26.309] 
115.803 
 (0.001) 
[10.888] 
A 39.160  
(0.000) 
[14.029] 
39.378 
(0.000) 
[13.856] 
68.050 
(0.000) 
[24.007] 
101.774 
(0.000) 
[26.981] 
120.730 
(0.001) 
[11.505] 
Profitability (NS) 
(+) 
1.026 
(0.014) 
[5.996] 
1.011 
(0.022) 
[5.272] 
2.974 
(0.000) 
[23.300] 
6.663 
(0.000) 
[31.959] 
18.749 
(0.000) 
[19.956] 
Financial leverage (DA) 
(-) 
-18.475 
(0.007) 
[7.234] 
-18.206 
(0.010) 
[6.665] 
-22.858 
(0.002) 
[9.352] 
-47.179 
(0.000) 
[18.071] 
-108.561 
(0.000) 
[13.025] 
Debt coverage (OCD) 
(+) 
11.565 
(4.729) 
[0.030] 
11.509 
(0.030) 
[4.685] 
14.048 
(0.020) 
[5.445] 
23.334 
(0.005) 
[7.893] 
51.465 
(0.004) 
[8.320] 
LPT size (TA) 
 (+) 
3.513 
(0.002) 
[9.443] 
3.539 
(0.002) 
[9.377] 
6.933 
(0.000) 
[21.043] 
10.771 
(0.000) 
[26.800] 
13.002 
(0.000) 
[12.387] 
Office LPT (LS_1)   0.115 
(0.874) 
[0.025] 
 -7.731 
(0.000) 
[21.822] 
-23.554 
(0.000) 
[14.660] 
Retail LPT (LS_2)   -3.547 
(0.000) 
[24.257] 
-8.588 
(0.000) 
[30.982] 
-16.273 
(0.000) 
[19.318] 
Stapled LPT (SS)     13.295 
(0.000) 
[15.774] 
      
Chi-Square 21.908 21.935 50.956 83.183 123.581 
*Pseudo R-Square 0.131 0.132 0.306 0.499 0.741 
*We utilise McFadden’s pseudo R-Square based on Ederington (1985) who recommend it as being the most attractive intuitively as 
well as theoretically of all others. Regression coefficients provided with significance levels (in parenthesis) and Wald chi-square [in 
brackets]. 
 
The primary control variables (NS, DA, OCD and TA) are all significant at .05 level in 
the predicted direction. The industry-based variables (LS_1, LS_2 and SS) are each 
found to be significant when added individually and together to the benchmark model., 
In results not shown in this study to maintain brevity, year of bond issue and size of 
bond issue are found to be statistically insignificant. All the models are significant at .05 
level with Likelihood Ratios ranging between 21.9 and 123.5. These results are 
comparable to other studies (Blume et al. 1998; Crabtree & Maher 2005; Gray et al. 
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2006) that have found debt coverage (OSD), leverage (DA) and profitability (NS) to 
provide explanatory power in the credit rating process. In addition, the significance of 
the log of LPT total assets (TA) suggests that larger LPTs will command higher credit 
ratings confirming information asymmetry supposition by Krishnaswami et. al (1999). 
 
The benchmark model 1 had a low pseudo R-square of 0.131 and adding the LPT sector 
variables individually significantly raised the pseudo R-square to 0.132 and 0.306 
respectively (models 2 and 3). A further marked difference in pseudo R-square (0.499) 
was noted when the two LPT sector variables (LS_1 and LS_2) were added to the 
benchmark model together (model 4). Overall, model 5 which incorporated all the 
industry-based variables (LS_1, LS_2 and SS) showed the best pseudo R-square result at 
0.741. 
 
These results are consistent with the interpretation that retail LPTs have more stable 
cash flows than office LPTs and the bonds they issue should command higher ratings. 
Further, despite Standard and Poor’s (2007) assertion that LPTs with exposure to non-
lease-related income may constrain their credit rating, results of this study show that the 
bonds issued by LPTs with stapled management structures command higher credit 
ratings. A possible explanation would be the higher anticipated returns from LPTs with 
stapled management structures. To investigate the effects of these industry-based 
predictability measures on bond ratings further, the incremental effect each variable has 
on bond rating prediction accuracy is examined. 
 
The predictive capacity increased from the model 1 (56%) to the full model 5 (91%). 
The other models had the following prediction accuracy rates: model 2 (60%), model 3 
(72%) and model 4 (91%). Table 7.5 compares the prediction accuracies across bond 
rating classes for all the models. The benchmark model 1 has a higher predictive 
capacity for the lower rated bonds (BBB+ and A-) and performs poorly for the higher 
rated notes (A). Models 2 and 3 shows that bonds issued by an office LPT are more 
likely to be rated BBB and those issued by retail LPTs rated A-. Further, the full model 
shows 66% likelihood of the bonds being rated either BBB+ or A-.  
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Table 7.5: OR Classification Accuracy of Models 1 – 5 
 
BBB+ A- A Correctly 
Predicted 
(%)
Model 1 22/24 (92%) 21/32 (66%) 0/21 (0%) 56%
Model 2 22/24 (92%) 21/32 (66%) 3/21 (14%) 60%
Model 3 20/24 (83%) 26/32 (81%) 9/21 (43%) 72%
Model 4 22/24 (92%) 30/32 (94%) 18/21 (86%) 91%
Model 5 23/24 (96%) 28/32 (88%) 19/21 (90%) 91%
 
 
7.4.2 ANN 
 
Analysis were done using the five models as defined in Section 7.3.2 on our initial 77 
sample which was divided into 54 (70%) as training and 23 (30%) test samples.  Results 
of the model prediction accuracies and variable contribution are shown below. 
 
7.4.2.1 Prediction Accuracy Analysis 
 
All the models had 96% prediction accuracy for the training sample (Table 7.6). The 
predictive capacity of models increased from 52% (models 1) to 73% (model 5) for the 
test set emphasising the importance of the inclusion of industry-based variables in the 
models.  The other models had the following results for their test samples: model 2 
(61%), model 3 (70%) and model 4 (77%). 
 
Table 7.6: Summary of ANN Results 
 
Training Sample Test Sample Model 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
Model 1 52(96%) 2(4%) 12(52%) 11(47%) 
Model 2 52(96%) 2(4%) 14(61%) 9(39%) 
Model 3 52(96%) 2(4%) 16(70%) 7(30%) 
Model 4 52(96%) 2(4%) 17(77%) 5(22%) 
Model 5 52(96%) 2(4%) 19(73%) 4(17%) 
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Table 7.7 shows the classification of accuracy within individual rating categories, with 
highest being for the A rating class at 76% - 100%.  This is followed by the A- rating 
class which has a range of 88% - 94% and finally the BBB+ rating class at 58% - 92%.  
These results are comparable to those obtained in OR; see Table 7.5.  ANN predicts 
better at higher rating classes (A and A-) than at the lower class (BBB+), which is the 
opposite for OR. 
 
Table 7.7: ANN Classification Accuracy of Models 1 – 5 
 
BBB+ A- A Correctly 
Predicted 
(%)
Model 1 14/24 (58%) 30/32 (94%) 20/21 (95%) 83%
Model 2 16/24 (67%) 30/32 (94%) 20/21 (95%) 86%
Model 3 22/24 (92%) 30/32 (94%) 16/21 (76%) 88%
Model 4 22/24 (92%) 28/32 (88%) 20/21 (95%) 91%
Model 5 20/24 (83%) 30/32 (94%) 21/21 (100%) 92%
 
 
Table 7.8 shows a comparison of the OR and ANN results, depicting similar results for 
the full models of both methods. 
 
Table 7.8: Prediction Accuracy Summary: OR vs. ANN 
 
OR ANN
Model 1 56% 83%
Model 2 60% 86%
Model 3 72% 88%
Model 4 91% 91%
Model 5 91% 92%
 
 
7.4.2.2 Variable Contribution Analysis 
 
 Earlier literature and publications by credit rating agencies state that financial variables 
are important in the credit rating of firms and unsecured bonds issued by firms, to the 
best of our knowledge no study has empirically examined the relative contribution of 
both financial and industry-based variables in LPT bond rating. This study thus 
evaluates the relative importance of different factors considered in the LPT bond rating 
using a neural network model. 
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 The results of the relative importance of these variables in our full neural network model 
(model 5) are shown in Figure 7.2. In order to maintain brevity, results of the other two 
models are not shown but suffice to state that the following order of importance was 
revealed though at various percentages: OCD, DA, SS, NS, LS_2, TA and LS_1. 
 
Figure 7.2: LPT Bond Rating Variable Contribution 
2.56%
9.62%
10.90%
11.54%
13.46%
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0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
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LPT size (TA)
Retail LPT (LS_2)
Profitability (NS)
Stapled LPT (SS)
Financial leverage (DA)
Debt coverage (OCD)
 
 
 This has study has shown that 27.0% of LPT bond rating is attributable to industry-
based variables; office LPT sector accounting for 2.6%, retail LPT 10.9% and stapled 
management structure 13.5%. Unlike Gray et al. (2006) who found industry-based 
variables insignificant in rating Australian firms using probit regression, results of OR 
and ANN analysis in this study indicate that industry-based variables are important in 
determining LPT bond ratings. A possible explanation is that LPTs core business is 
property investment. Financial variables contribute 73.0% to LPT bond rating, with debt 
coverage (OCD) being the dominant variable at 32.0%. This is followed by financial 
leverage (DA: 19.9%), profitability (NS: 11.5%) and LPT size (TA: 9.6%). 
 
One drawback observable from Figure 7.2 is that no signs are attached to the calculated 
weights. Thus the interpretation of the relative weights must be inferred from OR 
analysis. 
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7.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter examines the impact of financial and industry variables on LPT bond 
ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s from 1999 - 2006. OR results show that the 
financial variables used in our models, debt coverage (OCD) and financial leverage 
ratios (DA) have the most profound effect on LPT bond ratings. Furthermore, industry-
based variables of LPT sector (Office: LS_1 and Retail: LS_2) and stapled management 
structure (SS) significantly affect bond rating. 
 
Predictive accuracies of OR and ANN as alternative quantitative methods to rating LPT 
bonds are also examined. Empirical analyses indicate that both OR and ANN provide 
robust alternatives to rating LPT bond and that there are no significant differences in 
results between their two full models. Across all the models, ANN had better results 
than OR. Inclusion of industry-based variables increases the predictive accuracies of 
both OR and ANN models. In addition, ANN results show that 73% of LPT bond rating 
is attributable to financial variables and 27% to industry-based variables. 
 
However, before these results and those of chapter six can be generalised, field studies 
need to be conducted to compare the interpretation of the bond-rating process obtained 
from models in this study with those of CMBS issuers and arrangers. Deeper market 
structure analysis is also needed to fully explain the differences found in the models in 
this study. These matters are covered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN CMBS CREDIT 
RATINGS 
 
8.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The previous two chapters provided evidence of the limitations of traditional statistical 
techniques and the potential for unstructured analytical techniques, such as ANNs, in the 
credit rating of Australian CMBSs and LPT bonds. With the importance of subjective 
judgement in the bond rating process as propagated by credit rating agencies and 
researchers acknowledged, this chapter looks at the credit rating of CMBSs using 
qualitative techniques.  
 
In particular, mailed questionnaire surveys of issuers and arrangers of Australian 
CMBSs are undertaken in order to better understand the structuring issues they consider 
necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues necessary for the success of an 
issue. Appendix B shows sample questionnaires administered on the two respondent 
groups.  Furthermore, results of the surveys are analysed to compare whether there are 
any differences between the two groups. This is important for the identification of 
principal-agent problems, if any. 
8.2 DISTILLATION OF FACTORS CONSIDERED IN STRUCTURING 
CMBSs 
8.2.1 Structuring Details 
 
(i) Debt funding options 
 
CMBs are one of the many available debt funding options as discussed in Chapter two. 
Arrangers and issuers are asked to rank the importance of CMBSs as a debt funding tool. 
This forms a basis for deducing motivating factors behind its use as a funding tool and 
also impacts on the growth of the CMBS market. 
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(ii) Credit enhancement techniques used 
 
As earlier pointed out in chapter three, credit enhancement is undertaken to act as a 
“ring-fence” around assets to avoid insolvency and also results in a higher rating of the 
bonds issued. Therefore, questions are posed on the various credit enhancement 
techniques that are used in order to answer questions like, “Do CMBSs backed by 
certain property classes require specific credit enhancement techniques or are the 
techniques generic? What is the impact of using different credit enhancement techniques 
on the rating?” 
 
(iii) Preferred tranching and size of tranches 
 
Certain institutional investors, such as superannuation funds, are only mandated to 
undertake “investment-grade” rated investments (Newell 2006b). Although majority of 
the tranches in Australian CMBSs issued are AAA-class rated, BBB to B-class tranches 
are becoming common. This shows the growth/maturing of the market, increased 
acceptance of the investment asset and the increased participation of more 
knowledgeable investors (Chikolwa 2007a). Therefore, questions on the preferred 
tranching and their sizes are important to understanding the growth of the CMBS 
market. 
 
(iv) Structuring costs and duration 
 
Han (1996)  points out that for a CMBS transaction to be commercially viable in the US, 
issues have to be US$50 million and above to cover the high structuring costs. 
Henderson and ING Barings (1997) and (Ooi et al. 2003) reinforce Han’s assertion that 
the major drawback with CMBS issuance are the high structuring costs. As such, we 
seek to establish average structuring costs for Australian CMBSs that make CMBSs a 
viable debt funding tool. 
 
(v) Pricing details 
 
Market yields correspond to bond ratings, which indicate an association between rating 
and risk. The higher the credit quality the lower will be yield and the more successful 
will be the issue (Alles 2000; Kose et al. 2003). Arrangers and issuers are asked how 
they price their issues to ensure their success. 
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8.2.2 Motivating Factors behind CMBS Issuance 
 
According to Henderson & ING Barings (1997) factors that support securitization are: 
 Funds can be provided at attractive rates 
 Provision of an alternative source of funding 
 Ability to tap large sources of funds 
 Provision of matched funding for medium term and long-term receivables 
 An improved company’s return on capital 
  
Therefore, we seek to find out which of these factors are considered beneficial for 
CMBS by arrangers and issuers. 
8.2.3 Factors Attractive for Investors to Invest in CMBS  
 
Sing et al. (2004b) in their study on the development of CMBS market in Singapore 
asked respondents on the following factors which investors find attractive to invest in 
CMBS:  
 Rating of issues 
 Market liquidity 
 Term to maturity 
 Credit enhancement / guarantee 
 Denomination of tranche 
 Information efficiency 
 Correlation with other assets 
 Issuing agents and underwriting banks 
 
A similar approach is followed in our study to investigate factors which investors find 
attractive to invest in Australian CMBSs. 
8.2.4 Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating 
 
The following factors have been identified as being important for obtaining a high 
CMBS credit rating (Fitch Ratings 2005c; Moody's Investor Service 2003; Roche 2002; 
Standard & Poor's 2001): 
 Asset quality: Location; Age; Condition; Tenant retention rate. 
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 Tenant / Lease details: Credit quality of income; Tenancy concentration; Lease 
expiry profile. 
 Portfolio composition: Total number of assets; Diversification (property 
concentration, type, and geographic location). 
 Financials and other details: Refinancing risk; Transaction support mechanisms / 
credit enhancement; gearing (DSCR and LTV ratio). 
 Management: Quality and experience; Growth strategy. 
 
As pointed out in chapter four and five, secondary risk factors such as legal risk and 
third party risk, are not considered as common structural mechanisms to mitigate them 
have been set up for all CMBSs. Therefore, issuers and arrangers are asked to rank the 
importance of factors considered necessary to obtain a high credit rating. 
8.3 SURVEY METHODOLOGY  
 
The sample of CMBS issuers and arrangers selected for this study is taken from various 
Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports issued over the study period, 2000 - 2006. 
Due to the small population, invitation letters were sent out to twelve CMBS issuers and 
eight CMBS arrangers in August 2007 and January 2008, respectively. The first survey 
(August 2007) was done at the infancy of the “credit crunch crisis” and the second 
(January 2008) when its effects were being fully felt in the Australian capital markets. 
The difference in the state of the market between the two survey periods may influence 
the survey results. 
 
While the number of respondents in these surveys is small, they represent a significant 
coverage of the market. The author checked the contact details of each survey 
participant to ensure the invitation letter would be mailed to the correct person in the 
corporation.  
 
In compliance with the Curtin University of Technology human research ethics protocol, 
the identity of the respondents and interviewees will not be disclosed and the survey and 
interview results will be presented in an aggregated format. A copy of the invitation 
letter and the survey questionnaires are attached in Appendix 1. 
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8.3.1 Description of Respondents - Issuers 
 
For the period 2000 - 2006, a total of fifteen CMBS issuers were identified. Of the 
fifteen identified issuers, twelve were selected for survey after establishing a target 
respondent. The identified respondents were fund managers in CMBS issuer firms. The 
twelve presented a market share of 93%, with a combined CMBS issuance of AU$16.3 
billion. In the remaining three CMBS issuer firms, no clear respondent could be 
identified as the issuing decisions where spread in various departments and attempts to 
identify a respondent were not responded to.  
 
The surveys were posted out during the month of August 2007 and responses were 
received in the following month. A total of five responded, giving a response rate of 
42%. The five respondents had issued a combined total of AU$5.1 billion worth of 
CMBSs or 29% of total issuance from 1999 to December 2006. 
8.3.2 Description of Respondents - Arrangers  
 
During the same study period, a total of eight CMBS arrangers where identified, 
representing 100% market share. CMBS arrangers are international investment banks 
and the investment banking wings of major Australian banks, with target respondents in 
this group being investment bankers. They had arranged a combined CMBS issuance of 
AU$17.4 billion from 1999 to December 2006. A total of three responded, giving a 
response rate of 37.5%. The three respondents had arranged a combined total of 
AU$12.4 billion worth of CMBSs or 71% of total issuance from 1999 to December 
2006. 
8.3.4 Methods of Analysing Responses  
8.3.4.1 Likert Scale 
 
A 5-point Likert scale is applied in the questionnaire to determine the importance of a 
factor with score 1 = Not Applicable, 2 = Not Important, 3 = Important, 4 = Very 
Important, and 5 = Essential.  Arithmetic means of the Likert scale scores were done to 
determine the ranking in importance attributed to various factors in rating and investing 
in CMBSs, and in obtaining a high CMBS credit rating. Further, the percentage 
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attributable to the ‘very important’ and ‘essential’ categories in the responses was 
determined as a percentage of the overall factor score.  
8.3.4.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Analysis of variance was applied to determine whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between CMBS issuer and arranger responses. The analysis considered the 
weight of the responses to motivating factors behind CMBS issuance, potential factors 
attracting investment in CMBS, and factors considered necessary to obtain a high 
CMBS credit rating. There were a total of eighteen factors, and consequently eighteen 
ANOVAs to be performed. The results from the ANOVA would explore the significant 
differences, if any, between the issuer and arranger groups. 
 
One-way ANOVA tests were applied for each of the factors for both the issuer and 
arranger groups. The ANOVA tests were performed using Excel. If the F statistic from 
any of the eighteen tests be greater than the critical value of the respective test (P<5%), 
then the groups in that factor category are significant. Alternatively, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two respondent groups (Steel et al. 1997). 
8.3.4.3 Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
 
The ranking of responses of factors from each of the issuers and arranger groups were 
analysed to test the overall degree of association between the ranks using Spearman’s 
rank-correlation test (Croucher 1997; Kohler 1993). 
 
The formula for calculating the value of rs, the rank correlation co-efficient, is expressed 
by the equation: 
 
   = 1 -  
 
where: 
  di = the difference between the corresponding rankings, and 
  n  = the number of pairs of observations. 
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8.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
8.4.1 Issuers 
 
The first questions asked were on their level of participation in the CMBS market and on 
satisfaction with CMBSs as a funding source. Of the five respondents, three expressed 
satisfaction with utilising CMBS as a funding source, one was neutral and one was 
dissatisfied. The respondents who expressed satisfaction with CMBS as a funding source 
indicated that they had intentions of issuing a combined total of AU$3.5 billion over the 
next 3 - 5 years. 
 
Responses to the other questions are discussed below. 
8.4.1.1 Structuring Details 
 
(i) Debt funding options used 
Of the available debt funding options of commercial paper, bank debt, medium term 
notes and CMBS, the four respondents who answered this question were divided in 
preference with 50% for CMBS and 50% for bank debt. The strong preference for bank 
debt funding is indicative of the increased bank lending to the commercial property 
sector (Reserve Bank of Australia 2006). 
 
(ii) Credit enhancement techniques used 
Of the available credit enhancement techniques, 80% of the respondents regard credit 
tranching as their main method, with the remaining 20% opting for over-
collateralisation. The second most preferred methods of credit enhancement were cross-
collateralisation (80%), reserve funds (20%), and credit tranching (20%). The least 
preferred of the methods used were related party guarantees. Other techniques such as 
spread accounts, monocline and multiline insurance, letters of credit, and amortisation 
triggers were not used by the respondents. 
 
(iii) Preferred tranching and size of tranches 
Over 80% of the respondents preferred issuing four or more tranches (Aaa/AAA, 
Aa/AA, A/A, Baa/BBB, Ba/BB), with the remaining 20% preferring only three tranches 
(Aaa/AAA, Aa/AA, A/A). This shows the depth of the market and how confident the 
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issuers were that even the lower rated issues would be taken up. A probable reason for 
having only AAA, AA, and A rated tranches could be the desire to target wholesale 
investors with mandates to invest only in investment grade issues. 
 
Only one (20%) of the respondents preferred issuing tranche size of over AU$200 
million for AAA-rated notes. The most preferred tranche size (80%) was AU$51 - 
AU$200 million. The ideal subordination levels for this tranche were reported as 80% - 
85%. The preference for larger transaction size is supported by Han’s (1996) supposition 
that financing costs drop with increase in transaction size. 
 
(iv) Structuring costs and duration 
The duration of structuring CMBSs ranged from 4 - 9 months and average all-in 
structuring costs, excluding margins, ranged between 0.21% - 0.5%. No costs were 
ascribed to first loss cover or credit enhancement. 
 
(v) CMBS refinancing options 
The refinancing options considered when the CMBSs mature were further capital market 
issues and bank debt. Nearly 80% of the respondents regard further capital market issues 
as their first preference to CMBS refinancing and only 20% prefer bank debt. The 
reason advanced for bank debt was that it was cheaper, deeper and easier to arrange. 
 
(vi) Pricing details 
The recent credit squeeze has meant that pricing margins for CMBS are at their highest 
level and pricing of new issues is almost non-existent. Margins of 21 - 25 basis points 
(bp) were considered ideal by 80% of the respondents for both 3 year and 5 year AAA 
rated CMBS issues. The remaining 20% considered margins of 10 – 20 bp as being 
ideal. 
 
As for BBB rated CMBS issues, the range for 3 year issues was 51 – 80 bp and for 5 
year issues 81 – 80 bp. 
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8.4.1.2 Motivating Factors behind CMBS Issuance 
 
A list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of CMBSs was presented to the 
respondents and the relative importance of each factor was ranked (Table 8.1). The most 
important factor, from the view of the respondents, is provision of funds at attractive 
rates. The other factors considered important are provision of an alternative source of 
funding and ability to tap large sources of funds. The respondents found factors such as 
improving the company’s return on capital and provision of matched funding of medium 
and long-term receivables as not important considerations behind the decision to issue 
CMBSs. 
 
Table 8.1: Potential Motivating Factors behind CMBS Issuance - Issuers 
 
Potential Motivating Factor Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Funds can be provided at attractive rates  3.8 80% 
Provision of an alternative source of funding 3.6 80% 
Ability to tap large sources of funds 3.4 80% 
Provision of matched funding for medium term and long-term 
receivables 
2.0 20% 
An improved company’s return on capital  1.4 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
8.4.1.3 Factors Attractive for Investors to Invest in CMBS 
 
Over 80% of the respondents regard rating of CMBS issues as being the most important 
attraction factor for investors to invest in CMBSs. The other important considerations 
identified by 40% of the respondents are market liquidity, term to maturity, and 
information efficiency. The remaining factors of credit enhancement, denomination of 
tranche and the involvement of agents and underwriting banks were considered 
unimportant factors to attracting investors in CMBSs. 
 
Table 8.2 presents a list of potential factors which investors find attractive for investing 
in CMBSs. 
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Table 8.2: Factors Attractive for Investors to Invest in CMBS - Issuers 
 
Attracting Factor Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Rating of issues 4.0 80% 
Market liquidity 3.4 40% 
Term to maturity 3.2 40% 
Credit enhancement / guarantee 3.0 20% 
Denomination of tranche 3.0 20% 
Information efficiency 3.0 40% 
Correlation with other assets  2.4 0% 
Issuing agents and underwriting banks  2.0 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
These results are similar to those found by Sing et al. (2004b) in their study on the 
development of the CMBS market in Singapore. They listed rating of issues and market 
liquidity as the two most important factors, followed by term to maturity and credit 
enhancement. 
8.4.1.4 Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating 
 
Majority of the respondents regard asset quality (80%) and tenant / lease details (80%) 
as the two most important factors needed to obtain a high credit rating. This finding is 
consistent with criteria set by the rating agencies for CMBS credit rating (Moody's 
Investor Service 2003; Standard & Poor's 2003c, 2005b) and other researchers (Roche 
2002). However, less than 20% of the respondents consider management, financials and 
transaction support details as being important considerations to obtain a high credit 
rating. A probable reason for the low consideration of management is that most of the 
issuers are highly successful in running their LPTs and it is this same expertise that is 
being used in managing their CMBS issuances with no extra requirements needed. As 
for financials and transaction support details, there are minimum benchmarks to be met 
for a CMBS to be rated. 
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Table 8.3 presents a list of potential factors considered necessary to obtain a high 
CMBSs credit rating. 
  
Table 8.3: Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating - Issuers 
 
Potential Factors Considered Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Asset quality: Location; Age; Condition; Tenant retention rate  
 
3.7 80% 
Tenant / Lease details: Credit Quality of income; Tenancy 
concentration; Lease expiry profile  
 
3.6 80% 
Portfolio composition: Total number of assets; Diversification (asset, 
geographic, sector) 
 
3.2 40% 
Financials and other details: refinancing risk; Transaction support 
mechanisms / credit enhancement; gearing (DSCR and LTV ratio) 
 
3.0 20% 
Management: Quality and experience; Growth strategy 2.8 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
8.4.2 Arrangers 
 
All the respondents expressed satisfaction in their past experience with the use of 
CMBSs as a funding tool. However, due to the current credit squeeze resulting from the 
US sub-prime mortgage market crisis, they were all unsure of their future participation 
in CMBS structuring until market conditions normalised.  
 
Responses to the other questions are discussed below. 
8.4.2.1 Structuring Details 
 
(i) Debt funding options used 
Mixed results were obtained for the most preferred debt funding option with two of the 
respondents opting for bank debt and the remainder choosing CMBS. Again, no 
established pattern could be obtained for the least preferred option with each of the 
respondents choosing commercial paper, medium term notes and CMBS. 
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(ii) Credit enhancement techniques used 
Credit tranching was considered as main credit enhancement technique by all the 
respondents. They considered over-collateralisation, cross-collateralisation, amortisation 
triggers and reserve funds as second tier credit enhancement techniques. Other 
techniques such as spread accounts, monocline and multiline insurance, and letters of 
credit were not used by the respondents. 
 
(iii) Preferred tranching and size of tranches 
All the respondents indicated that only tranching from AAA to BBB was viable to 
attract investors and that only tranche sizes of AU$100 million and above were cost 
effective. The ideal subordination levels for AAA notes were reported as ranging from 
60% - 85%, different from the first group. 
 
(iv) Structuring costs and duration 
The duration of structuring CMBSs ranged from 4 - 6 months, with several activities 
running in tandem such as compiling documentation and the rating process. The average 
all-in-all structuring costs, excluding margins, ranged between 0.1% - 1%. First loss 
cover or credit enhancement costs were said to depend on the deal or were taken into 
account in the tranching process. 
 
(v) CMBS refinancing options 
Two of the respondents stated further capital market debt issues as their preferred 
refinancing option when the CMBSs matured and one preferred refinancing using bank 
debt. The least considered refinancing option by all respondents was asset sales. 
 
(vi) Pricing details 
One of the respondents indicated that pricing of CMBSs depended on characteristics of 
the underlying collateral, with another stating that historical ranges for AAA notes were 
20 - 40 basis points (bp) and 150 – 300 bp for BBB notes. All the respondents were in 
unison that under current market conditions, pricing of AAA notes could range between 
60 – 80 bp and BBB notes between 200 – 300 bp and that these could even be high as 
the CMBS market had literally shutdown. 
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8.4.2.2 Motivating Factors behind CMBS Issuance 
 
A list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of CMBSs was presented to the 
respondents and the relative importance of each factor was ranked (Table 8.4). The most 
important factors, from the view of the respondents, are provision of funds at attractive 
rates and ability to tap large sources of funds. The other factors considered important are 
provision of an alternative source of funding and improvement of the company’s return 
on capital. The respondents found the provision of matched funding of medium and 
long-term receivables as an unimportant consideration in CMBS issuance. 
 
Table 8.4: Potential Motivating Factors behind CMBS Issuance - Arrangers 
 
Potential Motivating Factor Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Funds can be provided at attractive rates  5.0 100% 
Ability to tap large sources of funds 4.0 100% 
An improved company’s return on capital  3.6 68% 
Provision of an alternative source of funding 3.3 33% 
Provision of matched funding for medium term and long-term 
receivables 
2.6 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
8.4.2.3 Factors Attractive for Investors to Invest in CMBS 
 
All of the respondents regard rating of CMBS issues as being the most important 
attraction factor for investors to invest in CMBSs, with term to maturity and market 
liquidity considered as the second and third most important factors respectively. The 
other factors considered by the respondents are information efficiency, credit 
enhancement and denomination of tranche. The involvement of agents and underwriting 
banks was considered an unimportant factor to attracting investors in CMBSs. 
 
Table 8.5 presents a list of potential factors which investors find attractive for investing 
in CMBSs. 
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Table 8.5: Factors Attractive for Investors to Invest in CMBS - Arrangers 
 
Attracting Factor Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Rating of issues 5.0 100% 
Term to maturity 4.0 100% 
Market liquidity 4.0 68% 
Credit enhancement / guarantee 3.6 68% 
Denomination of tranche 3.6 33% 
Information efficiency 3.6 33% 
Correlation with other assets  3.0 33% 
Issuing agents and underwriting banks  2.3 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
8.4.2.4 Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating 
 
Two of the respondents regard financials and transaction support details as being the 
most important factors needed to obtain a high credit rating, with portfolio composition 
coming in second. Asset quality and tenant / lease details come in third, with the least 
important factor being management. 
 
Table 8.6 presents a list of potential factors considered necessary to obtain a high 
CMBSs credit rating. 
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Table 8.6: Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating - Arrangers 
 
Potential Factors Considered Average 
Score 
% ‘very 
important / 
essential’ 
Financials and other details: Refinancing risk; Transaction support 
mechanisms / credit enhancement; Gearing (DSCR and LTV ratio) 
 
4.6 100% 
Portfolio composition: Total number of assets; Diversification (asset, 
geographic, sector) 
 
4.3 100% 
Asset quality: Location; Age; Condition; Tenant retention rate  
 
4.0 80% 
Tenant / Lease details: Credit quality of income; Tenancy 
concentration; Lease expiry profile  
 
3.7 33% 
Management: Quality and experience; Growth strategy 3.0 0% 
 Note: Score 1 = N/A, 2 = Not Important, 3 = important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Essential 
 
8.4.3 Comparison of Issuer and Arranger Results 
8.4.3.1 Structuring Details 
 
There following comparisons can be made between issuers and arranger perceptions of 
structuring details in CMBSs: 
 
(i) Debt funding options used 
Issuers had an even preference of debt funding options they used at 50% each of further 
CMBS issuances and bank debt, whereas no preference pattern could be established for 
arrangers. These results are not surprising with banking lending for commercial property 
being buoyant. For instance, it increased by 27% over the year to March 2007, with 
lending to the industrial property market growing by 31% (Reserve Bank of Australia 
2007). This is attributable to the strong property performance supported by improving 
business climate. Prime office property prices rose by 22% over the year to December 
2006, the strongest annual growth since December 1988, while industrial property prices 
rose by 12% over the same period. The NAB Business November 2007 Survey 
(National Australia Bank 2007) states that business conditions remain at record levels 
despite financial market turbulence and that though confidence has edged down, it is still 
at robust levels.  
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(ii) Credit enhancement techniques used 
Both issuers and arrangers considered credit tranching as main credit enhancement 
technique, followed by over-collateralisation, cross-collateralisation. Amortisation 
triggers and reserve funds are considered third-tier credit enhancement techniques. Other 
techniques such as spread accounts, monocline and multiline insurance, and letters of 
credit were not used by the respondents. 
 
This is in line with standard market practice of common features included in all CMBS 
issues. These matters were discussed in chapter four. 
 
(iii) Preferred tranching and size of tranches 
Both groups of respondents indicated that only tranching from AAA to BBB was viable 
to attract investors, but had differences in the ideal tranche size; issuers indicted a range 
of AU$51 - 200 million and arrangers indicated AU$100 million. The results are 
comparable to the US (Han 1996) and Singapore (Sing et al. 2004b) where US$50 
million and S$500.1 million respectively were deemed to be optimal tranche sizes to 
provide liquidity in the market. The ideal subordination levels for AAA notes were 
reported as ranging from 60% - 85%. 
 
(iv) Structuring costs and duration 
The duration of structuring CMBSs ranged from 4 - 6 months for the arrangers and 4 – 9 
months for the issuers, with several activities running in tandem such as compiling 
documentation and the rating process. Significant differences were noted for the average 
all-in-all structuring costs (excluding margins), which ranged between 0.1% - 1% for 
arrangers and issuers at 0.21 – 0.5%. These differences attributable to the two groups are 
not readily explainable. 
 
(v) CMBS refinancing options 
Both issuers and arrangers stated further capital market debt issues and refinancing using 
bank debt as their preferred refinancing option when the CMBSs matured. The least 
considered refinancing option considered was asset sales. 
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As explained earlier, bank funding to commercial property market has been favourable 
and demand for securitised debt securities has been strong, hence making it easier to 
refinance CMBSs using the two methods. 
 
(vi) Pricing details 
The two groups generally were of the view that ideal pricing for AAA notes should start 
at 20 bp and over 50 bp for BBB notes. Further, the differences in the survey period 
between issuers (August 2007) and arrangers (January 2008) showed in their 
interpretation of market conditions. At the time arrangers were surveyed, the CMBS 
market had literally shutdown due to the effects of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
They indicated that pricing of AAA notes could range between 60 – 80 bp and BBB 
notes between 200 – 300 bp under current market conditions. 
8.4.3.2 Analysis of Variance 
 
ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) is used to test the differences of perceptions between 
groups with respect to each of the eighteen factors in Tables 8.4 - 8.6 at 5% level of 
significance for arrangers and issuers. The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 
8.7 - 8.9. 
 
Table 8.7: ANOVA for Factor Responses to Motivations behind CMBS Issuance 
 
PROVISION OF FUNDS AT ATTRACTIVE RATES 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 15 5 0
Issuer 5 19 3.8 1.7
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 2.7 1 2.7 2.3823529 0.1736585 5.9873776
Within Groups 6.8 6 1.1333333
Total 9.5 7
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IMPROVED COMPANY’S RETURN ON CAPITAL 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 11 3.6666667 0.3333333
Issuer 5 7 1.4 0.3
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 9.63333 1 9.6333333 30.964286 0.0014268 5.9873776
Within Groups 1.86667 6 0.3111111
Total 11.5 7
 
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING SOURCE 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 10 3.3333333 0.3333333
Issuer 5 18 3.6 0.3
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.13333 1 0.1333333 0.4285714 0.5369633 5.9873776
Within Groups 1.86667 6 0.3111111
Total 2 7
 
 
ABILITY TO TAP LARGE SOURCES OF FUNDS 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 12 4 0
Issuer 5 17 3.4 0.8
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.675 1 0.675 1.265625 0.3035694 5.9873776
Within Groups 3.2 6 0.5333333
Total 3.875 7
 
 
PROVISION OF MATCHED FUNDING 
 
 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 8 2.6666667 0.3333333
Issuer 5 10 2 1.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.833333 1 0.8333333 0.75 0.4197531 5.9873776
Within Groups 6.666667 6 1.1111111
Total 7.5 7
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Table 8.8: ANOVA for Factors Investors Find Attractive to Invest in CMBS 
 
CORRELATION WITH OTHER ASSETS  
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 9 3 1
Issuer 5 12 2.4 0.3
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.675 1 0.675 1.265625 0.3035694 5.9873776
Within Groups 3.2 6 0.5333333
Total 3.875 7
 
 
ISSUING AGENTS AND UNDERWRITING BANKS 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 7 2.3333333 0.3333333
Issuer 5 10 2 0.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.2083333 1 0.2083333 0.46875 0.5191201 5.9873776
Within Groups 2.6666667 6 0.4444444
Total 2.875 7
 
 
DENOMINATION OF TRANCHE 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 11 3.6666667 1.3333333
Issuer 5 15 3 0.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.8333333 1 0.8333333 1.0714286 0.3405278 5.9873776
Within Groups 4.6666667 6 0.7777778
Total 5.5 7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192 
 
INFORMATION EFFICIENCY 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 11 3.6666667 1.3333333
Issuer 5 15 3 1
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.8333333 1 0.8333333 0.75 0.4197531 5.9873776
Within Groups 6.6666667 6 1.1111111
Total 7.5 7
 
 
MARKET LIQUIDITY 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 12 4 1
Issuer 5 17 3.4 1.3
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.675 1 0.675 0.5625 0.4816178 5.9873776
Within Groups 7.2 6 1.2
Total 7.875 7
 
 
RATING OF ISSUES 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 15 5 0
Issuer 6 25 4.1666667 1.3666667
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1.3888889 1 1.3888889 1.4227642 0.2718071 5.5914478
Within Groups 6.8333333 7 0.9761905
Total 8.2222222 8
 
 
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 11 3.6666667 2.3333333
Issuer 5 15 3 0.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.8333333 1 0.8333333 0.75 0.4197531 5.9873776
Within Groups 6.6666667 6 1.1111111
Total 7.5 7
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TERM TO MATURITY 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 12 4 0
Issuer 5 16 3.2 0.7
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 1.2 1 1.2 2.5714286 0.1599305 5.9873776
Within Groups 2.8 6 0.4666667
Total 4 7
 
 
Table 8.9: ANOVA for Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating 
 
ASSET QUALITY 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Issuer 3 11 3.6666667 1.3333333
Arranger 5 20 4 1.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.2083333 1 0.2083333 0.1442308 0.7171899 5.9873776
Within Groups 8.6666667 6 1.4444444
Total 8.875 7
 
 
TENANT/LEASE DETAILS 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 11 3.6666667 1.3333333
Issuer 5 18 3.6 1.3
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.0083333 1 0.0083333 0.0063559 0.9390493 5.9873776
Within Groups 7.8666667 6 1.3111111
Total 7.875 7
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PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 13 4.3333333 0.3333333
Issuer 5 16 3.2 0.7
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 2.4083333 1 2.4083333 4.1682692 0.0872468 5.9873776
Within Groups 3.4666667 6 0.5777778
Total 5.875 7
 
 
MANAGEMENT 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 9 3 0
Issuer 5 14 2.8 0.2
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.075 1 0.075 0.5625 0.4816178 5.9873776
Within Groups 0.8 6 0.1333333
Total 0.875 7
 
 
FINANCIALS AND OTHER DETAILS 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Arranger 3 14 4.6666667 0.3333333
Issuer 5 15 3 0.5
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 5.2083333 1 5.2083333 11.71875 0.0140871 5.9873776
Within Groups 2.6666667 6 0.4444444
Total 7.875 7
 
 
8.4.3.3 Analysis of Significant Differences between Arrangers and Issuers 
 
Table 8.10 identifies those factors where significant differences between the two 
respondent groups existed. These were: 
 Improved company’s return on capital, for motivating factors behind CMBS 
issuance; and 
 Financials and other details, for factors needed to obtain a high credit rating. 
 
 195 
 
The differences indicate a perception by the one group of greater relevance of these 
factors.  The issuer group found improved company’s return on capital to be the least 
important of all the factors motivating CMBS issuance, unlike the arranger group who 
considered it more favourably. 
 
For financials and other details, the arranger group ranked these more than the arranger 
group in terms of relevance in obtaining a high CMBS credit rating. 
 
One possible explanation for these differences is that arrangers consider a stable or solid 
financial standing of a company issuing CMBSs and its ability to meet its debt 
obligations to be critical in credit rating. This view can be reinforced by the recent 
“credit crunch” induced problems in the capital markets, meaning that only companies 
with more stable financial standings are able to issue debt securities. 
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Table 8.10: Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of All Respondents 
 Group Average Factor Score 
 
 
 Arranger  Issuer Significance 
Motivations Behind CMBS 
Issuance 
   
Provision of funds at attractive rates 5.0 3.8 ns 
Improved company’s return on 
capital 
3.6 1.4 ∗ 
Alternative funding source 3.3 3.6 ns 
Ability to tap large sources of funds 4.0 3.4 ns 
Provision of matched funding 2.6 2.0 ns 
Factors Investors Find Attractive 
to Invest in CMBS 
   
Rating of issues 5.0 4.0 ns 
Term to maturity 4.0 3.2 ns 
Market liquidity 4.0 3.4 ns 
Credit enhancement / guarantee 3.6 3.0 ns 
Denomination of tranche 3.6 3.0 ns 
Information efficiency 3.6 3.0 ns 
Correlation with other assets  3.0 2.4 ns 
Issuing agents and underwriting 
banks  
2.3 2.0 ns 
Factors Considered to Obtain a 
High Credit Rating 
   
Financials and other details 4.6 3.0 ∗ 
Portfolio composition 4.3 3.2 ns 
Asset quality 4.0 3.7 ns 
Tenant\Lease details 3.7 3.6 ns 
Management 
 
3.0 2.8 ns 
∗ = significantly different (P < 5%) 
ns = not significantly different 
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8.4.4 Ranking Average Factor Scores between Arrangers and Issuers 
 
Table 8.11 shows average factor scores and their ranking of the two respondent groups. 
Also shown are the overall average factor scores and their ranking. The average factor 
scores are arithmetic averages of all the eight respondents. 
 
The Spearman’s rank correlation co-efficients were determined for the factor scores of 
arrangers and issuers. These were: 
 
• Motivations Behind CMBS Issuance:   rs = 0.50 
• Factors Investors Find Attractive to Invest in CMBS: rs = 0.97 
• Factors Considered to Obtain a High Credit Rating:  rs = 0.45 
 
The results indicate that there is a strong relationship between arrangers’ and issuers’ 
ranking of the factors. 
 
The rankings for each of the factors assessed in Table 8.11 are discussed below: 
 
(i) Motivations Behind CMBS Issuance 
Both arrangers and issuers ranked provision of funds at attractive rates to be the most 
important factor behind CMBS issue with an overall factor score of 4.3. There were 
differences in perception of importance for the remaining factors. However, the overall 
factor average scores for provision of an alternative funding source and ability to tap 
large sources of funds were ranked second and third respectively. Their average factor 
scores are 3.5 and 3.1. The fourth ranked factor was provision of matched funding and 
the least was improvement of company’s return on capital, with average factor scores at 
2.8 and 2.3 respectively.  
 
(ii) Factors Investors Find Attractive to Invest in CMBS 
Rating of issues was considered the most important factor attracting investors to invest 
in CMBS by both arrangers and issuers, with an overall factor score of 4.4. Other factors 
ranked highly in order of importance are market liquidity, term to maturity, information 
efficiency, credit enhancement/guarantee and denomination of tranche, with average 
factor scores ranging from 3.5 – 3.0. Correlation with other assets and involvement of 
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issuing agents and underwriting banks were considered the least important, average 
factor scores at 2.6 and 2.1 respectively (Table 8.11). 
 
(iii) Factors Considered to Obtain a High CMBS Rating 
Average factor score rankings for arrangers and issuers were divergent with financials 
and other details, and asset quality ranked as the most important factors respectively. 
The reason for this divergent view was earlier discussed in Section 8.4.3.3.  A similar 
scenario prevailed for the remaining factors except for management which all parties 
considered the least important. 
 
However, on an overall basis asset quality prevailed as the most important factor at a 
score of 3.9. Financial details and other details, portfolio composition and tenant\lease 
details, all had the same score at 3.6. The least was management with a factor score of 
2.9. 
 
Overall results of our study are different from those presented by Roche (2002) for 
ranking CMBSs in the ABN AMRO model. In their model, property-based factors added 
up to 75% (asset quality (15%); refinancing risk (20%); lease expiry profile (15%); 
credit quality of income (15%); and tenancy concentration (10%)), management (10%), 
and portfolio composition (15%). On a percentage basis, their order of importance can 
be ranked as (1) tenant\lease details, (2) financials and other details, (3) asset quality, (3) 
portfolio composition, and (4) management. 
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Table 8.11: Arranger, Issuer and Overall Average Factor Scores 
 
 Arranger 
Factor 
Score 
Arranger 
Rank 
Issuer 
Factor 
Score 
Issuer 
Rank 
Overall 
Factor 
Score 
Overall 
Rank 
 
Motivations Behind CMBS 
Issuance 
      
Provision of funds at attractive 
rates 
5.0 1 3.8 1 4.3 1 
Improved company’s return on 
capital 
3.6 3 1.4 5 2.3 5 
Alternative funding source 3.3 4 3.6 2 3.5 2 
Ability to tap large sources of 
funds 
4.0 2 3.4 3 3.1 3 
Provision of matched funding 2.6 5 2.0 4 2.8 4 
Factors Investors Find 
Attractive to Invest in CMBS 
      
Rating of issues 5.0 1 4.0 1 4.4 1 
Term to maturity 4.0 2 3.2 3 3.5 3 
Market liquidity 4.0 2 3.4 2 3.6 2 
Credit enhancement / guarantee 3.6 3 3.0 4 3.3 5 
Denomination of tranche 3.6 3 3.0 4 3.0 6 
Information efficiency 3.6 3 3.0 4 3.4 4 
Correlation with other assets  3.0 4 2.4 5 2.6 7 
Issuing agents and underwriting 
banks  
2.3 5 2.0 6 2.1 8 
Factors Considered to Obtain 
a High Credit Rating 
      
Financials and other details 4.6 1 3.0 4 3.6 2 
Portfolio composition 4.3 2 3.2 3 3.6 2 
Asset quality 4.0 3 3.7 1 3.9 1 
Tenant\Lease details 3.7 4 3.6 2 3.6 2 
Management 
 
3.0 5 2.8 5 2.9 3 
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8.5 SUMMARY 
 
The survey of arrangers and issuers has provided insights into structuring issues they 
consider necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues necessary for the 
success of an issue. While the number of respondents in these surveys is small, they 
represent a significant coverage of the market. Furthermore, the first survey (August 
2007) was done at the infancy of the “credit crunch crisis” and the second (January 
2008) when its effects were being fully felt in the Australian capital markets. The 
difference in the state of the market between the two survey periods may influence the 
survey results. 
 
Rating of issues was found to be the main reason why investors invest in CMBSs and 
provision of funds at attractive rates as the main motivation behind CMBS issuance. 
Furthermore, asset quality was found to be the most important factor necessary to obtain 
a high credit rating. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarises the conclusions and property investment and finance 
implications made in the previous chapters. Summaries of the contributions of this 
thesis, limitations and future research are also presented. 
9.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND PROPERTY MARKET 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
In Australia, the description of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) has 
been expanded and accepted in the market to include a form of securitisation backed by 
direct property assets (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001), in addition to the traditional definition 
of the securitisation of commercial mortgages (Jacob & Fabozzi 2003). The Australian 
CMBS market has grown into a major commercial debt funding/investment instrument 
from when they were first introduced in 1999. 
 
Since Australian CMBSs are primarily backed by direct property assets, their credit risk 
assessment mainly involves property risk assessment. According to Henderson and ING 
Barings (1997), assets backing a securitisation are its fundamental credit strength. 
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) reinforce this view by stating that the assigned rating 
is the relative risk of the collateral and its ability to generate income.  
 
Ultimately, the goal of structuring CMBS transactions is to obtain a high credit rating as 
this has an impact on the yield obtainable and the success of the issue. Credit rating 
agencies claim that their ratings reflect each agency’s opinion about an issue’s potential 
default risk and rely heavily on a committee’s analysis of the issuer’s ability and 
willingness to repay its debt and therefore researchers would not be able to replicate 
their ratings quantitatively. However, researchers have replicated bond ratings on the 
premise that financial ratios contain a large amount of information about a company’s 
credit risk. In this study, artificial neural networks (ANN) and ordinal regression (OR) 
are used as alternative methods to predict CMBS credit ratings.  
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As such, this thesis examines issues relating to the development of Australian CMBSs 
and quantitatively and qualitatively analyses the structuring of the Australian CMBSs. 
 
Extensive analysis and discussion of these issues was presented in detail in Chapters 3 to 
8. Summary conclusions and property investment and financing implications for each of 
these issues are presented in the following sub-sections. 
9.1.1 Development of the Australian CMBS Market  
 
The Australian CMBS market is well matured in comparison with the much bigger US 
and EU CMBS markets as seen by the diversity of asset classes backing the issues and 
transaction types, tightening spreads, and record issuance volumes. High property 
market transparency (Jones Lang LaSalle 2006b) and predominance of Listed Property 
Trusts (LPT) as CMBS issuers (Standard & Poor's 2005b), who legally have to report 
their activities and underlying collateral performance to regulatory regimes such as 
ASX/ASIC and their equity partners, have contributed to the success of the Australian 
CMBS market. Furthermore, the strong commercial real estate market outlook should 
support further CMBS issuance, with LPTs continuing their dominance as issuers. 
 
Events in the LPT share market are of importance to the growth and development of the 
Australian CMBS market, it being one of the main LPT debt funding options. Although 
the value of LPTs fell by 2.5% a year to December 2007, in line with the recent falls in 
share prices in Australia and overseas, and the difficulties of several large property 
companies in recent months, there have been no announcements more recently of severe 
stresses in the sector (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008). 
 
While the cost of bank lending rates has risen in the past few months, the increase has 
not been as large as the rise in CMBS spreads. Lenders are clearly reluctant to issue 
CMBS at current spreads as doing so would be unprofitable. With the bank bill spread 
itself having increased, the interest rate on a new AAA-rated CMBS would likely have 
to be over 150 to 200 bps above the cash rate, compared with an average of 25 bps over 
recent years (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008). Issues of how risk is assessed and 
reported for adequate pricing of CMBSs are going to be important in reviving this 
market. These issues are discussed Section 9.1.2. 
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The sub-prime mortgage market events in the US have resulted in a “credit crunch” in 
the global financial system due to an increased perception of risk on the part of lenders. 
This has had an impact on the refinancing prospects for maturing CMBSs and further 
resulted in no new issuances since the second half of 2007 due to high spreads on 
securitisable financial receivables and unsecured debt offerings. Over AU$4.6 billion 
worth of CMBSs are set to mature in 2008 – 2009 (Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). 
 
Figure 9.1: Maturity Profile of Australian CMBS Between 2000 – 2006 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.1: Maturity Profile of Australian CMBS Between 2000 - 2006 
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Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
 
For instance, part of the problems faced by Centro Property Group is a result of their 
inability to refinance debt20, which includes CMBSs.  
9.1.2 Assessing and Reporting Property Risk in Australian CMBSs 
 
The success of Australian CMBSs can largely be attributed to high property market 
transparency and well developed securitisation market. These features and the 
dominance of issuance by LPTs have contributed to greater assessment and reporting of 
property risk in CMBSs. However, property risk assessment and reporting has to be 
done in a more systematic and consistent approach as shown by the proposed 
framework, which is based on Adair and Hutchinson’s (2005) delineation of property 
risk. The dominance of CMBSs issuance by LPTs who legally have to report their 
activities and underlying collateral performance to regulatory regimes such as Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) / Australian Security and Investment Commission (ASIC) and 
their equity investors ensures availability of public information on property risk.  
 
Adequate assessment of property risk and its reporting is critical to the success of CMBS 
issues. The proposed framework shows that assessing and reporting property risk in 
                                                 
20
 Refer to letter by Centro Group to its investors dated 17 December 2007 
(http://www.centro.com.au/NR/rdonlyres/C0D34A17-F5F0-4AAE-8663-
E7CC8E0FFB46/0/CentroEarningsRevisionandRefinancingUpdate.pdf ) 
BB BBB A AA AAA
2003 56 379 435
2005 97 148 47 734 1,025
2006 77 264 302 2,115 2,758
2007 83 126 176 1,532 1,917
2008 79 88 135 1,868 2,170
2009 23 158 189 141 2,002 2,512
2010 162 104 103 719 1,087
2011 95 141 222 1,730 2,187
2023 150 150
Total 
(AU$m)
23 750 1,058 1,181 11,078 14,241
Year Rating  Total  
(AU$m)
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Australian CMBSs, which are primarily backed by direct property assets, under the 
headings of investment quality risk, covenant strength risk, and depreciation and 
obsolescence risk can be easily done. Rating agencies can adopt a more systematic and 
consistent approach towards reporting of assessed property risk in CMBS. Issuers and 
institutional investors can examine the perceived consistency and appropriateness of the 
rating assigned to a CMBS issue by providing inferences concerning property risk 
assessment. Investor’s can also use the proposed framework as a primary source of 
obtaining information about the quality and marketability of various issues and also 
assess the market risk premium attached to CMBSs. 
 
Further, the debate on adequate risk assessment and its reporting in property investment 
schemes has received prominence following the collapse of several property 
development companies such as Westpoint, Australian Capital Reserve and Bridgecorp. 
In total, around 20,000 investors in these companies are owed approximately AU$900 
million. All four companies were mainly involved in residential property development 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2007).  As a result, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) has taken a number of steps to improve disclosure 
requirements applying to unlisted and unrated debentures. This follows concerns that 
retail investors in these debentures did not always fully understand the risks that they 
were taking. In mid 2007, it is estimated that unlisted and unrated debentures accounted 
for approximately AU$8 billion of the AU$34 billion in debentures held by retail 
investors and self-managed superannuation funds. ASIC released new requirements in 
Regulatory Guide 69 – Debentures – Improving Disclosure for Retail Investors21 in 
October 2007 setting disclosure benchmarks for, among other things, equity capital, 
liquidity, related party transactions and credit ratings. Regulatory Guide 156 – 
Debentures Advertising22 was further released in December 2007 which details several 
principle-based standards in relation to the advertising of risk involved in investing in 
debentures. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Refer to: http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg69.pdf/$file/rg69.pdf  
22
 Refer to: http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg156.pdf/$file/rg156.pdf  
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9.1.3 Quantitative Analysis of Australian CMBS Credit Ratings 
 
While this study has empirically tested variables propagated by credit rating agencies as 
being important to CMBS rating and found all but LTV to statistically insignificant 
using OR, we conclude that statistical approaches used in corporate bond rating studies 
have limited replication capabilities in CMBS rating and that the endogeneity arguments 
raise significant questions about LTV and DSCR as convenient, short-cut measures of 
CMBS default risk. However, ANNs do offer promising predictive results and can be 
used to facilitate implementation of survey-based CMBS rating systems. This should 
contribute to making the CMBS rating methodology become more explicit which is 
advantageous in that both CMBS investors and issuers are provided with greater 
information and faith in the investment. 
 
ANN results show that 62% of CMBS rating is attributable to LTV (38.2%) and DSCR 
(23.6%); supporting earlier studies which have listed the two as being the most 
important variables in CMBS rating. The other variables’ contributions are: CMBS issue 
size 10.1%, CMBS tenure 6.7%, geographical diversity 13.5% and property diversity 
7.9% respectively. 
 
The methodology used to obtain the above results is validated when applied to predict 
LPT bond ratings. Both OR and ANN provide robust alternatives to rating LPT bonds, 
with no significant differences in results between the two methods. This confirms our 
conclusion that statistical approaches used in corporate bond rating studies have limited 
replication capabilities in CMBS credit rating as all variables (apart from LTV) 
propagated by credit rating agencies as being important to CMBS rating are found to be 
statistically insignificant using OR. 
9.1.4 Qualitative Analysis of Australian CMBS Credit Ratings 
 
The survey of arrangers and issuers has provided insights into structuring issues they 
consider necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues necessary for the 
success of an issue. Rating of issues was found to be the main reason why investors 
invest in CMBSs and provision of funds at attractive rates as the main motivation behind 
CMBS issuance. Further, asset quality was found to be the most important factor 
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necessary to obtain a high credit rating supporting the view by Henderson and ING 
Barings (1997) that assets backing securitisation are its fundamental credit strength. 
 
Furthermore, the following can be deduced from the surveys: 
• The choice of which debt funding option to use depends on market conditions. 
• Credit tranching, over-collateralisation and cross-collateralisation are the main 
forms of credit enhancement in use. 
• On average, the AAA note tranche needs to be above AU$100 million and have 60 
- 85% subordination for a CMBS issue to be economically viable. 
• Structuring costs range between 0.1% – 1% of issue size and structuring duration 
range from 4 – 9 months. 
• Preferred refinancing options are further capital market issues and bank debt. 
• Pricing CMBSs is greatly influenced by factors in the broader capital markets. For 
instance, the market has literary shut down as a result of the “credit crunch” 
caused by the meltdown in the US sub-prime mortgage market. 
 
These findings can be useful to issuers as a guide on the cost of going to the bond 
market to raise capital, which can be useful in comparing with other sources of funds. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The main findings and property investment and finance implications of the development 
and structuring of Australian CMBSs were summarised and presented in the previous 
section. Following is a list of the major contributions of this thesis (which match the 
objectives listed in Section 1.2) to the body of knowledge in the area of property 
investment and finance: 
 
(1) It has bridged the gap between academic researchers and practitioners. To date 
few studies have been done on Australian CMBSs outside the credit rating 
agency circles. These studies are predominantly practitioner focused (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2001; Richardson 2003; Roche 2000, 2002). O’Sullivan (1998) and 
Simonovski (2003) are the only academic studies on CMBSs. Roche (2002) 
present a model used by ABN AMRO to rank Australian CMBSs, whereas other 
studies all look at CMBS market structures and development. However, none of 
these studies have looked at property risk assessment within CMBSs and 
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determinants of CMBS credit ratings. Furthermore, the current study is the most 
recent on the development of the Australian CMBS market. 
(2) Proposing a framework of assessing and reporting property risk in CMBSs which 
should prove useful to rating agencies, bond issuers and institutional investors. 
Rating agencies can adopt a more systematic and consistent approach towards 
reporting of assessed property risk in CMBS. Issuers and institutional investors 
can examine the perceived consistency and appropriateness of the rating assigned 
to a CMBS issue by providing inferences concerning property risk assessment. 
(3) ANNs do offer promising predictive results and can be used to facilitate 
implementation of survey-based CMBS credit rating systems. 
(4) The survey of arrangers and issuers has provided insights into structuring issues 
they consider necessary to obtain a high credit rating and pricing issues 
necessary for the success of an issue.  
 
Results of this thesis can be used as a modified form of implicit evaluation of CMBS 
issuers in addition to the explicit evaluation of CMBS issues. In line with Kim (2005), 
security analysts and investors can use these results as the primary source of obtaining 
information about the quality and marketability of various CMBS issues and also assess 
market risk premium attached to CMBSs while investment bankers can use the results to 
determine commission rates on undertakings  
 
Overall, as well as addressing priority areas in the Australian CMBS market, this thesis 
research has proposed a new framework of assessing and reporting property risk in 
CMBSs and empirically tested determinants of CMBS credit ratings that have provided 
major insights into the validation of CMBS structuring decision-making. 
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9.3 SUMMARY OF LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are several limitations surrounding this thesis. Although the empirical results of 
this study cannot be viewed as definitive due to the small sample size but can form a 
basis for future studies. Over time with more CMBS issuances, a larger sample size will 
enable analysis of various issues backed by different property classes to check for 
differences, if any. 
 
The current body of Australian CMBS knowledge is not that expansive as most 
literature is US based, where the composition and structure of CMBSs is different from 
that of Australia. US CMBSs are backed by mortgages on commercial properties 
whereas Australia CMBSs are primarily backed by direct property assets. Therefore, 
comparison of CMBSs between the two regions is limited mainly to market structure 
and transaction volumes. Statistical analysis of historical performance data to estimate 
credit risk of a pool of commercial mortgages is not possible for Australia. 
 
The study could have benefited from in-depth discussions of our results with those of 
credit rating agencies but this was not possible due to confidentiality issues. 
 
Another area that future researchers could explore is the use of Multiple Criteria 
Decision Methods (MDCM), in particular Saaty’s (1994; 1996; 2001) Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) to determine the actual weights behind various factors 
considered in structuring CMBSs. This issue was considered outside the realm of this 
study. 
 
Future researchers could also investigate the impact that exogenous factors resulting 
from the broader financial markets, such as the “credit crunch” as a result of the turmoil 
in US sub-prime mortgage market, have on the pricing of CMBS and on the decision-
making process of buyers and sellers of CMBSs. 
 
As such, this thesis on the development and structuring of CMBSs, along with the future 
research recommended, is expected to contribute significantly to the body of knowledge 
for CMBS funding and investment decision making. Appendix C gives details of the 
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published refereed journal articles from the research in this thesis to further validate the 
stature and significance of this thesis. 
 
It is clearly evident that the property research in this thesis can aid in the revitalisation of 
the Australian CMBS market after the “shut down” caused by the melt-down in the US 
sub-prime mortgage market and can also be used to set up property-backed CMBSs in 
emerging countries where the CMBS market is immature or non-existent. 
 
 211 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Access Economics 2007, Employment Forecasts - March 2007, Access Economics, 
Sydney.  
 
Adair, A. and Hutchinson, N. 2005, 'The Reporting of Risk in Real Estate Appraisal 
Property Risk Scoring', Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 
254-268.  
 
Alles, L. 2000, Asset Securitisation in Australia: How and Why it Works, Curtin 
Business School, Perth.  
 
Alles, L. 2001, Asset Securitization and Structured Finance: Future Prospects and 
Challenges for Emerging Market Countries, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
WP/01/147.  
 
Altman, E. I. and Rijken, H. A. 2006, 'A Point-in-Time Perspective on Through-the-
Cycle Ratings', Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 54-70.  
 
Alyuda Research Inc. 2001, Forecaster XL, Fremont, CA. 
 
An, X., Deng, Y. and Sanders, A. B. 2006, 'Subordination Level as a Predictor of Credit 
Risk', Cambridge-UNC Charlotte Symposium 12-14 June, Madingley Hall, University 
of Cambridge.  
 
ANZ Banking Group 2007a, Industry Report: Retail Trade, ANZ Banking Group, 
Melbourne.  
 
ANZ Banking Group 2007b, Retail Property Update, ANZ Banking Group, Sydney.  
 
APRA 2007a, Insight - Issue 3 2007, Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority 
(APRA), Sydney.  
 
APRA 2007b, 'Prudential Standard APS 110: Capital Adequacy', ed. APRA. 
 
Armstrong, P. and Fletcher, P. 2004, 'Securitization in Public Sector Finance', Public 
Money & Management, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 175-182.  
 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2006, Statistics: Quarterly Superannuation 
Performance, APRA, Canberra.  
 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission 2007, 'Unlisted, Unrated Debentures - 
Improving Disclosure for Retail Investors'. ASIC, 3 January 2008. 
 
Axiss Australia 2005, The Prime Office Market in Australia, Axiss Australia, Sydney.  
 
Bank of International Settlements 2005, The Role of Ratings in Structure Finance: 
Issues and Implications, Bank of International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.  
 212 
 
 
Baumgarter, T. A. and Hensley, L. D. 2005, Conducting and Reading Research in 
Health and Human Performance, Fourth edn, McGraw-Hill, Columbus. 
 
BDO Chartered Accountants & Advisers 2006, BDO Australian Listed Property Trust 
Survey 2006, BDO Chartered Accountants & Advisers, Sydney.  
 
Belkaoui, A. 1980, 'Industrial Bond Ratings: A New Look', Financial Management, vol. 
9, no. 3, pp. 44-51.  
 
Bethwaite, M. 2005, The Lessons from the Cross City Tunnel, NSW Business Chamber,  
Sydney. Retrieved April 20, 2007, from 
http://www.nswbusinesschamber.com.au/?content=/channels/Media_centre/_Media_rele
ases_2005/10-2005_October/cross_city_tunnel.xml 
 
Blume, M. E., Lim, F. and Mackinlay, C. 1998, 'The Declining Credit Quality of U.S. 
Corporate Debt: Myth or Reality?' The Journal of Finance, vol. 53, pp. 1389-1413.  
 
Breidenbach, M. 2003, 'Real Estate Securitization as an Alternative Source of Financing 
for the Property Industry', 9th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Annual Conference, 
Brisbane, 19-22 January.  
 
Burdekin, J. and Snoswell, D. 2004, 'Retail Yields: How Low Can They Go?' Australian 
Property Journal, vol. 38, no. 260-265.  
 
Carey, M. and Hrycay, M. 2001, 'Parameterizing Credit Risk Models with Rating Data', 
Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 25, pp. 197-270.  
 
Carey, M. and Treacy, W. F. 2000, 'Credit Risk Ratings at Large US Banks', Journal of 
Banking and Finance, vol. 24, pp. 167-201.  
 
Carroll, S. M. and Dickinson, B., W. 1989, 'Construction of Neural Nets Using the 
Radon Transform', IEEE Conference on Neural Networks, Washington DC.  
 
Carroll, S. M. and Dickinson, B. W. 1989, 'Construction of neural nets using the radon 
transform', Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Neural Networks, Washington DC, 
pp. 607-611.  
  
CB Richard Ellis 2006, Global Market Rents: November 2006, Boston. Retrieved March 
14, 2007, from http://www.cbre.com/NR/rdonlyres/19655449-4C90-4388-A74E-
F05A58547B7D/0/GMRNov2006FINAL.pdf 
 
CB Richard Ellis 2007a, Market View Australia & New Zealand Office - 2Q 2007, CB 
Richard Ellis, Sydney.  
 
CB Richard Ellis 2007b, Market View: Sydney Metropolitan Retail: Q4 2006, CB 
Richard Ellis, Sydney.  
 
 213 
 
Chaveesuk, R., Srivaree-ratana, C. and Smith, A. 1999, 'Alternative Neural Network 
Approaches to Corporate Bond Rating', Journal of Engineering Valuation and Cost 
Analysis, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 117-131.  
 
Chikolwa, B. 2007a, 'Development of Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities', Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 398-422.  
 
Chikolwa, B. 2007b, 'An Empirical Analysis of Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities Credit Ratings: Australian Evidence', 13th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 
Annual Conference, Fremantle, Perth.  
 
Chikolwa, B. 2007c, 'Financing Infrastructure Using Asset-Backed Securities: Lessons 
for Developing Countries', in African Real Estate Society Conference, Livingstone, 
Zambia, 2 - 5 May. 
 
Chikolwa, B. 2008, 'Determinants of Listed Property Trust Bond Ratings: Australian 
Evidence', Pacific Rim Property Research, vol. 14, no. 2, p. In Press 
 
 
Chikolwa, B. and Chan, F. 2008, 'Determinants of Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities Credit Ratings: Australian Evidence', International Journal of Strategic 
Property Management, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 69-94.  
 
Chu, H. and Lonegan, W. 2006, 'Measuirng the Real Risk of Mezzanine Property 
Finance', Australia Property Journal, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 188-211.  
 
Clayton UTZ 2003, A Guide to the Law of Securitisation in Australia: Third Edition, 
Clayton UZ, Sydney.  
 
Coakley, J. R. and Brown, C. E. 2000, 'Artificial Neural Networks in Accounting and 
Finance: Modelling Issues', Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and 
Management, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 119-144.  
 
Colonial First Estate Global Asset Management 2006, Australian Property Markets, 
Colonial First Estate, Sydney.  
 
Colonial First State Global Asset Management 2006, Real Estate Development and the 
Role of Finance in the Australian Investment Market, Colonial First State Global Asset 
Management, Sydney.  
 
Commercial Mortgage Alert 2007, Global CMBS Issuance in 2006, Commercial 
Mortgage Alert, Hoboken.  
 
Commonwealth of Australia 2007, 'Budget Paper No. 1: Budget Strategy and Outlook 
2007-08', ed. Finance and Deregulation. Commonwealth of Australia Canberra. 
 
Connellan, O. and James, H. 1998a, 'Estimated Realisation Price (ERP) by Neural 
Networks: Forecasting Commercial Property Values', Journal of Property Valuation and 
Investment, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 71-86.  
 
 214 
 
Connellan, O. and James, H. 1998b, 'Forecasting Commercial Property Values in the 
Short Term', RICS Cutting Edge Conference 1998, RICS Research, Leicester.  
 
Crabtree, A. D. and Maher, J. L. 2005, 'Earnings Predictability, Bond Ratings, and Bond 
Yields', Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 233-253.  
 
Croucher, J. S. 1997, Elements of Statistics for Business, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
New York. 
 
Cybenko, G. 1989a, 'Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoid function', 
Mathematics of Control Signals and Systems, vol. 2, pp. 303-314.  
 
Cybenko, G. 1989b, 'Approximation by Superpositions of a Signoid Function', 
Mathematics of Control Signals and Systems, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 303-314.  
 
Daniels, H. and Kamp, B. 1999, 'Application of MLP Networks to Bond Rating and 
House Pricing', Neural Computing and Applications, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 226-234.  
 
Davison, A., Sanders, A., Wolff, L. and Ching, A. 2003, Securitization: Structuring and 
Investment Analysis, Wiley Finance, New Jersey. 
 
De Francesco, A. J. 2007, 'Gearing and the Australian Real Estate Investment Market', 
Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 579-602.  
 
Deng, Y., Quigley, J. M. and Sanders, A. B. 2005, 'Commercial Terminations: Evidence 
from CMBS', Annual American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 
(AREUEA) Meetings, Philadelphia, January 7-9.  
 
Denzin, N. K. 1978, The Research Act, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Dixon, T. and Marston, A. 2002, 'The Impact of E-Commence on Retail Real Estate in 
the UK', Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 8, pp. 153-174.  
 
Do, A. Q. and Grudnitski, G. 1992, 'A Neural Network Approach to Residential 
Property Appraisal', Real Estate Appraiser, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 38-45.  
 
Draffin, P. 2002, 'Property Trusts Reviewed', Australian Property Journal, no. 37, pp. 
89-93.  
 
DTZ Australia 2007, Australian Investment Guide - November 2007, DTZ, Sydney.  
 
Dutta, S. and Shekhar, S. 1988, 'Bond Rating: A Non-Conservative Application of 
Neural Networks', Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Neural 
Networks, San Diego, pp. II443-II450.  
 
ECB 2007, Financial Stability Review, Brussels. Retrieved 2007, from 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview200612en.pdf 
 
Ederington, L. H. 1985, 'Classification Models and Bond Ratings', The Financial 
Review, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 237-262.  
 215 
 
 
Efrat, Z. 2006, CMBS Explosion, Australian Securitisation Forum, Sydney.  
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989, 'Building Theories from Case Study Research', The Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 532-550.  
 
Evans, A. H. J. and Collins, A. 1992, 'Artificial Neural Networks: An Application to 
Residential Valuation in the UK', Journal of Property Valuation and Investment, vol. 11, 
no. 2, pp. 195-203.  
 
Fabozzi, F. J. and Jacob, D. P. 1997, The Handbook of Commercial Mortgage-backed 
Securities, Frank Fabozzi Associates, New Hope. 
 
Fadlalla, A. and Lin, C. 2001, 'An Analysis of the Applications of Neural Networks in 
Finance', Interfaces, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 112-122.  
 
Fan, G., Sing, T. F. and Ong, E. S. 2004, 'Governance and Optimal Financing for Asset-
backed Securitization', Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 
414-434.  
 
Fischer, D. 2004, Income Property Analysis, D. Fischer, Perth. 
 
Fitch Ratings 1999, Australian Commercial Mortgage Default Model, Fitch Ratings, 
Sydney.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2001, Presale Report: CPIT Aurora Bonds Fitch Ratings,, Syney.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2005a, Presale Report: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1, Fitch 
Ratings, Sydney.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2005b, Presale Report: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2, Fitch 
Ratings, Sydney.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2005c, Rating Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage Transactions, Fitch 
Ratings, New York.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2007a, Asian (Ex-Japan) 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook, Fitch Ratings, 
Hong Kong.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2007b, Australian Structured Finance 2006 Summary and 2007 outlook, 
Fitch Ratings, Sydney.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2007c, Japanese Structured Finance: 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook, 
Fitch Ratings, Tokyo.  
 
Fitch Ratings 2007d, U.S. CMBS 2007 Outlook, Fitch Ratings, New York.  
 
French, N. and Gabrielli, L. 2004, 'The Uncertainty of Valuation', Journal of Property 
Investment & Finance, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 484-500.  
 
 216 
 
French, N. and Gabrielli, L. 2005, 'Discounted Cash Flow: Accounting for Uncertainty', 
Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 76-89.  
 
Funahashi, K. 1989, 'On Approximate Realisation of Continuous Mappings by Neural 
Networks', Neural Networks, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 183-192.  
 
Gallimore, P. and McAllister, P. 2004, 'Expert Judgement in the Process of Commercial 
Property Market Forecasting', Journal of Property Research, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 337-360.  
 
Gallimore, P. and McAllister, P. 2005, Judgement and Quantitative Forecasts in 
Commercial Property Investment, RICS, London.  
 
Garson, D. 1991, 'Interpreting Neural-Network Connection Strengths', AI Expert, no. 
April, pp. 47-51.  
 
Geltner, D. and Miller, N. G. 2001, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments, 
South-Western, Mason, Ohio. 
 
Ghosh, C., Nag, R. and Sirmans, C. F. 1997, 'Financing Choice by Equity REITs in the 
1990s', Real Estate Finance, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 41-50.  
 
Glanville, B. R. 1987, 'Property Unitisation and Syndication', The Valuer, no. October, 
pp. 622-625.  
 
Gray, S., Mirkovic, A. and Ragunathan, V. 2006, 'The Determinants of Credit Ratings: 
Australian Evidence', Australian Journal of Management, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 333-354.  
 
Grovenstein, R. A., Harding, J. P., Sirmans, C. F., Thebpanya, S. and Turnbull, G. K. 
2004, Commercial Mortgage Underwriting: How Well Do Lenders Manage Risks? , 
School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs.  
 
Han, J. 1996, 'To Securitize or Not to Securitize? The Future of Commercial Real Estate 
Debt Markets', Real Estate Finance, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 71-80.  
 
Hand, J. R. M., Holthausen, R. W. and Leftwich, R. W. 1992, 'The Effect of Bond 
Rating Change on Common Stock Prices', Journal of Finance, vol. WLVII, no. 2, pp. 
733-752.  
 
Hedander, J. 2005, 'An Empirical Study of Listed Property Trusts in Australia', Pacific 
Rim Property Research, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 84-111.  
 
Henderson, J. and ING Barings 1997, Asset Securitization: Current Techniques and 
Emerging Market Applications, Euromoney Books, London. 
 
Higgins, D. M. 2006, 'Positioning Commercial Property in the Australian Investment 
Market', 12th Annual Conference of the Pacific Rim Real Estate Society, Auckland,  22-
25 January  
 
Higgins, D. M. 2007, Placing Commercial Property in the Australian Capital Market, 
RICS, London.  
 217 
 
 
Hoesli, M. and MacGregor, B. D. 2000, Property Investment: Principles and Practice of 
Portfolio Management, Longman, London. 
 
Hornik, K., Stinchcombe, M. and White, H. 1989, 'Multilayer feedforward networks are 
universal approximators', Neural Networks, vol. 2, pp. 359-366.  
 
Hornik, K., Stinchcombe, M. and White, H. 1990, 'Universal approximation of an 
unknown mapping and its derivatives using multilayer feedforward networks', Neural 
Networks, vol. 3, no. 551-576.  
 
Huang, Z., Chen, H., Hsu, C., Chen, W. and Wu, S. 2004, 'Credit Rating Analysis with 
Support Vector Machines and Neural Networks: A Market Comparative Study', 
Decision Support Systems, vol. 37, pp. 543-558.  
 
Hughes, F. and Arissen, J. 2005, Global Real Estate Securities – Where Do They Fit in 
the Broader Market?, Euorpean Public Real Estate Association. Retrieved November 9, 
2006, from http://www.epra.com/media/Size_of_the_Total_Real_Estate_Markets.pdf 
 
Hutchinson, N. E., Adair, A. S. and Leheny, I. 2005, 'Communicating Investment Risk 
to Clients: Property Risk Scoring', Journal of Property Research, vol. 22, no. 2-3, pp. 
137-161.  
 
IMD 2006, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, IMD,  Lausanne. Retrieved March 
14, 2007, from 
http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/competitiveness_scoreboard_2006.cfm 
 
IMD 2007, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, IMD,  Lausanne. Retrieved January 
1, 2007, from http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf 
 
InTech 2003, Institutional Listed Property Exposure, JB Were Investment Series.  
 
IPF 2000, The Assessment and Management of Risk in the Property Investment Industry, 
Investment Property Forum,  London. Retrieved 10 October 2006, from 
www.ipf.org.uk/resources/pdf/research/research_reports/RiskReport.pdf 
 
IPF 2002, Risk Management for Real Estate Investment Portfolios: Summary Report, 
Investment Property Forum,  London. Retrieved 8 October 2006, from 
www.ipf.org.uk/servlet.cgi?page_id=336 
 
Iskander, M. E. and Emery, D. R. 1994, 'An Empirical Investigation of the Role of 
Indenture Provisions in Determining Bond Ratings', Journal of Banking and Finance, 
vol. 18, pp. 93-111.  
 
IVSC 2005, International Valuation Standards 2005, International Valuation Standards 
Committee, London.  
 
Jacob, D. P. and Fabozzi, F. J. 2003, 'The Impact of Structuring on CMBS Class 
Performance', Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. Special Real Estate Issue, pp. 76-
86.  
 218 
 
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2001, Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities: The New Kid on 
the Block, Sydney.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2003, Syndicates - The Future Landscape, Jones Lang LaSalle, 
Sydney.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2006a, Asia Pacific Property Digest: Q4, 2005, Jones Lang LaSalle, 
Sydney.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2006b, Global Real Estate Transparency Index, Jones Lang LaSalle, 
Chicago.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2006c, Survey of Investor Sentiment: December 2005, Jones Lang 
LaSalle, Sydney.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2007a, Asia Pacific Property Digest Australasia - Third Quater 
2007, Jones Lang LaSalle, Hong Kong.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2007b, Survey of Investor Sentiment Australia Fourth Quarter 2007, 
Jones Lang LaSalle, Sydney.  
 
Jones Lang LaSalle 2007c, Survey of Investor Sentiment: December 2006, Jones Lang 
LaSalle, Sydney.  
 
Joslin, A. 2005, 'An Investigation Into the Expression of Uncertainty in Property 
Valuations', Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 269-285.  
 
Kamstra, M., Kennedy, P. and Suan, T.-K. 2001, 'Combining Bond Rating Forecasts 
Using Logit', The Financial Review, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 75-96.  
 
Kaplan, R. and Urwitz, G. 1979, 'Statistical Models on Bond Ratings: A Methodological 
Inquiry', Journal of Business, vol. 52, pp. 231-261.  
 
Karbelk, S., Durnil, E. and Guy, B. 2006, 'Making Sense of CMBS in a Loan Workout 
Environment', Journal of Private Equity, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 86-93.  
 
Kauko, T. 2003, 'Residential Property Value and Locational Externalities', Journal of 
Property Investment & Finance, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 250-270.  
 
Kauko, T. 2004, 'Towards the 4th Generation - An Essay on Innovations in Residential 
Property Value Modelling Expertise', Journal of Property Research, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 
75-97.  
 
Kavanagh, J. 1997, 'Trust Changing Gear', Property Australia, no. June, pp. 14-15.  
 
Ketkar, S. and Ratha, D. 2001, 'Securitisation of Future Receivables', Finance 
Development, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 46-49.  
 
 219 
 
Kim, K. S. 2005, 'Predicting Bond Ratings Using Publicly Available Information', 
Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 75-81.  
 
Kohler, H. 1993, Statistics for Business and Economics, 3rd edn, Harper Collins, 
Sydney. 
 
Kose, J., Lynch, A. W. and Puri, M. 2003, 'Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan 
Characteristics: Implications for Yield', The Journal of Business, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 371-
409.  
 
Krishnaswami, S., Spindt, P. A. and Subramaniam, V. 1999, 'Information Asymmetry, 
Monitoring and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt', Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 51, pp. 407-434.  
 
Krishnaswamy, C. R., Gilbert, E. W. and Pashley, M. M. 2000, 'Neural Network 
Applications in Finance: A Practical Innovation', Journal of Financial Practice and 
Education, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 75-84.  
 
Kwon, Y. S., Han, I. and Lee, K. C. 1997, 'Ordinal Pairwise Partitioning (OPP) 
Approach to Neural Networks Training in Bond Rating', Intelligent Systems in 
Accounting, Finance and Management, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 23-40.  
 
Lai, P. P. 2005, 'An Exploration of Neural Networks and Its Application to Taipei's 
Housing Price', 10th Asian Real Estate Society Annual Conference, Sydney, 18-21 July.  
 
Lai, P. P. and Fischer, D. 2006, 'Artificial Neural Networks and Computer Assisted 
Mass Appraisal', 12th Annual Conference of the Pacific Rim Real Estate Society, 
Auckland, 22 - 25 January.  
 
Lee, S. 2007, 'Real Estate Portfolio Size in a Higher-moment World', 13th Pacific Rim 
Real Estate Society Conference, 21-24 January, Fremantle.  
 
Lenk, M. M., Worzala, E. M. and Silva, A. 1997, 'High-Tech Valuation: Should 
Artificial Neural Networks Bypass the Human Valuer', Journal of Property Valuation 
and Investment, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 8-26.  
 
Levy, D. and Henry, M. 2003, 'A Comparative Analysis of US, UK and Australian 
Published Property Research Methodologies and Methods', Pacific Rim Property 
Research, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 148-162.  
 
Lorenz, D., Truck, S. and Lutzkendorf, T. 2006, 'Addressing Risk and Uncertainty in 
Property Valuations: A Viewpoint from Germany', Journal of Property Investment & 
Finance, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 400-433.  
 
Maher, J. L. and Sen, T. K. 1997, 'Predicting Bond Ratings Using Neural Networks: A 
Comparison with Logistic Regression', Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and 
Management, vol. 6, pp. 59-72.  
 
 220 
 
Mallinson, M. and French, N. 2000, 'Uncertainty in Property Valuation: The Nature and 
Relevance of Uncertainty and How It Might Be Measured and Reported', Journal of 
Property Investment & Finance, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 13-32.  
 
Matolcsy, Z. P. and Lianto, T. 1995, 'The Incremental Information Content of Bond 
Rating Revisions: The Australian Evidence', Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 19, 
no. 5, pp. 891-902.  
 
Maxam, C. L. and Fisher, J. 2001, 'Pricing Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities', 
Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 498-508.  
 
McGreal, S., Adair, A., McBurney, D. and Patterson, D. 1998, 'Neural Networks: The 
Prediction of Residential Values', Journal of Property Valuation and Investment, vol. 
16, no. 1, pp. 57-70.  
 
Mirvac 2006, The Future of Real Estate Investing II: The Growth of Real Estate 
Debt Markets in Australia, Mirvac,  Sydney, from 
http://www.mirvac.com.au/investor/pdf/20070411_The_Growth_of_Real_Estate_Debt_
Markets.pdf 
 
Moody's Investor Service 2001a, The Combined Use of Qualitative Analysis and 
Statistical Models in the Rating of Securitisations, Moody's Investor Service, New York.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2001b, Presale Report: Commonwealth Property Investment 
Trust CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds, Moody's Investor Service, Sydney.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2002, Understanding Moody's Corporate Bond Ratings and 
Rating Process, Moody's Investors Service, New York.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2003, CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Australian CMBS, 
Moody's Investor Service, Sydney.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2005, 2004 Review and 2005 Outlook: EMEA CMBS: Near 
Record Issuance and Continued Growth Expected for 2005, Moody's Investor Service, 
London.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2006, Asian Structured Finance: Yearly Reviews and Outlooks 
(2001-2006), Hong Kong.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2007a, 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook: EMEA CMBS: 
Another Record Year with Tremendous Growth in the German CMBS and Multifamily 
Market, Moody's Investor Service, London.  
 
Moody's Investor Service 2007b, European Structured Finance rating Transitions: 
1988-2006, New York.  
 
Morrison, R. 2001, 'Sophisticated Debt Management by LPTs', Property Australia, vol. 
15, no. 10, pp. 16-17.  
 
 221 
 
Multiplex Property Trust 2005, Multiplex Property Trust Launches A$1 Billion CMBS 
Issue, Multiplex Property Trust,  Sydney. Retrieved November 11, 2006, from 
http://www.multiplex.biz/page.asp?partid=294&ID=165 
 
Murdoch, J. 2004, 'The Globalisation of Australian Listed Property Trusts', Australian 
Property Journal, no. February, pp. 5-11.  
 
National Asset Management Steering Group 2006, New Zealand Infrastructure Asset 
valuation and Depreciation Guidelines, Second edn, National Asset Management 
Steering Group, Thames. 
 
National Australia Bank 2007, Monthly Business Survey - November 2007. Retrieved 
January 3, 2008, from 
http://www.nabcapital.com/downloads/public/28870_0.pdf?SourcePage=/research/austr
alia/economics.aspx 
 
Newell, G. 2005, 'The Changing Dynamics of Australian Commercial Property 
Portfolios', Australian Property Journal, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 553-558.  
 
Newell, G. 2006a, 'The Changing Risk Profile of Listed Property Trusts', Australian 
Property Journal, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 172-180.  
 
Newell, G. 2006b, 'The Significance of Property in Industry Based Superannuation 
Funds in Australia', Australia and New Zealand Property Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 34-
43.  
 
Newell, G. 2007a, 'Listed Property Trusts in Australia', in Working Papers. University 
of Western Sydney, Sydney. 
 
Newell, G. 2007b, 'The Significance and Performance of Industrial Investment Property 
in Australia', Pacific Rim Property Research, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 361-388.  
 
Newell, G. 2007c, 'The Significance of Wholesale Property Funds in Australia', 
Australia and New Zealand Property Journal, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 216-224.  
 
Newell, G. and Peng, H. W. 2006, 'The Significance of Emerging Property Sectors in 
Property Portfolios', Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 178-198.  
 
Newell, G. and Peng, H. W. 2007a, 'The Significance and Performance of Industrial 
Property in Australia', 13th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, 21-24 January, 
Fremantle.  
 
Newell, G. and Peng, H. W. 2007b, 'The Significance and Performance of Retail 
Property in Australia', Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 
147-165.  
 
Newell, G. and Tan, Y. K. 2005, 'The Changing Risk Profile of Listed Property Trusts', 
11th Annual Conference of the Pacific Rim Real Estate Society, Melbourne, January 23-
27.  
 
 222 
 
Nguyen, N. and Cripps, A. 2001, 'Predicting Housing Value: A Comparison of Multiple 
Regression Analysis and Artificial Neural Networks', Journal of Real Estate Research, 
vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 313-336.  
 
O'Sullivan, B. 1998, The Risks and Mitigants in Securitising Australian Commercial 
Mortgage Backed Securities, Master of Science Thesis, University of Western Sydney.  
 
OECD 2007, OECD Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure, 
OECD, Paris.  
 
Ong, S. E., Ooi, J. and Sing, T. F. 2000, 'Asset Securitization in Singapore: A Tale of 
Three Vehicles', Real Estate Finance, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 47-56.  
 
Ooi, J., Liow, K. H. and Tay, L. 2003, 'The Wealth Effects of Securitising Commercial 
Real Estate: A Case on Raffles Holdings, Singapore', Pacific Rim Property Research, 
vol. 9, no. 113-27.  
 
Pagourtzi, E., Assimakopoulos, V., Hatzichristos, T. and French, N. 2003, 'Real Estate 
Appraisal: A Review of the Valuation Methods', Journal of Property Investment & 
Finance, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 383-401.  
 
Pagourtzi, E., Metaxiotis, K., Nikolopoulos, K., Giannelos, K. and Assimakopoulos, V. 
2007, 'Real Estate Valuation with Artificial Intelligence Approaches', International 
Journal of Intelligent Systems Technologies and Applications, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 50-57.  
 
Partnoy, F. 1999, 'The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for 
The Credit Rating Agencies', Washington University Law Quarterly, vol. 77, no. 3, pp. 
619-714.  
 
PCA/IPD 2007a, Investment Performance Index: December 2006, PCA/IPD, 
Melbourne.  
 
PCA/IPD 2007b, Performance Investment Index: September 2007, PCA/IPD, 
Melbourne.  
 
Peng, H. W. and Newell, G. 2007, 'The Significance of Infrastructure in Investment 
Portfolios', 13th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, 21-24 January, Fremantle.  
 
PIR 2005, Review of the Major Mortgage Funds 2005, PIR, Melbourne.  
 
PIR 2006, Australian Property Funds Industry Survey 2006, PIR, Melbourne.  
 
PIR 2007a, Monthly Review - May 2007, PIR, Melbourne.  
 
PIR 2007b, Unlisted Property Funds Review, PIR, Melbourne.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007, The Economic Contribution of Small to Medium-Sized 
Grocery Retailers to the Australian Economy, with a Particular Focus on Western 
Australia, National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia, Sydney.  
 
 223 
 
Property Council Australia 2007, 'Leading Indicators', Property Australia, vol. 
Miscellaneous copies.  
 
Psaltis, A. and Evans, M. 2002, 'Mezzanine Finance: Bridging the Gap', Australian 
Property Journal, no. February, pp. 7-10.  
 
Reserve Bank of Australia 2006, Financial Stability Review: March 2006, Reserve Bank 
of Australia, Sydney.  
 
Reserve Bank of Australia 2007, Financial Stability Review: September 2007, Reserve 
Bank of Australia, Sydney.  
 
Reserve Bank of Australia 2008, Financial Stability Review: March 2008, Reserve Bank 
of Australia, Sydney.  
 
Richardson, K. 2003, 'CMBS Market Shaping For Another Growth Spurt', Property 
Australia, vol. March, pp. 36-39.  
 
RICS 1994, Commercial Property Valuations (Mallinson Report), Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors, London.  
 
RICS 2002, The Carsberg Report, Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors,  London. 
Retrieved 10 October 2006, from www.cili.org.uk/library/papers/carsberg_report.pdf 
 
Roche, T. 2000, 'Trends in the Debts Markets', Australian Land Economics Review, pp. 
73-86.  
 
Roche, T. 2002, 'Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: A Homogeneous Asset 
Class?' Australian Property Journal, no. August, pp. 170-174.  
 
Rowland, P. J. 1993, Property Investments and Their Financing, The Law Book 
Company Limited, Sydney. 
 
Roy, B. and Vanderpooten, D. 1996, 'The European School of MCDA.. Emergence, 
Basic Features, and Current Works', Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, vol. 5, 
pp. 22-37.  
 
RREEF 2005, Understanding Infrastructure, RREEF Real Estate and Infrastructure, 
London.  
 
RREEF 2007a, The Future Size of the Global Real Estate Market, RREEF Real Estate 
and Infrastructure, London.  
 
RREEF 2007b, Global Real Estate Investment and Performance 2006 and 2007, 
RREEF Real Estate and Infrastructure, London.  
 
Saaty, T. L. 1994, Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory, with the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process, RWS Publications, Pittsburgh. 
 
 224 
 
Saaty, T. L. 1996, Multicriteria Decision Making - The Analytical Hierarchy Process, 
RWS Publications, Pittsburgh. 
 
Saaty, T. L. 2001, Decision Making for Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process for 
Decisions in a Complex World, RWS Publications, Pittsburgh. 
 
Salchenberger, L. M., Cinar, E. M. and Lash, N. A. 1992, 'Neural Networks: A New 
Tool for Predicting Thrift Failures', Decision Sciences, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 899-915.  
 
Shin, K. and Han, I. 2001, 'A Case-Based Approach using Inductive Indexing for 
Corporate Bond Rating', Decision Support Systems, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 41-52.  
 
Shopping Centre Council of Australia 2005, Australian Shopping Centre Directory, 
Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Sydney.  
 
Simonovski, J. 2003, A Brief Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitisation 
(CMBS) in Australia, Bachelor of Science Thesis, University of Western Sydney.  
 
Sing, T. F., Ong, E. S., Fan, G. and Simans, C. F. 2004a, 'Analysis of Credit Risks in 
Asset-Backed Securitization Transactions in Singapore', Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, vol. 28, no. 2/3, pp. 235-253.  
 
Sing, T. F., Ong, E. S. and Ng, K. H. 2004b, 'Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securitization in Singapore: The Challenges Ahead', Real Estate Finance, vol. 21, no. 3, 
pp. 14-27.  
 
SPSS Inc. 1968, SPSS 15.0, Chicago, IL. 
 
Srinivasan, V. and Bolster, P. J. 1990, 'An Industrial Bond Rating Model Based on the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process', European Journal of Operations Research, vol. 48, pp. 
105-119.  
 
Stack, R. 2002, 'Viewing the LTV Steel ABS Opinion in its Proper Context', Journal of 
Corporate Law, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 211-229.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2001, Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization - The 
Rating Process, Standard & Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2003a, Presale Report: ALE Finance Company Pty. Ltd. - Series 1, 
Standard and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2003b, Presale Report: Quay 62 Pty. Ltd. Series 2001-1, Standard 
and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2003c, Things That Matter: The Australian Commercial Real Estate-
Backed Securities Market, Standard & Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2004a, CMBS Property Evaluation Criteria, Standard & Poor's, New 
York.  
 
 225 
 
Standard & Poor's 2004b, Presale Report: STOREs Pty. Ltd., Standard and Poor's, 
Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2005a, Australia & New Zealand CMBS Performance Watch, 
Standard & Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2005b, The Australian CMBS Market: The Story So Far, Standard & 
Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2005c, Guide to Legal Issues in Rating Australian Securitisation, 
Standard & Poor's, Sydney.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2005d, Presale Report: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1, 
Standard and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2005e, Presale Report: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2, 
Standard and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2006a, Australia & New Zealand CMBS Performance Watch, 
December 31, 2005, Standard & Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2006b, Presale Report: ALE Finance Co. Pty Ltd. - Series 1, 
Standard and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2006c, Presale Report: Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd. 
CMBS Series 2006-1, Standard and Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2006d, Presale Report: Cromwell CMBS Pty Ltd., Standard and 
Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2006e, Standard & Poor's CMBS Surveillance Process, Standard & 
Poor's, New York.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2007a, Corporate Securitizations Ratings Reaching New Frontiers: 
Global Credit Survey 2007, Standard & Poor's, London.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2007b, European CMBS Outlook 2007 - A Year of Continued 
Progress, Standard & Poor's, London.  
 
Standard & Poor's 2007c, Fourth-Quarter and Year-End 2006 Australia and New 
Zealand Structured Finance Performance Trends, Standard & Poor's, Melbourne.  
 
Standard and Poor's 2007, Solving the Ratings Riddle: The Gap Between Australian 
CMBS and LPT Corporate Debt Ratings, Standard and Poor's, Sydney.  
 
Steel, R. G. D., Torrie, J. H. and Dickey, D. A. 1997, Principles and Procedures of 
Statistics: A Biometrical Approach, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Structured Finance International 2006, 'Rise of the Conduits', in Structured Finance 
International, vol. 47. 
 226 
 
 
Surkan, A. J. and Singleton, J. C. 1990, 'Neural Networks for Bond Rating Improved by 
Multiple Hidden Layers', Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Neural 
Networks, Revised edn, San Diego, pp. 163-168.  
 
Tam, K. Y. and Kiang, M. Y. 1992, 'Managerial Applications of Neural Networks: The 
Case of Bank Failure Predictions', Management Science, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 926-947.  
 
Tan, Y. K. 2004, 'Australian Property Securities Funds: A Survey of Strategic 
Investment Issues', Pacific Rim Property Research, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 263-282.  
 
Tan, Y. K. 2004a, 'Benchmarking International Property in Australian LPT Portfolios ', 
Pacific Rim Property Research, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 3-29.  
 
Tan, Y. K. 2004b, 'Internal Management and Size the Winning Factors', Property 
Australia, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 58-59.  
 
Tay, D. P. H. and Ho, D. K. H. 1991, 'Artificial Intelligence and the Mass Appraisal of 
Residential Apartments', Journal of Property Valuation and Investment, vol. 10, no. 2, 
pp. 525-540.  
 
TEGoVA 2002, European Mortgage Securitisation: A Valuer's Guide, European Group 
of Valuer's Association, Brussels.  
 
TEGoVA 2003, European Property and Market Rating: A Valuer's Guide, European 
Group of Valuer's Association, Brussels.  
 
The Economist 2005, 'Survey: Bothersome Basel', in The Economist, vol. 371, pp. 5-7. 
 
UBS Real Estate Research 2006, Global Real Estate Investment: The World is Becoming 
Flatter, UBS, New York.  
 
Underwood, B. 2005, 'CMBS Emerging Market Dominance', Real Estate Finance, vol. 
22, no. 4, pp. 28-29.  
 
Upton, D. 1998, 'Syndicates and Beyond', Australian Property Journal, no. November, 
pp. 324-327.  
 
UrbisJHD 2007, Australian Shopping Centre Industry: Information Update, March 
2007, Shopping Centre Council of Australia, Sydney.  
 
Vogel, J. H. 2003, 'The Amazing Rise of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities: How 
an Inferior Product Prevailed', Real Estate Finance, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 15-20.  
 
Vresen, H. J. 2005, European CMBS: A Market Overview, Investment Property Forum, 
London.  
 
Weeraprajak, I. 2007, Faster Adaptive Network Based on Fuzzy Inference System, 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand.  
 
 227 
 
World Economic Forum 2007, The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, World 
Economic Forum, Geneva.  
 
Worzala, E. M., Lenk, M. M. and Silva, A. 1995, 'An Exploration of Neural Networks 
and Its Application to Real Estate Valuation', Journal of Real Estate Research, vol. 10, 
no. 2, pp. 185-202.  
 
Worzala, E. M., McCathy, A., Dixon, T. and Marston, A. 2002, 'E-Commence and 
Retail Property in the UK and USA', Journal of Property Investment & Finance, vol. 20, 
pp. 142-158.  
 
Yesilyaprak, A. 2004, 'Bond Ratings with Artificial Neural Networks and Econometric 
Models', American Business Review, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 113-123.  
 
Yin, R. K. 1994, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd edn, Sage 
Publications, London. 
 
Yoon, Y., Guimaraes, T. and Swales, G. 1994, 'Integrating Artificial Neural Networks 
with Rule-Based Expert Systems', Decision Support Systems, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 497-
507.  
 
Zhang, G. B., Patuwo, E. and Hu, M. Y. 1998, 'Forecasting With Artificial Neural 
Networks: The State of the Art', International Journal of Forecasting, vol. 14, pp. 35-
62.  
 
 
 
 
 
 228 
 
APPENDIX A: AUSTRALIAN AAA-RATED CMBS (2000 – 2006) 
No. Issue Date Sec. Issuer Rating  Issued 
Amt 
(AU$m) 
Cpn Type Cpn(%)/B
BSW (bp)
SM Date DSCR** LTV**
1 Jul-00 Off. Macquarie Office Trust AAA          224 Fixed NK Sep-03 2.4 35%
2 Dec-00 Ret. CBD Retail Infrastructure 
(No. 1) Pty
AAA            54 Floating 44 Jun-07 3.3 36.8
3 Apr-01 Off. CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Aaa* 150        Floating 41 Mar-06 2.0 32%
4 Jun-01 Div. Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd AAA 150        Fixed 6.50% Jun-06 2.2 40%
5 Jun-01 Div. Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd AAA 350        Floating 41 Jun-06 2.2 40%
6 Sep-01 Ind. Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 
2001-1
AAA 122        Floating 40 Sep-06 2.2 38%
7 Nov-01 Ind. Macquarie Goodman AAA 175        Fixed 5.25% Nov-06 2.6 39%
8 Nov-01 Ind. Macquarie Goodman AAA 135        Floating 43 Nov-06 2.6 39%
9 Nov-01 Off. Investa Properties Ltd. AAA 100        Fixed 6.00% Nov-06 2.4 36%
10 Nov-01 Off. Investa Properties Ltd. AAA 150        Floating 43 Nov-06 2.4 36%
11 Feb-02 Off. ING Office Finance Pty Ltd AAA 230        Fixed 6.25% Feb-07 2.4 39%
12 Feb-02 Off. ING Office Finance Pty Ltd AAA 178        Floating 40 Feb-07 2.4 39%
13 May-02 Ret. MCS Capital Pty. Ltd. AAA 60          Floating 42 May-07 2.8 35%
14 May-02 Ret. MCS Capital Pty. Ltd. AAA 104        Floating 42 May-07 2.8 35%
15 Jun-02 Div. Challenger Capital Markets AAA 100        Fixed 6.00% Jun-05 2.7 32%
16 Jul-02 Ind. ING Industrial Finance AAA 185        Fixed 5.25% Jul-07 3.1 33%
17 Jul-02 Ind. ING Industrial Finance AAA 85          Floating 43 Jul-07 3.1 33%
18 Jul-02 Div. Challenger Capital Markets AAA 120        Floating 40 Jul-05 2.7 32%
19 Sep-02 Off. Macquarie Office Trust AAA 155        Floating 29 Sep-03 2.3 39%
20 Oct-02 Ret. Australian Prime Property 
Fund Retail
AAA 120        Fixed 5.75% Oct-05 3.2 36%
21 Oct-02 Ret. Australian Prime Property 
Fund Retail
AAA 25          Floating 43 Oct-05 3.2 36%
22 Nov-02 Div. TMT Finance Pty Limited AAA 112        Floating 59 Nov-07 2.9 37%
23 Nov-02 Ret. Centro Capital Pty Ltd - Series 1AAA 180        Floating 53 Nov-07 2.3 40%
24 Dec-02 Ind. Deutsche Industrial Finance 
2002 - CMBS Trust
AAA 136        Floating 46 Dec-05 2.7 38%
25 Dec-02 Ind. Deutsche Industrial Finance 
2002 - CMBS Trust
AAA 100        Fixed 5.63% Dec-05 2.7 38%
26 Dec-02 Ret. Leda Asset Securitisation Pty LtdAAA 134        Floating 45 Dec-05 2.3 37%
27 Mar-03 Ret. Centro Capital Pty Ltd - 
Series 2
AAA 128        Floating 63 Dec-09 2.6 37%
28 Apr-03 Ind. ING Industrial Finance AAA 13          Fixed 6.25% Jul-07 2.6 38%
29 Apr-03 Ind. ING Industrial Finance AAA 27          Floating 40          Jul-07 2.6 38%
30 Apr-03 Off. Investa Properties Limited AAA 95          Fixed 6.00% Nov-06 2.2 39%
31 Apr-03 Off. Investa Properties Limited AAA 85          Floating 40 Nov-06 2.2 39%
32 May-03 Ind. ING Industrial Finance AAA 5            Floating 40          Jul-07 2.6 39%
33 Sep-03 Off. Macquarie Office AAA 152        Fixed 5.75% Sep-06 2.4 34%
34 Sep-03 Off. Macquarie Office AAA 250        Floating 43 Sep-06 2.4 34%
35 Oct-03 Div. Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd - 
Series 2003-1
AAA 102        Fixed 6.25% Oct-08 2.3 39%
36 Oct-03 Div. Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd - 
Series 2003-2
AAA 88          Floating 34 Oct-08 2.2 39%
37 Oct-03 Ret. ALE Finance AAA 100        Fixed 6.60% Nov-08 3.1 43%
38 Oct-03 Ret. ALE Finance AAA 110        Floating 47 Nov-08 3.1 43%
39 Oct-03 Ret. Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 
2003-1
AAA 210        Fixed 6.75% Nov-08 1.9 41%
40 Oct-03 Ret. Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 
2003-1
AAA 240        Floating 45 Nov-08 1.9 41%
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No. Issue Date Sec. Issuer Rating  Issued Amt 
(AU$m) 
Cpn Type Cpn(%)/BB
SW (bp)
SM Date DSCR** LTV**
41 Dec-03 Ind. Quay 62 Pty Ltd 
Series 2001-1
AAA 28               Floating 40 Sep-06 2.7 38%
42 Jan-04 Off. Macquarie Office 
Finance Pty. 
AAA 40               Fixed 5.25% Sep-06 2.0 40%
43 Jan-04 Off. Macquarie Office 
Finance Pty. 
AAA 80               Floating 43 Sep-06 2.0 40%
44 May-04 Off. Deutsche Office 
Finance 2004-
AAA 155             Fixed 6.50% Apr-09 2.1 38%
45 May-04 Off. Deutsche Office 
Finance 2004-
AAA 345             Floating 40 Apr-09 2.1 38%
46 May-04 Ret. STOREs Pty Ltd AAA 150             Floating 39 May-09 2.7 36%
47 Jun-04 Ret. ING Retail Finance 
No.2 - Series 1
AAA 65               Fixed 6.15% Jun-09 2.1 43%
48 Jun-04 Ret. ING Retail Finance 
No.2 - Series 1
AAA 126             Floating 35 Jun-09 2.1 43%
49 Jun-04 Div. Australand Finance 
Series 2004-1
AAA 120             Fixed 6.30% May-09 2.3 40%
50 Jun-04 Div. Australand Finance 
Series 2004-1
AAA 73               Floating 37 May-09 2.3 40%
51 Oct-04 Ret. Quay 62 Pty Ltd 
Series 2003-1
AAA 20               Floating NK Nov-08 1.9 41%
52 Dec-04 Div. TMT Finance Pty 
Limited
AAA 93               Floating 59 Jun-09 2.5 39%
53 Apr-05 Off. Quay 62 Pty Ltd 
Series 2005-1
AAA 350             Floating 17 Apr-08 2.0 37%
54 Apr-05 Off. Quay 62 Pty Ltd 
Series 2005-1
AAA 75               Floating P Apr-08 2.0 37%
55 Apr-05 Off. Macquarie Office 
Finance Pty. 
AAA 10               Fixed 5.80% Sep-06 2.2 38%
56 May-05 Off. Multiplex MPT 
CMBS Series 2005-
AAA 343             Floating 20 May-08 2.0 40%
57 May-05 Div. Multiplex MPT 
CMBS Series 2005-
AAA 298             Floating 25 May-10 2.0 40%
58 May-05 Div. Australand Finance 
Series 2004-1
AAA 3                 Floating 21 May-09 2.3 40%
59 Jul-05 Ret. Walker Finance Pty 
Ltd
AAA 190             Floating 25 Jul-10 1.9 41%
60 Nov-05 Div. Australand Finance 
Series 2004-1
AAA 51               Floating NK Jun-09 2.2 40%
61 Dec-05 Ret. Walker Finance Pty 
Ltd
AAA 26               Floating 19 Jul-10 1.9 41%
62 Feb-06 Ret. Leda CMBS Pty 
Ltd
AAA 205             Floating 19 Feb-10 1.9 38%
63 Mar-06 Div Australand Finance 
Series 2006-1
AAA 169             Floating 17 Mar-11 2.1 40%
64 Apr-06 Div Cromwell CMBS 
Pty Ltd
AAA 226             Floating 25 Apr-09 2.2 41%
65 Jun-06 Ret. Centro Capital Pty 
Ltd - Series 1
AAA 42               Floating 16 Dec-07 2.1 39%
66 Jun-06 Ret. Centro Capital Pty 
Ltd - Series 2
AAA 38               Floating 19 Dec-09 2.2 37%
67 Sep-06 Ret. Quay 62 Pty Ltd 
Series 2003-1
AAA 150             Floating NK Nov-08 2.2 31%
68 Sep-06 Off. Macquarie Office 
Finance Pty. 
AAA 360             Floating 20 Sep-09 2.1 37%
69 Sep-06 Off. Macquarie Office 
Finance Pty. 
AAA 125             Floating 24 Sep-11 2.0 37%
70 Dec-06 Off. Series MCWF 2006-
1
AAA 330             Floating 25 Dec-09 1.8 44%
71 Dec-06 Off. WOT CMBS Pty Ltd Series 1AAA 320             Floating 26 Nov-11 2.0 35%
72 Dec-06 Ret. Centro Shopping Centre SecuritiesAAA 250             Floating 19 Dec-09 1.7 43%
73 Dec-06 Ret. Centro Shopping Centre SecuritiesAAA 300             Floating 24 Dec-11 1.6 43%
74 Dec-06 Ret. Centro Shopping Centre SecuritiesAAA 170             Floating 18 Dec-11 1.6 43%
 
Key: 
Ret: Retail  Off: Office  Ind: Industrial  Div: Diversified 
NK: Unknown  Cpn: Coupon  SM: Scheduled 
Maturity 
 Sec: Sector 
P: Private  DSCR: Debt service coverage 
ratio 
 LTV: Loan-to-value 
ratio 
   
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
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APPENDIX B: COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
1. COVER LETTER 
 
Dear ……………………….. 
 
We are currently conducting a property research project concerning the structuring and 
pricing of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) in Australia. This is part of 
the PhD research being done by Mr Bwembya Chikolwa of the Department of Property 
Studies, School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University of Technology in Perth, 
who I am co-supervising. 
 
Your contact information is obtained from the following published materials: websites, 
prospectus and/or annual report. Participation in this mail survey which seeks to gain 
insight into decision-making issues behind structuring and pricing CMBSs is voluntary. 
Should the theme of this questionnaire fall under the auspices of other experts in your 
establishment, please do not hesitate to pass it to them. The questionnaire takes 
approximately 20-25 minutes to complete. Please complete the enclosed questionnaire 
and return it to the address below. 
 
The completed questionnaires will be secured in line with university regulations and will 
only be accessible to the investigators. No information identifying the respondents will 
be published. 
 
If you require further details regarding this commercial mortgage-backed securities 
research, please contact me on (02) 9852 4175 or g.newell@uws.edu.au. Thank you for 
your assistance with this commercial mortgage-backed securities research. 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor Graeme Newell 
Professor of Property Investment 
School of Construction, Property & Planning 
University of Western Sydney 
Locked Bag 1797 
Penrith South DC NSW 1797 
  
NOTE: This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
Curtin University of Technology. If you have any complaints or reservations about the 
ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the Ethics Committee through the 
Research Ethics Officers (tel: 08 9266 2784). Any issues you raise will be treated in 
confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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2. QUESTIONNAIRE ON CMBS ARRANGERS 
 
STRUCTURING AND PRICING COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BACKED 
SECURITIES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Question 1: How do you rank the importance of 
these debt financing options? 
 
 
Rank  Rank 
Commercial paper [    ] Medium term notes [    ] 
Bank debt [    ] Commercial mortgage backed securities 
(CMBS) 
[    ] 
Other, please specify: 
_________________________________________
_____________ 
 
 
Question 2: How many commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) issues has your 
organisation arranged? 
 
 
Number Total Amount of Issue ($m) 
 
Number Total 
Amount 
of Issue 
($m) 
Past 1 year ___ ___ Past 5 
years 
___ ___ 
Past 3 
years 
___ ___ 
 
  
Other, please specify: ______________________________________________________ 
  
 
Question 3: Have you been satisfied with the success of the CMBS issues in your 
organisation? 
 
Dissatisfi
ed 
[    
] 
Neutral [    
] 
Satisfie
d 
[    ] 
 
 
Question 4: Does your organisation plan is arrange CMBSs in future? 
 
No [    ] Unsure [    ] Yes [    ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5: How many CMBSs does your organisation anticipate to arrange? 
 
 
Number Total Amount of Issue ($m) 
Next 1year ___ ___ 
Next 3 years ___ ___ 
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Question 6: What is your organisation’s preferred choice of issuing CMBS notes? 
 
 
Private placement [    
] 
Public offering [    
] 
If both are preferred, please specify: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Question 7: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of CMBS 
notes as a funding source. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Funds can be provided at attractive rates as a result of the added credit enhancement 
and resulting higher credit rating. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
An improved company’s return on capital after removal of securitised assets from the 
originator’s balance sheet which generates cash flow without increasing debt. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Provision of an alternative source of funding. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Provision of matched funding for medium and long-term receivables. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Ability to tap large sources of funds. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Question 8: When your organisation arranges CMBS transactions, what credit and liquidity 
enhancement techniques are used and how does it rank the importance of these techniques? 
 
Considered Rank 
 
Considered Rank 
Credit tranching [    ] ___ Cross collateralisation [    ] ____ 
Overcollateralisation [    ] ___ Reserve funds [    ] ____ 
Spread accounts [    ] ___ Amortisation triggers  [    ] ____ 
Related party 
guarantees 
[    ] ___ Letters of credit [    ] ____ 
Monoline insurance [    ] ___ Multiline insurance [    ] ____ 
 
Question 9: Below is a list of potential factors considered for CMBS notes to obtain a high 
credit rating. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Asset quality: Location; Age; Condition; Tenant retention rate 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Tenant/Lease details: Credit quality of income; Tenancy concentrations; Lease expiry 
profile 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Portfolio composition: Total number of assets; Diversification (asset class, geographic, 
sector) 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
  
Management: Quality and experience; Growth strategy 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Financial and other details: Refinancing risk; Transaction support 
mechanisms/credit enhancement; Gearing (DSCR and LTV ratio) 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
 
Question 10: When your organisation arranges CMBS issues, what length of bond tenure 
was used and how does it rank the preference? 
 
 
Considered Rank 
 
Considered Rank 
1 
year 
[    ] ___ 3 years [    ] ____ 
5 
years 
[    ] ___ 7 years [    ] ____ 
Other, please specify: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 11: What type of interest rate does your organisation prefer when arranging 
CMBS issues? 
 
 
Fixed rate notes [    ] 
Floating rate notes [    ] 
If both are preferred, please specify: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 12: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of fixed rate 
notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Security for funding rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Matching fixed liabilities 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Not in the business of “betting” on interest rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Most investment mandates require fixing rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
  
 
Most financiers require at least some fixed rate 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Question 13: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of floating rate 
notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Uncertain term of debt required 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Uncertain debt level required 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Break costs of fixed debt can be expensive 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
In-house expertise in interest rate “betting” 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Question 14: Below are refinancing options when the CMBSs mature. Rank the importance of 
each option. 
 
Rank 
 
Rank 
Equity raising ___ Further capital market debt issues ____ 
Bank debt ___ Asset sales ____ 
Other, please specify: __________________________________________________  
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Question 15: What is your organisation’s preferred option/s of tranching CMBS issues 
and how does it rank the importance of these options? 
   
Rating Considered Rank 
Aaa/AA
A 
[    ] ___ 
Aa/AA [    ] ___ 
A/A [    ] ___ 
Baa/BB
B 
[    ] ___ 
Ba/BB [    ] ___ 
B/B [    ] ___ 
N/R [    ] ___ 
Other, please specify: ________________________________________________________  
  
 
Question 16: What level of subordination sequence would you consider ideal for the CMBS 
issues that you have arranged? 
 
Rating Subordination required (%) 
Aaa/AAA ___ 
Aa/AA ___ 
A/A ___ 
Baa/BBB ___ 
Ba/BB ___ 
B/B ___ 
N/R ___ 
 
Question 17: What is your organisation’s preferred tranche size for senior Aaa/AAA notes 
and how does it rank the importance of these preferences? 
   
Issue Value  Considered Rank 
Less than $10 million [    ] ___ 
$11 million – $50 million [    ] ___ 
$51 million – $100 million [    ] ___ 
$101 million – $200 million [    ] ___ 
Over $200 million [    ] ___ 
 
Question 18: Below is a list of potential factors considered attractive for investors to invest in 
CMBS notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Correlations with other assets 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Issuing agents and underwriting banks 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Denomination of tranche 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Information efficiency 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Market liquidity 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Rating of issues 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Credit enhancement/guarantee 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Term to maturity 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    
] 
Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Question 19: What is your cost estimates of structuring CMBS transactions? 
     
Percentage of value of total 
issue  
Front-end fees and 
expenses  
Running cost of 
debt funding 
Running cost of ancillary 
facilities 
Cost of 
first loss 
cover or 
credit 
enhancem
ent  
Less than 0.1% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.1% – 0.2% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.21% – 0.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.51% – 1% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
1.1% – 1.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 1.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
 
Question 20: What was the duration of the following activities in structuring the CMBS issues 
that your organisation arranged? 
 
Action Duration  (Weeks) 
Feasibility study ___ 
Appointment of parties ___ 
Data analysis ___ 
Due diligence ___ 
Financial modelling ___ 
Documentation ___ 
Rating process ___ 
Marketing ___ 
Launch and completion ___ 
Monitoring and reporting ___ 
Substitution ___ 
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Question 21: What is your organisation’s preferred yield spread over the 3 month bank bill 
swap rate (BBSW) for AAA notes? 
(Please tick the most relevant box below): 
 
Type of Note 
bps  1-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 
Less than 10 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
10 – 20 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
21 – 25 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
26 – 30 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
31 – 35 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
36 – 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
If possible, please specify the range: 
_________________________________ 
 
Question 22: What is your organisation’s preferred yield spreads over the 3 month 
BBSW for BBB notes? 
(Please tick the most relevant box below): 
 
Type of Note 
bps  1-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 
Less than 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
41 – 50 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
51 – 60 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
61 – 70 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
71 – 80 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
81 – 90 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 90 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
If possible, please specify the range: 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
Question 23: Additional comments: 
 
If you have any comments or observations on structuring and pricing commercial 
mortgage-backed securities in Australia, please add these comments below. 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTENCE. 
 
Please return your completed survey to: 
 
Professor Graeme Newell 
School of Economics and Finance 
University of Western Sydney 
Locked bag 1797 
Penrith South NSW 1797 
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3. QUESTIONNAIRE ON CMBS ISSUERS 
 
STRUCTURING AND PRICING COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BACKED 
SECURITIES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Question 1: How do you rank the importance of 
these debt financing options? 
 
 
Rank  Rank 
Commercial paper [    ] Medium term notes [    ] 
Bank debt [    ] Commercial mortgage backed securities 
(CMBS) 
[    ] 
Other, please specify: 
_________________________________________
_____________ 
 
 
Question 2: How many commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) issues has your 
organisation issued? 
 
 
Number Total Amount of Issue ($m) 
 
Number Total 
Amount 
of Issue 
($m) 
Past 1 year ___ ___ Past 5 
years 
___ ___ 
Past 3 
years 
___ ___ 
 
  
Other, please specify: ______________________________________________________ 
  
 
Question 3: Have you been satisfied with the success of the CMBS issues in your 
organisation? 
 
Dissatisfi
ed 
[    
] 
Neutral [    
] 
Satisfie
d 
[    ] 
 
 
Question 4: Does your organisation plan is issue CMBSs in future? 
 
No [    ] Unsure [    ] Yes [    ] 
 
 
 
 
Question 6: What is your organisation’s preferred choice of issuing CMBS notes? 
 
 
Private placement [   ] 
Public offering [   ] 
If both are preferred, please specify: 
Question 5: How many CMBSs does your organisation anticipate to issue? 
 
 
Number Total Amount of Issue ($m) 
Next 1year ___ ___ 
Next 3 years ___ ___ 
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________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Question 7: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of CMBS 
notes as a funding source. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Funds can be provided at attractive rates as a result of the added credit enhancement and 
resulting higher credit rating. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
An improved company’s return on capital after removal of securitised assets from the 
originator’s balance sheet which generates cash flow without increasing debt. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Provision of an alternative source of funding. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Provision of matched funding for medium and long-term receivables. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Ability to tap large sources of funds. 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Question 8: When your organisation issues CMBS transactions, what credit and liquidity 
enhancement techniques are used and how does it rank the importance of these techniques? 
 
Considered Rank 
 
Considered Rank 
Credit tranching [    ] ___ Cross collateralisation [    ] ____ 
Overcollateralisation [    ] ___ Reserve funds [    ] ____ 
Spread accounts [    ] ___ Amortisation triggers  [    ] ____ 
Related party 
guarantees 
[    ] ___ Letters of credit [    ] ____ 
Monoline insurance [    ] ___ Multiline insurance [    ] ____ 
 
Question 9: Below is a list of potential factors considered for CMBS notes to obtain a high 
credit rating. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Asset quality: Location; Age; Condition; Tenant retention rate 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Tenant/Lease details: Credit quality of income; Tenancy concentrations; Lease expiry profile 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Portfolio composition: Total number of assets; Diversification (asset class, geographic, 
sector) 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
  
Management: Quality and experience; Growth strategy 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Financial and other details: Refinancing risk; Transaction support 
mechanisms/credit enhancement; Gearing (DSCR and LTV ratio) 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Question 10: When your organisation issued CMBSs, what length of bond tenure was used 
and how does it rank the preference? 
 
 
Considered Rank 
 
Considered Rank 
1 
year 
[    ] ___ 3 years [    ] ____ 
5 
years 
[    ] ___ 7 years [    ] ____ 
Other, please specify: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 11: What type of interest rate does your organisation prefer when arranging 
CMBS issues? 
 
 
Fixed rate notes [    ] 
Floating rate notes [    ] 
If both are preferred, please specify: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 12: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of fixed rate 
notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Security for funding rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Matching fixed liabilities 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Not in the business of “betting” on interest rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Most investment mandates require fixing rates 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
  
 
Most financiers require at least some fixed rate 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Question 13: Below is a list of potential motivating factors behind issuance of floating rate 
notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Uncertain term of debt required 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Uncertain debt level required 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Break costs of fixed debt can be expensive 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
In-house expertise in interest rate “betting” 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
 
Question 14: Below are refinancing options when the CMBSs mature. Rank the importance of 
each option. 
 
Rank 
 
Rank 
Equity raising ___ Further capital market debt issues ____ 
Bank debt ___ Asset sales ____ 
Other, please specify: __________________________________________________  
 
Question 15: What is your organisation’s preferred option/s of tranching CMBS issues 
and how does it rank the importance of these options? 
   
Rating Considered Rank 
Aaa/AA
A 
[    ] ___ 
Aa/AA [    ] ___ 
A/A [    ] ___ 
Baa/BB
B 
[    ] ___ 
Ba/BB [    ] ___ 
B/B [    ] ___ 
N/R [    ] ___ 
Other, please specify: ________________________________________________________  
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Question 16: What level of subordination sequence would you consider ideal for the CMBS 
issues that you have arranged? 
 
Rating Subordination required (%) 
Aaa/AAA ___ 
Aa/AA ___ 
A/A ___ 
Baa/BBB ___ 
Ba/BB ___ 
B/B ___ 
N/R ___ 
 
Question 17: What is your organisation’s preferred tranche size for senior Aaa/AAA notes 
and how does it rank the importance of these preferences? 
   
Issue Value  Considered Rank 
Less than $10 million [    ] ___ 
$11 million – $50 million [    ] ___ 
$51 million – $100 million [    ] ___ 
$101 million – $200 million [    ] ___ 
Over $200 million [    ] ___ 
 
Question 18: Below is a list of potential factors considered attractive for investors to invest in 
CMBS notes. Rate the importance of each factor. 
 
Correlations with other assets 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Issuing agents and underwriting banks 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Denomination of tranche 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Information efficiency 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Market liquidity 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Rating of issues 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Credit enhancement/guarantee 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
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Term to maturity 
N/A [    ] Not 
important 
[    ] Important [    ] Very 
Important 
[    ] Essential [    ] 
 
Question 19: What is your cost estimates of structuring CMBS transactions? 
     
Percentage of value of total 
issue  
Front-end fees and 
expenses  
Running cost of 
debt funding 
Running cost of ancillary 
facilities 
Cost of 
first loss 
cover or 
credit 
enhancem
ent  
Less than 0.1% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.1% – 0.2% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.21% – 0.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
0.51% – 1% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
1.1% – 1.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 1.5% [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
 
Question 20: What was the duration of the following activities in structuring the CMBS issues 
that your organisation issued? 
 
Action Duration  (Weeks) 
Feasibility study ___ 
Appointment of parties ___ 
Data analysis ___ 
Due diligence ___ 
Financial modelling ___ 
Documentation ___ 
Rating process ___ 
Marketing ___ 
Launch and completion ___ 
Monitoring and reporting ___ 
Substitution ___ 
 
Question 21: What is your organisation’s preferred yield spread over the 3 month bank bill 
swap rate (BBSW) for AAA notes? 
(Please tick the most relevant box below): 
 
Type of Note 
bps  1-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 
Less than 10 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
10 – 20 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
21 – 25 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
26 – 30 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
31 – 35 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
36 – 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
If possible, please specify the range: 
_________________________________ 
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Question 22: What is your organisation’s preferred yield spreads over the 3 month 
BBSW for BBB notes? 
(Please tick the most relevant box below): 
 
Type of Note 
bps  1-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 
Less than 40 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
41 – 50 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
51 – 60 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
61 – 70 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
71 – 80 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
81 – 90 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
Over 90 [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
If possible, please specify the range: 
_____________________________________ 
 
Question 23: Additional comments: 
 
If you have any comments or observations on structuring and pricing commercial 
mortgage-backed securities in Australia, please add these comments below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTENCE. 
 
Please return your completed survey to: 
 
Professor Graeme Newell 
School of Economics and Finance 
University of Western Sydney 
Locked bag 1797 
Penrith South NSW 1797 
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APPENDIX C: JOURNAL ARTICLES AND CONFERENCE PAPER 
 
Determinants of Listed Property Trust Bond Ratings: Australian 
Evidence 
 
Bwembya Chikolwa♣ 
School of Urban Development, Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane Qld 4001, Australia 
 
Abstract 
 
Using artificial neural networks (ANN) and ordinal regression (OR) as 
alternative methods to predict LPT bond ratings, we examine the role that various 
financial and industry-based variables have on Listed Property Trust (LPT) bond 
ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s from 1999-2006. Our study shows that 
both OR and ANN provide robust alternatives to rating LPT bonds and that there 
are no significant differences in results between the full models of the two 
methods. OR results show that of the financial variables used in our models, debt 
coverage and financial leverage ratios have the most profound effect on LPT bond 
ratings. Further, ANN results show that 73.0% of LPT bond rating is attributable 
to financial variables and 27.0% to industry-based variables with office LPT 
sector accounting for 2.6%, retail LPT 10.9% and stapled management structure 
13.5%.  
 
Keywords: 
Listed property trusts; bond rating; ordinal regression; artificial neural networks  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Bonds provide an important mechanism by which firms obtain new funds to 
finance new and continuing activities and projects. Bond issuance has been 
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recognised by Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) as an important debt funding tool. 
Newell (2007a) and PIR (PCA/IPD 2007a) show the growth in debt levels of 
LPTs from only 15% in 1997 to 36% as at December 2006. Debt funding has been 
through direct bank borrowings and issuance of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) and unsecured bonds. For the period 1999-2006, bonds23 worth 
a total of AU$10.5 billion were issued by LPTs (Property Council Australia 
2007). In contrast, the Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database shows that 
LPTs raised AU$18.2 billion in equity raisings, excluding initial price offerings 
(IPOs). Chikolwa (2007a) also shows that LPTs issued CMBSs worth AU$9.3 
over the same period. 
 
In Australia, the bond ratings are assigned by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. The ratings inform the public of the 
likelihood of an investor to receive the promised principal and interest payments 
associated with the bond issue (Shin & Han 2001) The assigned ratings are 
important due to the implications they contain regarding the bond issue. Market 
yields correspond to bond ratings, which indicate an association between rating 
and risk. For instance, the success of an issue is dependent on obtaining a lower 
yield which is also influenced by high the credit quality (Alles 2000; Kose et al. 
2003). Issues of proprietorship have resulted in the methodology of rating mostly 
being shrouded in mystery. The methods and input variables used in rating are not 
fully disclosed to the public (Altman & Rijken 2006; Shin & Han 2001). As such, 
studies of rating process are of interest not only to bond holders but also to 
investors. 
 
Bond rating agencies assert that researchers cannot replicate their ratings 
quantitatively (Kim 2005) as they are the agency’s opinion about an issue’s 
potential default risk and that they rely heavily on a committee’s analysis of the 
issuer’s ability and willingness to repay its debt. However, researchers have still 
gone ahead and replicated bond ratings on the premise that the financial variables 
extracted from public financial statements, such as financial ratios, contain a large 
amount of information about a company’s credit risk (Huang et al. 2004). Kamstra 
                                                 
23
 This excludes commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
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et al. (2001) state that financial variables are able to explain about two thirds of a 
company’s bond rating.  Traditionally statistical techniques such as multivariate 
discriminant analysis (MDA), multiple regression analysis (MRA), probit and 
logit models and more recently artificial neural networks (ANN) have been used 
to capture and model the expertise of the bond rating process. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, only three studies have examined credit ratings 
using Australian data (Chikolwa 2007b; Gray et al. 2006; Matolcsy & Lianto 
1995). Chikolwa (2007b) find that rating agencies use only a subset of variables 
they describe or indicate as important to rating CMBS24 and show the superiority 
of ANNs over ordinal regressions in predicting CMBS ratings. Gray et al (2006) 
find that interest coverage and leverage ratios have the most profound effect on 
credit ratings, using an ordered probit regression.  Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) 
examine the incremental information content of bond rating revisions on stock 
prices, after controlling for accounting information, using a cross-sectional 
regression approach. Their finding that only rating downgrades have 
informational content is consistent with other studies. 
 
This paper extends the analysis of Chikolwa (2007b) and Gray et al. (2006) by 
mainly applying ANN and OR as alternative methods for predicting ratings on 
bonds issued by Australian LPTs between 1999 and 2006. Tests are undertaken to 
compare the predictive power of ANN models and ordinal regression models. We 
find that both OR and ANN provide robust alternatives to rating LPT bonds and 
that there are no significant differences in results between the two full models. OR 
results show that of the financial variables used in our models, debt coverage and 
financial leverage ratios have the most profound effect on LPT bond ratings. 
Further, ANN results show that 73.0% of LPT bond rating is attributable to 
financial variables and 27.0% to industry-based variables; office LPT sector 
accounting for 2.6%, retail LPT 10.9% and stapled management structure 13.5%.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the significance of the bond 
markets as an unsecured funding source for LPTs. Next, Section 3 reviews 
                                                 
24
 Only Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was found to be statistically significant. 
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literature on the use of ANNs in real estate and corporate bond rating studies. 
Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. The study results and their 
analyses are shown in Section 5. Concluding remarks and future research 
directions are shown in Section 6.  
 
2. Significance of Listed Property Trust Bonds 
 
The Australian LPT sector has grown significantly from AU$7 billion in 1992 to 
over AU$136 billion by market capitalisation as at December 2006, with total 
assets of over AU$140 billion, comprising over 3,000 institutional-grade 
properties in diversified and sector-specific portfolios (Newell 2007a; PCA/IPD 
2007a).  LPTs currently are the third largest sector on the stockmarket and 
representing over 10% of the total Australian stockmarket capitalisation, 
compared to only 5% of the total Australian stockmarket capitalisation in 2000 
(UBS 2007). Figure 1 shows the growth in LPT market capitalisation since 1987. 
 
Figure 1:  Growth in Australian LPT Market Capitalisation: 1987-2006 
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Source: Newell (2007a) 
 
Diversified LPTs have a market share of 32% by market cap., office LPTs have 
11%, retail LPTs 43% and industrial LPTs 12% (UBS 2007). Unlike US REITs, 
Australian LPTs do not have residential property in their portfolios.  
 
The maturing nature of the LPT market has seen the increased sophistication of 
LPT debt management. Intense competition and pressure to add value to LPT 
returns have required LPT managers to be more sophisticated in capital and debt 
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management (Blundell 2001). A range of sophisticated debt products including 
CMBS, property trust bonds, hybrids and off-balance sheet financing have been 
used as a natural hedging strategy by LPTs with international property exposure 
and also to fund acquisitions. As at December 2006, LPTs had on average debt 
levels of 36% from 10% in 1995 (Newell 2007a; PIR 2006) with some LPTs with 
100% international property having debt levels in excess of 50%; eg: Rubicon 
America, Reckson NY Property, Galileo Shopping America (Newell 2006a). 
 
With regards to LPT bond issuance, the total cumulative issuance volume from 
1999 to December 2006 reached AU$10.5 billion, with 87 issues as shown in 
Figure 2. Generally, annual LPT bond issuance has remained stable at around 
AU$1.5 billion, with the exception of the year 2003 when issuance nearly reached 
AU$2.8 billion. LPT bond issuance as a funding source can be compared to LPT 
equity raisings, excluding initial price offerings (IPOs). Although LPTs have 
raised more funds through issuing additional securities (AU$18.2 billion), bond 
issuance has featured prominently as well at an average of 65% of equity raisings. 
For instance in 2006, LPTs issued bonds worth AU$1.7 billion and raised AU$2.2 
billion through issuance of additional securities. 
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Figure 2:  Australian LPT Bond Issuance and Equity Raisings Ex. IPOs:  
 1999-2006 
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Sources: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines and Connect 4 
Company Prospectuses database (1999-2006) 
 
To further emphasise the importance of issuance of bonds by LPTs as a funding 
source, we compare with the issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) which is dominated by LPTs (Chikolwa 2007a; Standard & Poor's 
2005b)25 from 2000 to 2006; see Table 1. Although more funds have been raised 
via CMBS (AU$14.3 billion) than LPT bonds (AU$10 billion), more LPT bonds 
(total number issued 85) have been issued in number than CMBSs (total number 
issued 66). Furthermore, in certain years (2001 and 2003) more funds where 
raised via LPT bonds than CMBS issuance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Listed Property Trusts have a 65% CMBS market share. 
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Table 1: Australian LPT Bond Issuance and CMBS Issuance: 1999-2006 
 
AU$ million No. of Issues AU$ million No. of Issues
2000 $357 2 $100 1
2001 $1,320 5 $1,615 12
2002 $2,845 19 $1,570 12
2003 $2,191 14 $2,792 28
2004 $1,513 7 $905 9
2005 $2,102 8 $1,320 12
2006 $4,013 11 $1,650 11
Total $14,340 66 $9,952 85
CMBS Issuance LPT Bond IssuanceYear
 
Sources: CMBS issuance: Chikolwa (2007a); LPT bonds: Author’s compilation from various 
Property Australia magazines (1999-2006) 
  
The Australian LPT bond market has remained competitive in comparison to their 
US equivalent, REITS unsecured debt offerings, with the two countries showing 
its increase in importance as a debt funding source. Table 2 shows LPT bond 
issuance and US REIT unsecured debt offerings by value and number from 1999-
2006.  
 
Table 2:  Australian LPT Bond Issuance and US REITS Unsecured Debt 
Offerings: 1999-2006 
Year
AU$m No. of Issues AU$m No. of Issues
1999 $500 2 $10,337 69
2000 $100 1 $9,117 70
2001 $1,615 12 $12,864 44
2002 $1,570 12 $13,830 71
2003 $2,792 28 $14,163 68
2004 $905 9 $22,499 97
2005 $1,320 12 $21,230 105
2006 $1,650 11 $32,841 82
Grand Total $10,452 87 $136,880 606
US$1 = AU$0.7692 as at 31 December 2006
LPT Bonds US REIT Unsecured Debt Offerings
 
Source: LPT bonds: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999-
2006); US REITS: NAREIT website 
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Figure 3 shows the top 10 LPT bond issuers who command a 93% market share 
and have issued bonds worth a combined total of AU$9.8 billion from 1999-2006. 
Major players in the LPT bond market include GPT (AU$2.8 billion), Westfield 
(AU$1.5 billion), Stockland (AU$1.4 billion) and CFS Gandel Retail Trust 
(AU$1 billion).  
 
Figure 3: Top 10 Australian LPT Bond Issuers: 1999-2006 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999-2006) 
 
An interesting feature is that of the top 5 LPT bond issuers, only the Investa 
Property Group have issued CMBSs with the remaining preferring only LPT bond 
issuance. Further, of the top 5 LPT bond issuers, Westfield, General Property 
Trust and Stockland are in the UBS Leaders 300 Index, emphasizing their ability 
to use their balance sheet to back bond issuance. 
 
Figure 4 shows an inverse relationship between industry spread to swaps and 10-
year government bond rates; as 10-year government bonds rates rise, industry 
spread to swaps tighten and vice versa. Generally, 1-3 year LPT bonds have been 
priced at 2-3bp above 5 year LPT bonds. There are no marked differences in 
swaps between 5 year and above LPT bonds. 
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Figure 4: Australian LPT Bond Industry Spread to Swap and 10-Year 
Government Bond Rates: April 2003 - October 2006 
 
Sources: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999-2006) and RBA 
(2007) 
 
The sub-prime mortgage market events in the US are having an impact on the 
global bond markets and may have an impact on the refinancing prospects for 
maturing LPT bonds. Figure 5 presents the maturity profile of all the LPT bonds 
issued between 1999 and 2006. Nearly AU$3.3 billion worth of LPT bonds are 
maturing in 2008-2009, of which 45.9% are BBB rated bonds. As investors 
require greater compensation to invest in BBB rated bonds, refinancing will 
become more expensive. 
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Figure 5: Australian LPT Bond Maturity Profile 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Property Australia magazines (1999-2006) 
 
The macroeconomic outlook for the Australian market remains benign, with 
historically low unemployment rates and a low interest environment expected to 
continue. However, liquidity and valuation issues surrounding securitised debt 
backed by sub-prime mortgages in the US home market has resulted in the ‘credit 
crunch’ in the global financial system due to an increased perception of risk on the 
part of lenders. This has resulted in higher spreads on securitisable financial 
receivables and unsecured debt offerings.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
ANNs are trainable analytical tools that attempt to mimic information processing 
patterns in the human brain. They are applied to a wide variety of pattern 
matching, classification, and prediction problems and are useful in many financial 
applications such as: stock price prediction, development of security trading 
systems, modelling foreign exchange markets, prediction of bond ratings, 
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forecasting financial distress, and credit fraud detection and prevention. 
Comprehensive reviews of articles demonstrating the use of ANNs in various 
finance situations can be found in Fadlalla and Lin (2001); Coakley and Brown 
(2000); and Krishnaswamy et al. (2000).  
 
Neural networks are regarded by many authoritative commentators as a useful 
addition to standard statistical techniques, and are in fact themselves based on 
statistical principles. Statistical methods such as multivariate discriminant analysis 
(MDA), multiple regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit models have been 
used in order to capture and model the expertise of the bond rating process.  
Frequently these studies are in form of comparative analysis, with researchers 
contrasting them with the findings and perceived efficiency of ANNs.  
Salchenberger et al. (1992) and Tam and Kiang (1992) state that the main 
advantage ANNs have over statistical methods is that they do not require priori 
specification of a function form, but rather they attempt to learn from the training 
input-output examples alone. 
 
3.1 Artificial Neural Networks in Real Estate Studies 
 
ANN has recently earned a popular following amongst real estate researchers 
covering aspects such as real estate valuation: Tay and Ho (1991), Evans and 
Collins (1992), Worzala et al. (1995), Kauko (2004), Lai and Fischer (2006), 
Pagourtzi et al. (2007); examination of the impact of age on house values: Do and 
Grudnitski (1992); prediction of house value: McGreal et al. (1998), Nguyen and 
Cripps (2001) and Lai (2005); forecasting commercial property values: Connellan 
and James  (1998a) and Connellan and James (1998b); predicting commercial 
mortgage-backed securities credit ratings: Chikolwa (2007b); and the impact of 
environmental characteristics on real estate prices: Kauko (2003). 
 
Most of the studies, except for Worzala et al. (1995) and Lenk et al. (1997), show 
that ANNs have a superior predictive capacity over traditional statistical 
techniques. Worzala et al. and Lenk et al. noted that ANNs where not necessarily 
superior over traditional statistical techniques.  
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The increased use of neural networks by academic and commercial analysts in 
real estate studies is motivated by their recognition of complex patterns of 
multivariate property data (Connellan & James 1998a). This increased use of 
ANN methodology in the commercial real estate research gives credence to its 
extension to research in predicting ratings on bonds issued by LPTs.  
 
3.2 Artificial Neural Networks in Corporate Bond Studies 
 
Several studies show that ANNs can be applied to bond rating: Dutta and Shekhar 
(1988); Surkan and Singleton (1990); Maher and Sen (1997); Kwon et al. (1997); 
Daniels and Kamp (1999); Chaveesuk et al. (1999); Yesilyaprak (2004); Huang et 
al. (2004); and Kim (2005). 
 
Kim (2005) used an adaptive learning network (ALN) on a sample of 1080 
observations (companies) primarily collected from the CMPUTSTAT database, 
Dun and Bradstreet database, and Standard and Poor’s bond manuals to predict 
their rating. The overall performance of the model shows that the trained ALN 
model was successful in predicting 228 (84%) out of 272 cases. The further 
showed a prediction accuracy of 88% and 91% for investment grade and 
speculative bonds respectively. 
 
Yesilyaprak (2004) compared ANNs and MDA and multinomial logit (ML) 
techniques for predicting 921 bonds issued by electric utility (367), gas (259), 
telephone (110) and manufacturing companies (185). ANNs (57 – 73 %) 
performed better than both MDA (46 – 67 %) and ML (46 – 68 %) in predicting 
the bond rating in three samples. ML (68 %) performed better in predicting the 
bond rating (in one sample (electric utility). 
 
Huang et al. (2004) compared back propagation neural networks and vector 
support machine learning techniques for bond rating in Taiwan and the United 
States. The data set used in this study was prepared from Standard and Poor’s 
CompuStat financial data. They obtained a prediction accuracy of 80%. 
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Chaveesuk et al. (1999) compared the predictive power of three NN paradigms- 
back propagation (BP), radial basis function (RBF) and learning vector 
quantisation (LVQ)- with logistic regression models (LRM). Bond issues of 90 
companies were randomly selected from the 1997 issues listed by Standard and 
Poor’s. LVQ (36.7%) and RBF (38.3%) had inferior results to BP (51.9%) and 
LRM (53.3%). BP only performed slightly better than LRM.  They further 
concluded that assignment of bond ratings is one area that is better performed by 
experienced and specialised experts since neither NN nor LRM produced accurate 
results. 
 
Daniels and Kamp (1999) modelled the classification of bond rating using NN 
with one hidden layer; and a linear model using ordinary least squares (Srinivasan 
& Bolster). Financial figures on bonds issued by 256 companies were selected 
from Standard and Poor’s DataStream. The percentage of correct classification 
ranged from 60-76% for NN and 48-61% for OLS.  
 
Maher and Sen (1997) compared the performance of neural networks with that of 
logistic regression. NN performed better than a traditional logistic regression 
model. The best performance of the model was 70% (42 out of 60 samples). 
 
Kwon et al. (1997) compared the predictive performance of ordinal pairwise 
partitioning (Shopping Centre Council of Australia) approach to back propagation 
neural networks, conventional (CNN) modelling approach and MDA. They used 
2365 Korean bond-rating data and demonstrated that NNs with OPP had the 
highest accuracy (71-73%), followed by CNN (66-67%) and MDA (58-61%). 
 
Surkan and Singleton (1990) also investigated the bond rating abilities of neural 
networks and linear models. They used MDA, and found that NNs outperformed 
the linear model for bond rating application. 
 
Dutta and Shekhar (1988) were the first to investigate the ability of neural 
networks (NNs) to bond rating. Their sample comprised bonds issued by 47 
companies randomly selected from the April 1986 issues of Value Line Index and 
the Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide. They obtained a very high accuracy of 
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83.3% in discerning AA from non-AA rated bonds. However, the sample was so 
small that it simply amounted to showing the applicability of neural networks to 
bond rating. 
 
In summary, most studies on ANNs showed promising results than those of other 
classification methods. The current study attempts to extend the use of ANNs to 
predict ratings on LPT bonds. The predictive capacity of ANNs is further 
compared to that of OR. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data  
 
Our initial sample consists of all 87 Standard and Poor’s rated bonds issued by 
Australian property trusts between 1999 and 2006 as found in the Property 
Australia magazine. After removing bonds that had incomplete financial 
information, our sample was reduced to 77. Concurrent and complete financial 
report information for the period 1999 to 2006 is obtained from the Aspect Fin 
Analysis database. We follow Gray et al (2006) definition of annual financial 
report as being contemporaneous with the rating if it relates to the financial year-
end that occurs three to fifteen months prior to the rating. This ensures that any 
changes based on information released in the annual report are captured in the 
corresponding rating. Three-year averages of relevant financial ratios rather than 
the most recent observations are used in line with the ‘rating through the cycle’26 
process which is adopted by credit rating agencies to capture the longer-term 
perspective (Carey & Hrycay 2001; Carey & Treacy 2000).  
 
In order to have a reasonable number of observations in each rating class, the 
agency rating classes A, A+ and A3* are combined into a single rating class A, 
and the agency-rating classes BBB and BBB+ are combined into a single rating 
class BBB+. Further, the reclassification of tranches into three classes could 
enhance model performance because mathematical and statistical approaches have 
general limits in dealing with ordinal nature of bond rating. It known that as the 
number of bond classification increases, the predictive power could likely 
                                                 
26
 This is described as a rating assessment in a worst case scenario, in the bottom of a presumed 
credit quality cycle. 
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decrease (Kwon et al. 1997). Table 3 provides summary statistics over time and 
by sector. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Sample Observations Over Time, Rating Class and 
Sector 
A A- A+ A3* BBB BBB+ Total
1999 1 1 2
2000 1 1
2001 2 7 3 12
2002 4 2 3 1 2 12
2003 4 19 5 28
2004 1 4 4 9
2005 3 3 6 12
2006 1 4 2 4 11
Total 17 39 3 1 2 25 87
Diversified 3 15 3 2 16 39
Office 6 1 9 16
Retail 14 18 32
Total 17 39 3 1 2 25 87
Panel A: LPT Bond Rating by Year
Panel B: LPT Bond Rating by Sector
 
 
1.2 Selection of Variables 
 
Bond rating recognises the following areas of attention: profitability; liquidity; 
asset protection; indenture provisions; and quality of management. Bond rating 
models use independent variables, often calculated as ratios, which are 
predominantly derived from public financial statements. The assumption is that 
financial variables extracted from public financial statements, such as financial 
ratios, contain a large amount of information about a company’s credit risk 
(Huang et al. 2004).  The primary reference for modelling bond ratings which has 
been utilised directly or with minor variations is the Kaplan and Urwitz (KU) 
(1979) model. The KU model uses financial ratios relating to leverage, coverage, 
liquidity, profitability, and size.  Rating agencies list qualitative factors such as 
management ability, value of intangible assets, financial flexibility, operating 
efficiency, industry risk, accounting quality and market position as being 
important in their rating process (Moody's Investor Service 2002). However, most 
of these qualitative factors are likely reflected in the quantifiable data such as 
  260 
financial and non-financial variables, and could be assessed indirectly from 
analysing these quantifiable data (Kim 2005). 
 
Consistent with information provided by Standard and Poor’s (2007) and 
Moody’s Investor Service (2002) and with the approach used by Gray et al. 
(2006), we model LPTs credit rating as a function of its financial characteristics 
given by interest coverage, profitability and leverage and industry characteristics. 
Credit ratings tend to be highly sensitive to the firm’s interest coverage ratio- 
firms with higher coverage ratios are likely to have higher credit ratings. 
Profitability is another signal of the firm’s ability to generate cash to meet its 
financial obligations- a high profitability ratio is more likely to be associated with 
a better credit rating. Cash flow or debt coverage ratios, such as free cash flows 
relative to total debt, are important in credit analysis as they provide an indication 
of the firm’s present ability to service its debt and meet its financial obligations. A 
low cash-flow-to-debt ratio may be symptomatic of higher risk and a signal of 
weak prospects. High cash flow relative to total debt is associated with higher 
credit ratings. Further, higher leverage factors, measured as debt to total assets, 
reduce the cushion the firm has with respect to any incremental changes in its 
fortunes. Higher leverage is associated with lower credit ratings. In addition, long-
term debt leverage is generally higher for firms with lower ratings.  
 
Blume et al (1998) hypothesises that a firm with higher equity beta is expected to 
have a lower credit rating as it will be less able to service its debt for given 
accounting ratios as its equity risk increases. However, there have been 
inconsistent results in prior literature of using equity beta as a predictor variable in 
credit rating. Earlier studies (KU) found it to be a significant variable in credit 
rating prediction, while recent studies (Crabtree & Maher 2005; Gray et al. 2006; 
Maher & Sen 1997) have all found it to be insignificant. As such our models do 
not include beta a predictor variable. 
 
The log of assets provides a robust measure of firm size, while at the same time 
providing a rational proxy for information asymmetry in view of the fact that 
information asymmetry typically decreases as a firm size increases (Krishnaswami 
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et al. 1999).  As such we hypothesise that bonds issued by large LPTs by asset 
size should command higher ratings. 
 
Rating agencies suggest that credit ratings should depend, in part, on the firm’s 
business environment.  Numerous industry characteristics including 
competitiveness, barriers to entry, exposure to technological change, regulatory 
environment and vulnerability to economic cycles can have a significant influence 
on the level of business risk a firm faces (Gray et al. 2006; Iskander & Emery 
1994). For instance, Moody’s Investor Service (2003) find competitive pressures, 
characteristics of the catchment areas, and expectations of future developments to 
have a greater impact in their rating of retail LPTs and vacancy rates, tenant 
demand trends, and future stock additions on office LPTs. Retail LPTs exhibit 
cash flow stability than office or industrial LPTs, given Australia’s relatively 
steady consumer spending trends as well as the long-term nature of their lease 
structures. Consequently, an office LPT is expected to generate stronger debt 
coverage ratios at a given level. A more stable and predictable cash flow should 
translate into a lower level of business risk and hence a lower credit risk. To 
control for possible LPT sector effects, indicator variables (0,1) for each LPT 
sector in the sample are included.  An LPT sector dummy (0,1) is added as an 
independent variable to the benchmark model for two (i.e. n - 1) groups 
 
Stapled securities account for over 75% of the LPT market capitalisation, 
compared to only 29% in 2004 (Newell 2006a). Tan (2004b) show that the 
adoption of this internal management structure has enabled a closer alignment of 
unit holders and manager interests, no fee leakage and a lower cost of capital. 
Further, Newell (2006a) state that the adoption of the internal management 
structure has not increased LPT risk levels. However, Standard and Poor’s (2007) 
assert that LPTs exposure to non-lease-related income may constrain their credit 
rating as these activities carry much higher business risk than traditional, passive 
asset management, which reduces the firm’s percentage of income-producing 
assets and its debt capacity at all rating levels. To control for possible LPT 
stapled-structure effects, indicator variables (0,1) for each LPT stapled-structure 
in the sample are included.  An LPT stapled-structure dummy (0,1) is added as an 
independent variable to the benchmark model for one (i.e. n - 1) group. 
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Descriptive statistics regarding the sample are provided in Panel A and variable 
definitions in Panel B of Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
DA 0.08 0.38 0.23 0.07
OCD 0.08 0.52 0.24 0.08
NS 1.05 3.74 2.27 0.78
TA ~ 8.89 9.96 9.56 0.29
LS_1 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39
LS_2 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47
SS 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.47
Panel B: Variable Definitions
DA
OCD
TA
NS
LS_1
LS_2
SS
~ In millions
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed a LPT with a stapled structure, 0 
otherwise.
3-year average of total debt divided by 3-year average of total assets.
3-year average of operating cash flow divided by 3-year average of total debt.
Natural log of 3-year average of total assets.
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed an office LPT, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bond is backed an retail LPT, 0 otherwise.
3-year average of net tangible assets per share.
 
 
Table 5 provides the bivariate correlations that exist between the data items. 
 
Table 5: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 TA DA OCD NS LS_1 LS_2 SS
TA 1.000
DA 0.180 1.000
OCD -0.028 -.745(**) 1.000
NS .610(**) -0.083 -0.154 1.000
LS_1 -.350(**) .363(**) -.265(*) -.514(**) 1.000
LS_2 0.015 0.101 0.099 -.274(*) -.327(**) 1.000
SS .662(**) -0.089 0.027 .772(**) -0.177 -.408(**) 1.000
**Indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at 5% level.
 
A number of models are used. Our benchmark Model 1 includes NTA per share 
(NS), Total debt/total assets (DA), operating cash flows/total debt (OCD) and log 
of total assets (TA) as independent variables. Model 2 tests whether the office 
LPT sector (LS_1) has an impact on bond rating. We further test whether retail 
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LPT sector (LS_2) has an impact on bond rating in Model 3. In model 4, test the 
combined effect on LPT sector (LS_1 and LS_2) have on LPT bond rating. 
Finally, Model 5 has all the independent variables in Models 1 and 5 in addition to 
the stapled-structure (SS) variable. LPT bond rating is the dependent variable in 
all the models.  
 
To test the hypotheses, ordinal regressions are applied to the LPT bond sample 
whereas prediction of accuracy in bond rating for ANN evaluates their 
contribution to the model. 
 
1.3 Description of OR Model 
 
There is a general consensus on the inappropriateness of least squares methods to 
rate bonds as they ignore their ordinal nature (Kamstra et al. 2001). OR has been 
considered appropriate as it accommodates the ordinal nature of bond ratings.  
 
The model is similar to the general multiple linear regression model but defines 
Y i  and estimates β differently. 
 
The logistic model computes the probabilities that an observation will fall into 
each of the various rating categories. The observation is classified into the 
category with the highest probability. This probability is estimated by the logistic 
model as:  
 
 logit )( pi = log 
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  = β 0 + β1 X i1+ β 2 X i2 +…… β n X in     
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where:  
   r = bond rating category; 
pi  = P (Yi = r); 
i
 = 1…n, where n is the sample size; and  
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Xi1,….,, Xin  are predictor variables. 
 
The β s are estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function: 
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where β is the vector of the parameters to be estimated. Once β ’s are estimated, 
pi is estimated by  
 pi  = 
e X i+ −1
1
β        
 (3) 
 
The observation is assigned to the bond rating category with the highest predicted 
probability. These predictions are compared to the actual bond rating assigned to 
the issue to calculate classification accuracy for the model.  
 
The observed value on Y i  depends on whether or not a particular threshold has 
been crossed. 
 
 Y i  = BBB+ if Y i∗  is ≤ β1  
 Y i  = A- if β1≤ Y i∗  ≤ β 2  
 Y i  = A if Y i∗  ≥ β 2  
OR regressions were where carried out in SPSS® version 15.0 (SPSS Inc. 1968). 
 
4.4 Description of ANN Model 
 
ANN models have three primary components as shown in Figure 5: 
1) The input layer; 
2) The hidden layer(s), commonly referred to as the ‘black box’; and 
3) The output measure(s) layer, the estimated LPT bond rating. 
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Figure 5: Structure of a LPT Bond Rating Neural Network 
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The hidden layer(s) contain two processes: the weighted summation functions; 
and the transformation functions. Both of these functions relate the values from 
the input data (e.g. NS, DA, OCD, TA, LS_1, LS_2 and SS variables) to output 
measures (LPT bond rating). The weighted summation function typically used in a 
feed-forward/back propagation neural network is: 
∑=
n
j
ijij WXY         
 (4) 
where Xi is the input values and Wij the weights assigned to the input values for 
each of the j hidden layer nodes. A transformation function then relates the 
summation value(s) of the hidden layer(s) to the output variable value(s) or Yj. 
This transformation function can be of many different forms: linear functions, 
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linear threshold functions, step linear functions, sigmoid functions or Gaussian 
functions. Most software products utilise a regular sigmoid function such as: 
e
Y
yT −+
=
1
1
        
 (5) 
This function is preferred due to its non-linearity, continuity, monotonicity, and 
continual differentially properties (Do & Grudnitski 1992). 
Alyuda Forecaster XL® (Alyuda Research Inc. 2001) was used for the ANN 
experimentation. In the case of our 4-7 input and 3 output network, the hidden 
units where automatically set at 9 (model 1), 12 (model 2), 33 (Model 3), 33 
(model 4) and 6 (model 5). 
 
5. Empirical Results and Analysis 
5.1 OR 
 
The results of the ordinal regression analyses are shown in Table 4. To 
empirically specify the model, three tests were used: the standard technique of 
likelihood ratio test, the significance of the individual coefficients, explanatory 
power (pseudo R-Square) and the accuracy of the predicting rate.  
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Table 4: OR Results 
 
 
Variable  
(Expected Sign) 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
A- 37.741 
(0.000) 
[13.224] 
37.959 
(0.000) 
[13.062] 
66.040 
(0.000) 
[23.116] 
98.773 
(0.000) 
[26.309] 
115.803 
 (0.001) 
[10.888] 
A 39.160  
(0.000) 
[14.029] 
39.378 
(0.000) 
[13.856] 
68.050 
(0.000) 
[24.007] 
101.774 
(0.000) 
[26.981] 
120.730 
(0.001) 
[11.505] 
Profitability (NS) 
(+) 
1.026 
(0.014) 
[5.996] 
1.011 
(0.022) 
[5.272] 
2.974 
(0.000) 
[23.300] 
6.663 
(0.000) 
[31.959] 
18.749 
(0.000) 
[19.956] 
Financial leverage 
(DA) (-) 
-18.475 
(0.007) 
[7.234] 
-18.206 
(0.010) 
[6.665] 
-22.858 
(0.002) 
[9.352] 
-47.179 
(0.000) 
[18.071] 
-108.561 
(0.000) 
[13.025] 
Debt coverage 
(OCD) (+) 
11.565 
(4.729) 
[0.030] 
11.509 
(0.030) 
[4.685] 
14.048 
(0.020) 
[5.445] 
23.334 
(0.005) 
[7.893] 
51.465 
(0.004) 
[8.320] 
LPT size (TA) 
 (+) 
3.513 
(0.002) 
[9.443] 
3.539 
(0.002) 
[9.377] 
6.933 
(0.000) 
[21.043] 
10.771 
(0.000) 
[26.800] 
13.002 
(0.000) 
[12.387] 
Office LPT (LS_1)   0.115 
(0.874) 
[0.025] 
 -7.731 
(0.000) 
[21.822] 
-23.554 
(0.000) 
[14.660] 
Retail LPT (LS_2)   -3.547 
(0.000) 
[24.257] 
-8.588 
(0.000) 
[30.982] 
-16.273 
(0.000) 
[19.318] 
Stapled LPT (SS)     13.295 
(0.000) 
[15.774] 
      
Chi-Square 21.908 21.935 50.956 83.183 123.581 
*Pseudo R-Square 
 
0.131 0.132 0.306 0.499 0.741 
*We utilise McFadden’s pseudo R-Square based on Ederington (1985) who recommend it as being 
the most attractive intuitively as well as theoretically of all others. Regression coefficients 
provided with significance levels (in parenthesis) and Wald chi-square [in brackets]. 
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The primary control variables (NS, DA, OCD and TA) are all significant at .05 
level in the predicted direction. The industry-based variables (LS_1, LS_2 and 
SS) are each found to be significant when added individually and together to the 
benchmark model. In results not shown in this study, we find year of bond issue 
and size of bond issue to be statistically insignificant. All the models are 
significant at .05 level with Likelihood Ratios ranging between 21.9 and 123.5. 
Our results are comparable to other studies (Blume et al. 1998; Crabtree & Maher 
2005; Gray et al. 2006) that have found debt coverage (OSD), leverage (DA) and 
profitability (NS) to provide explanatory power in the credit rating process. In 
addition, the significance of the log of total assets (TA) suggests that larger LPTs 
will command higher credit ratings confirming information asymmetry 
supposition by Krishnaswami et. al (1999). 
 
The benchmark model 1 had a low pseudo R-square of 0.131 and adding the LPT 
sector variables individually only raised the pseudo R-square to 0.132 and 0.306 
respectively (models 2 and 3). A marked difference in pseudo R-square (0.499) 
was noted when the two LPT sector variables (LS_1 and LS_2) were added to the 
benchmark model together (model 4). Overall, model 5 which incorporated all the 
industry-based variables (LS_1, LS_2 and SS) showed the best pseudo R-square 
result at 0.741 
 
These results are consistent with the interpretation that retail LPTs have more 
stable cash flows than office LPTs and the bonds they issue should command 
higher ratings. Further, despite Standard and Poor’s (2007) assertion that LPTs 
with exposure to non-lease-related income may constrain their credit rating, we 
find that the bonds issued by LPTs with stapled management structures command 
higher credit ratings. A possible explanation would be the higher anticipated 
returns from LPTs with stapled management structures. To investigate the effects 
of these industry-based predictability measures on bond ratings further, we 
examine the incremental effect each variable has on bond rating prediction 
accuracy. 
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The predictive capacity increased from the model 1 (56%) to the full model 5 
(91%). The other models had the following prediction accuracy rates: model 2 
(60%), model 3 (71%) and model 4 (91%). Table 5 compares the prediction 
accuracies across bond rating classes for the all the models. The benchmark model 
1 has a higher predictive capacity for the lower rated bonds (BBB+ and A-) and 
performs poorly for the higher rated notes (A). Models 2 and 3 shows that bonds 
issued by an office LPT are more likely to be rated BBB and those issued by retail 
LPTs rated A-. Further, our full model shows 73% likelihood of the bonds being 
rated either BBB+ or A-.  
 
Table 5: OR Classification Accuracy of Models 1-5 
 
BBB+ A- A Correctly 
Predicted 
(%)
Model 1 22/24 (92%) 21/32 (66%) 0/21 (0%) 56%
Model 2 22/24 (92%) 21/32 (66%) 3/21 (14%) 60%
Model 3 20/24 (83%) 26/32 (81%) 9/21 (43%) 72%
Model 4 22/24 (92%) 30/32 (94%) 18/21 (86%) 91%
Model 5 23/24 (96%) 28/32 (88%) 19/21 (90%) 91%
 
 
5.2 ANN 
 
Analysis were done using the five models as defined in section 4.2 on our initial 
77 sample which was divided into 54 (70%) as training and 23 (30%) test 
samples.  Results of the model prediction accuracies and variable contribution are 
shown below. 
 
5.2.1 Prediction Accuracy Analysis 
 
All the models had 96% prediction accuracy for the training sample; see Table 6. 
The predictive capacity of models increased from 52% (models 1) to 83% (model 
5) for the test set emphasising the importance of the inclusion of industry-based 
variables in the models.  The other models had the following results for their test 
samples: model 2 (61%), model 3 (70%) and model 4 (78%). 
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Table 6: Summary of ANN Results 
Training Sample Test Sample Model 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
Model 1 52(96%) 2(4%) 12(52%) 11(48%) 
Model 2 52(96%) 2(4%) 14(61%) 9(39%) 
Model 3 52(96%) 2(4%) 16(70%) 7(30%) 
Model 4 52(96%) 2(4%) 18(78%) 5(22%) 
Model 5 52(96%) 2(4%) 19(83%) 4(17%) 
 
 
Further Tables 7 shows the classification of accuracy within individual rating 
categories with highest being for the A rating class at 76.2% - 95.2%.  This is 
followed by the A- rating class which has a range of 87.5% - 93.8% and finally the 
BBB+ rating class at 58.3% - 91.7%. These results are comparable to those 
obtained in OR; see Table 5. ANN predicts better at higher rating classes (A and 
A-) than at the lower class (BBB+), which is the opposite for OR. 
 
Table 7: ANN Classification Accuracy 
BBB+ A- A Correctly 
Predicted 
(%)
Model 1 14/24 (58%) 30/32 (94%) 20/21 (95%) 83%
Model 2 16/24 (67%) 30/32 (94%) 20/21 (95%) 86%
Model 3 22/24 (92%) 30/32 (94%) 16/21 (76%) 88%
Model 4 22/24 (92%) 28/32 (88%) 20/21 (95%) 91%
Model 5 20/24 (83%) 30/32 (94%) 21/21 (100%) 92%
 
 
5.2.2 Variable Contribution Analysis 
 
Though earlier literature and publications by credit rating agencies state that 
financial variables are important in the credit rating of firms and unsecured bonds 
issued by firms, to the best of our knowledge no study has empirically examined 
the relative contribution of both financial and industry-based variables in LPT 
bond rating. This study thus evaluates the relative importance of different factors 
considered in the LPT bond rating using a neural network model.  
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Garson (1991) developed a means whereby connection weights within a neural 
network can be interpreted allowing the effect of various input nodes to be 
examined and ranked according to their relative importance. This is intrinsically 
done in Alyuda Forecaster XL®. The results of the relative importance of these 
variables in our full neural network model (model 5) are shown in Figure 6. We 
do not show the results of the other four models but suffice to state that the 
following order of importance was revealed though at various percentages: OCD, 
DA, NS, SS, LS_2, LS_1 and TA. 
 
Figure 6: LPT Bond Rating Variable Contribution 
 
Our study has shown 27.0% of LPT bond rating is attributable to industry-based 
variables; office LPT sector (LS_1) accounting for 2.6%, retail LPT (LS_2) 
10.9% and stapled management structure (SS) 13.5%. Unlike Gray et al. (2006) 
who found industry-based variables insignificant in rating Australian firms using 
probit regression, results of our OR and ANN analysis indicate that industry-based 
variables are important in determining LPT bond ratings. A possible explanation 
is that LPTs core business is property investment. Financial variables contribute 
73.0% to LPT bond rating, with debt coverage (OCD) being the dominant variable 
at 32.0%. This is followed by financial leverage (DA: 19.9%), profitability (NS: 
11.5%) and LPT size (TA: 9.6%). 
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One drawback observable from Figure 6 is that no signs are attached to the 
calculated weights. Thus the interpretation of the relative weights can be inferred 
from OR analysis. 
 
6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Directions 
 
The sub-prime mortgage market events in the US have resulted in a ‘credit 
crunch’ in the global financial system due to an increased perception of risk on the 
part of lenders. This has had an impact on the refinancing prospects for maturing 
LPT bonds and further resulted in no new issuances due to high spreads on 
securitisable financial receivables and unsecured debt offerings. As such, studies 
on bond ratings are of great importance for the resuscitation of this source of 
funding. 
 
This study examines the extent to which various financial and industry variables 
have on Listed Property Trust (LPT) bond ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s 
from 1999-2006. Ordinal regression (OR) results show that of the financial 
variables used in our models, debt coverage and financial leverage ratios have the 
most profound effect on LPT bond ratings. Further, we find industry-based 
variables of LPT sector and stapled management structure to significantly affect 
bond rating. 
 
We also examine predictive accuracies of OR and Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) as alternative methods to rating LPT bonds. Empirical analyses indicate 
that both OR and ANN provide robust alternatives to rating LPT bond and that 
there are no significant differences in results between the two full models.  
Inclusion of industry-based variables increases the predictive accuracies of both 
the OR and ANN models. In addition, ANN results show that 73.0% of LPT bond 
rating is attributable to financial variables and 27.0% to industry-based variables. 
 
However, before these results can be generalised, field studies need to be 
conducted to compare the interpretation of the bond-rating process we have 
obtained from our models with bond-rating experts. Deeper market structure 
analysis is also needed to fully explain the differences we found in our models. 
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Further, though our results cannot be viewed as definitive due to the small sample 
size, the can form a basis for future studies.  
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Abstract 
 
Using artificial neural networks (ANN) and ordinal regression (OR) as 
alternative methods to predict Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities (CMBS) 
credit ratings, we examine the role that various financial and industry-based 
variables have on CMBS credit ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s from 1999-
2005. Our OR results show that rating agencies use only a subset of variables 
they describe or indicate as important to CMBS credit rating as some of the 
variables they use were statistically insignificant. Overall, ANN show superior 
results to OR in predicting CMBS credit ratings. 
 
KEYWORDS: Commercial mortgage-backed securities; Credit rating prediction; Ordinal 
regression; Artificial neural networks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) have expanded the investment 
realm of both investors and issuers. They are seen as an alternative to direct 
investment in property offering advantages of liquidity, diversification, and being 
an alternative investment to other financial investments.  CMBSs are bonds 
backed by a single commercial mortgage or, more generally, a pool of commercial 
mortgages (Jacob & Fabozzi 2003). In Australia, the expansion of the description 
of CMBSs as a form of securitisation of direct property assets, in addition to 
traditional definition of the securitisation of mortgages, has gained acceptance in 
the market (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001).  CMBS securities also benefit from the 
standardised rating agency process that is directly analogous to the corporate bond 
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markets. Corporate bond ratings inform the public of the likelihood of an investor 
receiving the promised principal and interest payments associated with the bond 
issue (Shin & Han 2001). However, issues of proprietorship have resulted in the 
methodology of rating mostly being shrouded in mystery. The methods and input 
variables used in rating are not fully disclosed to the public (Shin & Han 2001).  
 
Generally, the analysis undertaken by Standard and Poor’s (2001), Moody’s 
Investors Service (2003) and Fitch Ratings (2005c) in rating Australian CMBSs 
falls into three categories: property characteristics and cash flow analysis; 
portfolio level analysis; and transaction structure analysis, as elaborated in 
Appendix 1. The Appendix also includes factors considered and their weighting 
used by ABN AMRO (Roche 2002) in ranking CMBSs. Market yields correspond 
to bond ratings, which indicate an association between rating and risk. The higher 
the credit quality the lower will be yield and the more successful will be the issue 
(Alles 2000; Kose et al. 2003). As such, studies of rating process are of interest 
not only to bond holders but also to investors.  
 
Although bond rating agencies claim that their ratings reflect each agency’s 
opinion about an issue’s potential default risk and rely heavily on a committee’s 
analysis of the issuer’s ability and willingness to repay its debt and therefore 
researchers would not be able to replicate their ratings quantitatively (Kim 2005), 
researchers have still gone ahead and replicated bond ratings on the premise that 
the financial variables extracted from public financial statements, such as financial 
ratios, contain a large amount of information about a company’s credit risk 
(Huang et al. 2004). Bond rating studies have traditionally used statistical 
techniques such as multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), multiple regression 
analysis (MRA), probit and logit models to capture and model the expertise of the 
bond rating process. Recently, however, a number of studies have demonstrated 
that artificial neural networks (ANN) can be used as an alternative methodology 
to bond rating.  
 
This study investigates several aspects of the use of ANN as a tool for predicting 
credit ratings of Australian CMBSs. Tests are undertaken to compare the 
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predictive power of ANN models and ordinal regression models.  Maher and Sen 
(1997) show the following as reasons why predictability of credit rating is useful: 
- it provides a firm some insight into the cost of going to the bond market to 
raise capital, which can be useful in comparing with other sources of 
funds; 
- It can help investors decide where they want to place their money; 
- It can provide a modified form of implicit evaluation of the firm in 
addition to the explicit evaluation of the bond issue; and 
- An insight into factors consistent with establishing a firm’s bond rating is 
useful in understanding the value of the firm. 
Furthermore, security analysts and investors can use these ratings as the primary 
source of obtaining information about the quality and marketability of various 
issues and assess also market risk premium attached to the bonds while 
investment bankers use the ratings for determining commission rates on 
undertakings (Kim 2005). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on the use of 
ANNs in various real estate applications and corporate bond rating studies 
respectively. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and analysis. Section 5 concludes and highlights future research 
direction.  
 
2. An Overview of the Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities Market 
 
The Australian CMBS market has undergone significant development since the 
first transactions came to the market in 1999, with a range of transaction types and 
issuers now accessing the market. The first CMBSs in Australia were done by 
Leda Holdings in 1999, the Longreach/Qantas head office securitisation and the 
David Jones flagship stores deals in 2000.  As at the end of 2005 a total of 55 
CMBSs had been issued with 137 tranches. 
 
On the whole, global issuance of CMBSs has been on the increase with the USA 
leading the way. From 1999 to November 2005, CMBSs totalling US$532 billion 
had been issued in the USA compared to US$184 billion for the rest of the world 
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during the same period as depicted in figure 1. There has also been an increase in 
the financing of commercial property through capital markets. Industry data show 
that in 2005 issuance of commercial CMBS in the United States was around 
US$170 billion, an 82 per cent increase over the previous year. Strong activity is 
also evident in Europe, where around US$56 billion of CMBS were issued in 
2005, with around three quarters of this amount issued in the United Kingdom. In 
2005, A$2.29 billion of newly rated notes were issued in Australia, an increase of 
8.03% on the previous year. 
 
Figure 1: CMBS Global Issuance (January 1999-November 2005) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Commercial Mortgage Alert 
 
 
The total cumulative Australian and New Zealand CMBS issuance volume since 
1999 had reached A$12.6 billion as shown in figure 2 below (Standard & Poor's 
2007c). Total notes outstanding as at the end of 2005 was A$10.496 billion, 
arising from 16 credit lease and 31 CMBS transactions.  Table 1 shows the 
number of tranches by sector issued from 1999-2005. With the overall Australian 
securitisation market approaching A$200 billion in debts outstanding, CMBS is 
still a relatively small asset class. Nevertheless, it remains both an important 
financing tool for commercial property owners and an alternative source of 
diversification for fixed income-investors. Appendix 2 shows some of the CMBSs 
issue by deal type and size. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative CMBS Issuance: Australia/New Zealand 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2007) 
 
Table 1: Number of Australian CMBS Issues by Sector (2000-2005) 
Sector  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005 
Diversified 1 2 11 7 7 14 42 
Industrial 4 3 6 12 4 3 32 
Office 0  3 4 5 9 10 31 
Retail 0 0 15 9 0 8 32 
Total 5 8 36 33 20 35 137 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
Majority of the issues are in the single borrower multi-property category with over 
95% of the total issuance to date. The CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds CMBS is the only 
one single borrower single-property issuance to date.  Two multi-borrower multi-
property issues have been by MCS Capital Pty Limited and Challenger Capital 
Markets Ltd. ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 issuance is the only 
whole-business CMBS to date. The diversity of issuance transaction types show 
the maturity of the market as well as the arranger’s confidence in trying out 
various CMBS structures to suit market needs.  
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However, as at the end of 2005 conduit-style CMBSs from large loans securitised 
in conduit programs which are common in the USA and Europe had not yet been 
undertaken in Australia. Conduit CMBSs are backed by reasonably large well 
diversified pools of small-to medium-sized secured property loans. A lot of the 
commercial mortgages continued to sit on bank balance sheets, and there was 
limited interest in pursuing securitisation of these assets. Since 2000, the most 
dominant CMBS issues have been in the office sector (A$3.6 billion), followed by 
the retail sector (A$2.7 billion). The diversified sector and the industrial sector 
have had A$2.6 billion and A$1.4 billion worth of CMBS issuance respectively. 
This is shown is figure 2. 
 
Figure 3: Australian CMBS Issuance by Sector (1999-2005) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
Given the general appetite for fixed-income securities and the limited supply in 
the market, CMBS credit spreads have been contracting as shown in figure 4 
below. In 2005 ‘AAA’ five-year, interest only notes were priced at 20-25 bps 
(basis points) over three months’ bank bill swap (BBSW), and three-year, interest-
only notes at 17-20 bps over three-month BBSW. ‘BBB’ were priced at 60-95 bps 
over BBSW. These margins were lower than those of 2002, when they priced at 
least 20 bps wider for ‘AAA’ and 60 bps wider at ‘BBB’ level. 
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Figure 4: AAA Rated CMBS - Average Industrial Spread to Swap (Apr 2003- Oct 2005) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Property Australia magazine 
 
Figure 5 shows the top 10 Australian CMBS issuers, all of which are Listed 
Property Trusts (LPTs). LPTs have a 65% market share. The single-purpose-
vehicle-like characteristics of LPTs have helped in their establishment as major 
players in the CMBS market. Between 2001 and 2004, LPTs issued CMBSs worth 
over $3.7B via 27 issues (eg: Mirvac, Macquarie Goodman Industrial, ING 
Office, ING Industrial, Investa, Macquarie Office) and bonds worth over $4.8B 
via 40 issues (eg: Gandel, Commonwealth Property, GPT, Stockland, Westfield) 
(Newell 2005). This increased participation can partly be attributed to the high 
demand by institutional investors, mainly superannuation funds, for shares and 
bonds issued by LPTs in comparison to investing in direct property. The total 
contribution of asset allocation by Australian superannuation funds to property 
(both direct and indirect) declined from 17% in 1988 to 9% in 2000-2002, though 
the contribution of indirect property increased from 3% to 7% over the same 
period (InTech 2003). In 2005, 95% of superannuation funds had a specific 
allocation to property (either direct or indirect) averaging 10% (Newell 2006b). 
With the drop in public bond issuance, bonds and CMBSs issued by LPT have 
been an attractive investment option for superannuation funds. 
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Figure 5: Top 10 Australian CMBS Issuers 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2005). 
 
The macroeconomic outlook for the Australian market remains benign, with 
historically low unemployment rates and a low interest environment expected to 
continue. These stable economic conditions are expected to foster resilience in the 
supply of securitisable financial receivables. 
 
3. Prior Research in Artificial Neural Network Systems 
 
ANNs are trainable analytical tools that attempt to mimic information processing 
patterns in the human brain. They are applied to a wide variety of pattern 
matching, classification, and prediction problems and are useful in many financial 
applications such as: stock price prediction, development of security trading 
systems, modelling foreign exchange markets, prediction of bond ratings, 
forecasting financial distress, and credit fraud detection and prevention. 
Comprehensive reviews of articles demonstrating the use of ANNs in various 
finance situations can be found in Fadlalla and Lin (2001), Coakley and Brown 
(2000), and Krishnaswamy et al. (2000).  
 
Neural networks are regarded by many authoritative commentators as a useful 
addition to standard statistical techniques, and are in fact themselves based on 
statistical principles. Frequently these studies are in form of comparative analysis, 
with researchers contrasting the findings and perceived efficiency of ANNs with 
more tried and tested statistical methods.  Although Salchenberger et al. (1992) 
and Tam and Kiang (1992) state that ANNs have several advantages over 
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statistical methods, the results of these studies were less than expected because the 
real data in application is usually unevenly distributed among classes and these 
applications are limited in dealing with the ordinal nature of bond rating. Unlike 
statistical models, a neural network does not require priori specification of a 
function form, but rather attempts to learn from training input-output examples 
alone.   
 
3.1 Artificial Neural Network Systems in Real Estate Research 
 
ANN has recently earned a popular following amongst real estate researchers 
covering aspects such as real estate valuation: Tay and Ho (1991), Evans and 
Collins (1992), Worzala et al. (1995); Kauko (2004); examination of the impact of 
age on house values: Do and Grudnitski (1992), prediction of house value: 
McGreal et al. (1998), Nguyen and Cripps (2001) and Lai (2005); forecasting 
commercial property values: Connellan and James  (1998a) and Connellan and 
James (1998b); and the impact of environmental characteristics on real estate 
prices: Kauko (2003). 
 
McGreal et al. (1998), Nguyen and Cripps (2001), and Lai (2005); all 
demonstrated the superiority of ANN over MRA in predicting house values. 
Worzala et al. (1995) and Lenk et al. (1997), however, noted that ANNs where not 
necessarily superior. Connellan and James (1998b) also show the superiority of 
ANNs over MRA in predicting commercial property values. 
 
The increased use of neural networks by academic and commercial analysts in 
real estate studies is motivated by their recognition of complex patterns of 
multivariate property data (Connellan & James 1998a). This increased use of 
ANN methodology in the commercial real estate research gives credence to its 
extension to research in predicting CMBS bond ratings.  
 
3.2 Artificial Neural Network Systems in Corporate Bond Rating Research 
 
Bond ratings are subjective opinions on the likelihood of an investor receiving the 
promised interest and principal payments associated with bond issues. They are 
published by bond rating agencies such as Moody’s Investor Service, Standard 
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and Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings, in the form of a letter code, ranging from AAA-for 
excellent financial strength-to D for entities in default.  
 
Rating agencies and some researchers have emphasized the importance of 
subjective judgement in the bond rating process and criticized the use of simple 
statistical models and other models derived from artificial intelligence to predict 
credit ratings, although they agree that such analysis provide a basic ground from 
judgement in general (Huang et al. 2004). Qualitative judgement, which includes 
accounting quality, operating efficiency, financial flexibility, industry risk, and 
market position, is still difficult to measure though. Literature on bond rating 
prediction has demonstrated that statistical models and artificial intelligence 
models (mainly neural networks) achieved remarkably good prediction 
performance and largely captured the characteristics of the bond rating process. 
 
In this sense, various quantitative methods have been applied to bond rating. 
Statistical methods such as multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), multiple 
regression analysis (MRA), probit and logit models have been used in order to 
capture and model the expertise of the bond rating process. 
 
Several studies show that ANNs can be applied to bond rating: Dutta and Shekhar 
(1988), Surkan and Singleton (1990), Maher and Sen (1997), Kwon et al. (1997), 
Daniels and Kamp (1999), Chaveesuk et al. (1999), Yesilyaprak (2004), Huang et 
al. (2004), and Kim (2005). 
 
Dutta and Shekhar (1988) were the first to investigate the ability of neural 
networks (NNs) to bond rating. Their sample comprised bonds issued by 47 
companies randomly selected from the April 1986 issues of Value Line Index and 
the Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide. They obtained a very high accuracy of 
83.3% in discerning AA from non-AA rated bonds. However, the sample was so 
small that it simply amounted to showing the applicability of neural networks to 
bond rating. 
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Surkan and Singleton (1990) also investigated the bond rating abilities of neural 
networks and linear models. They used MDA, and found that NNs outperformed 
the linear model for bond rating application. 
 
Maher and Sen (1997) compared the performance of neural networks with that of 
logistic regression. NN performed better than a traditional logistic regression 
model. The best performance of the model was 70% (42 out of 60 samples). 
 
Kwon et al. (1997) compared the predictive performance of ordinal pairwise 
partitioning approach to back propagation neural networks, conventional (CNN) 
modelling approach and MDA. They used 2365 Korean bond-rating data and 
demonstrated that NNs with OPP had the highest accuracy (71-73%), followed by 
CNN (66-67%) and MDA (58-61%). 
 
Chaveesuk et al. (1999) compared the predictive power of three NN paradigms- 
back propagation (BP), radial basis function (RBF) and learning vector 
quantisation (LVQ)- with logistic regression models (LRM). Bond issues of 90 
companies were randomly selected from the 1997 issues listed by Standard and 
Poor’s. LVQ (36.7%) and RBF (38.3%) had inferior results to BP (51.9%) and 
LRM (53.3%). BP only performed slightly better than LRM.  They concluded 
came that assignment of bond ratings is one area that is better performed by 
experienced and specialised experts since neither NN nor LRM produced accurate 
results. 
 
Daniels and Kamp (1999) modelled the classification of bond rating using  NN 
with one hidden layer; and a linear model using ordinary least squares. Financial 
figures on bonds issued by 256 companies were selected from Standard and 
Poor’s DataStream. The percentage of correct classification ranged from 60-76% 
for NN and 48-61% for OLS.  
 
Yesilyaprak (2004) compared ANNs and MDA and multinomial logit (ML) 
techniques for predicting 921 bonds issued by electric utility (367), gas (259), 
telephone (110) and manufacturing companies (185). ANNs (57 – 73 %) 
performed better than both MDA (46 – 67 %) and ML (46 – 68 %) in predicting 
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the bond rating in three samples. ML (68 %) performed better in predicting the 
bond rating (in one sample (electric utility). 
 
Huang et al. (2004) compared back propagation neural networks and vector 
support machine learning techniques for bond rating in Taiwan and the United 
States. The data set used in this study was prepared from Standard and Poor’s 
CompuStat financial data. They obtained a prediction accuracy of 80%. 
 
Kim (2005) used an adaptive learning network (ALN) on a sample of 1080 
observations (companies) primarily collected from the CMPUTSTAT database, 
Dun and Bradstreet database, and Standard and Poor’s bond manuals to predict 
their rating. The overall performance of the model shows that the trained ALN 
model was successful in predicting 228 (84%) out of 272 cases. The further 
showed a prediction accuracy of 88% and 91% for investment grade and 
speculative bonds respectively. 
 
In summary, most studies on ANNs showed promising results than those of other 
classification methods. The current study attempts to extend the use of ANNs to 
predict ratings on CMBSs. The predictive capacity of ANNs is further compared 
to that of OR. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 
In this paper we hypothesise that loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is negatively related to 
CMBS credit rating whereas debt-to-service coverage ratio (DSCR) is positively 
related. The incidence of default rises with increase in LTV; that is, if all other 
factors are held constant, the probability of default for a loan increases as the LTV 
increases, but not equal. Unlike the LTV, where the probability of default 
increases as the LTV rises, the incidence of default is a decreasing function of the 
DSCR. However, the relationship between the DSCR and the probability of 
default is weaker than the relationship between the LTV and default. Our 
motivation for the specified hypothesis stems from Fabozzi and Jacob (1997) and 
Geltner and Miller (2001), among others, who state that LTV and DSCR are the 
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two mostly widely used commercial mortgage underwriting criteria. Descriptions 
of LTV and DSCR are found in Section 4.5 
 
We further hypothesise that CMBS issues with a well diversified portfolio both on 
a property composition and geographic location basis will attract higher credit 
ratings. The diversity of a portfolio of assets will have an impact on the volatility 
of the pool’s expected loss. By diversifying the mix and location of property, one 
can mitigate a pool’s expected losses. Property diversity mitigates the risk of fall 
in asset value of the single largest property in the pool. Geographic diversity 
mitigates the risk single market decline and may reduce any losses associated with 
this type of risk.  In support of our hypotheses, Moody’s Investor Service (2003) 
asserts that CMBS deals also benefit from portfolio diversification. 
 
Additional hypotheses are that size of issue and note tenure are positively and 
negatively related to the success of bond issues respectively. Larger bond issues 
are done by bigger firms with strong track records who fall under stricter 
regulatory regimes such as the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
and the Managed Investment Scheme provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, 
among others, should attract higher credit ratings. Longer note tenures increase 
the incidence of default and should therefore attract lower credit ratings.  
 
To test the hypotheses, ordinal regressions are applied to the CMBS sample 
whereas prediction of accuracy in bond rating for ANN evaluates their 
contribution to the model. 
 
4.2 Description of OR Model 
 
There is a general consensus on the inappropriateness of least squares methods to 
rate bonds as they ignore their ordinal nature (Kamstra et al. 2001). OR has been 
considered appropriate as it accommodates the ordinal nature of the bond rating in 
the analysis.  
 
The model is similar to the general multiple linear regression model but defines 
Y i  and estimates β differently. 
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The logistic model computes the probabilities that an observation will fall into 
each of the various rating categories. The observation is classified into the 
category with the highest probability. This probability is estimated by the logistic 
model as:  
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where β is the vector of the parameters to be estimated. Once β ’s are estimated, 
pi is estimated by  
 pi  = 
e X i+ −1
1
β        (3) 
 
The observation is assigned to the bond rating category with the highest predicted 
probability. These predictions are compared to the actual bond rating assigned to 
the issue to calculate classification accuracy for the model.  
 
The observed value on Y i  depends on whether or not a particular threshold has 
been crossed. 
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 Y i  = BBB if Y i∗  is ≤ β1  
 Y i  = A if β1≤ Y i∗  ≤ β 2  
 Y i  = AA if β 2  ≤ Y i∗  ≤ β 3  
 Y i  = AAA if Y i∗  ≥ β 3  
 
OR regressions were where carried out in SPSS® version 13.0 (SPSS Inc. 1968) 
 
4.3 Description of ANN Model 
 
This subsection contains a gentle introduction to the fundamental theory of ANN. 
Consider the following model: 
 
( ; )t t ty g x θ ε= +        (4) 
 
where ( )g • denotes a continuous differentiable function, tx is a 1k ×  vector of 
explanatory variables, which could include the lagged dependent variables, t iy −  
for some i , θ  is a 1l ×  vector of parameter and tε  is a sequence of 
independently, identically distributed random variables. In general, the explicit 
function form of g  is unknown. However, it is possible to find a universal 
approximator, so that the function g  can be estimated as accurately as one wish. 
One such approximator is  
 
0
1
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where  
 
1( ; , )
1 exp( [ ])G z c z cν ν= + − −      (6) 
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is the well known logistic function. (Hornik et al. 1989, 1990) (see also (Cybenko 
1989a), (Carroll S.M. & B.W. Dickinson 1989), (Funabashi 1989)) showed that 
for any continuous function ( ; )tg x θ , every compact subset K of k  and every 
0δ > , there exists a ( ; )tF x γ  such that  
 
sup || ( ; ) ( ; ) ||t t
x K
F x g xγ θ δ
∈
− <       (7) 
 
 
Following these results, it is straightforward to show that the accuracy of the 
approximation is determined by the number of hidden layer units, namely, q  and 
the parameter vector γ , given a set of k  inputs, namely, the 1k ×  vector tx . The 
choice of q  can be somewhat arbitrary, it is often a matter of striking a balance 
between accuracy and over-fitting. Given q , the parameter vector γ  can be 
estimated using non-linear least squares:  
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Obviously, the computational complexity of this minimisation problem grows as 
the number of hidden layer units grows. Several studies (See (Weeraprajak 2007) 
for a comprehensive review) have suggested that the computational burden can be 
reduced if it is possible to separate the function ( )F •  into linear and non-linear 
components. In this case, the parameters associated with the linear component can 
be estimated using conventional least squares estimator, which has a closed form 
solution and the parameters in the non-linear component can be estimated using 
the non-linear least squares estimator. This implies the number of parameters 
required to be estimated by the non-linear estimator is reduced and hence improve 
computation efficiency.  
 
The graphical representation of the basic ANN model with the three primary 
components, namely the input layer (the input/explanatory variables, tx ), the 
  294 
hidden layer (black box) with multiple units, ( , )t iG x γ  and the output measure 
layer (the estimated CMBS rating in this case) can be found in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 Structure of a CMBS rating neural network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hidden layer(s) contain two processes: the weighted summation function (the 
linear component); and the transformation function (the nonlinear component). 
Both of these functions relate the values from the input data (e.g. LTV; DSCR; 
issue size; bond tenure, property diversity, geographical diversity) to output 
measures (CMBS rating).  
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Alyuda Forecaster XL® (2001) was used for the ANN experimentation. In the 
case of our 6 input and 4 output network, the hidden units where automatically set 
at 29 (model 1), 28 (model 2) and 23 (Model 3). 
 
4.4 Data  
 
Based on Standard and Poor’s Ratings Direct database, our dataset comprised all 
the CMBSs issued between July 1999 and December 2005 totalling 55. The issues 
had a combined total of 137 tranches and ratings ranging from AAA, AA, A, 
BBB+, BBB, BBB- , to NR. In this study, all A and BBB rated tranches were 
grouped into two groups that is A-rated and BBB-rated respectively. The 
reclassification of tranches into four classes could enhance model performance 
because mathematical and statistical approaches have general limits in dealing 
with ordinal nature of bond rating. It known that as the number of bond 
classification increases, the predictive power could likely decrease (Kwon et al. 
1997).  
 
We further excluded unrated tranches, to leave us with 118 tranches (training 
sample) and 17 tranches (test sample) respectively. Zhang et al.(1998) indicate 
that literature offers little guidance in selecting the training and test samples, with 
most authors selecting them based on the rule of 90% vs. 10%, 80% vs. 20% or 
70% vs. 30%, etc. They emphasise that the critical issue is to have both the 
training and the test sets representative of the population or underlying 
mechanism. The division of training and test sets should depend on the problem 
characteristics, the data type and the size of the available data.  Details of the 
individual rating categories in each sample are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Observations per CMBS Rating 
 
Rating Training Sample  Test Sample 
 Count Proportion  Count Proportion 
A 17 14%  4 23% 
AA 25 21%  3 18% 
AAA 62 53%  3 18% 
BBB 14 12%  7 41% 
Total 118 100%  17 100% 
 
Descriptive statistics of the data used in the experiments is shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Training Sample 
  
Issued 
Amount (A$m) 
Bond 
Tenure 
(Years) 
DSCR** LTV** Property 
Diversity 
Geographical 
Diversity 
Mean 79.87 3.97 2.14 0.46 0.29 0.48 
Standard Error 7.36 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Standard Deviation 79.90 1.31 0.51 0.10 0.18 0.15 
Minimum 1 1 1.28 0.31 0.08 0.2 
Maximum 350 7 3.5 0.76 1 1 
 
Test Sample 
  
Issued 
Amount (A$m) 
Bond 
Tenure 
(Years) 
DSCR** LTV** Property 
Diversity 
Geographical 
Diversity 
Mean 47.59 4.94 1.81 0.48 0.32 0.51 
Standard Error 13.33 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06 
Standard Deviation 54.96 0.24 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.26 
Minimum 3 4 1.2 0.36 0.11 0.21 
Maximum 190 5 2.7 0.61 0.55 0.78 
 
Appendix 3 provides bivariate training sample correlations that exist between the 
data items.  
 
4.5 Selection of Variables  
 
Bond rating recognises the following areas of attention: profitability; liquidity; 
asset protection; indenture provisions; and quality of management. Bond rating 
models use independent variables, often calculated as ratios, which are 
predominantly derived from public financial statements. The assumption is that 
  297 
financial variables extracted from public financial statements, such as financial 
ratios, contain a large amount of information about a company’s credit risk 
(Huang et al. 2004). Financial ratios used relate to leverage, coverage, liquidity, 
profitability, and size.  Financial and property ratios referred to are in appendix 3. 
Rating agencies list qualitative factors such as management ability, value of 
intangible assets, financial flexibility, operating efficiency, industry risk, 
accounting quality and market position. However, most of these qualitative factors 
are likely reflected in the quantifiable data such as financial and non-financial 
variables, and could be assessed indirectly from analysing these quantifiable data 
(Kim 2005). 
 
According to Moody’s (2003), the credit risk of CMBSs depends the 
characteristics of the underlying properties, loan structure, loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio and the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and portfolio diversification. 
Standard and Poor’s (2001) as well state that their basis of rating is the relative 
risk of the collateral and the ability of the collateral to generate income. The main 
criterion used to quickly assess credit risk of CMBS deals are the loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio and the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997). 
The LTV is calculated by dividing the total amount of the notes issued by the 
current market value of all the properties. The DSCR is calculated by dividing the 
total net passing income of the properties by the debt-servicing amount. The debt-
servicing amount is derived by multiplying credit rating agencies’ stressed interest 
rate assumption by the notes’ issuance amount. 
 
Credit rating agencies establish a stabilised net cash flow and an ‘assessed capital 
value’, which are used as the basis of the debt-sizing calculations. The appropriate 
LTV and DSCR are applied to those values. The capitalisation rate used to 
determine the ‘assessed capital value’ is a function of the risk and return of the 
asset, reflecting its age, quality, location, and competitive position within the 
market (Standard & Poor's 2004a). 
 
Following Hedander (2005) who used a diversity scoring system based on the 
Herfindahl Index to measure diversity on a geographic and property type 
concentration basis in Australian listed property trusts, we adopt a similar 
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procedure to measure diversity in Australian CMBS portfolios. This index 
effectively converts a pool of issues of uneven size into a measurement of 
diversity, as if all issues were the same size. A totally focussed CMBS issue has 
an index equal to one, while the index for a diversified CMBS issue is closer to 
zero. Appendix 4 shows property and geographical diversity details, among 
others.  
 
The Herfindahl Geographic Region Index (HHGR) for each respective CMBS 
issue is calculated as follows: 
HHGR = ∑
=
8
1
2
)(
j
j
x
x
       (9) 
 
where  j = Geographic region: the states in Australia (New 
South Wales,  
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western 
Australia, Northern Territory, Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) and Tasmania, 
x j  = Percentage of asset type in portfolio 
x  = Total portfolio composition  
 
We wish to acknowledge use of other factors in CMBS rating to deal with 
transaction and legal risk but have not considered them in this study as there are 
common or standard features that have been set up to mitigate these risks in all 
issues. 
 
A number of models are used. Model 1 includes LTV and DSCR as independent 
variables. Model 2 has an addition of bond tenure and the log of issue size to the 
independent variables in Model 1. Finally, Model 3 has all the independent 
variables in Models 1 and 2 in addition to portfolio diversification variables. 
Tranche rating is the dependent variable in all the models.  
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5. Empirical Results and Analysis- 
5.1 OR 
 
The results of the ordinal regression analyses are shown in Table 4. To 
empirically specify the model, three tests were used: the standard technique of 
likelihood ratio test, the significance of the individual coefficients, explanatory 
power (pseudo R-Square) and the accuracy of the predicting rate. From the 
observed significance levels, only LTV is related to CMBS credit ratings being 
significant at .05 level of confidence in all three models but with anomalous 
positive coefficients implying that high LTV ratios command higher credit 
ratings. A negative coefficient for LTV was hypothesised as higher LTV increase 
the level of default and result in lower credit ratings. Log of issued amount 
(SIZELN) had the anticipated positive coefficient sign whereas bond tenure 
(TENURE) and level of property diversity (PD) had the anticipated negative 
coefficients. DSCR, TENURE, PD and geographic diversity (GD) appear not be 
related to the rating being insignificant at .05 level of confidence. This is an 
interesting finding as prior literature has stipulated that LTV and DSCR are the 
two main predictors of CMBS default risk (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997). However, 
recent research by An (2006), Deng et al. (2005) and Grovenstein et al. (2004), 
among others, find little statistically significant relationship exists between 
original LTV and DSCR and CMBS default risk, supporting our results. They 
attribute this to the endogenous nature of original LTV and DSCR to the 
underwriting process. Lenders frequently respond to higher perceived overall risk 
(based on a multidimensional analysis including factors other than LTV and 
DSCR) by limiting the amount they will lend thereby lowering the loan-to-value 
ratio and increasing the debt service coverage ratio.  
 
The low pseudo R-square in all three models (ranging from 0.018 to 0.039) 
indicate that there are other factors affecting CMBS bond rating, giving credence 
to use of other investigative techniques into their rating such as ANN. It should 
also be noted that addition of variables SIZELN and TENURE (model 2) to the 
basic model of DSCR and LTV increased the predictive power from 0.018 to 
0.033. The full model with all the variables (model 3) showed an over double 
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increase in the predictive power (0.018 to 0.039) over the basic model though 
there was a marginal increase over model 2 (0.033 to 0.039). 
 
The inclusion of additional variables to the basic model increased chi-square from 
7.036 (model 1) to 9.778 and 11.495 (model 2 and 3) respectively though 
significance levels decreased. Models 1 and 2 chi-square were significant at the 
0.05 level and model 3 at the 0.10 level. 
 
These results imply that rating agencies use only a subset of variables they 
describe or indicate as important to CMBS rating. Further, the suggested variables 
do not generally (with exception of LTV and to some extent DSCR) discriminate 
among credit ratings. This is exemplified by figures 1 to 6 in Appendix 5. There is 
a strong relationship between CMBS rating and LTV, whereas a weak relationship 
exists with DSCR. The other variables show no relationship to CMBS rating. 
 
Table 4: OR Results 
*We utilise McFadden’s pseudo R-Square based on Ederington (1985) who recommend it as being 
the most attractive intuitively as well as theoretically of all others. Regression coefficients 
provided with significance levels (in parenthesis) and Wald chi-square [in brackets]. 
 
 
Variable 
(Expected 
Sign) 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
A 1.980 (0.310) [1.031] 3.861 (0.100) [2.700] 4.115 (0.088) [2.914] 
AA 3.053 (0.118) [1.952] 4.959 (0.035) [4.428] 5.221 (0.031) [4.664] 
AAA 5.515 (0.006) [2.006] 7.481 (0.002) [9.545] 7.757 (0.002) [9.768] 
DSCR (+) 0.471 (0.321) [0.983] 0.622 (0.207) [1.593] 0.801 (0.122) [2.393] 
LTV (-) 6.268 (0.011) [6.548] 8.307 (0.003) [9.004] 9.512 (0.001) [10.401] 
SIZELN 
(+) 
  
 0.590 (0.122)  [0.331] 0.693 (0.077) [3.130] 
TENURE 
(-) 
  
 -0.079 (0.565) [2.394] -0.087 (0.553) [0.353] 
PD (-)       -1.255 (0.230) [1.438] 
GD (+)       -0.949 (0.446) [0.580] 
          
Chi-
Square 
7.036 (0.030)  9.778 (0.044)  11.495 (0.074)  
*Pseudo 
R-Square 
 
0.018   0.033   0.039   
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Table 5 shows the number of ratings correctly predicted. The best results was 
obtained by model 3 which included all the variables at 53% (63 out of 118 cases) 
followed by models 1 and 2 at 52% (61 out of 118 cases) each. 
 
Table 5: OR Classification Accuracy of Models 1-3 
Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The log-likelihood test in this case failed as the estimation of the general model 
failed to converge. Subsequently we do not believe the test is valid in this case, 
leading us to conclude that statistical approaches used in corporate bond rating 
studies have limited replication capabilities in predicting CMBS credit ratings. 
 
 
 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA BBB Total 
A 17 0 17 
AA 23 0 23 
AAA 59 0 59 
BBB  17 2 19 
Total 116 2 118 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA BBB Total 
A 17 0 17 
AA 23 0 23 
AAA 58 1 59 
BBB 16 3 19 
Total 114 4 118 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA BBB Total 
A 17 0 17 
AA 23 0 23 
AAA 59 0 59 
BBB 15 4 19 
Total 114 4 118 
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5.0 ANN 
5.2.1 Prediction Accuracy Analysis 
 
As pointed out in section 4.5 and following the approach taken to test the 
explanatory power of OR models to predict credit ratings by composing models 
with various independent variables, the same approach was adopted  using ANN. 
Three models were run starting with the basic model with two independent 
variables being LTV and DSCR. Some researchers (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997) and 
rating agencies (Moody's Investor Service 2003) regard these as the most 
important variables in determine a CMBS credit rating.  The second model 
included bond tenure (TENURE) and log of issue size to the independent 
variables in Model 1. Finally, Model 3 had all the independent variables used in 
Models 1 and 2 in addition to portfolio diversity variables. Tranche rating is the 
dependent variable in all the models.  
 
The predictive capacity of ANNs decreased from 93% (models 1 and 2) to 91% 
(model 3) for the training set and test and increased from 70% (model 1) to 80% 
(model 2 and 3) for the test set as shown in Table 6. Further Tables 7 shows the 
classification of accuracy within individual rating categories. Appendix 6 shows 
the error distribution. 
 
Table 6: Summary of ANN Results 
Training Sample Test Sample Model 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
No. of Good 
Predictions 
No. of Bad 
Predictions 
Model 1 93(95%) 5(5%) 14(70% 6(30%) 
Model 2 93(95%) 5(5%) 16(80%) 4(20%) 
Model 3 91(93%) 7(7%) 16(80%) 4(20%) 
 
Table 7: ANN Classification Accuracy 
Model 1 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA AA A BBB 
AAA 55 3 1 0 
AA 0 22 1 0 
A 1 5 11 0 
BBB 0 0 0 19 
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Model 2 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA AA A BBB 
AAA 59 0 0 0 
AA 2 21 0 0 
A 1 3 11 2 
BBB 1 0 0 18 
 
Model 3 
Actual CMBS 
Rating 
Predicted CMBS Rating 
 AAA AA A BBB 
AAA 57 0 2 0 
AA 1 20 2 0 
A 1 3 12 1 
BBB 1 0 0 18 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Variable Contribution Analysis 
 
Though earlier literature and publications by credit rating agencies state that LTV 
and DCSR are important property ratios which impact on the achievable credit 
rating for a CMBS issue, to the best of our knowledge no study has empirically 
examined the relative contribution of each of these input parameters to a CMBS 
rating. This study thus evaluates the relative importance of different factors 
considered in the CMBS rating using a neural network model. 
 
The results of the relative importance of these variables in our full neural network 
model (model 3) are shown in Figure 7. We do not show the results of the other 
two models but suffice to state that the following order of importance was 
revealed though at various percentages: LTV, DSCR, Issued Amount and Bond 
Tenure. 
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Figure 7: CMBS Rating Variable Contribution 
 
  
Our study has shown 62% of CMBS rating is attributable to LTV (38.2%) and 
DSCR (23.6%); supporting earlier studies which have listed the two as being the 
most important variables in CMBS rating. The other variables contributions are: 
CMBS issue size 10.1%; and CMBS tenure 6.7%, geographic diversity 13.5% and 
property diversity 7.9% respectively. 
 
Our results are comparable to those stated in the ABN AMRO CMBS Ranking 
Model.  Under the model all the property-based factors added up to 75% (asset 
quality (15%); refinancing risk (20%); lease expiry profile (15%); credit quality of 
income (15%) and tenancy concentration (10%). All these factors are captured by 
LTV and DSCR in our model, which have a combined total weighting of 62%. In 
our model, diversification accounted for 21% whereas the ABN AMRO model 
had 15%. Differences between our model and the ABN AMRO model with the 
remaining factors makes difficult to complete the comparisons comprehensively. 
Our model captures bond tenure and amount issued. The ABN AMRO model 
captures management experience and growth strategy. 
 
One drawback observable from Figure 2 is that no signs are attached to the 
calculated weights. Thus the interpretation of the relative weights can be inferred 
from OR analysis. 
 
 
 
 
10.112% 
6.742% 
23.596% 
38.202% 
7.865% 
13.483% 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Issued Amount (A$m) 
Bond Tenure 
(Years) 
DSCR** 
LTV** 
Property Diversity 
Geographical Diversity 
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6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Superior predictive results were obtained from the ANN analysis in comparison to 
OR. ANN correctly predicted 95% and 91% CMBS rating for the training and test 
sets respectively whereas OR had 52-53% for the training set across the three 
models, confirming results obtained in earlier studies on predicting corporate bond 
rating using the two methodologies. Further, ANNs offer better results classifying 
across rating classes, while OR perform better only at the AAA class level and 
perform poorly for lower classes.  
 
While our study has empirically tested variables propagated by credit rating 
agencies as being important to CMBS rating and found all but LTV to statistically 
insignificant using OR, we conclude that statistical approaches used in corporate 
bond rating studies have limited replication capabilities in CMBS rating and that 
the endogeneity arguments raise significant questions about LTV and DSCR as 
convenient, short-cut measures of CMBS default risk. However, ANNs do offer 
promising predictive results and can be used to facilitate implementation of 
survey-based CMBS rating systems. This should contribute to making the CMBS 
rating methodology become more explicit which is advantageous in that both 
CMBS investors and issuers are provided with greater information and faith in the 
investment. 
 
However, before these results can be generalised, field studies need to be 
conducted to compare the interpretation of the bond-rating process we have 
obtained from our models with bond-rating experts. Deeper market structure 
analysis is also needed to fully explain the differences we found in our models. 
Further still, though our results cannot be viewed as definitive due to the small 
sample size, the can form a basis for future studies. Over time with more CMBS 
issuances, a larger sample size will enable analysis of various issues backed by 
different property classes to check for differences, if any. 
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Appendix 1 Factors Considered in Rating Australian CMBSs 
Moody’s CMBS Rating Approach1 Standard and Poor’s CMBS Rating 
Approach2 
Fitch Ratings CMBS Rating Approach3 ABN AMRO CMBS Ranking Model4 
 Property Characteristics Analysis 
-Sustainable cash flow 
-Quality grade 
-Property type 
-Tenant quality 
 
 Loan Structure Analysis 
-Amortisation profile 
-Floating rate loans 
-Seasoning and Delinquencies 
-Cross-Collateralisation and Cross-
Defaulting 
-Other loan features 
 
 Loan-to-Value and Debt-Service 
Coverage Ratios Analysis 
-Current, Balloon and Target LTV 
-Actual and Hurdle DSCR 
 
 Portfolio Level Analysis 
-Portfolio diversification 
-Other overall considerations (legal 
environment, quality of service, 
liquidity, tail periods, commingling risk, 
insurances) 
 Property Based Analysis 
-Location 
-Tenancy (tenant profile, lease 
maturity risk) 
-Lease 
-Market rental rates and expenses 
-Building quality assessment 
-Supply and demand considerations 
-Management 
 
 Transaction Structure Analysis 
-Term of debt 
- Amortisation profile 
- Hedging strategy 
-Cash trap mechanisms 
 
• Rating Analysis 
 Quantitative Analysis 
-Adjustment to Net Operating Income (rent 
recognition, vacancy, other income, management 
fee, real estate taxes, insurance) 
-Capital items consideration (leasing costs, 
replacement reserves) 
-Interest rate adjustment (mortgage constant to 
reflect long-term conventional financing) 
-Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
-Loan-to-Value Ratio 
-Amortisation credit 
 
 Qualitative Analysis 
-Sponsor/manager’s track record 
-Overleverage and Subordinate Debt 
-Collateral quality (location, access and visibility; 
design and construction quality; tenant quality; 
economic and market trends; leaseholds 
-Environmental issues 
-Pool-related adjustments (loan and geographic 
diversity) 
 
• Structural Issues 
-Balloon payments 
-Liquidity 
-Servicer’s experience 
-Cross-Collateralisation and Cross-Default 
 Asset Quality (15%) 
-Location 
-Age 
-Condition 
-Tenant retention 
 
 Refinancing Risk 20%) 
-Refinancing risk 
-Ownership structure 
 
 Leasing Expiry Profile (15%) 
-Percentage of lease expiring over 
debt term 
-Amount of future cash flow to 
amortise debt 
 
 Management (10%) 
-Track record 
-Growth strategy  
 
 Tenancy Concentration (10%) 
-Credit worthy of tenant 
-Lease profile 
 
 Number of Assets in Pool (15%) 
-Diversification 
-Number of assets in pool 
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-Control of property cash flow 
-Property releases 
-Low Debt Service Reserve 
-Management replacement 
-Insurance coverage 
 
• Legal Features 
-Special-purpose entity 
-Representations and Warranties 
Sources:  
2. Moody’s Investor Service (2003). 
3. Standard and Poor’s (2001). 
4. Fitch Ratings (2005). 
5. Roche (2002). 
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Appendix 2: Training Sample Correlations 
Variable Issued 
Amoun
t (A$m) 
Bond 
Tenure 
(Years) 
DSCR*
* 
LTV** Property 
Diversit
y 
Geographica
l Diversity 
Rating* 
Issued 
Amount 
(A$m) 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .037 .236(**) 
-
.465(**) 
.025 -.089 .505(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  .673 .006 .000 .777 .307 .000 
Bond Tenure 
(Years) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.037 1 .070 .037 .108 -.216(*) .030 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.673   .420 .666 .211 .012 .727 
DSCR** Pearson 
Correlation 
.236(**
) 
.070 1 
-
.689(**) 
-.146 -.042 .669(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.006 .420   .000 .090 .626 .000 
LTV** Pearson 
Correlation 
-
.465(**
) 
.037 
-
.689(**) 
1 .203(*) .073 
-
.861(**) 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .666 .000   .018 .401 .000 
Property 
Diversity 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.025 .108 -.146 .203(*) 1 .194(*) -.138 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.777 .211 .090 .018   .024 .112 
Geographica
l Diversity 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.089 -.216(*) -.042 .073 .194(*) 1 -.063 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.307 .012 .626 .401 .024   .471 
Rating* Pearson 
Correlation 
.505(**
) 
.030 .669(**) 
-
.861(**) 
-.138 -.063 1 
  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .727 .000 .000 .112 .471   
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 3: Financial and Property Ratios 
 
No. Category Description Operating and 
Financial Ratio 
Property Ratio Variable 
1 Size 
Tangible fixed 
assets 
Total assets Property value V 
2 Coverage Total size of debt Total debt Debt D 
3 Leverage 
Long term 
capital 
intensiveness 
Total debt/Total 
assets 
Loan-to-value D/V 
4 Profitability 
Short term 
capital 
intensiveness 
Short term 
debt/Total assets 
Break even  (OE+PMT)/GI 
5 Liquidity 
Total liquidity of 
the firm 
Current 
assets/Current 
liabilities 
Debt service 
coverage 
PMT/NOI 
6 Coverage 
Measure of 
company’s 
ability to pay 
bond holders 
Pre-tax interest 
expense/Income 
Interest coverage (NOI-PMT)/NOI 
7 
Indenture 
provision 
Subordination 
status 
(0-1)    
8 Efficiency 
Quality of 
management 
Net operating 
income/Sales 
Operating 
expenses ratio 
NOI/GI 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Belkaoui (1980); Rowland (1993) and Fischer(2004)  
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Appendix 4: CMBS Summary Details (1999-2005) 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m)
S&P 
Stressed 
Value 
(AU$m)
Capital 
Value 
Discount 
(%)
 Market 
Net 
Income 
(AU$m)
S&P Net 
Income 
(AU$m)
Net 
Income 
Discount 
(%)
DSCR LTV PD GD
All
Min 0 1 49,650 200 200 0 18 17.90 0 1.20 32.0% 1.16% 0% 20% 3.6 83.0% 1 8.0% 0.20
Max 350 7 1,008,603 1,880 1,660 22.9% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 3.50 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 100.0% 1.00
Average 75 4 349,805 760 672 11.0% 62.00 56.28 9.0% 2.14 45.1% 3.1% 37.5% 45.8% 7.8 97.2% 21 29.8% 0.47
Diversified
Min 1 3 97,316 265 228 7.3% 21.00 19.50 3.0% 1.29 32.0% 1.9% 17.9% 42.0% 3.6 91.3% 7 9.7% 0.32
Max 350 6 588,200 1,430 1,255 20.2% 123.87 107.80 13.4% 3.50 68.0% 4.4% 56.0% 67.0% 10.0 99.0% 25 60.2% 0.51
Average 62 4 284,666 688 606 12.0% 56.79 50.97 9.3% 2.10 46.1% 3.2% 39.5% 50.9% 7.1 97.0% 19 35.5% 0.40
Industrial
Min 5 1 500,844 454 399 3.0% 46.00 37.80 2.0% 1.46 33.0% 2.0% 24.2% 24.3% 4.1 94.0% 26 8.0% 0.48
Max 185 5 1,008,603 1,147 885 22.9% 92.26 84.10 17.8% 3.10 68.0% 3.3% 24.2% 25.0% 6.3 99.0% 39 14.0% 0.79
Average 60 3 787,841 808 701 12.2% 74.79 67.53 9.8% 2.40 42.6% 2.5% 24.2% 24.9% 5.4 97.6% 34 10.2% 0.63
Office
Min 10 1 49,650 495 473 4.4% 34.40 29.30 5.4% 1.28 32.0% 1.2% 13.3% 39.0% 4.1 83.0% 1 11.9% 0.26
Max 350 5 431,691 1,880 1,660 16.4% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 2.40 62.0% 3.4% 75.0% 79.9% 8.0 99.5% 21 100.0% 1.00
Average 133 3 310,142 1,220 1,084 10.9% 96.40 83.27 13.6% 2.04 41.0% 2.2% 44.3% 54.2% 5.7 96.4% 13 26.3% 0.49
Retail
Min 0 3 91,152 200 200 0.0% 17.90 17.90 0.0% 1.20 35.0% 2.0% 0.0% 20.1% 4.0 93.0% 2 11.0% 0.20
Max 240 7 533,343 1,380 1,100 20.3% 92.80 85.40 13.9% 3.30 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 64.0% 0.78
Average 61 5 189,845 524 468 0.10 41.76 39.06 5.9% 2.09 0.48 0.04 0.30 0.45 13.9 0.98 20 0.37 0.45
Diversity
Tenant/Lease Details
LF TA
No. of Assets
CQI TC WALE OR
Property Details Financial DetailsSector Issue  Issued 
Amount 
(A$m) 
Note 
Tenure 
(Years)
Total 
Lettable 
Area (m²)
Capital Value Net Income ($m) Gearing
LF: Liquidity Facility (% of stressed    
       value) 
 
WALE: Weighted Average Lease   
              Expiry (Years) 
 
TC: Tenancy Concentration (Top 5 tenants as %   
        of total gross income) 
PD: Property Diversity (% of portfolio value) 
CQI: Credit Quality of Income (% of  
         income from investment grade  tenants)         
 
OR: Occupancy Rate (%)  GD: Geographic Diversity Herfindahl Index TA: Total number of properties 
Source:  Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
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Appendix 5: Variable Scatter Plots 
 
Figure 1 CMBS Rating vs. LTV (Strong relationship) 
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Figure 2 CMBS Rating vs. DSCR (Weak relationship) 
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Figure 3 CMBS Rating vs. Issued Amount (No relationship) 
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Figure 4 CMBS Rating vs. Bond Tenure (No relationship) 
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Figure 5 CMBS Rating vs. Property Diversity (No relationship) 
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Figure 6 CMBS Rating vs. Geographical Diversity (No relationship) 
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Appendix 6: ANN Error Distribution 
Model 1 
Class # Cases # Errors % Errors 
AAA 59 4 6.78% 
AA 23 1 4.35% 
A 17 6 35.29% 
BBB 19 0 0.00% 
Total 118 11 9.32% 
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Model 2 
Class # Cases # Errors % Errors 
AAA 59 0 0.00% 
AA 23 2 8.70% 
A 17 6 35.29% 
BBB 19 1 5.26% 
Total 118 9 7.63% 
 
Model 3 
Class # Cases # Errors % Errors 
AAA 59 2 3.39% 
AA 23 3 13.04% 
A 17 5 29.41% 
BBB 19 1 5.26% 
Total 118 11 9.32% 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper investigates how property risk in Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (CMBS) issued between 2000 and 2005 can be assessed and reported in a 
more systematic and consistent approach to be easily understood by institutional 
investors. Adequate assessment of property risk and its reporting is critical to the 
success of CMBS issues. We adopt a framework of assessing property risk in CMBSs 
based on Adair and Hutchinson’s (2005) delineation of property risk.  Our framework 
shows that assessing and reporting property risk in Australian CMBSs, which are 
primarily backed by direct property assets, under the headings of investment quality 
risk, covenant strength risk, and depreciation and obsolescence risk can easily be 
done. Rating agencies can adopt a more systematic and consistent approach towards 
reporting of assessed property risk in CMBS. Issuers and institutional investors can 
examine the perceived consistency and appropriateness of the rating assigned to a 
CMBS issue by providing inferences concerning property risk assessment. 
 
Keywords: 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities; Property Risk; Loan-to-Value Ratio; Debt 
Service Coverage Ratio; Diversification 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is a creative arrangement for raising funds through 
the issuance of marketable securities backed by predictable future cash flows from 
revenue producing assets (2004a). In Australia, Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
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Securities (CMBS), a sub-class of ABS, are predominantly in the form of 
securitisation of direct property assets (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001). According to 
Henderson and ING Barings (1997) assets backing a securitisation are its fundamental 
credit strength. In the case of Australian CMBSs this involves looking at property 
backing these issues vis-à-vis property risk. There are four main areas of risk in 
securitisation, namely asset risk; cash flow risk; legal risk; and third party risk. 
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) state that the credit risk of a mortgage loan will 
depend on the characteristics of the underlying properties; the loan structure; loan-to-
value (LTV) and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR); the overall portfolio 
diversification; and other factors, such as the transaction structure, legal risk and 
servicing quality. They further state that the assigned rating is the relative risk of the 
collateral and its ability to generate income. Therefore, the ratings inform the public 
of the likelihood of an investor receiving the promised principal and interest payments 
associated with the bond issue (Shin & Han 2001). 
 
In this paper, property risk is delineated as in line with Adair and Hutchinson’s (2005) 
property risk scoring model. The key headings under this model are: 
 
 Market transparency risk; 
 Investment quality risk; 
 Covenant strength risk; and 
 Depreciation and obsolescence risk. 
 
However, of concern are the last three property risk parameters since market 
transparency risk is not an issue for the Australian property market. Australia is one of 
the most transparent property markets, ranked first together with the USA (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2006b) and has the most highly securitised commercial property market in the 
world (Hughes & Arissen 2005). Table 1 shows the placement of Australia on Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL) Global Transparency Index as at December 2006. JLL define 
transparency as “as any open and clearly organized real estate market operating in a 
legal and regulatory framework that is characterized by a consistent approach to the 
enforcement of rules and regulations and that respects private property rights”. They 
further add that “the ethical and professional standards of private sector advisors, 
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agents and brokers who are licensed to conduct business in each country have to be 
high”.  
 
Table 1: JLL Global Real Estate Transparency Index: 2006 
 
Highly transparent: 
Australia, US, New Zealand, Canada, UK, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Sweden, France, Singapore 
 
Transparent: 
Finland, Germany, South Africa, Denmark, Austria, Ireland, Belgium, Spain,  Switzerland, Norway, 
Italy, Malaysia, Japan, Portugal 
 
Semi-transparent: 
Mexico, Czech Republic, Hungary,  Poland, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea,  Slovakia, Chile, Greece, 
Russia, Philippines, Brazil, Slovenia, Thailand, Argentina, India 
 
Low transparency: 
China, Macau, UAE, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Turkey, Peru, Romania, Colombia, Uruguay, Saudi 
Arabia, Panama 
 
Opaque: 
Egypt, Venezuela, Vietnam 
 
Source: Jones Lang LaSalle (2006) 
 
According to Hughes and Arissen (2005), 30.2% of Australia’s investment-grade property was listed 
on the stock market and the share of listed property as a percentage of overall stock market was 10.7%, 
higher than any other country in the world (see Table 2).  
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Table 2: Global Levels of Securitised Property 
 
Country Percentage of property listed on 
stockmarket 
Percentage of stockmarket 
Australia 30.2% 10.7% 
Hong 
Kong/China 26.0% 5.5% 
Singapore 26.05 9.3% 
Luxembourg 12.5% 5.9% 
Sweden 9.9% 3.5% 
Canada 7.5% 2.6% 
US 7.2% 2.3% 
Netherlands 6.5% 3.4% 
New Zealand 5.6% 5.2% 
Austria 5.1% 4.6% 
UK 4.6% 1.7% 
Japan 4.2% 2.2% 
France 3.5% 1.6% 
Switzerland 3.1% 0.6% 
Spain 2.9% 1.7% 
Total 5.6% 2.3% 
 
Source: Hughes and Arissen (2005) 
 
The advantage of having a highly securitised property market is that investors have 
more publicly available information on property risk as a result of the listed property 
companies being legally bound to report their activities and underlying collateral 
performance to regulatory regimes such as ASX/ASIC and their equity investors. 
 
To date few studies have been done on Australia CMBSs outside the credit rating 
agency circles. These studies are predominantly practitioner focused (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2001; Richardson 2003; Roche 2000, 2002). Chikolwa (2007a), O’Sullivan 
(1998) and Simonovski (2003) are the only academic studies on CMBSs. Roche 
(2002) presents a model used by ABN AMRO to rank Australian CMBSs, whereas 
other studies all look at CMBS market structures and development. However, none of 
these studies have looked at property risk assessment within CMBSs. 
 
As such, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how property risk as assessed in 
Australian CMBSs over 2000-2005 can be clearly reported in a more concise and 
systematic approach; particularly focussing on assessment of investment quality risk, 
covenant strength risk, and depreciation and obsolescence risk. Other secondary risk 
factors such as legal risk relating to issues such insolvency and bankruptcy and third 
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party risk involving the credit rating of support parties such as security trustees, 
interest rate providers and liquidity facility providers, are not discussed in this paper. 
Common structural mechanisms have been set up to mitigate secondary risk in all 
CMBS issues. We refer readers to Standard and Poor’s, (2005c), Clayton UTZ (2003) 
and  Moody’s Investor Service (2003). The framework should prove useful to rating 
agencies, bond issuers and institutional investors. Rating agencies can adopt a more 
systematic and consistent approach towards reporting of assessed property risk in 
CMBS. Issuers and institutional investors can examine the perceived consistency and 
appropriateness of the rating assigned to a CMBS issue by providing inferences 
concerning property risk assessment. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the 
significance of risk assessment in property investments. Section 3 contains 
methodology and data.  Results and discussion are presented in section 4. Section 5 
presents a case study showing how property risk was assessed and adopted mitigating 
strategies. Finally, we conclude in section 6.  
 
2.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPERTY RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
There has been significant growth in the area of property risk research in both the 
valuation and investment realm from the year 2000. The debate for more property risk 
research started with the Mallinson Report (RICS 1994). One of the recommendations 
of this report was that common professional standards and methods should be 
developed for measuring and expressing valuation uncertainty.  Mallinson and French 
(2000) took this recommendation a step further by examining in-depth the reporting 
of uncertainty within valuation to the client. They proposed a statistical method to 
account for uncertainty in valuation reports. The Investment Property 
Forum/Investment Property Databank (2000; 2002) also highlighted the need for more 
rigorous risk assessment measures within the property profession. More specifically 
they concluded that a new approach was needed which combined conventional 
analysis of returns uncertainty with a more comprehensive survey of business risks.  
This debate was brought into sharper focus by the publication of the Carsberg Report 
(RICS 2002) , which emphasised the need for more acceptable methods of expressing 
uncertainty, particularly when pricing in thin markets where information is deficient. 
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Furthermore the debate on the reporting of risk was taken forward by The European 
Group of Valuers Association (TEGoVA) (2003) by the publication of the “European 
Property and Market Rating: A Valuer’s Guide”. The function of the rating system is 
to support risk, property, and loan analyses of portfolios in connection with 
securitisation, investment and disinvestment decisions and granting of property loans 
respectively. An earlier publication by TEGoVA (2002) entitled “European Mortgage 
Securitisation: A Valuer’s Guide” provided valuers with criteria for determination of 
the risk profile in the European mortgage-backed securities market. The International 
Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC) (2006c) has also published a white paper on 
guidelines for the valuation of property-backed securitised assets, with a call for 
comments on these guidelines. The thrust of the white paper is that these assets should 
be assessed on a discounted cash flow basis accounting for all risk factors. 
 
Lorenz et al (2006) show how rating and simulation approaches can be used in 
property valuation to address uncertainty and risk. Hutchinson et al (2005) develop a 
generic market model that can be used to risk score individual property investments 
utilising the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a multi-criteria decision making tool. 
Adair and Hutchinson (2005) examine risk analysis within investment decision-
making framework and the property industry and further explain how their property 
risk scoring framework can be applied. French and Gabrielli (2004; 2005) show the 
superiority of using simulations in property valuation to account for uncertainty. 
Despite attempts by these studies for better assessment of risk and uncertainty and 
their communication to clients, Lorenz (2006) and Joslin (2005) concede that the 
concept of uncertainty within property valuation is poorly understood and that it is 
rarely conveyed to clients in a coherent form. 
 
Further impetus for the explicit communication of risk in property has emerged more 
recently under the requirements of the Basel 2. The implications of Basel 2 are that 
banks must be more explicit about the risks of lending. As property constitutes a 
major source of such lending the identification, analysis and communication of the 
risks involved are becoming more important (The Economist 2005). 
 
Lorenz et at (2006) also report that confusion surrounds the terms risk and uncertainty 
within valuation literature because they are often used interchangeably and because 
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one can often be found within the description of the other. They do not offer a 
definition of risk but follow Chicken and Posner’s (1999) classification of the 
constituents of risk as shown below: 
 
    Risk = Hazard × Exposure 
 
Whereby hazard is the way in which a thing or situation can cause harm while 
exposure is the extent to which the likely receipt of the harm can be influenced by the 
hazard.  This is analogous to the perception of risk in CMBS in terms of the 
probability of default and severity of loss. The probability of default is measured 
through debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and severity of loss through loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio. Fabozzi and Jocob (1997) state that these are the main criterion used to 
quickly assess the risk of CMBS deals. The LTV is calculated by dividing the total 
amount of the notes issued by the current market value of all the properties. The 
DSCR is calculated by dividing the total net passing income of the properties by the 
debt-servicing amount. The debt-servicing amount is derived by multiplying credit 
rating agencies’ stressed interest rate assumption by the notes’ issuance amount. 
 
Credit rating agencies establish a stabilised net cash flow and an ‘assessed capital 
value’, which are used as the basis of the debt-sizing calculations. The appropriate 
LTV and DSCR are applied to those values. The capitalisation rate used to determine 
the ‘assessed capital value’ is a function of the risk and return of the asset, reflecting 
its age, quality, location, and competitive position within the market. 
 
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) state that the core of their analysis is the assessment 
of cash flows that will be available to service the debt during the term of the loans and 
for refinancing, if necessary. Sustainable cash flows are meant to represent the cash-
generating potential of a property looking through the real estate cycle. Underwriting 
at or near the peak is more likely to produce unsustainable incomes and capital values 
than underwriting at the bottom of the cycle. For instance, Fitch Ratings (1999) show 
that a rating of ‘A’ or higher should be have survived the early 1990’s Australian 
recession intact. Transactions rated lower than ‘A’ would suffer losses. At the peak of 
the recession in 1992, interest rates rose to 17% and commercial real estate market in 
Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide were severely hit. In general, net effective 
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rents on commercial properties decreased more than 50%, vacancy rates increased to 
more than 20%, and values dropped more than 50%. 
 
The study’s major contribution is offering a framework for assessing and 
communicating property risk for the success of the CMBS issues. As pointed out 
earlier, risk and uncertainty are poorly understood in property valuation and this may 
extend to CMBSs since property assets are the fundamental credit strength of 
Australian CMBSs.  CMBS investors are able to make informed decisions before 
investing in CMBSs on the premise that issuers and credit rating agencies have 
systematically and consistently assessed property risk before launching the issues and 
assigning credit ratings respectively. 
 
1.0 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
All the CMBSs issued over a six year period of 2000 to 2005 were obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s presale reports as found in their Ratings Direct database to 
identify and review how property risk factors were addressed in all issues and within 
specific property asset classes following the delineation of property risk by Adair and 
Hutchinson (2005). We compare and contrast property risk assessment by using 
various parameter averages within CMBS issues, across property sectors and other 
industry set standards over the assessment period. 
 
Our dataset comprised a total of 49 generic CMBSs (excluding credit lease and small 
ticket transactions) with a total of 135 tranches, worth over AU$10.3 billion.  Generic 
CMBSs27 account for 62% of all CMBS issuances (Standard & Poor's 2005a). Credit 
lease and small ticket transactions are not discussed in this paper. Table 3 presents a 
summary of aggregated details of all the Australian CMBSs issued from 2000 to 
2005; these account for nearly 69% of all CMBSs by worth. 
                                                 
27
 These are mainly single-borrower transactions. 
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Table 3: Summary of Australian CMBS (2000-2005) 
MV 
(AU$m)
S&P SV 
(AU$m)
CDV (%) NMI 
(AU$m)
S&P NI 
(AU$m)
NID 
(%)
DSCR LTV PD GD
All Min 0 1 49,650 200 200 0 18 17.90 0 1.20 32.0% 1.16% 0% 20% 3.6 83.0% 1 8.0% 0.20
Max 350 7 1,008,603 1,880 1,660 22.9% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 3.50 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 100.0% 1.00
Average 75 4 349,805 760 672 11.0% 62.00 56.28 9.0% 2.14 45.1% 3.1% 37.5% 45.8% 7.8 97.2% 21 29.8% 0.47
Diversified Min 1 3 97,316 265 228 7.3% 21.00 19.50 3.0% 1.29 32.0% 1.9% 17.9% 42.0% 3.6 91.3% 7 9.7% 0.32
Max 350 6 588,200 1,430 1,255 20.2% 123.87 107.80 13.4% 3.50 68.0% 4.4% 56.0% 67.0% 10.0 99.0% 25 60.2% 0.51
Average 62 4 284,666 688 606 12.0% 56.79 50.97 9.3% 2.10 46.1% 3.2% 39.5% 50.9% 7.1 97.0% 19 35.5% 0.40
Industrial Min 5 1 500,844 454 399 3.0% 46.00 37.80 2.0% 1.46 33.0% 2.0% 24.2% 24.3% 4.1 94.0% 26 8.0% 0.48
Max 185 5 1,008,603 1,147 885 22.9% 92.26 84.10 17.8% 3.10 68.0% 3.3% 24.2% 25.0% 6.3 99.0% 39 14.0% 0.79
Average 60 3 787,841 808 701 12.2% 74.79 67.53 9.8% 2.40 42.6% 2.5% 24.2% 24.9% 5.4 97.6% 34 10.2% 0.63
Office Min 10 1 49,650 495 473 4.4% 34.40 29.30 5.4% 1.28 32.0% 1.2% 13.3% 39.0% 4.1 83.0% 1 11.9% 0.26
Max 350 5 431,691 1,880 1,660 16.4% 142.20 120.30 22.5% 2.40 62.0% 3.4% 75.0% 79.9% 8.0 99.5% 21 100.0% 1.00
Average 133 3 310,142 1,220 1,084 10.9% 96.40 83.27 13.6% 2.04 41.0% 2.2% 44.3% 54.2% 5.7 96.4% 13 26.3% 0.49
Retail Min 0 3 91,152 200 200 0.0% 17.90 17.90 0.0% 1.20 35.0% 2.0% 0.0% 20.1% 4.0 93.0% 2 11.0% 0.20
Max 240 7 533,343 1,380 1,100 20.3% 92.80 85.40 13.9% 3.30 76.0% 13.3% 100.0% 100.0% 30.0 100.0% 101 64.0% 0.78
Average 61 5 189,845 524 468 0.10 41.76 39.06 5.9% 2.09 0.48 0.04 0.30 0.45 13.9 0.98 20 0.37 0.45
Property Details Financial DetailsSector Issue  Issued 
Amount 
(A$m) 
Note 
Tenure 
(Years)
TLA (m²) Capital Value Net Income ($m) Gearing Diversity
Tenant/Lease Details
LF TA
No. of Assets
CQI TC WALE OR
 
Key: LF: Liquidity Facility (% of stressed value) 
CQI: Credit Quality of Income (% of  income from 
investment grade  tenants)  
MV: Market Value 
S&P CV: Standard & Poor’s Stressed Value 
 
WALE: Weighted Average Lease   
              Expiry (Years)  
OR: Occupancy Rate (%) 
CDV: Capital Value Discount 
TLA: Total Lettable Area 
 
TC: Tenancy Concentration (Top 5 tenants as %  of 
total gross income)  
GD: Geographic Diversity Herfindahl Index 
S&P NI: Standard & Poor’s Net Income 
NID: Net Income Discount 
PD: Property Diversity (% of portfolio value)  
TA: Total number of properties 
DSCR: Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
LTV: Loan-to-Value Ratio 
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Over the study period, the peak issuance year was the year 2002 with 19 (38%) 
followed by the year 2003 at 14 (27%) issues. The years 2004 and 2005 had 
comparatively similar issuances at 7 (14%) and 8 (16%) respectively. The formative 
years of 2000 and 2001 had issues of 2 (1%) and 5 (4%) respectively. These figures 
are represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 1: Australian CMBS Issuance by Percentage (2000-2005) 
2000
4%
2002
38%
2003
27%
2004
14%
2005
16%
2001
1%
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale 
reports 
 
Figure 2 presents the CMBS issuance by sector over 2000 to 2005. Over this six year 
period, the most dominant CMBS issues have been in the office sector (AU$3.6 
billion), followed by the retail sector (AU$2.7 billion). The diversified sector28 and 
the industrial sector have had AU$2.6 billion and AU$1.4 billion worth of CMBS 
issuance respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 These are property portfolios composed of different property types. 
  330 
Figure 2: Australian CMBS Issuance by Sector Amounts (2000-2005) 
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Source: Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS 
presale reports 
 
 
Specific details obtained per CMBS issue were: 
 
 Total lettable area, capital values, and net income; 
 Gearing and transaction structure details; 
 Tenancy and lease details relating to the credit quality of tenants, tenant 
concentration, and lease expiry profiles; 
 Asset quality details relating to location, average age, condition, and tenancy 
retention; 
 Diversification and total number of assets backing the issues; and 
 Management profile of issuers. 
 
To further illustrate property risk assessment in CMBS issues, Multiplex CMBS Issuer 
Ltd. Series 2005-1 & 2005-2 are taken as case-study, with all publicly available data 
collected from credit rating agencies CMBS presale reports and the company’s 
website. The Multiplex CMBS issues were selected on account of being the largest 
and most recent during our study period. 
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4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The CMBS data collected as pointed out in Section 3 were analysed on an aggregated 
basis to compare property risk assessment within the various property sub-classes 
using our framework. The results of the analysis under the delineation of property risk 
are shown below. 
 
4.1 Investment Quality Risk 
 
Cross and Over Collateralisation 
 
Cross-collateralisation is a standard feature in Australian CMBS issues. Equity and 
cash flows from performing properties are available to support weaker properties, 
improving the probability of default and the recovery assumptions on the loan.  Large 
asset backing contributes to the attainment of a higher credit rating (Moody's Investor 
Service 2003). Lee (2007), among other authors, asserts that real estate portfolios with 
smaller number of properties have a higher volatility of portfolio returns than larger 
portfolios. Averages of 18 properties (285,000m²) backed diversified issues, whereas 
34 properties (788,000m²) backed industrial issues. Office property-backed issues had 
an average of 13 properties (310,000m²) with 20 properties (190,000m²) for retail 
property-backed issues.  
 
Overcollateralisation is achieved by the special purpose vehicle owning assets to a 
greater value than the funds it raises from investors or lenders (Henderson & ING 
Barings 1997). In case of default, the market value should be able to meet all loan 
repayments. However, credit rating agencies substantially discount market values and 
net income to arrive at their “stressed values” on a worst-case basis as pointed out in 
Section 2. Stressed values are the basis on which loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-
to-service coverage ratio (DSCR) are determined. These are the main criterion used to 
quickly assess credit risk of CMBS deals (Fabozzi & Jacob 1997). DSCR is the main 
driver of frequency of default, while LTV is the key factor for expected severity of 
loss.  LTV is calculated by dividing the total amount of the notes issued by the current 
market value of all the properties, while DSCR is calculated by dividing the total net 
passing income of the properties by the debt-servicing amount. The debt-servicing 
amount is derived by multiplying credit rating agencies’ stressed interest rate 
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assumption by the notes’ issuance amount. This offers ‘double-edged’ protection to 
investors as the LTV and DSCR are based on discounted values.  
 
On the basis of risk assessment of capital values and incomes between property asset 
classes, discounts applied as shown in Table 3 are investigated. Industrial property-
backed issues showed the highest average capital value discount (12.2%) followed by 
diversified property-backed issues (12%), office backed issues (10.9%) and retail 
property-backed issues (10.0%). A further look at the average net rent discount shows 
office backed issues had the highest discount (13.6%) followed by industrial property-
backed issues (9.8%), diversified property-backed issues (9.3%); and retail property-
backed issues (5.9%) had the lowest discount. These discounts can be used as proxies 
of portfolio composition and CMBSs that can be issued. For instance, a CMBS issue 
of AU$100 million needs to be backed by a portfolio value of AU$109 million at a 
market average discount of 10.9% in the case of office backed issues. 
 
These results show that the composition of a property portfolio backing an issue and 
the capital and rental discounts applied, considered the volatility of the of the various 
property sub-classes. Moody’s (2003) assert that volatility of property classes in 
Australia runs from the least being retail property, followed by industrial property, 
office property and lastly hotel property. 
 
Occupancy Rates 
 
Occupancy rates in all issues ranged between 83% and 100% way over industry 
averages. Retail property-backed issues had an average occupancy rate of 98% in line 
with the average national occupancy rates of 97%-98% followed by diversified and 
industrial property-backed issues which had 97% each. Office property-backed issues 
had an average occupancy rate of 96%, significantly above the average national 
occupancy rate of 92.5% as at December 2005 (Colonial First Estate Global Asset 
Management 2006). High occupancy rates mitigate the risk of rental loss due to 
vacancies.  
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Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratio and Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) 
 
As pointed out in Section 2, the risk and return profile of an asset reflects its age, 
quality, location, and competitive position within the market. These aspects are 
captured in the capitalisation rate adopted for property valuation. The ‘assessed 
capital value’ is the basis of the debt-sizing calculations of LTV and DSCR.  
 
The incidence of default rises with the LTV; that is, if all other factors are held 
constant, the probability of default for a loan increases as the LTV increases, but not 
equally. Unlike the LTV, where the probability of default increases as the LTV rises, 
the incidence of default is a decreasing function of the DSCR. However, the 
relationship between the DSCR and the probability of default is weaker than the 
relationship between the LTV and default. Table 4 shows composite ranges for both 
DSCR and LTV across all rating classes assigned during the study period. It should be 
noted that various rating classes have specific LTV and DSCR ranges. As we progress 
from the lower notes (BBB) to higher notes (AAA), LTV thresholds decrease and 
DSCR thresholds increase respectively.  Details of indicative LTV and DSCR 
threshold levels in various asset classes can be found in Standard and Poor’s (2003c) 
and Jones Lang LaSalle (2001). 
 
Table 4: LTV and DSCR Threshold in Australian CMBS Issues (2000-2005) 
 
Sector 
 
DSCR (times) LTV range 
(%)* 
Min Max Min Max 
Diversified 1.29 3.50 0.32 0.68 
Industrial 1.46 3.10 0.33 0.68 
Office 1.28 2.40 0.32 0.62 
Retail 1.20 3.30 0.35 0.76 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
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DSCR ranged from 1.28 to 3.1 for the industrial and office property-backed issues 
whereas retail property-backed issues had a slightly higher range of 1.2 to 3.3. As for 
LTV ratios, the highest range was again in the retail property-backed issues from 0.35 
to 0.76 with those backed by the diversified, industrial and office property-backed 
issues ranging from 0.32 to 0.62 as shown in Table 2. This confirms the earlier  
Moody’s Investor Service (2003) and Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) suppositions of 
retail properties having the least cash flow and asset value volatility and hence rating 
agencies assessing them at higher LTV and DSCR ranges. 
 
Liquidity Facility 
 
This covers interest shortfalls and amounts necessary to preserve and protect the 
mortgage collateral. The standard has been to allow for six months’ of note payments 
at the credit rating agency’s refinance constant for six months’ of transaction 
expenses.  Across all issues this ranged from 1.16% to 13.3% of S&P’s accessed 
capital values. Diversified property-backed issues had a range of 1.9%-4.38%; 
industrial property-backed issues ranged from 1.96%-3.34%; and office property-
backed issues from 1.16%-3.4%. The largest range was in the retail property-backed 
issues which had 2.0%-13.3%. 
 
A probable explanation for the high liquidity facility ranges in retail properties could 
be the higher need to continually maintain and update these assets in comparison to 
office and industrial properties. Further, retail properties and office properties have a 
larger number of tenants than in industrial properties which entails having larger 
allowances to mitigate rent payment delays.  
 
Overall Portfolio Diversity 
 
The diversity of a portfolio of assets will have an impact on the volatility of the pool’s 
expected loss. Diversity is examined by property type, geographic location, 
loan/property concentration and economic sector. By diversifying the mix of property 
types, one can mitigate a pool’s expected loss. Geographic diversity mitigates the risk 
of single market decline and may reduce any losses associated with this type of risk. 
Generally, loans secured by operational real estate such as hotel properties tend to 
have the highest default probability followed by unanchored retail properties and 
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office properties. Loans secured by anchored retail and industrial/warehouse 
properties have the lowest default levels (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001). Roche (2002) 
further expands this assertion by stating that diversity across property type is more 
valuable than geographic diversity because the market for investment grade in 
Australia is relatively small and values across cities for specific asset types, such as 
single tenanted, large office properties in secondary CBD or suburban locations, are 
highly correlated. Table 5 shows the current composition of securitised portfolios. 
 
Table 5: Current Composition of Property Portfolios 
 
Property Type 
Property Portfolios 
Diversified Industrial Office Retail 
Hotel √    
Cinema √   √ 
Car park √    
Warehouse/Distribution √ √   
Business/Office park √ √   
Industrial estate √ √   
Container park √    
Campus √    
Development site/Hi-tech √ √   
CBD A-grade offices √  √  
Non-CBD A-grade offices √  √  
Regional shopping centre    √ 
Sub-regional shopping 
centre 
   √ 
Neighbourhood shopping 
centre 
   √ 
Bulky goods retail centre    √ 
 
 
Following Hedander (2005) who used a diversity scoring system based on the 
Herfindahl Index to measure diversity on a geographic and property type 
concentration basis in Australian listed property trusts, we adopt a similar procedure 
to measure diversity in Australian CMBS portfolios. This index effectively converts a 
pool of CMBS issues of uneven size into a measurement of diversity, as if all issues 
were the same size. A totally focussed CMBS issue has an index equal to one, while 
the index for a diversified CMBS issue is closer to zero.  
 
The Herfindahl geographic region index (HHGR) for each respective CMBS issue is 
calculated as follows: 
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HHGR = ∑
=
8
1
2
)(
j
j
x
x
 
where  j = Geographic region: the states in Australia (New South 
Wales,  
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western 
Australia, Northern Territory, Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) and Tasmania, 
x j  = percentage of asset type in portfolio 
x  = total portfolio composition  
 
Of all the sector issues, diversified property-backed issues had the most geographical 
diversity with an average score of 0.40 followed by retail and office property-backed 
issues with scores of 0.45 and 0.49 respectively. Industrial property-backed issues had 
the least diversity with a score of 0.63. An explanation of this is that the eastern states 
of New South Wales and Victoria account for the bulk of Australia’s gross domestic 
product. Retail and office properties included in most issues are found in most states 
with little representation in Tasmania and Northern Territory. 
 
The Herfindahl property type index (HHPT) for each respective CMBS issue is 
calculated as follows: 
 
HHPT = ∑
=
6
1
2
)(
i
i
x
x
 
where  i = type of property: industrial, office, retail, hotel, car 
park, other 
xi  = percentage of asset type in portfolio 
x  = total portfolio composition  
 
Assessment for diversity by property type basis was only undertaken for the 
diversified property-backed sector, which had a score of 0.77.  Lack of adequate data 
was the reason for not assessing the retail, office and industrial sectors.  
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Another measure of diversity is the percentage of the largest property by value in 
relation to the whole portfolio value. A large single property value exposure has a 
negative impact on the portfolio in instances of default. The retail property-backed 
sector had the largest average single property value concentration at 37.5% due to the 
large size of the properties both on floor area basis and by market value. The least was 
the industrial sector at 10.2%. The diversified property-backed sector closely followed 
the retail property-backed sector at 35.5% whereas the office property-backed sector 
had an average of 26.3%. 
 
Details on HHGR, HHPT and property diversity are found in Table 3. 
 
4.2 Covenant Strength Risk 
 
Covenant strength risk is impacted through credit quality of income, the weighted 
average lease expiry profile (Yoon et al.), and tenancy concentration. A large 
percentage of income from investment grade tenants minimises the incidence of 
default whereas a lower diversity of tenants increases the incidence of default.  
 
Tenancy concentration is measured through the contribution of 5 or 10 top tenants’ 
contribution to total net income. The office sector had the highest percentage of the 5 
top tenants’ contribution to net income at an average of 54.2% and the least was the 
industrial sector at 24.9%. The diversified and retail sectors had averages of 50.9% 
and 45.0% respectively.  
 
As for credit quality of income which is measured by percentage of income from 
investment grade tenants, the same trend exhibited in tenancy concentration continues 
with office sector at 44.3%, diversified sector at 39.5%; retail sector at 30.5%; and 
industrial sector at 24.2% respectively. An explanation of this is that most office 
buildings included in CMBSs are prized-trophy properties occupied by large well 
established and often highly credit-rated firms. As for retail properties, apart from 
credit-rated anchor tenants such as the Woolworths group, Coles Mayer, David Jones, 
to name a few, the bulk of the tenants are small unrated specialties.   
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A higher weighted average lease expiry profile also lowers the incidence of default as 
there is a higher probability of rental receipt (Moody's Investor Service 2003). Nearly 
all issues had WALE profiles above the tenure of the issued notes, with the exception 
being the retail sector which has very long leases by some anchor tenants in excess of 
15 years. The diversified sector had average WALE profile of 7.0 years and the office 
and industrial sectors had 5.6 and 5.4 years respectively. 
 
4.3 Depreciation and Obsolescence Risk 
 
In all the issues depreciation and obsolescence risk is mitigated by the inclusion of 
maintenance and capital expenditure reserves. Sufficient and regular capital 
expenditure is necessary to ensure that collateral quality, occupancy and value are 
maximised. A capital expenditure reserve may be required to ensure sufficient funds 
are available to cover any major capital expenditure works during the life of the 
transaction. Capital expenditure requirements may also be addressed via a facility 
from an appropriately rated counterparty. There are no set rules as each transaction 
has different requirements depending upon the condition of the assets, the gearing 
levels, and the positioning of the asset in the market. Some of the parameters in place 
are lump sums over a certain period or percentages of the independent valuation of the 
"core" properties. 
 
2.0 CASE STUDY: MULTIPLEX CMBS ISSUER LTD. SERIES 2005-1&2 
 
Although the above analysis was conducted on an aggregated basis for comparison of 
property risk assessment across various property sub-classes, this analysis can be 
extended to compare property risk assessment between CMBS issues. In this section, 
the Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1&2 CMBS issues are presented as a 
case study of how property risk can be assessed and reported using our framework. 
 
5.1 Background 
 
In May 2005 Multiplex Property Trust announced the launch of a AU$1 billion 
CMBS issue to settle a significant portion of its bank debt. A substantial reduction in 
their cost of debt was also announced at a weighted average margin of 0.334% per 
annum (Multiplex Property Trust 2005).  The CMBS was in two series, with tranches 
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ranging from AAA through to BBB-. Series One had a scheduled maturity of three 
years and Series Two five years. The CMBS was secured by 17 properties located in 
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Canberra and Perth, with a combined fair market value 
of AU$1.7 billion. The two series have a generic transaction structure. In Figure 3 we 
show the transaction structure of Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2. 
 
Figure 3: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2 Transaction Structure 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2005a; 2005b) presale reports 
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5.2 Issue Details 
 
Details of the CMBS issues as shown in Table 6 were analysed using the property 
sub-class averages in Table 1 and other industry benchmarks to assess property risk. 
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Table 6: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1&2 
 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 
2005-1 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 
2005-2 
Issue Date: May 2005    May 2005    
Term-to-Maturity:  3 years    5 years    
Property Type: 8 Office Buildings 5 Retail (30.7%)* & 4 Office (69.3%)* 
Buildings 
Size:  245,323 m²    196,450 m²    
Aggregate Market Value: AU$931.7m    AU$803.5m    
Issue Size:  AU$537m    AU$463m    
Tranche:         
AAA AU$343m (40.6%) [2.03] 20bp AU$298m (40.5%) [2.01] 25bp 
AA AU$61m (47.8%) [1.73] 30bp AU$53m (47.7%) [1.70] 40bp 
A AU$54m (54.2%) [1.52] 40bp AU$39m (53.1%) [1.53] 50bp 
BBB AU$51m (60.2%) [1.37] 57bp AU$52m (60.1%) [1.35] 75bp 
BBB- AU$28m (63.5%) [1.30] 80bp AU$21m (63.0%) [1.29] 90bp 
Interest Type Floating    Floating    
Occupancy Rate 98%    93%    
Weighted Average 
Unexpired Lease Term:  
4.9 years    7.6 years    
Liquidity Facility:  AU$29.5m    AU$25.5m    
Refinance constant: 9.0%    9.0%    
Largest Tenant (% of Net 
Income): 
14%    17.9%    
Property Diversity 
(Largest single exposure): 
AU$200m or 21.48% of portfolio 
value 
AU$222.5m or 28% of portfolio value 
Net Income from Top 10 
Tenants:  
71%    54%    
Geographic Diversity:         
New South Wales 68%    57%    
Queensland 17%    22%    
Western Australia 15%    6%    
Victoria -    8%    
Australian Capital 
Territory 
-    7%    
Herfindahl property type 
index (HHPT): 
1.000    0.848    
Herfindahl geographic 
region index (HHGR): 
0.261    0.625    
 
*Per cent of aggregate market value. Loan-to-Value Ratios (in parenthesis) and Debt 
Service Coverage Ratios [in brackets]. Coupon rate at basis points (bp) plus 3 months 
bill swap rate  
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2005d; 2005e) and Fitch Ratings (2005a; 2005b) 
presale reports and author’s compilation 
 
 
 
 
 
  341 
5.3 Property Portfolio 
 
Portfolio composition of the two series is shown below and additional details are 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1&2 Property Portfolios 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 
Property Location Ownership Occupancy % of 
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
Goldfields House Sydney 100 98 21.46 200.00 
Jessie Street Centre Parramantta 100 100 19.32 180.00 
NRMA Centre Sydney 50 100 14.92 139.00 
AMP Place  Brisbane 100 87 12.29 114.50 
KPMG Tower Sydney 50 100 12.48 116.25 
Bank West Tower Perth 50 100 9.93 92.50 
Ernst & Young Building  Perth 100 93 5.06 47.20 
ANZ Centre Brisbane 50 100 4.54 42.20 
Total    100.00 931.65 
 
Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-2 
Property Location Ownership Occupancy % of  
Portfolio 
Market 
Value 
(AU$m) 
Ernst & Young Centre Sydney 50 88 27.7 222.50 
240 Queens Street Brisbane 100 98 15.9 127.50 
15 Blue Street Nth Sydney 100 100 10.8 87.00 
Defence Plaza Melbourne 100 100 8.1 65.00 
111 Alinga Street Canberra 100 96 6.8 55.00 
King Street Wharf Sydney 100 100 10.1 81.50 
Pittwater Place Sydney 100 86 8.0 64.0 
Great Western Super Centre Brisbane 100 96 6.4 51.0 
Carillon City Shopping Centre Perth 50 88 6.3 50.0 
Total    100.00 803.50 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2005d; 2005e)  
The portfolio details were used to arrive at geographic and property diversity factors, 
which were then compared with the sector averages in Table 3. 
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5.4 Property Risk Assessment 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the property risk assessment of Multiplex CMBS Issuer 
Ltd. Series 2005-1 CMBS issue as an example.  
 
Table 8: Property Risk Assessment in Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 
Property Risk Criteria Mitigating Strategy Comments 
Investment Quality:   
Cross collateralisation 8 office buildings  Reduced risk of default as each of the properties 
support each other in instances of poor 
performance. Though the portfolio composition is 
less than the sub-sector average for 2000-2005 of 
13, the portfolio’s net income is higher than the 
sub-sector average by 35%. 
 
Over collateralisation Aggregated market value of 
AU$931.7m vs. total loan value of 
AU$537m 
The total property value would have to fall under 
42% to result in non-payment of principal. 
Property yields forecast to compress further 
during loan period (2005-2010) due to the high 
demand for ‘prized trophy’ properties and will 
result in growth in property values. 
 
Occupancy rate 98% Well above national average of 91.5% as at 
January 2005 for CBD offices and the sub-sector 
average for 2000-2005 of 96.4%. 
 
Tenancy Retention 87% MPT have shown ability to actively manage lease 
renewals. 
 
LTV (AAA notes) 40.6% Below the Australian rating parameter for 
commercial offices of 45% 
 
DSCR (AAA notes) 2.03 Above the Australian DSCR rating parameter for 
commercial offices of 2.00. Rental growth 
projected to grow at about 3% over loan period 
guaranteeing coupon payment. 
 
Liquidity Facility AU$29.5m or 5.49% of issued debt Adequate coverage of six months’ of note 
payments and transaction expenses. The sub-
sector average for 2000-2005 was 2.2%. 
 
Portfolio Diversification:   
- Asset Type (HHPT) 1 Highly focussed portfolio.  
 
-  Property 21.48% of portfolio value Single property value risk mitigated by ‘prized-
trophy’status of property. 
 
- Geographic (HHGR) 0.26 Well below the sub-sector average for 2000-2005 
of 0.49. 
Covenant Strength:   
Credit Quality of Income 71.4% Low risk of rental default due to the high 
percentage of credit rated tenants. Sub-sector 
average for 2000-2005 is 44.3%. 
 
Weighted Average Lease Expiry  4.9 years 1.9 years above loan maturity, added certainty of 
rental income receipt but falls short of the sub-
sector average for 2000-2005 is 5.7 years. 
 
Tenancy Concentration 14% Well diversified rental income sources. Very 
favourable in comparison to the sub-sector 
average for 2000-2005 of 54.2%. 
 
Depreciation and Obsolescence: Guarantee to maintain assets to 
investment quality standards 
Limited capital expenditure requirements over the 
medium term as assets are relatively new. 
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It has been shown that property risk in Multiplex CMBS Issuer Ltd. Series 2005-1 can 
be easily compared with set benchmarks and reported using our framework. This is of 
benefit to guaranteeing investors of their promised principal and interest payments. 
Other transaction structure features, though not subject of discussion in this paper, 
such as insurance for full reinstatement, along with public liability and business 
interruption/loss of rental, borrower collection accounts, interest rate swap provision 
and tail periods of 18 months to cover refinancing risk further reinforce this. 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The success of Australian CMBSs can largely be attributed to high property market 
transparency and well developed securitisation market. These features and the 
dominance of issuance by LPTs have contributed to greater assessment and reporting 
of property risk in CMBSs. However, this has to be done in a more systematic and 
consistent approach as shown by our property risk assessment and reporting 
framework. The dominance of CMBSs issuance by LPTs who legally have to report 
their activities and underlying collateral performance to regulatory regimes such as 
ASX/ASIC and their equity investors ensures availability of public information on 
property risk.  
 
Over the study period 2000-2005, investment risk was minimised by composing well 
diversified portfolios of mainly ‘prized-trophy’ properties as well as utilising 
conservative loan-to-value ratios and high debt-service-coverage ratios. Weighted 
average lease expiry profiles in excess of the tenure of the issued notes, adequate 
tenant concentrations, and ample income from investment-grade tenants, all mitigated 
covenant strength risk. As for depreciation and obsolescence risk, no standard feature 
were set though all issues provide for maintenance and capital expenditure reserves to 
maximise collateral quality, occupancy and value. This information can be used to 
benchmark property risk assessment and reporting in individual CMBS issues. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper explores the development of the Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (CMBS) market from 1999 to 2006 and outlines similarities and 
dissimilarities with United States (US) and European (EU) CMBS markets. Whilst the 
US has been the market leader in terms of issuance volumes and diversity of asset 
classes backing the issues, the other two regions have not lagged far behind and have 
replicated the US CMBS model to suit their local needs. In comparison to the much 
bigger US and EU CMBS markets, the Australian CMBS market is well matured as 
seen by the diversity of asset classes backing the issues and transaction types, 
tightening spreads, and record issuance volumes. Furthermore, the strong 
commercial real estate market outlook supports further CMBS issuance, with Listed 
Property Trusts (LPTs) continuing their dominance as issuers. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Australia the description of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) has 
been expanded and accepted in the market to include a form of securitisation of direct 
property assets (Jones Lang LaSalle 2001), in addition to the traditional definition of 
the securitisation of commercial mortgages (Jacob and Fabozzi, 2003). The 
Australian Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) market has been one of 
the most dynamic and fastest-growing capital market sector in the last few years 
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(Richardson 2003). The market has undergone significant development since the first 
transactions came to the market in 1999, with a range of transaction types and issuers 
now accessing the market. The first CMBSs in Australia were done by Leda Holdings 
in 1999, the Longreach/Qantas head office securitisation and the David Jones flagship 
stores deals in 2000.  To date a total of over 60 CMBSs, with nearly 180 tranches 
totalling over AU$17.4 billion have been issued. 
 
The growth of the CMBS market as a funding source and as an investment option is 
attributable to its advantages of lower pricing, improved liquidities, diversification on 
lenders, non-recourse to the parent company, release of value while retaining future 
growth potential, and off-balance sheet financing in comparison to bank financing. 
Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) illustrated the potential of CMBSs being a cheaper and 
alternative debt financing option for companies with property exposure. They further 
added that CMBSs offered investors advantages of insolvency remoteness, greater 
diversification, and greater transparency. Roche (2000), Blundell (2001) and 
Morrison (2001) also stated the advantages of CMBS over traditional bank financing 
as including cost effectiveness, flexible arrangement, and longer repayment 
timeframes that closely match the long-term nature of property investment. The 
Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) also noted that increased supply of CMBS, with a 
range of subordination, has broadened the investor base in real estate debt markets 
and reduced the commercial property sector’s dependence on bank financing. 
 
In Australia, the growth of the CMBS market is linked to that of Listed Property 
Trusts (LPT). The single-purpose-vehicle-like characteristics of LPTs have helped in 
their establishment as major players in the CMBS market. LPTs continue to be the 
mainstay of the Australian CMBS market, with 65% of issuance market share. If 
wholesale funds are included, this figure increases to 75% (Standard & Poor's 
2005b). Draffin (2002) attributed the strong interest in CMBS issuance from LPTs to 
the ability to achieve AAA rating matched by strong investor demand; the cost 
effectiveness of CMBS debt relative to traditional forms of property finance; and the 
potential flexibility afforded by structured CMBS debt. Many LPTs used equity 
capital to fuel growth and expansion during the mid-1990’s, but later switched to debt 
financing in 1997 when the RBA cut interest rates in the second half of 1996, which 
made debt financing a cheaper option to equity capital (Kavanagh 1997). Jones Jang 
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LaSalle (2001) predicted the rise of LPT CMBSs on the premise that they had AU$16 
billion debt, of which 50% was bank debt. Between 2001 and 2004, LPTs issued 
CMBSs worth over AU$3.7 billion via 27 issues (eg: Mirvac, Macquarie Goodman 
Industrial, ING Office, ING Industrial, Investa, Macquarie Office) and bonds worth 
over $AU4.8 billion via 40 issues (eg: Gandel, Commonwealth Property, GPT, 
Stockland, Westfield) (Newell & Tan 2005).  
 
This increased participation in CMBS issuance can also be partly attributed to the 
high demand by institutional investors, mainly superannuation funds, for shares and 
bonds issued by LPTs in comparison to investing in direct property. The total 
contribution of asset allocation by Australian superannuation funds to property (both 
direct and indirect) declined from 17% in 1988 to 9% in 2000-2002, though the 
contribution of indirect property increased from 3% to 7% over the same period 
(InTech 2003). In 2005, 95% of superannuation funds had a specific allocation to 
property (either direct or indirect) averaging 10% (Newell 2006b). The introduction 
of compulsory superannuation in 1992 saw superannuation funds increase their total 
assets from only AU$36 billion in June 1984 and AU$238 billion in June 2005 to 
AU$946 in September 2006 (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2006). Their 
growth has been underpinned by strong investment returns and new contributions.  
With the drop in public bond issuance, bonds and CMBSs issued by LPT have been 
an attractive investment option for superannuation funds. Outstanding government 
securities fell from AU$130 billion in 1999 to AU$112 billion at the end of 2006. On 
the contrary, outstanding amounts for other debt securities; in particular asset backed 
securities29 increased from AU$17.5 billion to AU$104 billion over the same period. 
Figure 1 shows outstanding debt securities from 1999 to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 These include commercial mortgage-backed securities 
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Figure 1: Outstanding Debt Securities (1999-2006) 
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Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2007) 
 
On a global level, the CMBS market increase is linked to the United States (US) 
market. For the 1999 to 2006 period, CMBSs totalling over AU $977 billion (US$770 
billion)30 had been issued in the US compared to AU$367 billion (US$289 billion) 
for the rest of the world. Please see Figure 2. Industry data show that in 2006 issuance 
of commercial CMBS in the US was around AU$261 billion (US$206 billion), a 22% 
increase over the previous year, and non-US issues were billion AU$118 (US$93 
billion), representing an increase of 34% over the 2005 period (Commercial 
Mortgage Alert 2007). There was strong activity in Europe (EU) in 2006, where 
around billion AU$108 billion (€64.75 billion) of CMBS were issued in 2005, with 
around three quarters of this amount issued in the United Kingdom (UK). In 2006, 
AU$4.9 billion of newly rated notes were issued in Australia, an increase of 38% on 
the previous year (Standard & Poor's 2007c). 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 For ease of comparison, the interbank exchange rates of US$1=AU$1.27 and EUR€1=AU$1.67 as at December 31, 2006 have 
been used. 
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Figure 2: CMBS Global Issuance (1999-2006) 
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Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert (2007) 
 
The 2006 CMBS issuance of AU$261 billion (US$206 billion) in the US, AU$108 
billion (€64.75 billion) in the EU and AU$4.9 billion in Australia, represents 40%, 
12% and 7% respectively of the overall securitisation markets in these regions 
(Standard & Poor's 2007b; 2007c). Although these percentages appear to be low 
except for the US, CMBSs are seen as a good source of funding by issuers and as a 
good investment option by investors. 
 
As such, given the rapid growth of the Australian CMBS market, the purpose of this 
paper is to retrace this growth and compare it with that of US and the EU; particularly 
focussing on market structure and issues details. Furthermore, the paper presents a 
future outlook of the Australian CMBS market. 
 
2.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BACKED 
SECURITIES 
 
The significance of the CMBS market is best illustrated by looking at developments 
in the bigger US and EU markets. Comparing with developments in the US and EU 
markets aids the analysis of how the Australian CMBS market has evolved.  
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2.1 US CMBS Market 
The US has been leading the way in global issuance of CMBSs. For the period 1990 
to 2006, CMBSs totalling over AU$1257 billion (US$990.7 billion) had been issued 
in the US. Figure 3 shows the total amount of CMBS issuance per year since 1990. 
 
Figure 3: US CMBS Issuance (1990-2006) 
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Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert 
 
US CMBS issuance rose from AU$4.3 billion (US$3.4 billion) in 1990 to AU$261 
billion ($US$206 billion) in 2006. As of the second quarter of 2005, there was 
AU$596 billion ($470 billion) worth of CMBS outstanding in the US market, 
representing around 40% of the overall asset-backed securities market and around 
20% of the overall commercial loan market. 
 
Figure 4 shows market size of commercial and multifamily securitisations ($720 
billion) with that of REITs ($438 billion market cap), Microsoft ($274 billion market 
cap on the New York Stock Exchange) and the GDP of Australia ($720 billion).  The 
$720 billion worth of commercial and multifamily securitisations outstanding only 
represents about 26% of commercial and multifamily mortgages that have been 
issued (Figure 5). This further shows the growth potential of this investment class. 
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Figure 4: Market Comparison (as of December 31, 2006) 
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Figure 5: Market Comparison (as of September 30, 2006) 
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According to Commercial Mortgage Alert (2007), retail collateral has commanded 
roughly a 25% share of issues by value for several years. The multi-family sector has 
declined in its share as office properties have increased in importance. The industrial 
and hotel property types have retained relatively small, but significant shares. 
 
Since 1993 the proportion of issues carrying triple-A ratings has increased steadily, 
largely as a result of a number of improvements throughout the CMBS market. 
Originators and issuers have improved underwriting, documentation, and marketing, 
which have helped to improve the average loan quality. Rating agencies have 
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improved the rating process with more sophisticated models incorporating more 
historical performance data, thereby providing a better guidance on risk. Property 
market fundamentals have remained healthy; and the market for CMBS has 
deepened, particularly for highly rated securities such as triple A rated CMBS, 
encouraging an increase in their supply. This trend is also driven in part by the 
shallow market for lowest grade CMBS tranches31, a chronic condition that exerts 
significant influence on both the public and private real estate debt markets. 
 
The last three years (2004-2006) have seen a predominance issuance of floating rate 
notes. In 2006 81% of the issues were floating rate notes representing an increase of 
1.2 % and 4.9% over 2005 and 2004 respectively. 
 
The US CMBS market is dominated by conduit/fusion transactions32. In 2006 they 
accounted for 88% of the outstanding CMBS issuance, and the large loan deals for 
the remaining 12% (Standard & Poor's 2006e). For analytical purposes, re-REMICS, 
CRE CDOs, and corporate-dependant deals have been included in the above two 
categories due to their special collateral characteristics.  
 
Conduit transactions have had strong investor appeal has evidenced by contraction in 
spreads. Figure 7 shows the 10-year fixed conduit spreads between 1996 and 2006. 
The earlier years saw upward movements in annual average spreads of between 44 
basis points (bp), and 53 bp, with the exception being 1998 which recorded a high of 
111 bp. However, after 2001 there has been a fall from a high of 53 bp to just less 
than 30 bp as at the end of 2006 (Commercial Mortgage Alert 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Tranching involves issuance of several classes of securities against a pool of assets, each with distinct risk-return profiles. 
32
 CMBS backed by reasonably large, well diversified pools of small-to medium-sized and large-sized secured property loans. 
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Figure 6: 10-Year Fixed Conduit Spreads and 10-Year Treasury Rate 
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Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert 
 
According to Fitch Ratings (2007d) by the end of 2006, the ratio of upgrades to 
downgrades was 34:1 (the highest ratio for structured finance products). Of the nearly 
5000 CMBS deals they rated, the surveillance group upgraded 1,781 tranches and 
downgraded 52. Credit rating upgrades depict mainly an improvement in the 
performance of the underlying asset backing a CMBS issue and downgrades the 
opposite. 
 
2.2 EU CMBS Market 
EU CMBS issuance in 2006 was AU$108 billion (€64.75 billion), an increase of 39% 
on 2005 levels. The number of transactions increased to 80, from 64 (Standard & 
Poor's 2007b). Between 1997 and 2004, more than AU$129 billion (€77 billion) was 
raised from 124 transactions. Figure 7 shows and historical overview of annual 
issuance.  
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Figure 7: EU CMBS Issuance 1995 – 2006 
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The UK has been traditionally the dominant jurisdiction in EU CMBS issuance, 
accounting for 74% in 2004. Germany is rapidly catching up, with multifamily deals 
making up 23% of all CMBS and 29% of conduit deals in 2006 (Structured Finance 
International 2006). 
 
In terms of asset composition, office and retail properties continued to form the 
dominant collateral security in 2006 at 31% and 28%, respectively. The residential 
sector emerged as a leading collateral security in 2006, mainly driven by 
securitisations of loans secured by German multifamily portfolios; it increased from 
15% in 2005 to 23% in 2006 (Moody's Investor Service 2007a).  
 
By 2005 EU CMBS issuance was largely in the AAA rating category with 60% of the 
total and AU$7.5 billion (€4.5 billion) worth of non-investment grade CMBS issued 
from 2000. 
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Vresen (2005) points out that the majority of EU CMBS issuance from 2000 to Q1 
2005 were floating notes averaging at 73%.  
 
No single transaction type made up a majority issuance mainly due to a wide range of 
legal structures to accommodate each of the transaction types. However, the single 
largest transaction type was the single-borrower single-property transaction with 28% 
of the total issuance to the end of 2004. Together with the single borrower and multi 
borrower property categories made up 605 ( 68.8%) of the 879 issues as at end of 
2005 (Vresen 2005).  
 
EU CMBS transactions are generally grouped into three segments: true-sale single 
borrower33, true-sale multiple borrower34, and synthetic transactions35. Figure 8 
shows the dominance of true-sale transactions form 1999-2004. True-sale multiple 
borrower transactions comprised 68% and 42.3% of all true-sale transaction in 2003 
and 2004 respectively (Moody's Investor Service 2005).  
 
Figure 8: EU CMBS Volume by Structure Category (1999-2004) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Moody’s Investor Service EU CMBS 
Year-end and Outlook Reports 
 
                                                 
33
 True-sale borrower (single property, multiple-property, liquidating pool, credit tenant lease) 
34
 True-sale multiple borrower (single property and multiple property) 
35
 Synthetic transactions are typically funded through the sale of credit linked notes  
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Spreads tightened by approximately 60% in the last three quarters of 2004. In July 
2004 the market saw AA spreads at around 40 bp, with two recent first quarter 2005 
transactions closing at 17 bp for the AAA classes. This implied a 57.5% tightening in 
AAA over the last three quarters. Furthermore, the BBB class saw spreads at 200 bp 
in July and in the first quarter of 2005 at around 75%. This implied a 62.5% 
tightening at BB over the last three quarters. As a result, the difference between AAA 
and BBB spreads narrowed from 160 bp to only 58 bp, a 64% reduction (Vresen 
2005). Obviously, lower spreads mean that bond investors are not being compensated 
as they were for similar risk. On the other hand, it also means that costs of funds for 
originators and borrowers are lower, making CMBS even more attractive as a 
financing source. 
 
According to Vresen (2005), EU CMBS showed the best upgrade performance in 
2004 of any major EU ABS sector, with 7.6% of the ratings being upgraded. This 
compares with an average upgrade in EU ABS of 4.5%. The 2004 CMBS 
downgrade-to-upgrade ration was 0.4, just behind residential mortgage backed 
securities and consumer ABS, both which saw downgrades in 2004. Moody’s 
(2007b) reported 2006 EU CMBS upgrades at 8% and downgrades at 2.1%. 
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
All CMBS presale reports from 1999 to 2006 as found in Standard and Poor’s 
Ratings Direct database were assessed. During this period, a total of 65 issues with 
over 180 tranches, worth over AU$14.8 billion were issued; this represents 100% of 
all the CMBS issued to 2006, excluding credit lease and small ticket transactions. 
These generic CMBSs which are single-borrower and multi-borrower transactions 
accounted for 62% of all the CMBS issuances in 2005 (Standard & Poor's 2005a). 
Credit lease and small ticket transactions are not discussed in this paper. Tables 1 and 
2 show some of the major CMBS issues and some of the major properties in the 
portfolios backing these issues respectively. 
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Table 1: Major Australian CMBS Issues 
No. Issue 
Date 
Sector Issue Transaction 
Type 
S&P 
Rating 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$m) 
Coupon 
Type 
Coupon/
BBSW+ 
Scheduled 
Maturity 
DSCR** LTV** Security 
1 Apr-
01 
Office CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Single-
borrower 
single-
property 
 
Aaa* 150 Floating 41 Mar-06 2.0 32% ABN AMRO Office Tower with a total 
portfolio value of AU$713 million 
2 
  
Jun-
01 
  
Diversified 
  
Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd - Series 
2001-1 
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AAA 
150 
350 
Fixed 
Floating 
6.50% 
41 
Jun-06 
Jun-06 
2.2 
2.2 
40% 
40% 
25 modern, investment-grade buildings 
in the office, hotel, retail, industrial & 
carpark sectors with a total portfolio 
value of AU$1,430 million 
3 
  
Feb-
02 
  
Office 
  
ING Office Finance Pty Ltd 
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
 
AAA 
AAA 
230 
178 
Fixed 
Floating 
6.25% 
40 
Feb-07 
Feb-07 
2.4 
2.4 
39% 
39% 
18 commercial office properties with a 
total portfolio value of AU$1,215 million 
25 retail, office, industrial, cinema and 
car park properties with a total portfolio 
value of AU$798 million 
  
  
  
  
 
4 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Jun-
02 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Diversified 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Challenger Capital Markets Ltd 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Multi-
borrower 
multi-
property 
AAA 
AAA 
A 
A 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB 
NR 
100 
120 
61 
54 
55 
17 
10 
99 
Fixed 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
6.00% 
40 
6.50% 
80 
100 
6.75% 
130 
P 
Jun-05 
Jun-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
Jul-05 
2.7 
2.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
2.7 
32% 
32% 
48% 
48% 
56% 
60% 
60% 
32% 
  
101 pub assets with a total portfolio 
value of AU$562 million 
  
  
  
5 
  
  
  
  
Nov-
03 
  
  
  
  
Retail 
  
  
  
  
ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - 
Series 1 
  
  
  
  
Whole-
business  
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AA 
100 
110 
45 
35 
40 
Fixed 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
6.60% 
47 
90 
120 
67 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
Nov-08 
3.1 
3.1 
2.2 
1.8 
2.6 
43% 
43% 
60% 
71% 
51% 
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No. Issue 
Date 
Sector Issue Transaction 
Type 
S&P 
Rating 
Issued 
Amount 
(AU$m) 
Coupon 
Type 
Coupon/
BBSW+ 
Scheduled 
Maturity 
DSCR** LTV** Security 
6 
  
  
  
 
May-
05 
  
  
 
Office 
  
  
  
  
Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 
2005-1 
  
  
 
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
343 
61 
54 
51 
28 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
20 
30 
40 
57 
80 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
May-08 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
40% 
47% 
53% 
59% 
62% 
8 commercial properties with a total 
portfolio value of AU$932 million 
  
  
  
7 
  
  
  
May-
05 
  
  
  
Diversified 
  
  
  
Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 
2005-2 
  
  
  
       
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
298 
53 
39 
52 
21 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
25 
40 
50 
75 
90 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
May-10 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
40% 
47% 
52% 
59% 
62% 
5 commercial and 4 retail properties with 
a total portfolio value of AU$804 million 
  
  
  
  
8 
  
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
  
Office 
  
  
  
  
Series MCWF 2006-1 
  
  
  
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
320 
50 
25 
30 
15 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
19 
23 
27 
47 
57 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
Jun-11 
1.8 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
44% 
51% 
54% 
58% 
60% 
52 retail centres with a total portfolio 
value of AU$802 million 
  
  
9 
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
Office 
  
  
  
WOT CMBS Pty Ltd Series 1 
  
  
  
Single-
borrower 
multi-
property 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
320 
45 
90 
50 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
Floating 
26 
31 
41 
61 
May-11 
May-11 
May-11 
May-11 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
2 office buildings, 1 retail building and 1 
university building with a total portfolio 
value of AU$ 
  
  
Conduit 10 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Dec-
06 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Retail 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Centro Shopping Centre Securities 
- CMBS Series 2006-1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
AAA 
AAA 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BBB- 
250 
300 
170 
37 
62 
53 
28 
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
Floating  
19 
24 
18 
28 
40 
65 
85 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
N/K 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
43% 
43% 
43% 
45% 
49% 
52% 
54% 
13  mortgage facilities secured against 47 
retail properties and 1 retail distribution 
centre with a total portfolio value of 
AU$1,580 million 
  
  
  
  
 
N/K: Not Known 
Source: Author’s compilation from various Standard and Poor’s CMBS presale reports 
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Table 2: Major Properties in Australian CMBS Issues 
 Sector 
 
Issue Date of 
Issue 
Major Property in Issue Property 
Value 
(AU$ m) 
Office CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds Apr-01 ABN AMRO Tower $495 
Office Deutsche Office Finance 2004-
CMBS Trust 
May-04 Governor Phillip Tower and 
Governor Macquarie Tower, 
Sydney NSW 
$478 
Retail/Office/Hotel Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 2005-1 Apr-05 Collins Place, 25-55 Collins 
Street, Melbourne VIC 
$425 
Retail Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 2003-1 Oct-03 Southland, VIC $350 
Office Mirvac Capital Pty Ltd Jun-01 The Optus Centre, Miller St NSW  $330 
Retail Deutsche Office Finance 2004-
CMBS Trust 
May-04 Southgate Complex, Melbourne 
VIC 
$316 
Retail Centro Shopping Centre 
Securities Limited - CMBS Series 
2006-1 
Jun-06 Centro Galleria, WA (50%) & 
Centro Goulburn, NSW (50%) 
$299 
Retail Quay 62 Pty Ltd Series 2003-1 Oct-03 Pacific Fair, Broadbeach $292 
Industrial Deutsche Industrial Finance 2002 
- CMBS Trust 
Dec-02 DB Office Park, North Ryde NSW $103 
Industrial Macquarie Goodman Industrial 
Finance Pty Ltd. 
Nov-01 City West Office Park, Pyrmont 
NSW 
$93 
 
 
Specific details obtained per CMBS issue were on issue size, underlying collateral, 
rating tranche distributions, interest rate types and transaction types. Details on 
CMBS market size, spread trends, and performance of the issues were obtained from 
other secondary sources. All these were used to assess how the market had developed 
and to compare and contrast with that of the US and EU. A cogent review and 
explanation of these features will help to understand the changing nature of the 
Australian CMBS market. Using the historical approach, a researcher endeavours to 
record and understand events of the past. In turn, interpretations of recorded history 
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hold to provide better understanding of the present and suggest possible future 
directions (Baumgarter & Hensley 2005). 
 
4.0 ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 
BACKED SECURITIES 
 
The overall cumulative Australian CMBS issuance since 1999 reached AU$17.5 
billion at the end of 2006. In 2006 a record number of new issuances exceeding 
AU$4.9 billion were issued, passing the earlier issuance record year of 2002 (AU$3.7 
billion)(Standard & Poor's 2007c). The years 2003 and 2005 produced stable 
issuances of over AU$2 billion per year. In 2004 there was a slight fall in issuances to 
AU$1.6 billion. Figure 9 shows the volumes of CMBS issuance since 1999 in dollar 
amount and number of issues per annum. It also shows the size of the CMBS issues 
in relation to the overall asset backed securities market. The total ABS issuance in the 
year 2006 was AU$70 billion, of which the CMBS sub-market accounted for 7%. 
This represents a significant leap from 2% of the $14.4 billion ABS total issuance in 
1999 (Fitch Ratings 2007b). 
 
Figure 9: Australian Annual ABS/MBS/CMBS Issuance Volumes 
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Source: Standard and Poor’s(2006a) 
 
The last three years has seen average number of issues of eight which is lower than 
the record number of issuances of fourteen in 2002. However, the size of issues has 
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been increasing. For instance, all the new issues in 2006 each had a combined tranche 
value of over AU$400 million. Furthermore, the last two years have seen record issue 
sizes with AU$1 billion for Multiplex MPT CMBS Series 2005-1&2 in 2005 and 
AU$900 million for Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS Series 2006-1 in 
2006. 
 
Figure 10 presents CMBS issuance by sector from 2000 to 2006, excluding credit 
lease and small ticket transactions. Over this six year period, the most dominant 
CMBS issues have been in the office sector (AU$5.2 billion), followed by the retail 
sector (AU$4.5 billion). The diversified sector and the industrial sector have had 
AU$3.4 billion and AU$1.4 billion worth of CMBS issuance respectively.  
 
Figure 10: Australian CMBS Issuance by Sector (2000-2006) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
Over 2000-2006, diversified backed issues had the most tranches at 31%, followed by 
retail backed issues at 28% and office at 23%. The least number of tranches were in 
the industrial backed issues at 18%. This is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Number of Tranches in Australian CMBS Issues (2000-2006) 
 
Sector  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2000-2006 % of Total 
Diversified 1 2 11 7 7 14 13 55 31% 
Industrial 4 3 6 12 4 3 0 32 18% 
Office 0 3 4 5 9 10 11 42 23% 
Retail 0 0 15 9 0 8 18 50 28% 
Total 5 8 36 33 20 35 42 179 100% 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Standard and Poor’s presale reports 
 
Majority of the tranches have been A-class rated though lower B-class tranches are 
becoming common as well (Figure 11). This shows the growth/maturing of the 
market, increased acceptance of the investment asset and the increased participation 
of more knowledgeable investors. 
 
Figure 11: Australian CMBS Issuance by Tranche Type and Amount (1998-2006) 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (Standard & Poor's 2006a) 
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A combination of both fixed-interest and floating-rate notes have been issued to 
attract a broad spectrum of investors. In the earlier year floating rate notes and fixed 
rate notes were issued in equal proportions. However, the last few years have been 
predominated by floating rate notes. For instance, in 2005, 68% were floating rate 
notes in comparison to 32% fixed rate notes. 
 
Majority of the issues are in the single borrower multi-property category with over 
95% of the total issuance to date. The CPIT 2006 Aurora Bonds CMBS issued in 
April 2001 is the only single borrower single-property issuance to date being for a 
single Sydney CBD office property.  Two multi-borrower multi-property issues have 
been by MCS Capital Pty Limited issued in May 2002 and Challenger Capital 
Markets Ltd issued in June 2002. ALE Finance Company Pty Ltd - Series 1 CMBS 
issued in first in November 2003 and its tap issue in April 2006, is the only whole-
business CMBS to date.  
 
The year 2006 saw the introduction of the first Australian conduit-style CMBS 
common in the US, Centro Shopping Centre Securities Ltd, CMBS Series 2006-1. 
This AU$900 million transaction is the securitisation of a portfolio of 13 non cross-
collateralised and non cross-defaulted real estate backed debt facilities to 12 
obligators. Each financing is backed by between 1 and 11 retail properties located in 
major Australian cities and regional centres. The total independent value of the asset-
backing the issue was AU$1.67 billion 
 
The diversity of issuance transaction types show the maturity of the market as well as 
the arranger’s confidence in trying out various CMBS structures to suit market needs.  
 
These deals are structured on a ‘secured loan’36 basis unlike other parts of the world 
where they are done on a ‘true-sale’ basis. A possible explanation is the 
predominance of Listed Property Trusts in the CMBS market, having a 65% market 
share (Standard & Poor's 2005b). LPTs’ core business is real estate investment and 
retaining control of the securitised assets is critical to their survival. 
 
                                                 
36
 This involves “selling” assets to a special-purpose “bankruptcy-remote” entity that, in turn, pledges the assets as collateral for 
a loan and then conveys the borrowed funds to the “seller” as consideration. 
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Given the general appetite for fixed-income securities and the limited supply in the 
market, CMBS credit spreads were contracting until the end of 2005 and have been 
stable since the start of 2006 as shown in Figure 12. In 2005 ‘AAA’ five-year, 
interest only notes were priced at 20-25 bps (basis points) over three month bank bill 
swap (BBSW), and three-year, interest-only notes at 17-20 bps over three-month 
BBSW. ‘BBB’ were priced at 60-95 bps over BBSW. These margins were lower than 
those of 2002, when they were priced at least 20 bps wider for ‘AAA’ and 60 bps 
wider at ‘BBB’ level. At the beginning of 2006, both ‘AAA’ five-year and ‘AAA’ 
three-year were trading at average ranges of 8-10 bps; as at the end of 2006 they were 
trading at average ranges of 15-17 bps. 
 
Figure 12: AAA Rated CMBS - Average Industrial Spread to Swap (April 2003- 
November 2006) 
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Source: Author’s compilation from Property Australia magazine 
 
Over the past three years (2003-2006), there were more upgrades than downgrades 
buoyed by improvements in property performance. Stable property markets continue 
to be reflected in steady cash flows and occupancy trends. No rating changes were 
experienced throughout the second half of 2005. Of the six rating changes in 2006, 
three upgrades resulted from improved property performance and the three 
downgrades resulted from lowering of a support party rating. The year 2006 also had 
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fifteen rating affirmations (Standard & Poor's 2007c). Table 3 shows the total number 
of upgrades and downgrades between 2003 and 2006. 
 
Table 4: CMBS Upgrades and Downgrades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2006) 
 
5.0 FUTURE OUTLOOK OF AUSTRALIAN CMBS 
 
The following support continued dominance of LPTs in CMBS issuance:  
 
 Their structure and single-purpose nature have been well established and 
accepted in the market. Only about a third of the 48 LPTs have issued 
CMBSs. The others are yet to utilise them as funding sources. 
o Of the AU$116 billion (68% market coverage) institutionally owned 
property in Australia, LPTs contribute AU$75 billion (61% of total) 
(Higgins 2006). These assets are best suited for securitisation due to their 
high capital values and stable cash flows.  
o The low gearing levels in comparison to the US (Newell & Tan 2005) 
present possibility for further issuance of debt securities via CMBS. 
Australian LPTs had an average gearing level of 42.1%, whereas their US 
counter-parts (Real estate Investment trusts) had levels higher than 50% 
(BDO Chartered Accountants & Advisers 2006). 
o The provision to buy and sale collateral assets in CMBS portfolios supports 
market growth though ‘tap’ issuances. In 2006, over 80% of activity came 
Year Upgrade
s 
Downgrad
es 
No. of 
Ratings 
2003 1 1 135 
2004 4 0 136 
2005 0 1 134 
2006 3 0 136 
Total 8 2 541 
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from tap issues, refinancing and restructurings from existing sponsors (Efrat 
2006). 
o The insatiable demand alluded to earlier by superannuation funds for fixed 
income  issued by LPTs. 
 
Many industry experts are divided on the role that unlisted property trusts will play in 
growth of the CMBS market (Efrat 2006). Some contend that unlisted property trusts 
have become sophisticated and have outgrown their existing financing mechanisms 
and that CMBS are an alternative debt funding tool for them. However, others have 
highlighted that the higher unlisted property trust gearing levels would entail issuance 
of lower rated tranches, for example, double B and lower which are not favourable 
for both issuers and investors. 
 
The launch of Centro Shopping Centre Securities - CMBS Series 2006-1 in 2006 
marked a milestone in the Australian CMBS market. Being the first such multi-
borrower program, it is anticipated that momentum for other similar issues will come 
from small to medium enterprises and the loans this sector has sitting on bank’s 
books, most of which hasn’t historically been securitised. As at June 2006, total 
commercial property exposure by all banks was AU$94.5 billion, with 0.4% and 
0.2% classified as nonperforming and impaired37 respectively (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2006). Banks have generally been reluctant to securitise their commercial 
property loans due to the low default rates as shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Assets on which payments are in arrears by more than 90 days or otherwise doubtful and the amount due is not well 
covered by the value of collateral. The remainder of these assets were in arrears, but were well covered by collateral. 
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Table 5: Australian Commercial Bank Property Exposure 
 
Sector Commercial 
Property 
Exposure- All 
Banks (%) 
Share of Total 
Commercial 
Lending (%) 
Impaired 
Assets Share of 
Commercial 
Property 
Exposure (%) 
Office  25.5 10 0.1 
Retail  18.5 7 0.1 
Industrial  10.7 4 0 
Land 
Developments/subdivisions 
10.8 * * 
Residential  17.8 11 0.4 
Tourism and leisure  4.4 2 0.1 
Other  12.3 4 0.2 
Total 100 37 0.2 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2006); Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (2006) 
 
The strong commercial real estate market outlook supports further CMBS issuance. 
Investors in real estate have been rewarded with strong returns with both direct 
property and LPTs outperforming shares and bonds over a ten-year period to 
Q4.2005; see Table 6 (PCA/IPD 2007; UBS 2007). This has reinforced the 
importance of real estate as an asset class in its own right leading to sustained 
demand for real estate as evidenced by continued yield compression. Figure 13 shows 
yield trends in retail, office and industrial sectors from 1991 to 2006. These trends are 
expected to continue due to the limited number of ‘investment-grade’ properties 
(Murdoch 2004) and the huge amounts being allocated to property investment, as 
alluded to earlier. The future outlook of various property sectors is positive: there is 
strong economic outlook and investor sentiment for industrial property (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2006c; Newell & Peng 2007a); continued catalysts to growth in retail 
property of strong rental growth, stable income streams, favourable planning 
environment limiting new supply and undue competition, and strong investor support 
(Burdekin & Snoswell 2004); and further office market growth underpinned by 
strong economic growth. Australia is ranked as the sixth most competitive country in 
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the world (IMD 2006) and Sydney ranks highly at 46 in CB Richard Ellis’ Global 
Market Rents Report of November 2006 (CB Richard Ellis 2006). Sydney and 
Melbourne also feature prominently among major Asia-Pacific cities at sixth and 
tenth respectively in Jones Lang LaSalle’s Asia Pacific Property Digest (Jones Lang 
LaSalle 2006a). Generally, office markets across Australia have performed well, with 
record sales activity and rental growth in Perth and Brisbane. 
 
Table 6: Asset Class Performance Q4:2006 
 
Average Annual Return (%)  Asset 
Class 1Y 3Y 5Y 10Y 
      
Direct property 17.29% 14.48% 12.96% 11.68% 
 Office 17.76% 12.21% 10.24% 10.14% 
 Retail 17.67% 16.40% 15.40% 12.84% 
 Industrial 13.43% 12.91% 13.27% 13.59% 
      
LPTs 25.90% 19.40% 16.10% 16.07% 
 Office 19.60% 13.00% 11.80% 10.80% 
 Retail 28.10% 20.50% 18.10% 16.40% 
 Industrial 36.20% 27.20% 20.40% 17.80% 
      
Shares 20.50% 15.50% 13.10% 13.11% 
      
Bonds 5.30% 5.50% 6.50% 6.33% 
 
Source: PIR (2007); UBS (2007) 
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Figure 13: Australian Commercial Property Yields (1989-2006) 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
Understanding global CMBS trends is important for investors and issuers. The 
globalisation of financial markets has seen the developments in the US CMBS market 
replicated in other parts of the world, albeit with some adaptation to suit local 
conditions. Conduit programs in the EU are predominantly single borrower 
transactions and have just been introduced in Australia. Single borrower transactions 
are the dominant issuance vehicles in both the EU and Australia. In the US multi-
borrower conduit transactions dominate. 
 
The last few years have seen spreads tighten in US, EU and Australia, showing the 
appeal of CMBS as a funding source. The performance of CMBSs has also been good 
as characterised by the number of CMBS credit rating upgrades outstripping 
downgrades. This is attributable to the strong property performance supported by 
improving business climate and the persistently low interest rate environment which 
has spurred demand for alternative investments, such as real estate, as part of the 
broadening hunt for higher yielding, and commensurately riskier assets (ECB 2007: 
58 ).  
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The Australian CMBS market is well matured as can be seen by comparison with the 
much bigger US and EU CMBS markets. High property market transparency (Jones 
Lang LaSalle 2006b) and predominance of LPTs as CMBS issuers  (Standard & 
Poor's 2005b), who legally have to report their activities and underlying collateral 
performance to regulatory regimes such as ASX/ASIC and their equity partners, have 
contributed to the success of the Australian CMBS market.  
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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to investigate how structured debt or asset-backed securitisation (ABS) 
can be used to fund infrastructure development in developing countries. 
Design/methodology/approach: A case study on how ABS has been used to fund infrastructure in Australia is 
presented and lessons that developing countries can learn from the Australian experience pointed out. 
Findings:  Huge amounts of funds are being poured into infrastructural investment.  However, much of this 
activity is occurring in developed countries with little activity in developing countries. Developing countries can 
participate in this windfall if clear policies, well-functioning institutions, and well led out regulations are put in 
place. 
Originality/value: ABS is seen an innovative way of funding infrastructure. 
Paper type:  Research paper 
 
Key words Infrastructure financing, asset-backed securitisation, developing countries. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The shortage of infrastructure in developing countries is an important obstacle to meeting 
populations’ needs, to enterprise development and to achieving the Millennium Declaration 
Goals (MDG). The needs for infrastructure investment worldwide in the coming decades are 
estimated at levels exceeding US$1,800 billion per year (OECD 2007). To meet MDGs for 
infrastructure, for example, Africa needs an estimated US$5-US$12 billion a year in 
additional infrastructure finance (Estache 2004). If such amounts are to be raised, policy-
makers need to mobilise all potential sources of capital and consider innovative schemes for 
infrastructure financing. To sustain infrastructure systems, adequate financing is also 
necessary (Fox 1994). Traditional sources for the initial investment are central government 
grants, donor funds and private-equity (or self-help) financing with user fees being the most 
viable option in the operational and maintenance stage. Unfortunately, in most developing 
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countries these traditional infrastructural development funding sources have proven to be 
inadequate as evidenced by increased budget deficits. Most developing countries are riddled 
with high economic deficits, with inadequate amounts spared for infrastructural development. 
 
Limited public resources for infrastructure provision and the promise of better efficiency 
from private funding of public infrastructure have led to the transfer of risks to private parties 
through privatisation of public infrastructure enterprises for existing assets and public private 
partnerships (PPPs) for new assets. In most developed countries the principal vehicle of 
delivering PPP’s is through private finance initiative (PFI). Developing countries have also 
started using PPI’s to deliver PPP’s.` Extensive literature exists on PPPs and PFIs mainly on 
the United Kingdom (UK) and on other countries following the UK lead. Dixon (2005) and 
Hodge (2004) present comprehensive overviews of the PPP market in UK and Australia 
respectively. Structured debt or asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is seen an innovative way 
of funding infrastructure. For instance, when Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) and its 
Spanish partner, Cintra paid US$3.8 billion for a 75-year lease on the Indiana Toll Road in 
the United States (US) this year, they put up US$385 billion of equity for their US$1.9 billion 
stake. The balance of US$1,515 billion was in form of structured debt (Chancellor 2007). 
 
However, despite the increased use of structured debt to fund infrastructure, only limited 
research regarding ABS as a funding tool for infrastructure development `in developing 
countries has been conducted.  As such the purpose of this paper is to assess how ABSs can 
be used to fund infrastructure in developing countries; particularly highlighting issues such as 
the current infrastructure investment market in Australia and other developed countries, the 
significance of infrastructure in economic development, mechanisms behind operating asset 
securitisation, and the lessons that can be learned by developing countries from Australian 
experience in funding infrastructure development.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In sections 2 and 3, we present the 
definition of infrastructure, its market characteristics and its significance to economic 
development. Section 4 introduces ABS as a tool to fund infrastructure.  A case study were 
ABS was used to fund infrastructure in Australia is presented in section 5. Section 6 outlines 
lessons that can be learned by developing countries from Australian experience in funding 
infrastructure development. Finally, we conclude in section 7.  
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3.0 Infrastructure: Definition and Market Characteristics 
 
Andersson, et al. (1997) define infrastructure – be it material or non-material, tangible or 
intangible – as a public good of substantial durability. Infrastructure can be classified into 
economic infrastructure (eg: utilities, toll roads, airports, pipelines, power stations and wind 
farms) and social infrastructure (e.g: healthcare facilities, education facilities and correctional 
facilities) (RREEF 2005). Its classification is continually evolving though with MIG’s bid for 
the London Stock Exchange earlier this year deemed to be financial infrastructure. Financial 
infrastructure is said to be distinguishable from traditional infrastructure on account of being 
more vulnerable to technological change and the vagaries of the business cycle (Chancellor 
2007). 
 
Infrastructure has similar investment characteristics to property investment; albeit with some 
significant differences which support  treating it as separate asset sector (Blundell 2006; 
O'Sullivan 2005; RREEF 2005). A comparison of the characteristics of infrastructure 
investment and property investment is shown in Table 1. 
  
Table 1:  Characteristics of Infrastructure and Property Investments 
Characteristics Infrastructure Property 
Typical investment size:  Higher  Lower 
Competition:  High competition for 
quality assets 
 High competition for quality assets 
Asset availability:  Asset scarcity; many in 
unique, monopoly 
situations 
 Moderate to deep volumes in most 
markets 
Acquisition dynamic:  Competitive tenders, 
regulatory, 
environmental, social 
and political issues, often 
held for the long term 
 Competitive tenders, environmental 
and social issues common 
Lquidity: 
 
 Moderate  Moderate in most sectors 
 
Source:RREEF (2005) 
 
Institutional investors have also identified the characteristics of infrastructure (Mercer 2005; 
RREEF 2005; UBS Investment Research 2006) to include: 
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 Monopolistic characteristics, 
 Captive customer base, 
 Predictable earnings and cash flow via regulation and/or long-term contracts, 
 High operating margins, 
 Low volatility of cash flows, 
 High probability of distributions of returns, 
 Low correlation of returns versus other asset classes 
 Long asset life, 
 Large investment scale 
 
These unique and attractive characteristics of infrastructure have seen increased interest from 
investors seeking income-oriented returns and diversification benefits. In Australia, 
infrastructure contributed the highest returns, as well as the highest volatility, and offered 
diversification benefits, particularly with unlisted infrastructure, in investment portfolios 
during the period Q3:1995-Q2:2006 (Peng & Newell 2007). Some of the major Australian 
investors in infrastructure are Macquarie Infrastructure Group, Macquarie Airports, Babcock 
and Brown Infrastructure Group, SP AusNet and Alinta Infrastructure Holdings). In 
Australia, the two main drivers of investing in infrastructure are capital inflows from 
superannuation funds (Nielson 2005) and budgetary pressures on governments to reduce 
infrastructure spending (McCarthy 2006; Mercer 2005; RREEF 2005). Superannuation fund 
investment in infrastructure will increase to AU$65 billion by 2012, from AU$8 billion in 
2002 (Nielson 2005). Government spending on infrastructure has been reduced from around 
14% in 1970 to 5% in 2005 (Mercer 2005). 
 
Infrastructure is now one of the world’s fastest growing investment asset classes with a 
current market value of over US$1,600 billion. In 2006, an enormous US$147 billion of 
infrastructure deals occurred, up from US$34 billion in 2004 (Jones 2007). Market growth is 
being lead by private infrastructure funds as depicted by their astounding increase: 10 new 
funds where raised and another 17 not closed as at November 2006. New players include the 
likes of ABN AMRO Bank N.V, 3i Group PLC, The Carlyle Group, and the Henderson 
Group investors PLC. The average size of the funds is similarly growing, rising from ₤150 
million in 2000 to ₤350 million in 2006 (Standard & Poor's 2007a). Peng and Newell (2007) 
show the size of the Australian infrastructure investment market, excluding direct investment 
in infrastructure projects, as approximately AU$83 billion (16 listed infrastructure funds: 
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AU$52 billion; 16 listed infrastructure companies: AU$27 billion; 19 unlisted infrastructure 
funds: AU$4 billion) with more than 290 infrastructure assets. Standard and Poor’s (2007a) 
rated 20 European deals worth €5.4 billion in 2006 alone. The infrastructure investment 
market is still growing with US$100 billion-US$150 billion of fund money raised and 
waiting to be invested (Standard & Poor's 2007a). Adding in debt, this money could be used 
to finance deals worth US$500 billion to US$1 trillion (Chancellor 2007).  
 
The high demand for infrastructure has also seen asset values soar and increases in debt-to-
EBITDA (earnings before income tax, depreciation and amortisation) multiples, while equity 
contributions have been decreasing.  Debt-to-EBITDA multiples in some recent deals have 
ranged from 12x to 30x (Standard & Poor's 2007a). Debt funding in infrastructure 
acquisitions increased from US$99.4 billion between 1990-1993 to US$436 billion between 
2002-2003; see Figure 1. Issuance of infrastructure bonds played an important role in debt 
funding with 208 bonds to a total value of US$43.3 billion issued between 1994 and 
November 2003 (World Bank 2004). 
 
Figure 1: Global Annual Average of Debt Financing for Infrastructure 
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4.0 Significance of Infrastructure to Economic Development 
 
Lakshmanan et al. (1985) assert that infrastructure or social overhead capital provides basic 
services without which most primary, secondary or service activities cannot operate 
effectively. Good infrastructure provides key economic services efficiently, improves the 
economy’s competitiveness, generates high productivity and supports strong economic 
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growth. It is therefore essential for the development of a region and the national economy as 
a whole. This more so important for sub-Saharan Africa whose economic problems are 
exemplified by inadequate infrastructure, weak institutions and institutional capacity, and 
huge internal and external funding imbalances (Ebohon et al. 2002), despite facing large 
increases in demand for public infrastructure services as a result of fast urban population 
growth rate (Bjorvatn 2000). Rapid population increase should be viewed as a potential 
market and not as a drawback to regional development. Andersson and Andersson (2000) 
ably stated that “a high density of demand on matching infrastructure for interaction provides 
the region with a large internal market in which to operate economic activities at low 
transaction costs….. By means of a large and dense internal market potential a gateway 
region can attract flows from the rest of the world”. This view is further supported by 
Johansson (1996) who contends that economic performance and evolution are influenced by 
density in combination with infrastructure. A review of economic research on the necessity of 
infrastructure in achieving the MDGs by developing countries can be found in Estache 
(2004). 
 
According to Fox (1994) provision of infrastructure services can influence economic output 
through both the supply and the demand sides of the economy. 
 
The supply-side effects are: 
i. Services like electricity and water can be direct inputs into production. 
ii. It is a complement to private capital or labour i.e. it makes other inputs more productive 
and lessens the wasteful use of natural resources. 
iii. It can indirectly increase an area’s overall ability to produce by attracting workers or 
private capital from other regions. 
 
The demand-side effects are: 
i. It creates income for those directly employed as well as for supplier firms. The spending 
and responding of these directly created incomes can create a multiplier effect on the 
economy. 
ii. Infrastructure investments can crowd-out or crowd-in private investment. Crowding-in 
occurs when development of infrastructure encourages more private investment. 
Crowding-out takes place when private investment is replaced by infrastructure. The 
relative strength of these different forms of crowding depends on a number of factors, 
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including how infrastructure is financed, whether there are unemployed resources 
available in the economy, and how savings and investment respond to interest rates. 
iii. Greater demand for infrastructure is expected as an economy develops because people 
(and businesses) purchase more water, electricity, and other services as their incomes rise. 
 
Therefore, having an adequate infrastructure base supports urban areas and also acts as a 
catalyst for economic development. 
 
The current infrastructure status quo in most developing countries can best be summed up 
using Fox’ (1994) words: 
“The condition of infrastructure facilities is poor, the services provided are 
inferior, and the financing systems are inadequate” 
Aaltonen et al. (1994) in their study entitled “Impact of The Urban Growth on The Lusaka 
Physical Environmental” revealed poor infrastructure and environment conditions in Lusaka, 
Zambia as summarised in Appendix 1. The situation has not changed much from the time of 
their study and in some cases it has even become worse. These observations are not only 
peculiar to Zambia but most developing countries as well. 
 
3.0 Financing Infrastructure Using Asset-Backed Securities 
3.1 Fundamentals of Asset-Backed Securitisation 
 
Asset backed securitisation (ABS), sometimes merely referred to as asset securitization, is a 
creative financing arrangement whereby debt instruments backed by assets such as 
mortgages, cash flows generated from the assets, are issued and offered for investment 
purposes in the capital markets (Ong et al. 2000). Alles (2001) defines asset securitisation as 
a process where ill-liquid assets owned by a financial institution, are pooled and sold in the 
legal or economic sense, to a third party referred to a special-purpose vehicle (SPV). The 
legal transfer or separation of the asset to an SPV that issues bonds is the key feature that 
distinguishes an asset securitization arrangement from the traditional mortgage-backed or 
collateralised bond issues. The parties that are involved in structuring an asset-backed 
security are depicted graphically in Figure 2 below. 
 
  383 
Figure 2:  Structured finance: key market participants 
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Credit enhancement is undertaken to act as a “ring-fence” around the assets to avoid 
insolvency and also results in a higher rating of the bonds issued. By doing this, the bond 
issuer increases the credit protection of the bondholders. Some of the credit enhancement 
techniques that are used are: credit tranching; overcollateralisation; cash collateralisation; 
reserve funds; spread accounts; amortisation triggers; related party guarantees; letters of 
credit; monocline insurance; and multiline insurance. 
 
The new obligations are of different form than the assets- different maturity, currency, 
security, or interest rate-and because of this difference are more attractive to investors. The 
differences are often related to credit ratings. The theory of why ABS works is that the sum 
of parts is greater than the whole (Partnoy 1999). As a result, transaction risks amongst many 
investors in several classes of securities known as tranches can be spread (Geltner & Miller 
2001). The credit quality of the security is directly related to the yield of the issue. The higher 
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the credit quality the lower will be yield and the more successful will be the issue (Alles 
2001).  
 
According to Henderson & ING Barings (1997) factors that support securitization are 
provision of: 
 funds at attractive rates as a result of the added credit enhancement and resulting 
higher credit rating; 
 improved company’s return on capital. Structured correctly, a securitization will 
remove securitised assets from the originator’s balance sheet, thus generating cash 
flow without increasing debt; 
 being an alternative source of funding; and 
 matched funding for medium and long-term receivables. 
 
The limits of the securitisation transaction can be found on the cost side and on the legal and 
structuring side. For example, in Singapore outright sale brokerage costs are between 0.5% 
and 1.0% of the selling price, whereas the total cost of asset securitisation is in the region of 
1.5% to 2%, excluding the extra management effort and time involved in structuring such 
deals (Ooi et al. 2003).  The cost of securitisation includes front-end fees and expenses, the 
running cost of debt funding, the running cost of ancillary facilities and the cost of first loss 
cover or credit enhancement. For the securitisation process to be viable, the cash flows 
derived from the issue of securities must exceed the costs associated with creating and 
carrying out the securitisation process, in present value terms (Alles 2001). 
 
3.2 Operating Asset Securitization 
Infrastructure assets as discussed earlier in 2.0, have characteristics that make them suitable 
for securitisation as entities. This form of securitisation is known as Operating Asset 
Securitisation (OAS). OAS is the sale of future revenues from specific operating asset, such 
as bridges, toll roads, prisons, water projects, electric power transmission lines, local power 
distribution systems. It requires the certainty of predictable cash flows, a long track record, 
strong resilience to economic downturns, and high barriers to entry (Glenn 2007).  Investors 
have a claim on the operating assets themselves. Other terminologies used to describe this 
form of securitisation are ‘whole-business securitisation’ and ‘corporate securitisation.’ 
Operating asset securitisation can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3. 
 
  385 
Figure 3:  Operating Asset Securitization 
 
 
 
In developing countries most of the future flow of securitisations are initiated by originators, 
whose offshore borrowing abilities are often stymied by the sovereign rating of the country 
where the originator is located (Ketkar & Ratha 2001). Securitising future receivables can 
enable developing countries to surpass the sovereign credit ceilings, borrow with better credit 
and fulfil financing in the international capital markets. Ketkar and Ratha (2001) and Ratha 
(2002) illustrate how this can be done through developing borrower countries selling their 
future production or receivables to an offshore special purpose vehicle, which then issues the 
debt instruments. Through a legal arrangement between the borrower and major international 
customers, payments for the receivables are deposited in an offshore account managed by a 
trustee. The debt is serviced from this account, with any excess collections transferred to the 
borrower. With a higher rating and lower risk for the securities supported by future flow, 
these developing countries can assume lower risk premiums and lower corresponding interest 
expense (Liu et al. 2007). 
 
4.0 Australian Infrastructure ABS Case Study: Wyuna Water 
 
Wyuna Water Pty Limited (Wyuna Water) owns two water filtration plants that provide 
drinking water to approximately 500,000 people in the Sydney’s southern suburbs and the 
Illawarra region. The company is 70% owned by ABN AMRO and 30% by Veolia Water 
Australia Limited, which is also the operator. Delivered at a cost of AU$180 million, the two 
plants have a combined production capacity of 370 ML/day and can be upgraded to provide 
an ultimate capacity of 534 ML/day.  Wyuna Water designed, constructed and financed the 
project, and subsequently operates the two water filtration plants under a 25-year BOO 
contract. Veolia Water Systems Australia process designed the plants. 
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In August 2003, ABN AMRO’s Infrastructure Capital team delivered a structured solution 
that repaid existing bank facilities and issued AU$185 million of new debt in the form of 
long-term capital market bonds.  
 
Details of the bond transaction are as follows: 
 
Tranche 1 
Issue Size: AU$ 132.89 million  
Maturity: 30 June 2021  
Structure: Nominal Annuity Bonds, paid quarterly 
Pricing: Yield of 6.477% or 69 basis points over the equivalent modified duration swap rate  
Rating: Aa2 (Moody’s Investor Services)  
 
Tranche 2 
Issue Size: AU$22.17 million  
Maturity: 30 March, 2022  
Structure: Inflation Linked Annuity Bonds, paid quarterly  
Yield: 3.945% or 50 basis points over the 2015 government bond.  
Rating: Aa2 (Moody’s Investor Services)  
 
 
Tranche 3 
Issue Size: AU$30 million  
Maturity: 30 March 2021  
Structure: Capital Inflation Linked Bonds, paid quarterly  
Yield: 4.31% or 80 basis points over the August 2020 government bond.  
Rating: Aa2 (Moody’s Investor Services)  
 
The multi-tranche issue was well received by investors, particularly domestic funds, who 
were attracted by the characteristics of the asset class and the range of bonds on offer. 
 
Servicing of bond payments ultimately comes from water usage fees. This financing 
mechanism can be emulated in developing countries to develop similar water supply 
schemes, albeit with clear policies, well-functioning institutions, and well led out regulations 
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to support it. Though the experience of private sector provision of water supply in developing 
countries is fraught with much controversy surrounding it, ABS can be used as a funding tool 
albeit with clear policies, well-functioning institutions, well led out regulations, proper 
valuation assessment of assets and ABS structures. These matters are discussed more fully 
below. 
 
5.0 Lessons for Developing Countries 
5.1 Financial, Regulatory and Policy Issues 
 
The bottlenecks in ensuring a healthy flow of capital from international markets to 
developing country infrastructure are related to policies, institutions, and regulation. In 
relation to Africa, Sheppard et al (2006) state the following as impediments to its ability to 
tap both foreign and local currency markets to raise private finance for infrastructure, 
especially long-term debt finance: 
 low or nonexistent sovereign credit ratings. Only 16 of 48 countries have foreign 
currency debt ratings, and only 4 of these have ratings of BB- or higher, which 
provide relatively broad access to financial markets; 
 most local financial markets have limited capacity to finance infrastructure projects; 
and 
 features typical of infrastructure projects raise the risk of investments. These projects 
are susceptible to political and regulatory interference due to their longer payback and 
build-out periods. 
 
Therefore, to promote more direct foreign investment in infrastructural assets the following 
need to be addressed (Sheppard et al. 2006; World Bank 2004): 
 development of strong institutional framework for protecting creditors’ rights, 
effective covenants, and reliable avenues for legal enforcement and remedy. Bond 
investors respond to a strong institutional framework by lowering the cost of capital; 
 improving the credit worthiness of public entities, such as municipal utilities and 
parastatal corporations, for them to access global and domestic capital markets.  These 
will remain major players in the financing, development, and delivery of 
infrastructure services in many developing countries.  Investment planning, financial 
reporting, and corporate governance will need to be improved; 
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 developing viable public-private risk-mitigation and financing instruments capable of 
addressing a host of political, currency, credit, contractual, and regulatory risks; 
 embarking on financial sector reform. The capacity of local capital markets, both as a 
source of long-term local currency finance and as a hedge against currency risk, needs 
to be strengthened. Pension reforms under way in several countries could increase 
long-term savings and transform them into investment funds for infrastructure;  
 development of more transparent procedures for project selection, appraisal and 
award of contracts. Furthermore, capacity building in procurement of public assets is 
needed; and 
 local bond issues to finance infrastructure projects should initially carry full or almost 
full guarantees by governments, official agencies, commercial banks, or local private 
institutions until the market develops. For example, the partial risk guarantee against 
regulatory default by the World Bank for the concession of Uganda’s electricity 
distribution company played a key part in attracting private investors. 
 
In relation to the promotion of the development of an ABS market in developing countries, 
Alles (2001) sets out the following as factors that need to be addressed: 
 Legal Environment: the necessary legal provisions are needed to promote the 
development of an ABS market such as the law under which trusts and SPVs are 
created and the manner in which assets are transferred from originator to 
securitisation vehicle. Legal provision is also needed for registration of securities and 
provision of information disclosure. 
 Taxation Issues:  the impact of taxation could be a key factor that determines the 
profitability of securitisation and hence its viability. Issues of whether the SPV or 
trust is subject to taxation or not and the implication of tax on the transfer of assets 
between the originator and the SPV are important. Other taxation issues relate to the 
levies on issue of securities. 
 Accounting Issues: current accounting guidelines as developed by the international 
accounting bodies for uniformity in accounting treatment of asset sales, revenue 
recognition and information disclosures relating to securitisation need to be 
considered. 
 Regulatory Issues: these are designed to ensure that financial institutions do not run 
into situations of illiquidity or insolvency, situations that can potentially trigger a 
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banking sector collapse and consequent paralysis of the economy. The Basel II capital 
accord has been adopted as a framework maintaining banks’ capital adequacy. 
 
The above stated are neither definitive nor exhaustive but form the basis of developing an 
ABS market to fund infrastructure. Developing countries can learn from Australian 
experience of compulsory superannuation and having a well developed transparent 
commercial property market. As alluded to earlier, compulsory superannuation contributions 
have immensely contributed to growth not only in the direct and indirect property markets, 
but also in the infrastructure market. A key factor in the success of ABSs as a funding source 
for infrastructure is the high market transparency and well developed securitisation market. 
Australia is one of the most transparent property markets, ranked first together with the USA 
(Jones Lang LaSalle 2006b)38 and has the most highly securitised commercial property 
market in the world (Hughes & Arissen 2005). 
 
5.2 Structuring ABSs 
 
ABSs are complex funding structures and the inherent risks need to be understood by all the 
parties involved. Risk assessment is mainly by building a cash flow model for the deal and 
undertaking simulation tests on the input factors such as various macro economic and market 
conditions, including the possible default of counterparties.. This gives a feel for the 
sensitivity of the deal, but does not assess probabilities. Quantitative assessment of ABS 
deals is typically very difficult due to the complexity of their legal structures with conditional 
income payments, uncertain costs, complex, conditional loan amortization patterns and 
multiple currencies, reserves, hedges and guarantees. By the nature of the market, new deal 
structures are always evolving so there is little applicable historical default data to guide the 
risk assessment of the latest deal structures.  
 
Projecting cash flows with certainty is problematic in ABSs. A case in point is the failed 
Cross City Tunnel (CCT) PPP in Sydney, Australia. The CCT was designed to ease 
congestion in Australia’s largest city, but revenue lagged forecasts and was placed into 
receivership in December 2006 owing banks including Westpac Banking Corp. and Deutsche 
                                                 
38
  Jones Lang LaSalle define transparency as “as any open and clearly organized real estate market operating in 
a legal and regulatory framework that is characterized by a consistent approach to the enforcement of rules and 
regulations and that respects private property rights. Further, the ethical and professional standards of private 
sector advisors, agents and brokers who are licensed to conduct business in each country are supposed to high”. 
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Bank some AU$560 million (US$452 million). The AU$680 million tunnel, which is 
Sydney’s first fully electronic toll road, runs 2.1 kilometres (1.3 miles) east to west beneath 
Sydney’s central business district. Initial projections forecast 90,000 trips a day within 18 
months of its opening in August 2005, but the number only reached one-third of that level 
before the receivers were called in amid driver complaints about the high charges to use it, 
even after tolls were reduced (Reuters Limited 2007).  
 
Bethwaite (2005) points out the following lessons from the CCT case which can be 
applicable to most PPPs: 
 the need for greater transparency in PPP contracts. Both private sector and Government 
need to be more open about questions regarding risk and pricing; 
 PPPs should not be used as instruments against competition. PPPs should be able to 
stack up without closing down competition; in the case of CCT, letting drivers choose 
travel alternatives; and 
 better and more flexible pricing models of PPPs are needed. 
The long-term nature of these transactions also makes risk forecasting difficult. According to 
Bruce Whittaker39 it is standard practice in ABS transactions to “wrap” all unforeseeable 
risks through insurance and other credit enhancement techniques. This enhancement comes at 
a price; the more the enhancement, the higher the transaction costs.  
 
Further, setting discount rates when analysing long-term leases presents problems when 
undertaking feasibility studies of ABS. In some instances, the use of a wrong discount rate 
has resulted in the sale transaction having a negative present value when the net sale proceeds 
are compared with the lease payments over the long term lease.  It may result in originator of 
the ABS “gaining for the moment for future pain”.  A case in point is the sale and lease back 
of the Australian Defence College at Weston Creek which was sold for $31.7m with 
subsequent rental payments due under a 20-year term amounting to $59.9m and could result 
in a negative net present value (McLennan 2004).  
 
Armstrong and Fletcher (2004) in their study on the securitisation of student hostel rentals at 
Keele University concluded that, securitisation can be expensive not so much in the rate of 
interest but the sheer length of time for which the money is effectively borrowed. In their 
                                                 
39
 Conversation with Bruce Whittaker of Blake Dawson Waldron, Melbourne in June 2005. 
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analysis Keele University had borrowed £1 at a cost £2.16 at 2000 prices over a 30 year 
period. They concluded that securitisation was no cheaper that straightforward borrowing as a 
means of obtaining capital. Other studies, such as Ooi (2003), have had contradictory 
conclusions that the over all interest rate in ABS transactions could be lower than it would be 
on a traditional mortgage loan. Further still, loan-to-value ratios in ABS transactions could be 
higher than in traditional mortgage bank financing (Breidenbach 2003). Adding to the debate 
further, Ooi (2003) concluded in their study that though securitisation was more expensive 
and time consuming than an outright sale, securitisation could be the only option for some 
high-value property owners to find buyers, especially in weak markets. 
 
Other classic ABS structuring debacles have included Leeds United Football club in the UK 
(Armstrong & Fletcher 2004) and LTV Steel Company Inc in the USA (Stack 2002). In 2002, 
Leeds United issued loan notes to the tune of £60m against 25 years of future gate receipts in 
order to finance the purchase of players. By April 2003, the club was facing the prospect of 
administration. Its debts had reached £78m, even after selling five star players. The team did 
not perform on the pitch and the spectators stayed away. The football stadium was used as 
part of security with ticket sales meant to service coupon payment. In the LTV Steel 
Company Inc ABS transaction, the ABS structure was designed in such a way that it deeply 
affected the core of the originator’s business disabling them from operating as a going 
concern if deprived of the assets transferred to the SPV. All ABS transactions are structured 
as “true sales” to safe guard the interests of bond holders in case of the SPV being insolvent. 
 
The above cases illustrate the need to properly structure ABS if they are to be used as 
alternative sources of funding infrastructure development.  
 
5.3 Asset Valuation 
 
Most ABS transactions are structured in such a way that the cash flow from lease payments, 
user fees and other income are sufficient enough to cover the coupon payments of the issued 
bonds and the financing costs of the transaction. Therefore, valuation of infrastructural assets 
lies at the heart of the success of these funding tools. The assessment of valuation of 
infrastructure can be a useful process when a government needs to determine the financial 
value of public infrastructure projects before and after construction. Some purposes of 
valuation include financial reporting, privatisation planning, loan origination, bond issuance, 
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and the cost-benefit or economic analyses.  Governments or quasi-government entities 
perform cost-benefit or economic analyses either to determine whether a public sector asset is 
being used and managed efficiently or to set a price for monopoly service. 
 
In the case of existing assets, various authors (Akakandelwa 2006; Bond & Dent 1996; 
Connellan 1997; French 2004; Pagourtzi et al. 2003), among others, contend that the most 
appropriate method of valuing specialised and limited market properties, such as 
infrastructure, is the Depreciated Replacement Cost (DRC) approach in line with 
International Valuation Guidance Note No. 8 (IVSC 2005). Thomson (1993) cited in Bond 
(2003: 10), in support of using DCF for valuing crown assets, contends that the sales 
comparison approach is inappropriate as these assets are rarely traded so little market 
evidence exists upon which is approach relies. He further states that the income approach is 
equally inappropriate as these assets are (often) monopolistic businesses as price of services 
are not set by market forces and thus do not reflect Net Current Worth. Furthermore, French 
(2004) states that specialised properties involve the owner-occupier’s views of worth of the 
property, i.e. the contribution it will make to business profit, as well as subjective issues such 
as status and feelings of security. He further contends that valuers can only attempt to 
replicate these calculations of worth in arriving at an estimate of exchange price by reliance 
on an accepted valuation model, such as DRC. 
 
The DRC is defined as “The current cost of replacing an asset with a modern equivalent asset 
less deductions for physical deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and 
optimitisation” (IVSC 2006a:14; 2006b:5). The issue of how to account for depreciation in 
this approach has always been debatable and the guidelines are meant for uniform application 
of the approach. 
 
The role of valuers has been expanded to value non-traditional asset classes such as 
infrastructure (Bond 2003) with some national bodies, such as the National Asset 
Management Steering Group in New Zealand (National Asset Management Steering Group 
2006), setting up guidelines on valuation and accounting for depreciation in infrastructure 
assets. Their role is also recognised in the valuation of real estate serving as collateral for 
securitised instruments (IVSC 2006c). This also applies to instances were infrastructure has 
been financed using bonds. 
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The foregoing highlight the need for valuers in developing countries to adopt internationally 
accepted valuation approaches and also to be well versed in guidelines on valuation and 
depreciation of infrastructure assets. ABSs can only be successfully used as a tool to fund 
infrastructure if the value of the underlying asset backing are correctly assessed. 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
 
Huge amounts of funds are being poured into infrastructural investment due to the high 
returns and diversification benefits from this asset class. Demand for infrastructure assets is 
so high that their values have soared and debt-to-EBITDA multiples have risen to record 
levels.  However, much of this activity is occurring in developed countries with little activity 
in developing countries. Developing countries can participate in this windfall if clear policies, 
well-functioning institutions, and well led out regulations. These should be in place for 
international investors to safe-guard their investments. 
 
The importance of infrastructure to economic development can not be over-emphasised. 
Developing countries lack adequate resources to develop infrastructure at the detriment of 
economic development. New innovative ways of funding infrastructure, such as ABSs, being 
used in developed countries could be adopted as funding tools. The use of ABS in Australia 
to fund infrastructure offers a good example for developing countries to emulate. The ABS 
market in Australia is well developed due to the high market transparency and well developed 
property market. 
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